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
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
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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

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ERRATA.

Page 21, line 1, for 1862, read 1662.

Page 25, line 15, for The Khiva's people, read The Khiva people.

The Article in the Oct. No., 1874, on "Natural Law and Spiritual Agency,"
was by S. H. Wilder of Meriden, Conn. By a misprint it was credited to "M. A.
Wilder."

THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CXXX.

JANUARY, 1875.

ARTICLE I.—CENTRAL ASIA.

IF there exists anywhere a real wonder-land, it is the continent of Asia. There empires, religions, and literatures flourished and decayed long before antiquity began. Asia is the true cradle of the race. Agriculture, trade, and commerce, some of the arts and sciences, history, revelation, language, and even nations occupying other parts of the globe, look away to Asia as their fatherland. Indeed, many of the things which modern civilization claims as peculiarly its own, can be traced back to those primeval Asiatic nations. The interest of the reader will surely be awakened if we call his attention to some striking facts connected with that old world.*

* In the year 2698 B.C. an embassy from a people occupying Eastern-Central Asia, among whom some of the arts and sciences were flourishing, went on a mission to China to the court of Hoangti. Four thousand one hundred years later, in A.D. 1404, a prince of Central Asia, Timur, who made the world tremble, could say: "My son, the King of Spain, who dwells at the end of the world, and is chief among the Frankish kings," to the ambassador of that king, namely, Don Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, who had come literally from the "end of the world." The highlands of Asia sent forth a nation (the Accads) to people the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates, centuries before the Babylonians and Assyrians became

The continent is itself a wonder-land. Its area amounts to 17,500,000 square miles, which is more than five times the area of Europe. Asia could take in the whole North American continent twice over, and have space enough left to accommodate the whole of Europe besides. Three-tenths of this vast area is desert: to borrow the language of a Chinese author, "there is neither water, herb, man, nor smoke; if there is no smoke, there is absolutely nothing"—nothing indeed but sand, and salt, and unrelieved desolation. In Persia, one desert of sand and salt covers 100,000 square miles. The largest desert is that of Gobi, or Shamoo, i. e., "sea of sand," which covers at least 600,000 square miles; and there are four others besides Shamoo and the one referred to in Persia. The continent is noted for great rainless districts; one of these, extending from Delhi northward, embracing a part of Thibet and Mongolia, is estimated at 2,000,000 square miles. Numerous rivers of the largest size carry the water of Asia north, south, and east, to different oceans, India alone sending fifty rivers to the sea. But besides this drainage, Asia has a central basin, or water system of 8,000,000 square miles, which vast region sends no water to the ocean. It has seas, rivers, and lakes of its own, some of which are by no means insignificant in size. For instance, the Tarim River in Eastern Turkestan, which flows into Lop Nor, is 1,500 miles long, and at the point where it empties into this lake it is 1,280 feet above the sea. This basin has a dozen or more important rivers, which do not reach the sea. Many of them are consumed by evaporation and irrigation, by salt marshes and sandy deserts. North and east of the Caspian Sea, and around the Sea of Aral, there is a vast country, embracing 55,000 square miles, remarkable from the fact that the whole of it is below the sea-level. This continent of physical marvels has one salt lake, the Dead Sea, which is 1,316 feet *below* the level of the sea; and in Thibet, two lakes, Manasarowar and Rewan Rhad, the surface of which is 15,000 feet *above* the level of the sea. The Thian Shan Mountains

masters of that country, and from the mountains of Central Asia a race went down to the plains of India to make that land in time one of marvels and of wealth. Asia is truly the fountain of nations. Time and again have peoples risen up as by magic from her soil, and marched forth to occupy other lands.

contain volcanoes (long. 90° E.), remarkable as the only instance of volcanic fires at so great a distance, 1,500 miles, from the ocean. In Central Asia are found the largest glaciers in the world outside of the Polar regions. Captain Montgomerie reports that in a certain district in Western Thibet there are three hundred square miles of glaciers. One of these is thirty-two miles long, or four times the length of the Mer de Glace. Here also are the highest mountains in the world. There are no less than forty-five peaks in the Himalaya Mountains which exceed 23,000 feet in height. Most of the passes through these mountains are upwards of 15,000 feet above the sea, and some of them rise even to 18,000 or 19,000 feet. The highest peak of this range, Deodunga, is 29,002 feet above the sea, supposed to be the highest peak in the world. Next to this is Kinchinjunga, which is 28,178 feet; and third in order comes Dhwalagiri, i. e., "White Mountain," which reaches a height of 27,600 feet, only about 21,000 feet higher than its modest namesake in New Hampshire, and nearly 12,000 feet higher than its famous namesake in the Alps. Then the mineral wealth of Central Asia is supposed, from the limited researches that have been made, to be very great. The Altai range bears the name of "Gold Mountains," from the abundance of gold found there. Gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, coal, salt, and very many precious stones are found in various parts. Besides many coal fields in different parts of Asia, Western China alone has, at least, so Baron von Richtofen reports, 400,000 square miles of excellent coal beds, enough to supply the world for thousands of years. And further, petroleum pits are said to be very abundant in the provinces of Shansi and Szechuen. By railways from the province of Kansu running westward, and by putting into use the navigable rivers and inland seas, Europe may yet draw its supply of coal from Asia, an "old world" getting its fuel and oil from a world still older.

Some striking moral contrasts in connection with the history and people of this country may also be noticed. For instance, in a certain town in Kansu, the northwesternmost province of China, M. Huc stops at the "Hotel of Justice and Mercy;" while in the town of Kashgar, a few hundred miles further to the west, Adolphe Schlagintweit has his head cut off by Wulee

Khan to add variety to that bloody and beastly despot's pyramid of skulls, a ghastly monument which he erected on the banks of the Kizyl. Again, Emir Nasrullah, of Bokhara, who died in 1860, was called the "Shadow of God;" but his character was perhaps the blackest and foulest in the dark records of Central Asia. Again, it is with pride that Bokhara has been called "THE HOLY;" yet nowhere else on earth perhaps has fanaticism been so bitter and cruel, or vice been so debauched and disgusting. Again, these Bokharians, and others of the Central Asiatics, although the proudest people in the world, and carrying their religious fanaticism to an insane pitch of excessiveness, have, at the same time, proved the greatest cowards in battle of any men that ever measured swords with civilized troops. Again, we notice a singular fact in connection with Asiatic rulers: Genghis Khan, Timur, and many of the other princes, were devoted friends and patrons of literature; among them were found historians and theologians; but most of them were devoted to poetry, and some of them wrote commendable poetry themselves. At the same time, they were bloody and cruel men. The cheapest thing at their command was human life. Savage cruelty was a characteristic of the times, and with this spirit those princes were thoroughly imbued.

The modern Asiatics have become adepts in some of the vices of civilization. We find them skillfully forging notes; and again making, and circulating with great success, counterfeit money. Some of the towns of Eastern Turkestan are flooded with quack medicines; and trade there at one time was seriously injured by the introduction of shoddy manufactures. In Thibet, they learned how to adulterate shawl-wool, and the shawl-brokers of Paris and London were obliged to protest against the practice, which was ruining both the goods and the trade. They are shrewd enough, also, to adulterate tea, liquor, and other commodities and articles of merchandise. Again, the traveler in this old world will find many things, besides the vices just mentioned, to remind him that he is living in the nineteenth century after Christ. In China he will find Chinese ladies playing the piano. "Every village in Persia has its ice-house stocked from the winter snows. This luxury is sold at

a very cheap rate, and is at the command of all classes." At Meshed, one can get his picture taken by a Persian photographer, who does very commendable work. Persia is crossed by several lines of telegraph. A line of telegraph runs through Siberia, to the mouth of the Amoor on the confines of the continent, while branch lines go to Japan and India. At Birjand are manufactured some of the richest and handsomest carpets in the world. At Candahar are found bankers with correspondents in several of the principal cities of Asia, notwithstanding the great insecurity as to life and property which everywhere prevails. Russian and English cutlery and calicos, and other necessary articles, are scattered everywhere, not only in the cities, but among the wild tribes of the deserts. In the cities of Afghanistan, books that have been written about the Afghans are sold and read. Mr. Bellew was asked here all sorts of questions about the "New World," and about "the Prúss who had conquered the French." An inquiring curiosity has been awakened there in late years, which only the telegraph and morning paper can satisfy. In a room in Candahar, where Mr. Bellew was entertained, there were no less than five American clocks all ticking at once! And in Bagdad, Mr. Bellew is our authority for saying that the traveler would fancy himself in a modern French or German town. And further, if the traveler has any respect for sacred traditions, he will be shown at Jagerk, near Meshed, in the eastern extremity of Persia, the veritable place where Jonah was cast into the sea, and at Yunasi, the veritable place where he was thrown again from the whale's belly.

But further, we are able to point to examples of enterprise and wealth among these Asiatics, which would do credit to the most civilized and prosperous people. Mr. Vambéry found in Bokhara a Chinese merchant from Komul, a town on the borders of the great Gobi desert, "inaccessible to Europeans, unvisited and undescribed," sixty stations from Bokhara and forty from Kashgar, with sixteen kinds of tea for sale. In his way he was a master, for he could tell every kind of tea simply by the touch. From the steppes of Central Asia, more than a million sheep are every year driven into the single town of Ekaterineberg and slaughtered. The fat is made into candles, and the establishment here supplies all Siberia with candles,

besides sending a great quantity to Russia. In Semipalatinsk there are many wealthy Tartar merchants. One told Mr. Atkinson that he imported annually 50,000 head of horned cattle into Siberia, which were consumed chiefly at the gold mines. Mr. Atkinson has met Kirghis traders with herds of 3,000 to 4,000 oxen, 1,500 miles from their homes, and 500 from their destination. One Tartar merchant is mentioned who had been to trade a summer with the Kirghis, and returned with above 3,000 horses, about 7,000 horned cattle, and more than 20,000 sheep, which he was taking to the frontier of Siberia. The value of the whole was about £15,000, and the whole had been obtained solely by *barter trade*. And the author just quoted remarks: "It is not uncommon to see a herd of 8,000 to 10,000 horses, more than 1,000 camels, 20,000 horned cattle, and 50,000 sheep spread over the steppe." Again, trade between Russia and China is very much facilitated by the steamers on Lake Baikal. But these steamers were placed there at great expense. All the machinery, including the engines and boilers, was made in St. Petersburg, and transported by land more than 4,000 miles to the place where they were to be used. Although this is a sample of Russian enterprise, it illustrates the fact that there is life in Asia. Besides, Russia has a fine fleet upon the Caspian Sea. On the Aral Sea are also Russian steamers, which have ascended the Jaxartes. The first were put upon the Aral by General Perovsky in 1853. They were made in Sweden, and at great expense were transported by land to their place of destination.

We have already spoken of the rich carpets manufactured at Birjand. The finest silk in the world comes from China, and in regard to colors, the moderns in civilized countries, with all that science has done for them, are yet far behind the Orientals. We analyze, Orientals execute. We are critics, while the Orientals are the artists. We are last and least in what we can do, just as the rhetorician who writes rules for an epic poem is later and less than the Homer who first created the poem itself.

This strange continent has also great interest for the student of Christian history. In the second, third, and fourth centuries, a wave of Christianity swept eastward, through Persia, into the

great deserts beyond the Caspian Sea, over the mountains of Central Asia, down their slopes into Chinese Tartary, across the great desert of Gobi, into Mongolia, and southward into China and India. In A.D. 1250 twenty-four metropolitan sees were enumerated in Central and Eastern Asia. Besides India and China, including Northwest China, we find the names of Balkh, Samarcand, Kashgar, Herat, Sistan, and Merv, places celebrated in more recent history as hot-beds of fanaticism, mentioned as metropolitan seats at the period just indicated. Merv, in A.D. 334, was an Episcopal see, and was raised to metropolitan dignity in A.D. 420. Elias, Metropolitan of Damascus, in A.D. 893 mentions Merv and Herat as metropolitan sees, places which those interested in the great game that is being played between England and Russia, will do well to remember. And not only in King Solomon's time was there commercial intercourse between India and the cities of Phœnicia and Etruria, but in the first century of the Christian era such intercourse was constant between India and Egypt, and Christianity was thus early planted in that far-off country by Christian sailors, if not by regularly commissioned Christian missionaries. From the few facts thus thrown together, it will be seen that this old world has unusual interest for the antiquarian and the historian, for the student of language, religion, and art, for the ethnologist and geologist, for the Christian missionary, and for those who seek to develop the wealth of nations by legitimate trade and commerce. There is to be an interesting, perhaps a glorious, future for Asia. Her broad territory is to be crossed by telegraphic lines and by postal routes; railroads are there to be built; her rivers and lakes are to be covered with ships; her mountains and valleys are to yield their untold wealth; and Christian civilization is yet to shed its blessing upon her many peoples.

But it is no doubt true, that the amount of popular knowledge in regard to this interesting country, is as yet very limited. And we are embarrassed by the fact that we cannot present our readers with a convenient map of Central Asia, so that they might follow us when we shall speak, as we shall be obliged to, of countries and places that are but little known. For this reason, we shall give fewer geographical details, and dwell

more on general commercial affairs, and perhaps the political relations between England and Russia, as related to that country.

It is hardly possible to say much of Central Asia without including, to some extent, Persia, Southern Siberia, Western China, and Northern India, because it has political relations in all these directions. The following general outline may be of service to the reader. Northern India pushes up into the mountains like a great bay. On the left, to one facing the north are the Suleiman Mountains, the natural boundary of India in this direction, beyond which is Afghanistan, stretching away in hills and table-lands to the Hindoo Koosh Mountains, which bound Afghanistan on the north. On the person's right are the Himalaya Mountains, beyond which lie other mountain ranges, and the table-lands of Western Thibet, till the Karakorum, or Kuen-lun ranges, are reached, which slope down into the desert of Gobi. Let us go now to Western China. The desert of Gobi pushes westward into the mountains, like a broad, vast bay. On the left of the person facing the west are the Kuen-lun Mountains just mentioned, and on his right is the great Thian Shan range, running through Mongolia in a northeasterly direction, far beyond which is the Altai range—the "Gold Mountains"—running through Southern Siberia. Directly to the west of the person thus standing is the Pameer table-land. This whole region, embracing the extreme northern part of India, Western Thibet, the northwestern part of Afghanistan, and the region stretching northward between Kashgar and Khokand to the Altai range, is one tangled mass of mountains. The highest and bleakest mountains in the world are here thrown together in the wildest confusion. The Suleiman push out southwest, separating India from Afghanistan. The Hindoo Koosh push westward, bounding Afghanistan on the north. The Himalaya go southeast, in all their wild, broken, icy grandeur. Parallel with the Himalaya is the Karakorum range, rising from the table-land of Thibet, and in the valley, between these two ranges, are the head waters of the Indus. The Karakorum, extending still eastward, becomes the Kuen-lun range, and northeast are the Thian Shan Mountains; these two ranges dividing, as we have explained, to

admit the broad head of the desert of Gobi. Such, in brief, is the outline of that vast net-work of mountains which culminate and confound each other in this "roof of the world." In such a region, the water-sheds are without number. Rivers go east, south, and west, besides those which flow into inland mountain lakes.

It is difficult to define the political divisions of Central Asia. Too many names would only confuse the reader. There are the three Khanates of Khiva, Bokhara, and Khokand. Then other more or less important political and commercial centres may be mentioned as follows: Herat, Candahar, Kabul, Balkh, Kunduz, Badakhshan, Chitral, Gilgit, Leh (Ladak), and still others, in the higher and more central table-lands. In addition to all these, we have yet to mention Eastern Turkestan, which must be done with more of detail, because at present it is the chief centre of interest in Central Asia. We have spoken of the western end of the Gobi Desert pushing up between two great mountain ranges, like the head of a bay. On the shores of this bay, so to speak, and including the mountain slopes, there is a broad belt of country, 4,000 or 5,000 feet in elevation, and drained by the tributaries of the Tarim River. This belt of land supports several important cities. Irrigation has made its valleys and plains unusually fertile, and corn fields and orchards cover the country with beauty. At the present time, both the English and the Russians are trying to get a controlling influence in the markets of Eastern Turkestan, because the field is an inviting one for commercial enterprise.

Silk is produced here in abundance, and the hills are rich in gold mines. Fruit is also abundant, and grapes are here produced which are celebrated throughout Central Asia. The population of this particular region is said to number about 1,500,000. This region became part of the Chinese Empire in 1758; but since 1847 her power has been very much weakened there, and about 1857 she lost control of it entirely. Bloody and exterminating civil wars prevailed from that time on, till 1864, when a certain Yakub Beg appeared upon the stage, conquered city after city, till he had the whole province subdued, which he has since ruled with firmness and justice, although with some severity. In 1868 he received the title of Atalik

Ghazee, i. e., "Protector and Champion of the Faith," from the Ameer of Bokhara. This title, we understand, is now dropped in speaking of him, and he is also no longer Yakub Beg, but "Ameer Yakub Khan." This title he received from the Sultan, and his new made Ameer-ship intends issuing silver coins with his own name on one side and that of the Sultan on the other. This Yakub seems to be in many respects a remarkable man. In 1853 he was an officer in the Khokandian service, and defended Ak Mesjid with considerable bravery against the Russians. It is said that he carries five bullet wounds, which he received while in the service just mentioned. This man calls himself "a mere trooper;" and if this signifies that he is modest enough to estimate himself justly, it is a great advance on the historical type of an Oriental prince. He is a good disciplinarian, is rapidly improving his army, enforces a strict observance of religion, has introduced many reforms, takes care that the taxes are not oppressive, is severe in his punishments, and is never known to cheat the gallows of its due.

But it is hardly late enough in the nineteenth century to look for perfection in an Asiatic prince; and our Yakub has some ways that are dark, it is said, especially when the question is in regard to foreign traders. The Russians appear to be bent solely on extending their commercial relations, but Yakub has an impression, emphasized by some rough experience, to say nothing of five bullet wounds, that these neighbors of his mean conquest, as well as commerce. If he admits Russian traders, he at the same time practically admits his conquerors. He has at no time said this, that we are aware of, and yet his actions imply as much. His small country, 1,100 miles in length (through which passes what the Chinese call "the South Road," i. e., the road along the southern slopes of the Thian Shan Mountains, one of the main routes of commerce between Pekin and Orenburg, points 5,000 or 6,000 miles apart), also his six principal cities, Yarkand, Kashgar, Khoten, Aksu, Toorfan, Koochar, besides others of less note, have for a long time been flooded with Russian goods. Still Yakub has all along been unfriendly to Russian traders. In 1868 he admitted one, but warned him not to come again. Russia gave him to understand that he must conform to the rules of civilized nations in regard to trade, or expect war. A temporary agreement was made,

but Yakub was still reluctant to open his doors freely to the Russians. Trade between Russia and Kashgar continued to be interrupted, and in 1870 Russian merchants in Tashkend met and petitioned their government to compel Yakub to behave himself. In 1872 Russia said emphatically to Yakub that he must *trade or fight!* He at once came to terms, and has been engaged since then in efforts to remove obstacles to trade and all other causes of quarrel. This year (1874) it is reported of him that he is anxious to strengthen peaceful relations between himself and both England and Russia.

But the English government, also, has been active in its efforts to open friendly commercial relations with Eastern Turkestan. India must appear there as a merchant, not as a soldier. It would be as wild to attempt to move an army over those almost impassable mountains between herself and the dominions of Ameer Yakub Khan as it would be to attempt to fight the man in the moon. England boasts that her policy is no longer to incorporate new territory. This sounds magnanimous: but we should remember that she has reached the "thus far" of Nature in the shape of the Suleiman and Himalayan Mountain ranges, and changing her policy was hardly a matter of her own option. But in regard to her efforts in Eastern Turkestan, we may mention briefly that Mr. Shaw's journey was made in 1868, Mr. Hayward's in 1868-9. Mr. Forsyth went in 1870. In 1873 Mr. Forsyth was there again with the Indian Mission, of which Dr. Bellew was a member. So far as treaty regulations are concerned, the way seems open, at the present time, to the most friendly relations between the two governments. But the English seem to stand in the way of their own interests. When the cities of Eastern Turkestan were open to the English and Russians alike, with a decided preference on the part of Yakub for the English, the Russians have beaten the English and control the trade in those markets. The matter can be easily explained. The Russian manufacturers have studied the tastes and wants of the people of Eastern Turkestan, which the English have not done. And besides the obstacle of Yakub's preference, which we have mentioned, Russia had other obstacles to contend with, which India had not. For instance, the cost of transporting a hundred-weight of

piece-goods from Moscow to Yarkand, *via* Tashkend, is £4 7s., while the cost for the same from London to Yarkand, *via* Lahore, is £3 17s. 6d. Large profits were to be made in the markets of Eastern Turkestan. £10 worth of piece-goods at Umritsur, taken to Yarkand at a cost of £3, and paying 9s. duty, will bring £18 in Yarkand. So, also, broadcloth, tea, dyed skins, guns, pistols, and especially sugar, will realize a large profit in those markets. Yet in spite of the advantages in favor of England, Russia has beaten her in fair competition. The reason is that England does not adapt her goods to the real wants of the Asiatics. Russia, in the course of two centuries, has learned how to trade with these people. She studies the tastes, the whims, or the prejudices of the people whose custom she desires to secure. She adapts clothing and such other goods to the climate, and even produces colors to please the Oriental fancy. Take the single article of loaf sugar. Russia makes small, attractive loaves, which the Asiatics are pleased with, and make great use of as delicate presents among themselves. England adheres to the old form of loaf, large and clumsy, and for this reason her commodity finds but little sale. Again, England makes up bales of goods at home without reference to the final or Asiatic transportation, which is the most important, and of course the bales have to be broken and the goods rearranged and repacked, which involves considerable expense. Russia, in making up her bales, has special reference to the long transportation on mule-back and pony-back and the steep mountain passes, and thus saves time and expense. A writer in the *Geographical Review* for April, 1874, says: "The fact is we are already late in our endeavor to get a footing in those markets, and can only hope to make way slowly." And he states further, that merchants who come from India stand in their own way by refusing to trade till they can realize fifty per cent. profit. Besides, they insist upon being paid in gold, which is impossible. They will not descend to barter trade, while the Russians understand that barter trade, what in Yankee land is called "dicker," is both the way to control the markets and the way to wealth. The consequence is, that in all the bazaars of Yakub's cities all the articles of luxury, as well as the articles of necessary consumption, come from Tashkend bearing Moscow trade-marks.

But things are not all settled yet in Eastern Turkestan. In fact, things in Central Asia are hardly ever settled. This small but important country is a revolted province of China. By the terms of a treaty of recent date between China and Russia, China may ask Russia suddenly to help restore the revolted province. Alas, in that case, for Yakub! his titles, the smiles of the Sultan, his Turkish flag, and silver coins, will avail him little. Indeed, it is now rumored that a Chinese army, armed with European rifles, and commanded and disciplined by French officers, is moving westward, possibly against Yarkand, in which case our friend Yakub will have his hands full. Between the upper and nether milstone—Russia and British India—it seems as if every smaller power must be crushed. Some now living may see the day when China, Russia, and India will absorb pretty much all there is in Asia, including Afghanistan, Belochistan, and Persia. There are certainly grounds for such a prophecy. We ask no one to believe this because we have said it; but whoever will watch carefully the march of events in that country, will, we think, be forced to come to this conclusion.

We have thus far called attention to the physical features of Central Asia, together with some of its political relations, especially to those of Eastern Turkestan, which attracts at present unusual notice.

We propose now to present a few hints illustrative of the immense natural obstacles to be overcome in the way of trade. These are the inhospitable deserts, the impassible mountains, the interminable distances, and the want of proper roads. And one cannot but be astonished at the enterprise which overcomes these and every other obstacle, and makes communication constant, and trade remunerative. Let us suppose ourselves at Umritsur, the commercial centre of the Punjab, which has railway connection with Lahore and Calcutta. We want to go to the capital of Ameer Yakub's dominions. There are two routes which lead over the mountains to Yarkand. One is 945 miles long, or about seventy marches. The other and longer route is more easterly, and is 1,069 miles long, or about seventy-seven marches. On the first there are four passes to be crossed that are higher than 17,500 feet above the

sea; and for ten successive marches the halting-ground is never below 15,000 feet. On the second route, in twenty-five marches the camping ground is never below 11,000 feet; three times only is it below 12,000 feet; and in eleven cases is 15,000 feet and upwards. There are also four passes to be crossed, one of which is upwards of 17,500 feet above the sea, and three are over 18,350 feet. These are the available roads along the lowlands, the height of Mont Blanc and upwards! Col. Rawlinson speaks of this mighty mountain barrier between Northern India and Eastern Turkestan as "a deadener of the sense of neighborhood." The number of miles just given do not represent the distances "as the crow flies," but as the caravans go. The distances in detail are as follows:

Umritsur is about sixty miles from the foot of the mountains.

Umritsur to Cashmere, 260 miles, 19 days.

Cashmere to Leh, 256 " 19 "

Leh to Yarkand, 450 " 80 " (summer route.)

" " 556 " 34 " (winter route.)

Making a total of 966 miles against 1,072 by the winter route, and sixty-eight against seventy-two days time. Leh, it will be remembered, is the capital of Ladak. At Leh a route intersects with the one just described as coming from Cashmere, which comes up from Kooloo *via* Lahool, and which is described as very difficult. From Umballa, the nearest point on the railroad, to Kooloo is 190 miles, or about thirteen days. From Kooloo to Leh is 287 miles, or twenty-two days. On this route across a high table-land, where the heat rises to 220° Fahrenheit, where the atmosphere becomes so rare that men and beasts suffer and sometimes die, merchants and travelers have to carry their provisions for 137 miles of the distance, and only coarse and scanty grass can be obtained for cattle. On this route there is one pass over 17,000 feet, and another over 18,000 feet in height. But the greatest difficulty which the traveler experiences is not the want of food or water, nor the oppressive heat, but it is that of breathing! This, the reader will remember, is between Kooloo and Leh. And we have already described the route between Umritsur, *via* Cashmere, and Leh. It is said that there is no natural obstacle in the way of establishing a good cart road, or even a railroad, along the Jhelum

River, and through the Cashmere valley to the very gates of Thibet. The difficulties of the route to Eastern Turkestan begin after Cashmere is left. Ladak is reached, without any serious obstacle, by a pass in the Himalaya 11,600 feet high. Leh, the capital of Ladak, is situated in an unusually large and very green oasis, at the height of 11,200 feet above the sea. After leaving Leh the real struggle begins. Just beyond Leh there is a difficult pass of 17,600 feet, on the other side of which is the greatest confluent of the Indus, the passage of which is sometimes very dangerous. Here are five stages along the richest valley of Ladak. Here travelers take supplies for the arduous journey before them from this point onward. They must take provision for eighteen stages of table-land desert which intervenes between this point and Yarkand, and in these stages four passes must be crossed ranging from 17,500 to 18,600 feet in height.

We must call attention to the fact that England is very much nearer than Russia to Yarkand and all the other markets of Central Asia. Yarkand is about two months and a half from Umritsur or Umballa, points on the railroad which goes direct to Calcutta; while from Yarkand to Samara on the Volga is about four to five months. The distance from the Indus to Vernoë and Kopal is about one-third of the distance from these Russian forts and trading stations to Nijne Novgorod on the Volga. From Nijne Novgorod to Semipalatinsk is about double the distance from the latter place to the Indus. The distance from Peshawur to Samarcand is about 850 miles; while from Samarcand to Orenburg is about 1,500 miles. It will thus be seen that British India is very much nearer the markets of Central Asia than Russia.

A few additional facts as to distances may be given on the side of Russia. What the Chinese call the "south road," one of the main commercial routes between Pekin and European Russia, passes along the southern slope of the Thian Shan Mountains, and through Eastern Turkestan. Aksu is about 2,550 miles from Pekin, and Kashgar is about 3,000 miles from the same place. From Aksu to Khokand is 800 miles. From Khokand to Orenburg requires about two months' time. The transport of merchandise from Pekin to Kashgar requires about

five or six months. From Bohkara to Orenburg is about 1,100 miles, and caravans make the distance in fifty to sixty days. From Tashkend is about the same distance, and requires about the same time. The roads leading out from Semipalatinsk are important as trade routes for Central Asia. From Semipalatinsk to Tashkend is about fifty to fifty-five days; to Khokand about seventy days: to Kulja (now in the possession of the Russians) about thirty to thirty-five days. Russia is building a cart road of twenty-eight stages over the rough, bleak mountain ridges which intervene between Eastern Turkestan and Fort Vernoe, and the country to the northwest. At Fort Vernoe the route descends to the great plain of Western Siberia, and for 1,700 miles passes over its dreary wastes, *via* Semipalatinsk, Omsk, Petropavlovsk to Troitsk, whence crossing the Ural Mountains by a fair cart road, after 400 miles more, it reaches Perm, on the Kama River. Perm is connected by steamer with the Volga, and the commercial centres of Russia. From Kashgar to Perm is not less than 2,600 miles. The transport of merchandise occupies from five to six months, and can only be made in the summer. There is a more westerly route, *via* Khokand. After the mountains are passed, the road drops down into the barren desert of Orenburg, and to cross this is attended with much hardship. For 650 miles food has to be carried for men, and for 400 miles for camels also. The time for the transit of merchandise by this route is from three to five months, according to the season. From Kashgar to Samara, on the Volga, *via* Tashkend and Orenburg, is about 1,900 miles. From Kashgar to Perm, on the Kama, *via* Tashkend and Petropavlovsk, is about 2,400 miles. It will be seen from these data that Russia has double the distance to contend with that England has. England has to contend with wild mountains, Russia with vast, bleak deserts.

Much has already been done to improve communication in Central Asia, but it will be seen from the facts just presented that the want of proper roads is a very serious obstacle to trade and travel.

Russia, or rather Central Asia, needs railroads to enable her to develop her resources. During the present year (1874) capital has been subscribed in St. Petersburg to build a railroad

from Orenburg to Samara, 260 miles. Mr. Lesseps proposes a railroad from Orenburg to Samarcand, 1,500 miles, to be built by the Russians. It is stated that the Russian government is determined to build this road at its own expense, in case it is not done by a private company. Then from Samarcand to Peshawur it is proposed that the English build the road. The distance is 850 miles. A writer in a recent number of the *Edinburgh Review* thinks this proposed railroad will not be built for a long time to come. He claims that the cost of it would be so great, and the returns at first so limited, that no private capitalists would undertake it, and that the Russian finances are too low to allow the government to build it. But we must remember that Englishmen have a habit of prophesying in accordance with their wishes in regard to the affairs of Russia, about whose real plans the rest of the world knows very little. Intelligent men in other countries than England judge that the establishment of such a road between India and Europe would give immense impetus to every branch of the Indian, as well as the English and Russian, international trade. It would certainly go far towards developing the resources of Central Asia itself. Russia must build a railroad to Central Asia, if she would strengthen and consolidate her acquisitions there. The great objection urged in England to the Euphrates valley railroad has been that the transit of goods and passengers would probably be insignificant. Yet this road will no doubt be built before long. The Governor of Kirmanshah, with whom Mr. Bellew conversed, stated that this railroad would prove the regeneration of Persia, and he hoped that it would soon be set on foot. These two roads seem to be greatly needed, and, being twelve or fifteen hundred miles apart, they could never be considered as rival routes. Russia has the Caucasus; also the Caspian, on which she has a fine fleet; the three great Khanates are practically hers; her troops have been at Sherri Sebz; it is reported that her forces are marching upon Merv; Meshed in the west, and Balkh in the east, are in her grasp; and Herat, the key of India on the north, must soon yield to the manifest destiny of Russia. England is aware of all these facts, talks about them, and is powerless. She knows that the Euphrates route to India will lie at the mercy of

Russia. But apart from the hopes, or fears, or jealousies of either Russia or England, the interests of civilization demand that these means of communication and development be provided, and before long the work will no doubt be undertaken and completed.

But in spite of the appalling obstacles in the way of trade, the commerce of Central Asia with China, Russia, and India, is immense. Not immense compared with the natural resources of the country, nor measured by the already highly developed trade of China and India with foreign countries. But it is immense, considering that the local princes are often no more than royal robbers: considering how frequently whole caravans are ruined by the Nomad tribes; considering also the imperfect cultivation of the soil, the deserts, the mountains, and the interminable distances that have to be overcome. Both England and Russia consider this trade important already, and they are convinced that it can be vastly increased.

In 1871 the value of exports from India and Cashmere to Eastern Turkestan was £23,134; and the value of goods imported the same year from Eastern Turkestan into Cashmere and India was £19,257. In 1861, a meeting of merchants was held in Umritsur to consider the interests of the shawl trade. Taking an average of ten years, it was found that this trade amounted to £500,000 a year, of which a large portion belonged to Umritsur itself. It must be remembered that Thibet, together with the southern slopes of the Thian Shan mountains in Eastern Turkestan, furnish the shawl wool for the 16,000 looms of Cashmere, where are produced the shawls which sell in London for five hundred to two thousand dollars each. The following may be mentioned as an illustrative and curious fact: the coarse sugar which is made in Cashmere is carried a long journey of two months and a half to Yarkand, where it is refined and crystallized. The sugar candy is then carried back over the same long route to Ladak and Cashmere. The sugar candy made at Yarkand is very white, or rather almost colorless in transparency. A letter in the *London Times* for Jan., 1873, stated that the Russian trade with Tashkend amounted in 1868 to £5,000,000. Tashkend has been regarded as commercially and politically the key of Central Asia, at least from the north.

The statement just quoted from the *Times* as to its trade has been questioned by Englishmen, without, however, any good grounds; and the Russians claim that this trade can be greatly increased if that of Eastern Turkestan can be secured. Some years since the annual trade between Russia and Bokhara, amounted to £1,150,000. In considering the trade of Central Asia, we must take into account the yearly fairs at Nijne Novgorod, on the Volga. Great caravans come from the plains of Siberia and China, and the mountains of Central Asia, on long journeys of four, five, six, and even seven months, laden with native products to exchange for those of Russia. In 1857, goods were sold to the value of £14,000,000. In 1861, upwards of £16,000,000. And in 1863, nearly £17,000,000 worth of goods were disposed of. Baron von Meyendorf states that as long ago as 1820-21 the trade between Bokhara and Russia amounted to £320,000 yearly. In 1861, Bokhara sent into Russia raw cotton to the value of £150,000. In 1835, Russia imported from Central Asia £127,000 worth of cattle. In 1860, she imported £546,000 worth from the same source. In 1835, the quantity of raw cotton imported from Central Asia was 430,000 pounds weight; in 1860, it was no less than 6,266,000 pounds. More than half the exports from Russia consist of cotton manufactures. But the balance of trade is, or has been, very much in favor of Central Asia. Russia sends, consequently, a great deal of specie there, besides leather, corn, cloth, hardware, iron, etc. It may be of interest to note some of the leading articles of trade in Central Asia, as, for instance, gold, horses, ponies, sable furs, silk, cotton, wool, shawl wool, camels' hair, opium, saffron, sulphur, dyes, spices, rose leaves, gum arabic, asafoetida, raw and dried fruits, salt, sugar, borax, Japan and Damascus blades, and other hardware, medicines, and a great variety of manufactured and miscellaneous articles besides. It is thought that Russia will soon become one of the greatest tea consuming nations on the globe. The passion of a Russian for tea is said to equal that of an Irishman for whiskey. When this trade is developed, as it is destined to be at no distant day, the tea-producing regions of Asia will be greatly enriched by it. A customer in the shape of a nation of 60,000,000 of people will prove a fact of great interest for Central Asia.

We must make room for one fact illustrative of the wealth of some of these Central Asiatic traders. In Afghanistan the tribe that does the principal carrying trade is the Lohanis. They are a hardy people, suffering great losses in life and property from robbers, besides enduring the severities of long and difficult roads. They come down through the mountain passes before these are closed in the fall, bringing to the plains of India the products of Central Asia. The caravans are large, numbering two thousand or more enterprising merchants. The main body encamp for the winter in the plains of the Punjab, while the caravans move on to Calcutta, or other points, and make their trades, and come back in time to return to their own country, as soon as the passes are clear of snow, in April or May. On one occasion, Sir Bartle Frere reports, a certain merchant had been detained at Delhi longer than was expected, and the head man of the caravan (which was about to start) was offered by this merchant's wife 10,000 rupees (about \$5,000) a day if he would delay the march of the caravan until her husband could arrive, for she knew if left behind he would be unable to follow them through the passes, except at great risk to his life and the property he might have with him. It is an interesting reflection that these merchants, besides English goods, have for years been carrying back some ideas of Christian civilization into the great fanatical cities of Central Asia—Cabul, Ghazee, Candahar, Herat, Balkh, Khokand, and Bokhara.

But in addition to the few hints we have given in regard to trade in Central Asia, and the fact that Russia controls the markets there almost to the exclusion of English goods, a great deal might be said of Russia's conquests in that country since she first looked eastward with covetous intent upon those vast regions and those wild hordes of millions of men. The history of this advance is one of the most interesting in modern annals. The enterprise manifested, the obstacles overcome, the censures she has endured in silence from other nations, the skill she has displayed, the steady march of her power, are facts which call forth the admiration of the enemies of Russia, as well as the praise of her friends. We look now upon her conquest in Asia as a fact accomplished. There was a time

when it was not so. In 1862 Russia sent her first envoys to the Court of Persia. They are said to have been "two very dirty ambassadors." Indeed, "they were sent away owing to their filthy habits." Besides this disadvantage and its consequent rebuff, she was late on the ground. England was there long before. She had sent envoys to Persia in 1290, 1561 (Anthony Jenkinson), 1627, and in 1631. Again, Russia's first mission to China, of which we have any account, was in 1619. The two Cossacks who composed it were kindly received, but having no presents they could not see the "Dragon's face," and were dismissed with a letter which all the learning of Russia at Tobolsk and Moscow could not decipher. Thus it was two hundred and fifty years ago. But to-day no other nation is her equal in regard to a knowledge of the history, geography, and languages of Asia. In fact, Russia's knowledge in these respects is the real secret of her power. In 1690 Peter the Great sent envoys to China across the deserts of Central Asia. It took them one year and eight months to reach their destination. In 1719 Peter sent thither another embassy to arrange a commercial treaty. In 1727 another embassy was sent, which succeeded in making a treaty that was satisfactory, and in establishing other friendly relations. Russia had a mission of ten members established at Peking to learn the Chinese and Manchu languages, so that interpreters could be prepared and communications be carried on more satisfactorily.

Some Englishmen, alarmed at the proximity of Russia to India, write as if Russia had suddenly adopted an aggressive policy in the East, with ultimate designs on Constantinople and the West. Such should be reminded that Russian policy in Asia is two centuries old. Stated as fairly as possible, it is that she aims at extending her trade. But she has found it impossible to do this without absorbing, in some cases by treaty, in others by conquest, the territory of her neighbors. The record of her advance is a record of hardships and perils endured, and of obstacles overcome, which are almost appalling. Considering what she has done and suffered, a careful and just historian might say with truth that she deserved to succeed. But it is not our purpose now to trace in full the

steps of her advance. We can only say that by the close of the seventeenth century Russia had incorporated the whole of Siberia and Kamschatka. She reached the Amoor and then extended her power to the ocean. A Russian fort, wherever it is built in Asia, is a protest against barbarism and slavery, and signifies order and protection to settlers and trade. But in the south, chiefly in the region of the three great Khanates, her traders and caravans were constantly interfered with. Several missions were sent at different times to Bokhara, with little success, however, beyond a promise to do better, which the Bokharians never intended to keep. The burden of every embassy which Russia sent was that fair commercial treaties might be established and slaves liberated. After half a century of fruitless diplomacy, Russia became convinced that she must protect her own commerce and the lives and property of her settlers. She began to build two converging lines of forts, one from Orenburg in an easterly direction bearing south, and another from the upper tributaries of the Irtysh River in a southwesterly direction. The bases of these two lines were twelve hundred miles apart. On the second line, Fort Kopal was built in 1852, and Vernoë in 1854, both of which have become important centres for trade. On the first line, Fort Aralsk was built at the mouth of the Jaxartes in 1847, and the line was gradually extended eastward. In 1853 the Russians had a hard struggle to capture Ak Mesjid, also on the first line, and here they made the acquaintance of Yakub Beg, who has since become, as we have seen, governor of Eastern Turkestan. These two lines of forts were begun not far from 1850. But the advance was slow, because the distance was great and the obstacles to be overcome were immense. In 1861 there still remained a gap between the converging lines of three hundred miles, which was not occupied till 1864 and later. In 1864 General Cherniayeff had advanced seventy-five miles south of Chamkand to Tashkend. In 1867 there was a further advance along the Jaxartes, and in 1868 General Kauffmann advanced to Samarcand, whose gates were thrown open to him in May of that year. It is a singular fact that in 1864, and again in 1865, the Khan of Khokand applied to British India for assistance against the Russians, but with no success. In 1866 the Ameer

of Bokhara did the same. But failing there, he went to Constantinople for aid, but without gaining his object. Since 1868 Samarcand has been occupied by Russian troops. In 1873 Khiva fell to the Russians; and to show how completely Bokhara is in the power of Russia, we have only to mention that the Zarefshan, which supplies Bokhara with water, flows through Samarcand, and hence the Bokharians are dependent upon Russia for every bucket of water they use. Proud Bokhara has been conquered without a blow. Such a feat of conquest is worthy of Bismarck or Benjamin Franklin Butler. But it is really geographical knowledge applied to the purposes of conquest. This is not the only instance where Russia's strongest ally has been her accurate geographical knowledge. If one would realize the political value of a knowledge of physical geography, one has only to study the movements of Russia in Asia during the past thirty or fifty years. She is fully aware of the value of Merv in this respect. It is a beautiful spot, was once the seat of a Christian bishop, and by possessing it her power would extend to the foot of the hills, on the other side of which lies Herat—the key of India on the north. Not counting Merv, Russia has during the quarter of a century just passed advanced her frontier line step by step seven hundred miles southward and nine hundred miles southeastward, in this particular part of Central Asia. It may be new to many to learn that Russia has been active in Asia for nearly two centuries. She has been remarkably successful. Mr. Vambery says: "No instance has yet been known of the Russians ever retracing their steps backwards in any part of Asia." General Perovsky said, in his letter of July 5, 1853, to the commandant of Fort Ak Mesjid: "The Russians have come hither not for a day, nor yet for a year, but for all time. They will not retire." And this marvelous feat of conquest Russia has accomplished without the aid of telegraphs or railroads, in spite of savage tribes and fierce fanatics who opposed her, and in the face of natural obstacles, which one might suppose would impede forever the progress of civilization.

The method of Russia's advance is quite uniform, and is briefly indicated as follows. She sends to the frontier a body of soldiers to build a temporary fort, or to establish a perma-

ment military post for the protection of traders and peaceable settlers. These traders and settlers are often molested by the wild tribes in the neighborhood. The Russian authorities call upon the Ameer, or Khan, or local governor, as the case may be, for indemnities. When these are not furnished, and usually they are not, the Russian forces advance, seize a certain amount of territory, which in time is sure to be incorporated with Russia's dominions, and governed, as expediency may dictate, by a Russian general, or by a native ruler in the capacity of a tributary and dependent. But Englishmen are constantly criticizing Russia's policy, as if like a lion she were only seeking prey to devour. The real question, however, in which the world is interested is between barbarism and civilization. When the question was between our Peace Commissioners and the Modocs, we decided at once as to which party had a right to prevail. We have a parallel case in Central Asia. Her tribes and governments were opposed to civilization and progress. They used all the means at their command to check both. And nothing less than the shadow of a great power advancing from the north could compel them into decent behavior. Hence to lavish sympathy upon the conquered Uzbek is as inappropriate and absurd as to lavish it upon the conquered Modoc. Let us take a single prominent and fair example, that of Russia's conquest of Khiva. It is no exaggeration to say that Russia for a half, or perhaps a whole, century has endured from Khiva what neither England nor America would have endured from any tribe for a single year. As long ago as 1714, Peter the Great formed a plan of establishing overland communication between his country and India. He sent out an expedition in 1717 to Khiva to force it into acquiescence to his plans, as well as to explore the Caspian and the Oxus, and ascertain how far in the direction of India this river was navigable. This expedition met with disaster; the men were all murdered by the Khiva people, and Bekovitch, its leader, is said to have been flayed alive. Since then, Khiva has sent out raiding parties against the settled populations in the northwest that were subject to Russia; she has always exacted heavy or ruinous tributes of Russia's caravans, and frequently captured the whole caravan itself; her subjects

captured Russian fishermen on the Caspian and sold them as slaves : and from 1841 to 1871, the history of Khiva's conduct towards Russia has been one of raids, robberies, cutting off of forces, interfering with commerce, instigating nomad tribes against Russia, producing constant and universal disorder, and making life and property everywhere insecure. In 1869 General Kauffmann wrote to the Khan of Khiva to release certain Russian slaves, to which no response was made. Subsequently other letters were sent with similar requests, which the Khan replied to in an insulting tone, even daring Russia to do her worst. The General proposed to punish Khiva by advancing there with his army, but he was checked in his plan by orders from St. Petersburg. In 1872 the Khan sought aid of Afghanistan, and even of the Queen of England, but was advised to come to terms with Russia. The Khiva's people continued, as if they were merely savage land pirates, to commit terrible offenses against the Russians. Russia could endure it no longer. In the spring of 1873, six avenging columns, from as many different points, were directed against the long offending State. The world knows the result. We are sure that Russia in her connection with Khiva has exhibited a patience and a forbearance which neither England nor America would have done had the case been theirs. England may be more civilized than Russia, yet had this case been hers, she would long ago have summoned the bayonet and the cannon to clean out a nest of fanatics that disgracefully persisted in hindering the progress of civilization.

We can heartily endorse what the *London Quarterly Review* for April, 1865, says, namely : "It is assuredly a great boon to humanity that some of the most fertile countries in the world should be restored to life and touched by the breath of material progress. It is a matter of thankfulness that bad and cruel tyrannies, held disgraceful among Asiatic nations themselves, should crumble to dust at the first blow of the Northern Giant.

In regard to Russia's further progress there is no serious physical obstacle in her way until she reaches the Hindoo Koosh. By a natural law of growth she must inevitably reach those mountains. In a late treaty between Bokhara and Russia, it was stipulated that Russia might maintain a military

force on the south bank of the Oxus in the neighborhood of Afghanistan, if she saw fit. The Russian forces have been at Sherri Sebz, the birthplace of Timur. Strange reversion of history! Nearly five centuries ago the Tartars under Timur had been in Hungary and Poland, and the terrified Danes were kept back from their herring fisheries for a whole year, dreading the approach of the Asiatic conqueror. Now, the birthplace and royal cities of his great empire are ruled by the representatives of a European power. If the Hindoo Koosh are the natural limit of Russia from the north, the Suleiman and Himalaya Mountains are much more the natural limit of the English from the south. Yet there is an intervening belt of country before which there is doubtless some fate or fortune. Mr. Bellew makes a significant remark, which every historian will accept at once, to the effect that the belt of country lying between Russia and British India must in time yield to one or the other power. It cannot remain neutral, nor can it remain in barbarism. Civilization must advance. Let us suppose that Russia takes Merv, as it is reported that she has done, or is about to do. The nomad tribes, which live by robbing caravans and peaceful settlers, will rob the Russian settlers, and perhaps flee to Afghan territory for protection. Now who shall compel these robbers to keep the peace? This question is already being discussed between England and Russia. Russia wants England to guarantee the neutrality of Afghan, which England will not do, for she knows that she cannot compel those nomads to behave themselves. But suppose that England and Russia agree simply that Afghan shall be neutral territory. Afghan then must keep her nomads from robbing the Russians, or Russia will defend her own people as she has done in numberless cases before, which means the conquest of the territory whence the trouble arises. Afghan would probably crumble away.

We have no hesitation in saying, with Mr. Vambéry, that Russia has her eye on Herat. This is the key of India on the north. Every great Asiatic conqueror has seen its importance, and struggled for the possession of it: and history records more than fifty sieges which it has had to endure on account of its importance, for the conquest of Asia. From Meshed to Herat

an army can march in eight days, and from Meshed to the Caspian in eight or ten days. English statesmen admit that it is impossible to prevent the establishment of Russian influence over Persia. A Russian fleet on the Caspian, and the Russian authority established at Herat, and Northern Persia would be little more than a dependency of Russia. And Russia will extend and consolidate her power in Central Asia, regardless of the hopes or fears of Englishmen. English writers raise a great many theoretical obstacles to Russia's advance. Meanwhile Russia marches on slow, but resistless, as the advance of an Atlantic tide; and in almost every English paper that appears upon this subject, there is evident an unexpressed conviction that England is powerless to dictate to Russia what the limit of her advance shall be. Russia is silent; studies geography, makes plans, and the world hears suddenly of some brilliant success which she has achieved. Months afterwards England succeeds in *understanding* what has been done.

At the risk of some repetition, we ask the reader to find on as good a map as may be at his command the following places: first, look at the Caucasus region, which belongs to Russia, and where she has an army of two hundred thousand men. Then, her communications with the Caspian are excellent. Upon the Caspian there is a fine Russian fleet. An army can march in from sixteen to twenty days from the Caspian to Herat. Northern Persia is practically in the power of Russia. Russia, we suppose, is already at Merv, and consequently controls the valley up to the foot of the hills, on the other side of which lies Herat. Herat is the key of India on the north. Candahar is about four hundred miles from Herat; and the military route to India is by Candahar, and not by Cabul. Then let the reader remember the influence of Russia in Eastern Turkestan, and that by the annexation of Kulja on the southern slopes of the Thian Shan Mountains, she controls the roads which lead to India through the dominions of Yakub Beg. Russia's connection with Persia and Afghanistan will, no doubt, in the immediate future attract the most serious attention. It is said that if Russia occupies Herat, the English must advance to Candahar. But it is to be hoped that England will not attempt to control territory beyond the passes of the Suleiman Moun-

tains. Let Russia advance to the Suleiman if she wishes to, and can do so; in that case wild tribes will be subdued, order and safety will prevail where now all is anarchy, and England and Russia can meet as merchants and not as armed enemies seeking each other's destruction.

But the more we study this subject, the more we are convinced of the absurdity of the fear that Russia has any serious designs on India. Suppose Russia were to absorb all the territory north of the Himalaya and Suleiman Mountains, England could defend the passes in such a way that all the world could not break through them. If one should say that Russia cherished the ultimate design of absorbing Persia, one would give thus a more probable guess. In that way she might to some extent cripple England. The day, however, for a collision between these two great powers in Asia is yet far off, unless, as we have said, Russia occupies Herat, and the English in their alarm occupy Candahar. The former is probable: the latter would be a very unwise act, and one which England would in the end have cause to regret.

But while we watch with interest the great game that is being played on that vast continent by England and Russia, there are questions of greater importance than who shall be the winner in this contest, to which we on this side the globe ought to give our earnest attention. Humanity, geographical knowledge, the development of material resources, the history of languages and religions, the advancement of Christianity, all the questions which pertain to science, all the interests of civilization, demand that some power which can do it, be it Russia or England, should knock at the gates of those citadels of fanaticism and cruelty which have so long resisted all progress, until they are wide open for the free admission of missionaries and teachers, of railroads and commerce, of the army of peaceful men, who will develop the surprising resources of those fertile valleys, and the vast mineral wealth of those many mountains and hills.

ARTICLE II—HERBERT SPENCER'S PROPOSED RECONCILIATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE.

It rarely happens that the publication of a philosophical treatise awakens an interest so general and cordial as that which greeted the appearance of Mr. Herbert Spencer's *First Principles*,* constituting the opening volume of his grand system of philosophy. Much of the *éclat* which attended the publication of this volume was undoubtedly due to the announcement and exposition, which it contained, of a grand law of evolution, which claimed to bear sway in every department of change, from the infinitesimal scale of atoms and molecules to the measureless range of the planetary spaces—from the lowest forms of inorganic matter to the highest manifestations of life and mind. But the good-will of thoughtful persons was especially drawn to Mr. Spencer's proposed reconciliation between science and religion. He was hailed by the periodical press as a scientist "who does not treat the subject of religion with supercilious neglect," who "is not chargeable with excluding God from the universe, or denying all revelation of Him in His works." Says one reviewer: "Mr. Spencer comes in good faith from what has been so long a hostile camp, bringing a flag of truce and presenting terms of agreement, meant to be honorable to both parties." As regards the author's proposed basis of religion and terms of agreement between religion and science, another reviewer parries objections, and vindicates the view presented as pre-eminently *the* religious position, by alleging "that the doctrine itself is so profoundly, so intensely, so overwhelmingly religious, nay, so utterly and entirely CHRISTIAN, that its true meaning could not be seen for very glory." The reviewer goes on to say: "Like Moses when he came down from the Mount, this . . . philosophy comes with a veil over its face, that its too divine radiance may be hidden for a time. This is Science, that has been con-

* *First Principles of a New System of Philosophy.* By HERBERT SPENCER. New York: D. Appleton & Company. 1866.

versing with God, and brings in her hand His law written on tables of stone." Such was the response of cordiality, at times rising to enthusiasm, which greeted Mr. Spencer's exposition of the relation between science and religion.

Holding the author responsible neither for the extravagant claims nor the confused rhetoric put forth by his eulogist last quoted, we may venture, undazzled by "the glory that excelleth," to come directly to the examination of his proposed basis of agreement between religion and science,—the "law written on tables of stone," which Science, having conversed with God, presents, through him, for our consideration. The brightness of the face of the revealer need not interfere, in the least, with the reading of the handwriting on the tables of stone, which he has brought with him from the mount of vision. In a word, we shall be treating the author with all due respect, if we meet him in candor and fairness as one who "comes in good faith presenting terms of agreement meant to be honorable to both parties." In this spirit we would proceed to inquire how far the proposed terms of agreement are, and ought to be satisfactory, to the parties in question.

Mr. Spencer sets out with a plea for religion,—an argument to prove that there is a basis for religion in the reality of things. He assumes that there may be a class of honest doubters, "who, in contempt for its follies, and disgust at its corruptions, have contracted towards religion a repugnance which makes them overlook the fundamental verity contained in it." (p. 17.) Accordingly he enters into an elaborate discussion to make it apparent that there must be a fundamental verity at the basis of religion.

The author starts with the very plausible assumption, that wide-spread beliefs, however erroneous in their main features, must owe their prevalence to some elements of truth which they contain. And when two such beliefs are found in seeming conflict with each other, it is only another step in the same direction to assume that they embrace some common element of truth in which they may meet and agree. This is illustrated by the widely divergent views of human government, which have been held in different ages and countries. Thus all the conflicting theories of government, from that which deifies the

ruler and enslaves the subject, through all gradations, to that which makes the ruler the mere servant of the people, are said to embrace this principle in common,—“the subordination of individual actions to social requirements.” (p. 9.)

It is a plausible induction from this illustrative example, that all religious beliefs, however conflicting in some of their elements, must embrace some common truth in which they are at one with each other. The same inference would also hold good with regard to any seeming conflict between religion and science. So far as they occupy common ground, according to Mr. Spencer, there must be some common basis of truth, on which they may meet and be reconciled.

The author sets forth the need of such a reconciliation in language which, to a large proportion of his readers, must seem somewhat exaggerated. He says: “Of all antagonisms of belief, the oldest, the widest, the most profound, and the most important is that between religion and science.” (p. 11.) He draws a lively picture of the animosities of the strife between the contending parties to this antagonism. On the one side are the indignant scientists, overflowing with contempt and disgust at the follies and corruptions of religion; on the other the alarmed religionists, offended to the last degree by the destructive criticisms of science, and inspired with a certain inarticulate dread by the remembrance of the rude shakes which science has given to many of their most cherished convictions. (pp. 17, 18, 21.)

Such is the author's picture of the conflict between religion and science. The candid reader, whether religionist or scientist, will hardly accept it as a fair representation of the contest which it professes to set forth. It is, however, a not wholly untrue delineation of the chronic wrangle between a small class of bigots in religion and a corresponding class of egotists in science. But it is not a just representation of any contest, properly so called, between science and religion. Apart from extremists of both classes, there is the great body of thoughtful persons, who have no sympathy with the cowardly anger of bigots at the freedom of scientific investigation, and are amused rather than offended at the supercilious conceit of egotists in science; and yet such persons are calmly accepting all the

valid results of scientific progress, and are finding in those results the confirmation of whatever is most vital in their religious creeds. The process of reconciliation between religion and science must consist in the progressive adjustment, in such minds, of any seeming antagonism between religious belief and positive knowledge, which may arise in the progress of scientific discovery. We shall have occasion to consider, as we proceed, how far the author's plan of reconciliation is adapted to aid candid inquirers, of this class, in coming to satisfactory results.

Mr. Spencer's representation of the contest between religion and science is open to objection in another respect. With an evident intent to treat religion with respect, he leans with an obvious partiality to the side of science. While the intolerance of science is set forth in an apologetic tone, as springing from a generous indignation at the follies and corruptions of religion, the hostile attitude of religion is represented as consisting of helpless anger, unthinking prejudice, and suspicious dread. (pp. 17, 18.) This attitude of the author is noticeable as revealing a bias, which does not promise very liberal concessions to religion, in the terms of reconciliation to be proposed in the sequel.

Having set forth the alleged antagonism between religion and science, in the manner indicated above, the author proceeds to urge a very conclusive plea in favor of religion. "The universality of religious ideas, their independent evolution among different primitive races, and their great vitality," are adduced as conclusive proof that "religion, if not supernaturally derived, . . . must be derived out of human experiences," and must, therefore, be based on something deep in the nature of man and in the constitution of things. (pp. 14, 15.) It is next assumed, without argument, that science is substantially true. (pp. 18, 19.) Hence arises the exigency for the search, among the conceptions of religion and science respectively, for the truths common to both, in which they may come together in happy and lasting reconciliation.

The method of seeking for the truth, in which religion and science shall coalesce, is next set forth. Under this head the direction of the search and the kind of truth to be sought are

pointed out. Beginning with religion, the author assumes that the truth to be sought must be some fundamental verity, which lies hidden in all religions, even the rudest. In other words, the fundamental verity in question must be an "*element common to all religions.*" It is essential that this common element be found, in order that the diverse religions may come to an agreement among themselves, as a preliminary step towards making their peace with science. But the author adds, "this element must be more *abstract* than any current religious doctrine." This is a concession to the scruples of science. For the author maintains that no belief, which goes beyond this simple *abstract element*, can serve as the desired basis of agreement. "For," says he, "science cannot recognize beliefs like these; they lie beyond its sphere." (p. 23.)

In like manner, we are called to explore science in search of a fundamental verity, on which it is to come to an agreement with religion. And here we are told, that the basis of agreement sought can be no truth of mathematics, physics, or chemistry,—“no generalization of the phenomena of space, of time, of matter, of force,” since “religion can take no cognizance of special scientific doctrines.” In short, the basis of agreement, which is sought for, must be “a fact, which science recognizes in common with religion,”—“the most *abstract truth* contained in religion and the most *abstract truth* contained in science,”—a truth both of religion and science, which each “will assert with all possible emphasis,” in the absence of the other. (pp. 22–24.)

If we could forget the one-sided representation of the alleged antagonism between science and religion, we should say that the proposed plan of reconciliation thus far deals fairly with both parties. The feasibility of the plan is yet to be tried by the test of success.

As a preliminary step to entering on the search for the fundamental verity supposed to be common to all religions, the author invents a very ingenious logical machinery for separating the chaff of error from the grain of truth which he is seeking. It consists in a method of distinguishing those conceptions, which stand for realities—which they truly, and more or less completely, represent—from a class of illusive conceptions, which represent no corresponding realities. Of course those

religious conceptions, which are found to be of the latter class, are set aside as illegitimate, while those of the first class are recognized as valid. The following is a brief summary of the logical artifice referred to.

A conception may be said to be complete when the attributes of the object conceived are such in kind and number, that they can be represented in consciousness so nearly at the same time as to seem to be all present together. As objects conceived become larger and more complex, the conception of them is incomplete, and is said to be symbolical. The conception of the earth as a sphere, and the conception of the solar system, as also conceptions of general classes, are said to be of this description.

Symbolical conceptions are said to be legitimate or to represent realities, when we are able to verify them by some cumulative or indirect process of thought, or by the fulfillment of predictions based upon them. Such as cannot be thus verified are pronounced to be illegitimate and illusive. From the habit of treating verifiable symbolical conceptions, which are based on partial knowledge, as representing realities, the author thinks we pass to that of treating mere fictions, based on no actual knowledge, as representing real existences. Of course, those elements of religious beliefs which are said to involve unverifiable symbolical conceptions are pronounced illusive. When all such conceptions are winnowed out of the great mass of current religious beliefs, the ultimate religious ideas, which constitute the fundamental verity common to all religions, will be found. (pp. 25-29.)

The author first applies the foregoing principles to the question of the origin of the universe,—a question involved in all forms of religious belief. He assumes, that in all our attempts even to conceive of the origin of the universe, we are only able to form conceptions of the illegitimate and illusive kind, which, by no process of verification, can be proved to correspond to any real existence. If we try to think of the universe as self-existent, self-created, or created by external agency, we are said to be alike baffled, in either case, in our effort to form any legitimate conception, or even to find a thinkable basis of reality. Under this head, the doctrine of a personal creator is set aside as illusive. (pp. 30-36.)

If from the question of the origin of the universe, we pass to that of its nature, the same difficulties are said to meet us under new aspects. In thinking of the realities that affect our senses, we necessarily recognize a cause; and in reasoning on the relation of cause to the universe, we come to the idea of a first cause. To make out an adequate first cause, we must recognize that cause as infinite and absolute. But when we try to verify our supposed conception of a first cause, in thinking of this cause as infinite and absolute, we find, according to our author, the attributes of causality, infinitude, and absoluteness mutually destructive of each other; and our symbolical conception of an infinite and absolute first cause proves to be of the illegitimate order, and the object of it unthinkable. (pp. 36-42.)

Turning now to religion to see what remains of it, after this winnowing process, the author finds a very small but precious remnant, which he recognizes as the fundamental verity which he is seeking. It meets the tests previously laid down, in being a *common constituent* of all religions, and "*the most abstract of all religious doctrines.*" (p. 45.) Affirming that "every religion may be defined as an *à priori* theory of the universe," he claims that "every theory tacitly asserts two things: firstly, that there is *something to be explained*: and secondly, that *such and such is the explanation.*" That is, every religion assumes that the universe presents a great problem for solution; and each one attempts the solution in its own several way. But all of these attempted solutions are set aside as made up of symbolical conceptions of the unverifiable, illusive kind: and there only remains, as the substance and whole content of religion, the recognition of "something to be explained," of "a problem to be solved," of "questions that press for solution" (p. 30), of "a mystery ever pressing for interpretation." (p. 44.) But not only are all the attempted interpretations of the mystery of the universe set aside as illusive, but all conceivable interpretations are demolished by the same logical enginery, which has done execution on all extant systems of religious belief. And thus to the recognition of the unsolved mystery must be added the recognition of the impossibility of any solution whatever. The final result, the creed of creeds, which is reached at last, may be summed up in two articles: 1st. The universe everywhere

manifests causal power: 2d. The power thus manifested is inexplicable. Or, in the words of the author, "the power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." On this basis science is expected to be at one with religion. To accomplish this result, Mr. Spencer next goes in search of ultimate scientific ideas. (p. 46.)

Before following the author in the next step of the inquiry, it is proper to call attention to a seeming inconsistency in his manner of setting forth the ultimate religious ideas reached by the previous inquiry. He defines religion "as an *à priori* theory of the universe." He sets aside, as illusive, all actual and all possible theories of the universe within the sphere occupied by religion, leaving only, as the all of religion, the recognition of the unsolved problem, and an intense craving for an impossible solution. After this demolition, what is there remaining of religion, that can properly be called a theory of any kind? Mr. Spencer ought to define again, and to make religion consist in a feeling of omnipresent "mystery ever pressing for interpretation," as is implied in the final result of his research into ultimate religious ideas. He sets out with something quite different. He begins with religion "as an *à priori* theory of the universe." He makes religion, in the end, a felt need—never to be satisfied—of some theoretic explanation of the mystery of the universe. In brief, religion is a theory; religion is a felt need of a theory; or religion is a felt need of religion.

Passing on to the consideration of ultimate scientific ideas, the author takes up the ideas of space and time, of matter, force, and motion, and assumes to show that they all run into symbolic conceptions of the illegitimate order, incapable of expansion into real conceptions, and not admitting of any other mode of verification. (pp. 47-54.) Or, if we turn to consciousness, as affected by the external world, and attempt to deal with the conceptions of the subjective and the objective, we shall, according to our author, find ourselves at last amid another crowd of symbolic conceptions of the unverifiable, illusive kind. (p. 61, et seq.) The conclusion is that "ultimate religious and ultimate scientific ideas alike turn out to be mere symbols of the actual, not cognitions of it." (p. 68.) As religion

finds itself, at last, face to face with the vast unknown and unknowable, so science, in the end, must stop and bow before the same impenetrable mystery of the unsearchable. Thus a basis of agreement between religion and science is found at last.

The author goes on to confirm the conclusion, already reached, in a chapter on the relativity of all knowledge. From the relativity of all actual knowledge is deduced the inscrutableness of things in their essential nature. The author deduces the relativity of all knowledge from an analysis of the *product* of thought, as embodied in the inductions, generalizations, and classifications of science (p. 69); from an analysis of the *process* of thought in working out these inductions, generalizations, and classifications (p. 74); and from the nature of all vital relations. "Life," says the author, "in all its manifestations, inclusive of intelligence in its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." From which the relative character of our knowledge necessarily follows. (p. 85.) But this exposition of the relativity of knowledge brings us again face to face with inexplicable mystery, which transcends all knowledge.

The next step of procedure is to set forth, a little more definitely, the transcendent mystery, which remains as the whole creed of religion, after everything else has been scattered to the winds, and which science meets and recognizes as the impassable barrier, at which every path of scientific research comes to an end. Assuming to have demonstrated the relativity of all real knowledge, the author asks, "What must we say concerning that which transcends knowledge?" If all knowledge is relative, does that necessarily negative every form of consciousness outside of the relative? A more important question still—does it negative all *reality* outside of the relative? (p. 87.)

In answering the first question the author distinguishes between a definite consciousness, made definite by its limiting relations, and an indefinite consciousness, which remains after all limiting relations have been abstracted. He maintains that this latter is a real form of consciousness, though not properly a concept, or knowledge. (pp. 90, 91.) He asserts that this is an indestructible element of every relative conception, the

ultimate element in all forms of thought, which no extent of abstraction can eliminate. As regards the existence of a reality, corresponding to this indefinite consciousness, the author holds that the belief in such real existence is a necessary datum of consciousness. He contends that the consciousness of the finite implies the belief in the reality of the infinite, and that the consciousness of the relative includes the belief in the existence of the absolute. That this belief is valid is argued from its indestructibility, its persistence in consciousness, in spite of every effort to suppress it—this being the author's test of the validity of all forms of belief. (p. 96.)

The basis of reconciliation, towards which the author is laboring, is made to consist in the agreeing results reached by religion and science respectively, through different routes of research. Religion is said to start with a creed more or less concrete. But it is claimed that logical criticism eliminates one concrete element after another, till there is only left the recognition of omnipresent, inscrutable power manifested through the phenomena of the universe. (p. 100.) On the other hand, science sets out with the observation of external objects and their phenomena, and proceeds to co-ordinate them under general classes and laws, successively reaching results more and more general and abstract, till it is brought to a stand before the same omnipresent inscrutable power, which is said to be the basis of all phenomenal existence. Thus it is claimed that both religion and science teach the doctrine that "all things are manifestations of a power that transcends our knowledge." (p. 100.)

This power, which we are compelled to believe in as underlying all phenomena, is variously designated by the author, as the inscrutable power, the ultimate existence, the ultimate reality, the first cause, and the ultimate cause. Thus he recognizes and sanctions a necessary and authoritative belief in the existence of omnipresent causal power. But as this power is said to transcend human knowledge, we are forbidden to ascribe to it any attributes whatever. Mr. Spencer is particularly strenuous in opposing the ascription to the ultimate cause of the attributes of personality, i. e., conscious intelligence and will. In short, religion and science are said to agree in recognizing a

first cause, or an ultimate cause of all phenomenal existence; but both alike are forbidden to ascribe to the ultimate cause the character of a personal Creator.

The careful reader of Mr. Spencer's discussion will not doubt that he is seriously in earnest in his proposal of terms of reconciliation between religion and science. He urges the acceptance of the proposed terms by reasons which may be summed up under two heads. 1. It is urged that the proposed terms of agreement are valid in logic, and that they are the only terms to which such validity can be ascribed. 2. It is claimed that the proposed terms of agreement present a religion which is vastly superior, in all that is essential to religion, to the current forms of religious belief. We come now to enquire how far the proposed terms of agreement ought, in the light of the arguments by which they are supported, to be satisfactory to the alleged antagonistic parties, who are expected to agree to them?

It may be presumed that the skeptical scientist will not be very likely to complain of the proposed terms of agreement. He can hardly object to the acceptance of a creed so meagre—one which not only tolerates but justifies his principal doubts and denials with regard to current religious doctrines. He will, however, be likely to think less of the alleged superior quality of the proposed new religion than of smallness of the quantity which is offered for his acceptance. But ought the Christian believer to be satisfied with the proposed terms of reconciliation? Do the arguments by which the proposed basis of agreement is assumed to have been settled, deal fairly and impartially with the facts of the case, and is the logic without flaw. Moreover, does the proposed new religion obviously possess the superior qualities ascribed to it by Mr. Spencer? Will those who accept the theism of the New Testament, feel compelled by Mr. Spencer's logic, or attracted by the charms of the inscrutable ultimate cause, to give up their faith in an omnipotent personal Father? Before taking such a step the Christian believer will weigh well the arguments which urge him to it.

Those who have accepted the theism of the New Testament and have found satisfaction in the religious life which it inculcates, will be disappointed at the smallness of the remnant of

their faith which is left by the destructive criticism of Mr. Spencer. They will be inclined to ask why it is that the *abstract element*, dwelt upon by the author with so much emphasis and iteration, is all that is left of religion, while the entire fabric of science is left standing to enshrine and preserve the sole precious relic which remains to religion? It may not be amiss to inquire whether this result has been legitimately reached.

While we agree with the author, that the basis of agreement, among the various religious beliefs, must consist of elements common to them all, it seems to us arbitrary and illogical to insist that religion shall yield up, in deference to science, everything except some naked abstraction about which a difference of opinion is impossible. If science contains truths—as Mr. Spencer alleges—of which “religion takes no cognizance,” why may not religion contain doctrines, which are still true, though “science cannot recognize beliefs like these?” (p. 23.) If a scientific doctrine is not invalidated by the fact that it cannot properly be brought within the sphere of religion, why should a religious doctrine be declared invalid, because it cannot be legitimately recognized by science.

Mr. Spencer is not consistent with himself in rejecting every doctrine of religion which lies outside of the *abstract element* in which religion and science are said to agree. He alleges the fundamental truthfulness of religious ideas—or religion in general—on the ground of their *universality, independent evolution* among different primitive races, and *great vitality*. (p. 14.) He afterwards mentions certain religious doctrines which, “common though they may be to all religions,” are set aside from “the desired basis of agreement” as invalid, because “science cannot recognize” them. (p. 23.) For the same reason all religious beliefs are set aside as untrue, except the sole *abstract element*, which is saved, nursed, and caressed as the substance and all of religion. In thus rejecting beliefs, which are admitted to be common to all religions, Mr. Spencer violates his own principles. A belief which is common to all religions has the same evidence of its fundamental truthfulness as that on which the author grounds the validity of religion in general; that is, *universality, independent evolution, and tenacious vitality*. All of

these tests are implied in the fact, that a belief is *common to all religions*. The common elements of all religions may, therefore, be allowed to stand on this evidence of their truthfulness, though they may be beyond the sphere of science; just as "special scientific doctrines" are allowed to stand on their own intrinsic evidence of validity, notwithstanding they lie beyond the sphere of religion.

In following the logic of the author to the results which he reaches, it is interesting to notice his peculiar method of dealing with the *abstract*, and the ingenious mechanism by which he carries on the process of abstraction. Illustrations of the method and mechanism referred to may be gathered from the ground already passed over.

The *common elements*, which are to constitute the basis of agreement among different religions, are what "*remains after their discordant peculiarities have been . . . cancelled.*" (p. 23.) The *abstract element* which is to constitute the basis of agreement between religion and science is what *remains* of religion after everything else has been *cancelled* by the author's destructive criticism; and what *remains* of science after everything else has been *temporarily set aside*, till "the desired basis of agreement" is established. While the elements of religion, which are set aside by the author's method of abstraction, are permanently "cancelled," the scientific doctrines thus set aside are only held in temporary abeyance, afterwards to be restored in full force. If the result reached is remarkable, the logical mechanism by which it is brought about is peculiar.

The reader will perceive that Mr. Spencer's notion of the *abstract* is that of the *residuum*, which is left behind, after every separable element of a concrete has been removed. (pp. 91, 94.) Thus space is defined to be the abstract of all co-existences. (pp. 229, 230.) The method of arriving at this abstract is illustrated thus: "Our conception of matter . . . is that of co-existent positions, that offer resistance." . . . "We think of body as bounded by surfaces that resist, and as made up throughout of parts that resist. Mentally abstract the co-existent resistances, and the consciousness of body disappears, leaving behind it the consciousness of space." (p. 232.) In the ordinary acceptance of the term, the abstract is some element

of a concrete conception, which has been isolated in thought for the purpose of separate contemplation. According to Mr. Spencer's use of the term, the abstract is that element of the concrete which remains behind when abstraction has reached its utmost limit. In other words, the abstract is that which can never be abstracted; it is the *persistent residuum*, which is left after every other element has been removed by abstraction. We do not deny that the persistent residuum of a concrete conception, which remains behind after all other elements have been abstracted, is itself quite abstract. We call attention to the subject, that the reader may perceive how admirably the author's notion of the abstract and of the process of abstraction fits into the mechanism of symbolical conceptions, with the tests of their validity. He will also see how ingeniously mechanical, rather than logical, is the process by which Mr. Spencer arrives at the tenuous residuum of religion, which he offers to the acceptance of mankind.

Let us now see how far we are able to agree with Mr. Spencer, touching the ultimate religion towards which the human race is supposed to be tending. We agree with the author in recognizing a power behind phenomena which is inscrutable, as regards the ultimate basis of its existence. We accept without objection his favorite designation of that power, as the ultimate cause. But when he denies to the ultimate cause all assignable attributes, we dissent. Particularly do we dissent from his denial of the attribute of personality. And this is the only dissent that we care to insist upon in the subsequent discussion. Is the ultimate cause a person with the attributes of intelligence and will? This is the question which will mainly occupy us through the remainder of this Article.

In the first place, the personality of the power which is behind phenomena is a doctrine of all aboriginal religions, and has survived all the changes which have modified the multitudinous creeds of our race, in other respects. This is implied by the author when he speaks of "fetishism, which assumes a separate personality behind every phenomenon;" of "polytheism, in which these personalities are partially generalized;" of "monotheism, in which they are wholly generalized;" and of "pantheism, in which the generalized personality becomes one

these tests are **religious**. The **ultimate cause** is **for**, be **allowed** **the author in** **mental verity at** **then, in favor** **less it can be set**

In following the **of the personality** **der two heads : 1.** **ity is a symbolical** **2. The observed** **the idea of personal** **ence.**

The **equally against the doc-** **For the only concep-** **cause, is at best an "in-** **r calls it, a symbolic con-** **methods of verification laid** **indirect process of thought,"** **in add to our conviction that** **of a power behind phenomena** **pencer himself, in the end, rests** **of the ultimate cause, as repre-** **ductibility, and not on the tests by** **other symbolic conceptions. The** **personality has proved indestructible** **id revolutions of human history. It** **er it shall go down before the destruc-** **scientific skepticism.**

s, rather than proves, that the observed **al law are incompatible with the idea of** **the phenomenal world. This assumption** **the description of the alleged antagonism be-** **and science. This antagonism, says Mr. Spen-** **d when the recognition of the simplest uniformi-** **standing things set a limit to the previously uni-** **an." (p. 11.) The fallacy of this assumption will** **, if we direct our attention to another foregone** **, on which it is based. It is assumed in the**

affirmation that fetishism was universally established before the human race had recognized the simplest uniformities in surrounding things. It requires no argument to prove, that, without the recognition of, and conformity to, the uniformities of natural law, the human race would have perished long before the doctrines of fetishism could have gained universal sway. The burnt child dreads and shuns the fire, on the strength of its faith in the uniformity of natural order, long before there is any evidence of its having accepted the simplest religious creed. If, therefore, fetishism "assumes a separate personality behind every phenomenon" (p. 43), it does so in spite of previously recognized uniformities, and with no feeling of any incompatibility between the two classes of conceptions.

Assuming that the recognition of the uniformity of natural order, and the idea of personal agency at work in that order, are logically incompatible with each other, Mr. Spencer undertakes to set forth the process, by which, as he claims, the idea of the personality of the ultimate cause is to be eliminated from the theory of the universe. "As fast," says he, "as experience proves that certain familiar changes always happen in the same sequence, there begins to fade from the mind the conception of a special personality, to whose variable will they were before ascribed. And when, step by step, accumulating observations do the like with the less familiar changes, a similar modification of belief takes place with respect to them." (p. 102.) This is assumed to be a logical process, which in the end sets aside the personality of the ultimate cause, and leaves only the "inscrutable power behind phenomena," as the supreme object of worship.

It is sufficient to say of the alleged process, by which this result is said to be reached, that it involves the fallacious assumption already noticed; that systems of religious belief precede, in the order of human evolution, the observation of the uniformities of natural order. History does not confirm such an assumption, and the observed evolution of the individual mind and the witness of consciousness both testify directly the reverse. The doctrine of the personality of the "power manifested to us through all phenomena" (p. 108) has grown into the religious creeds of the race, as an integral ele-

ment in them all, in spite of previously observed uniformities; instead of fading out before the advancing generalization of natural phenomena.

Mr. Spencer's argument on this point derives its only show of plausibility from the tacit assumption of the capricious variability of all wills—a variability inconsistent with observed uniformities. But capricious variability, though a frequent, is not a universal accompaniment of voluntary agency. To a thoughtful view of the subject, there is no logical incompatibility between a uniform order of sequence and the agency of personal volition. Such uniform sequence does forbid us to attribute capricious variability to the governing will, but does not compel us to deny the reality of personal rule. It rather tends to exalt our conception of the comprehensive intelligence and far-reaching wisdom which guide the ruling will, and so intensifies our conviction of the reality of personal agency.

Mr. Spencer's life-work furnishes the most convincing of proofs, that the thoughts and acts of a personal agent are not always destitute of orderly sequence. Whoever carefully studies his grand system of philosophy, will find comprehensive plan in the structure of the system, and orderly sequence in the method of its unfolding; and in spite of these observed uniformities, the reader will recognize a strong personality at work in the construction of the system. Does such a work as this, because of observed uniformities of plan and method, afford less evidence of the agency of a personal will than do the capricious activities of a little child?

We are admonished by the author to refrain from assigning to the ultimate cause "any attributes whatever, on the ground that such attributes, derived as they must be from our own natures, are not elevations but degradations." (p. 109.) Hence the doctrine of personal agency in the phenomena and order of the universe is disparaged, as an unworthy assimilation of the ultimate cause to the nature of man.

It is noticeable, in the above quotation, that Mr. Spencer leaves us no other alternative, but either to ascribe to the ultimate reality the attributes of our own nature, or to treat the object of our worship as utterly unknowable. And so, in contemplating the ultimate existence, the author himself being

judge, the choice lies between anthropomorphism on the one hand, and the cognition of a certain mysterious something, which "cannot be brought within the forms of thought," on the other. The theist does not hesitate to choose the first alternative; and he sees in the choice no degradation of the being to whom he yields allegiance. And it seems to us, that the author, in spite of himself, sets the example of adopting the same choice. With every disposition to interpret Mr. Spencer fairly, he seems to us to ascribe attributes to the so-called unknowable, and that the attributes so ascribed are attributes of human nature. True, he stops short—inconsistently, as we think—of the ascription of personality. But he seems to us clearly to ascribe other human attributes to the ultimate existence.

The author's favorite designations of the mysterious something, which he recognizes as the basis of phenomenal existence, are "*that which is behind appearance*," and "*that which is manifested in things*." To be consistent, he ought to limit himself to these indefinite terms. But he goes on to ascribe *power* to the unknowable. Moreover, this *power* is not allowed to rest as a mere sleeping potentiality; but it passes out into active causation and thus becomes a *cause*. While the author contends that the unknowable "cannot be brought within the forms of thought," do not the terms *power* and *cause*, so freely applied by him to the mysterious something behind phenomena, actually bring it within the forms of thought? While forbidding the theist to ascribe personality or any other attribute to "*that which is behind appearance*," does not Mr. Spencer transgress the limits which he prescribes to others by himself ascribing to the unknowable the intelligible attributes of power and causality? Moreover, these are human attributes. We know power, in the first instance, only by the conscious possession of power; and we first know cause only by the conscious exertion of a casual act. Thus the author, like the believers in a divine personality, does ascribe attributes to "*that which is manifested in things*," and these attributes belong to human nature, and are known within the sphere of human experience, before being objectively applied.

In dealing with force as the cause of evolution, Mr. Spencer

again encounters the question of the personality of the power which is at work behind phenomena. He admits that "the force by which we ourselves produce changes . . . serves to symbolize the cause of changes in general,"—that this personal force "is the final disclosure of analysis," or the ultimate type of all force. (pp. 235, 236.) He had previously said, "our experience of *force* is that out of which the idea of matter is built, . . . that forces, standing in certain correlations, form the whole content of our idea of matter." But the *relative* reality, matter, implies an *absolute* reality, which is said to be "some mode of the unknowable, related to the matter we know as cause to effect" (p. 233.) Do not these quotations imply that *force* is that mode of the unknowable which is related to matter as cause to effect? This inference is justified by the further characterization of "*force* as the ultimate of ultimates," reached in the last analysis of causation. (p. 235.) And yet the force by which we ourselves produce changes is said to be "the final disclosure of analysis;" that is, the ultimate of the "ultimate of ultimates," spoken of above. Thus it would seem, that the force which we consciously exert is the symbol of that mode—why not say attribute?—of the unknowable, which is the dominant working cause in the phenomenal world. In thus transferring our idea of the conscious force, which we exert, to external nature, as the symbol of the cause of outward phenomena, we again have a human attribute ascribed to "that which is manifested in things." If such be the result of Mr. Spencer's effort to strip the ultimate reality of all conceivable attributes, we may venture to affirm the impossibility of recognizing a real existence behind phenomena, as the basis of phenomenal existence, without ascribing to that reality attributes with which we first became acquainted within the sphere of our own consciousness.

On the strength of Mr. Spencer's obvious admissions, the theist might presume to extend the symbolization of the ultimate cause by our conscious force, to other particulars of conscious agency. He might venture to suggest that our conscious force symbolizes the persistent force at work in external nature, as a voluntary personal force. As "the force by which we ourselves produce changes" is universally associated with personal

intelligence, and, by the law of its nature, acts according to plan, producing intelligible results, the theist might venture to assume, that our conscious force symbolizes in this respect the ultimate cause, when that cause seemingly acts according to plan, producing the intelligible results of order and system.

But Mr. Spencer is ready with his warning against any such indirect method of arguing the personality of the ultimate cause. He warns us against assuming an identity of nature between the subjective and objective forces thus brought into comparison. (p. 236.) It is objected, that such an assumption would endow a gravitating body with consciousness,—which is deemed absurd. (p. 50.) A more specific form of the objection is, that the assumption of a likeness in kind between the force of which we are immediately conscious, and force as it exists out of our consciousness, would imply in a gravitating body “a sensation of muscular tension, which cannot be ascribed to it.” It is also objected to the assumed likeness between the subjective force and the objective force, “that the force which exists outside of our consciousness is persistent, while the force of which we are conscious does not persist.” (p. 255.)

As regards Mr. Spencer's first objection, it is sufficient to reply, that the assumption of likeness in kind between our subjective force and the objective force, which exists outside of our consciousness, does not necessarily imply the consciousness of a gravitating body, as an individual entity; but it does imply the consciousness of the ultimate cause, which is supposed to wield the force of gravity together with all other cosmical forces. So far as the author's objection denies the attribute of consciousness to the ultimate cause, it is a mere begging of the question at issue between himself and the theist.

But the author objects, in the second place, that the assumption of likeness in kind between our subjective force, and the objective force which exists outside of our consciousness, implies a sensation of muscular tension in a body which manifests force; which is claimed to be absurd. But the objection carries with it such a confusion of ideas between the facts of consciousness and the facts of outward observation, that its fallacy becomes apparent on a very slight examination. The

objection is based on the fallacious assumption, that the conscious exertion of force includes the sensation of muscular tension. Now muscular tension is just as much outside of consciousness as the strain of a rope, at which we pull. We are conscious of a voluntary effort to move the parts of our body, or to resist or overcome external forces, but we have no consciousness of the muscular strain by which our voluntary force is exerted on the parts of our body and on external objects. Muscular tension is as much a fact of observation outside of consciousness, as the attraction of a magnet or the fall of a stone. We have a sensation of the exertion of force through the agency of our sentient organism. We learn, by the study of anatomy and physiology—not by sensation or by direct consciousness—that the force of which we are conscious is exerted by the contraction of our muscles. The existence of the muscles and their relative states of tension and relaxation are alike outside of our consciousness. We are conscious of the exertion of force, but never of the material mechanism by which we exert force. If then a sensation of muscular tension cannot be ascribed to the force which exists outside of our consciousness, no more does such a sensation enter into the cognition of the force of which we are conscious. In this respect, therefore, the two are alike.

If, as the author alleges, a body which manifests the objective force is not conscious, neither are the muscles which manifest our voluntary force conscious. But, as our muscular force originates in conscious volition, may not the all-pervading persistent force, which is outside of our consciousness, originate in volition? One of the best known uniformities of relation is that of the invariable association of a certain mental act, called volition, with the exertion of force. May not this be the type of an all-pervading uniformity,—that of the association of sovereign volition with the force, which works the mighty changes of evolution through the procession of the ages? We do not assume, at this stage of the discussion, that such is the case. We would only indicate the direction in which interesting analogies point.

As regards the allegation of unlikeness between the subjective force and the objective force, on the ground that the latter is persistent, while the former does not persist, if the objec-

tion is valid, then there is an exception to Mr. Spencer's universal law of the persistence of force. Almost in the next words the author admits that the force exerted inside of consciousness afterwards exists in a persistent form outside of consciousness. But he slides over the contradiction by alleging that the force no longer exists in a form cognizable by us. And so we come to the conclusion, that, contrary to the first assertion of the author, the force of which we are conscious is persistent like all other forces; but we see—what we have known all the time—that consciousness does not follow the force which we exert, beyond the limits of our sentient organism.

The reader may be at a loss to understand why Mr. Spencer is so much in earnest to eliminate the idea of personal agency from the conception of the dominant working forces of the universe. But his aim will become apparent, if we consider the relation of the doctrine of the personality of the ultimate cause to the grand doctrine of evolution, which lies at the basis of his new system of philosophy. Just as he insists on the indestructibility of matter (p. 238), the continuity of motion (p. 246), and the persistence of force (p. 251), lest the admission of any possible change in the absolute quantity of matter, motion, or force, should introduce an incalculable element, and thus render impossible a rational theory of evolution; so the impersonality of the ultimate cause is, in like manner, insisted upon, lest an incalculable element might come in through the unforeseen action of sovereign volition. It is obvious, that a material system, having for its basis the indestructibility of matter, the continuity of motion, and the persistence of force, is one of the possible choices of an infinite sovereign personality; and if such were the case, we should still have a valid basis for a rational doctrine of evolution. But the author's mind seems to be unalterably biased against such a conception, by associating caprice and uncertainty with all voluntary action.

This brings us to the next step in the process of eliminating every incalculable element from the conception of the dominant forces of the universe. To guard us against ascribing personality to the ultimate cause, the author endeavors to prove that the all-pervading persistent force is unlike the force of which

we are conscious. But when he regards this point as well established, he comes out with the assumption that the force of which we are conscious is *like* the all-pervading persistent force; nay, that every phase of living consciousness is only a correlated mode of the impersonal force that persists. (p. 280.) When he is trying to disprove the personality of the ultimate cause, he finds the cosmical persistent force unlike our personal force; but when he wishes to reduce all the phases of living consciousness to calculable terms, he finds our personal force and all other conditions of consciousness identical in kind with the cosmical force, that persists.

Mr. Spencer anticipates the rise of a prejudice or alarm "at the proposal to reduce the phenomena of life, of mind, and of society to terms of matter, motion, and force." But he thinks the prejudice ought to subside in consideration of the more exalted conceptions of matter and its forces, which science brings to view. (p. 222.) Especially is that prejudice expected to disappear before the rising faith, that the only consistent religion and the only consistent science must alike recognize "the unknown cause is coextensive with all orders of phenomena." (p. 223.)

We are free to admit that science and religion alike ought to recognize an ultimate "cause coextensive with all orders of phenomena." But we dissent from the creed which first denies the personality of the ultimate cause, and then would reduce the human personality, with all its high attributes, to the level of matter, motion, and force, in order to bring it within the prescribed limits of causation. If the conception of the ultimate cause is to be thus restricted, then we agree with the author, that there is no alternative but to bring the phenomena of mind within the same generalization with the changes of matter. (p. 274.) But science cannot bring the phenomena of life, mind, and society within the limits of the forces and laws which bear sway in the realm of inorganic matter. Hence, if the ultimate cause is "coextensive with all orders of phenomena," it is so by the possession of personality, that is, intelligence and will. Thus, we may have an ultimate cause, "coextensive with all orders of phenomena," by conceiving of a sovereign personality, possessing, in an infinite degree, that which is correlate to the

highest human attributes, yet descending to all the particulars of the phenomena of matter, motion, and force.

It will be unnecessary to follow Mr. Spencer through an effort of masterly ingenuity, to formulate and explain the evolution and functions of life, mind, and society in terms of mere material forces and laws. It will be sufficient to test the logical soundness of his explanations by an instance or two, drawn from each of the departments of living nature, specified above. If his view is correct, the "prejudice," aroused by the proposal to study such questions from a purely physical point of view, ought to subside, as we follow the author in the application of his principles to organic, mental, and social phenomena.

Mr. Spencer undertakes to apply his principles to the explanation of the phenomena of organic evolution. But he finds himself under the necessity of beginning with the organic germ, without accounting for its origin. Again, he is obliged to recognize this germ as possessing certain "mysterious properties, which make it, when subject to fit influences, undergo . . . special changes" (pp. 400, 401.) Now it is precisely the *origin* of an organic germ, with its vital endowment of "*mysterious properties*," which neither the author nor any other one has traced to inorganic matter, subjected simply to inorganic forces and laws. And when the author proceeds to illustrate the action of physical forces on the organic germ, he succeeds in showing the probability of *some change* in the changeable germ, through the action of incident forces; but he is unable to give any account of the *particular* changes that actually occur. He adduces, in the way of illustration, the fact of the production of the working-bee and the queen-bee from precisely similar germs, and of the production of widely contrasted organisms from the germ of the tape-worm, by varying conditions of food and other surroundings. These facts prove an *actual effect* of incident forces on organic development; but they suggest no reason why the *particular* effects produced should result rather than any others. So far are these facts from bringing organic evolution within the range of physical forces, that they render more evident and conspicuous those "mysterious properties" recognized by the author, which lift the phenomena of organization quite out of the sphere of mere physical agency.

The assumption of identity, in kind, between mental phenomena and physical forces, implies that they are reciprocally transformable into each other, and are mutually equivalent in these alternate transformations. But the assumption is not made good by the facts and analogies adduced in proof. (pp. 275, 277.) The testimony of consciousness is against the assumption, at every step of the author's attempted demonstration of the identity of mental states with physical forces. It is not a prejudice, but a necessity of thought, which makes *mind* a different thing from *matter*, which impresses it; which sees in the *movements* of mind something higher than the *dynamics* of material motion, and which never doubts that conscious volition is a free act, infinitely above the physical force, which it puts into action. Notwithstanding the light shed on the problems of existence by the grand doctrine of evolution, the world will, doubtless, continue to find a difference between the individual *mind* of Kepler and the *material masses* which occupied his attention; between the *operations* of his mind in dealing with astronomical problems, and the *motions* of the planets, which he formulated under his three grand laws. The persistent mental force, by which Newton grasped and reduced to law the omnipresent power, which wields and guides the masses and systems of infinite space, will always impress every thoughtful person as something different from the cosmical force, which was mastered by the great astronomer.

If we turn to Mr. Spencer's attempt to prove the correlation and equivalence of modes of consciousness on the one hand, and physical forces on the other (pp. 274, 280), we shall find that he sets forth interesting relations between objective agencies and subjective states, but no *correlations*, in the scientific acceptance of the term; and as regards any equivalence between mental states and physical forces, he does not even indicate a conceivable standard, by which such equivalence could be tested or proved. No Joule has yet arisen to reduce to mechanical measurement, in foot-pounds, the thoughts and emotions which stir and struggle in the depths of consciousness.

Admitting that the author shows important relations between the impressions of physical force and the mental states that rise in response to those impressions, he fails to show that those re-

lations are *dynamical in kind*, like the relations which are recognized as subsisting between well known physical forces which are transformable into each other. There is nothing in the mental states themselves to suggest their identity with any of the recognized forms of physical force; and there is nothing in the manner in which they rise in connection with the impressions of physical force to suggest a *dynamical transition* of the one into the other. The mechanical theory of heat gives the conception of the passage of a motion of vibration into a motion of translation, and the reverse. In this case force is recognized, as such, equally in both modes of manifestation; and the *dynamical continuity* is just as cognizable in the *transition* as in either mode of manifestation. Mental states, on the contrary, are not cognizable as modes of physical force, but as modes of living consciousness; and no *dynamical continuity* is cognizable between mental states and the force-impressions, with which they are sometimes associated in their origin.

One instance of the author's attempt to reduce social phenomena to the laws of physical forces, will suffice under this branch of the subject. Having set forth the law of *motion in the direction of the least resistance*, as applicable to bodies acted upon by several forces (p. 289), Mr. Spencer proceeds to apply the law to the movements of society. The spread of the human family over the earth by successive migrations, is referred to as a perfect illustration of the law. (p. 302.) In this example, it does not occur to the author to distinguish between the intelligent calculation and deliberate choice, by which a man selects and follows the lines of least resistance, on the one hand, and the physical necessity which determines the motions of inorganic bodies, on the other. But is the personal calculation of advantages, which determines the direction of migration, identical in kind with the physical necessity which determines the fall of a stone?

The author anticipates that it may be objected, that through want of knowledge or want of skill a man may fail to follow the line of least resistance. He replies that the man's ignorance of the line of least resistance, or inability to adopt it, is, *physically considered*, the existence of an insuperable obstacle to the discharge of his energies in that direction.

Is there not in the very idea of *ignorance physically considered*—ignorance considered as a physical force—an absurdity, analogous to that of measuring beer by the yard, or land surface by the bushel? And does not the absurdity reach a climax, when the *inability* to adopt the direction of least resistance is made identical with an insuperable physical obstacle? This sudden transformation of a subjective *impotency* of the mental kind into an objective *potency* of the physical kind, violates not simply a "prejudice," but every principle of logical discrimination by which things are separated into natural groups, according to their kinds.

In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are prepared to present a summary statement of Mr. Spencer's religious creed, with its several limitations and restrictions, and to note the reasons which determine the final shaping of the formula of belief which he offers to the acceptance of mankind.

1. We have the positive belief in the existence of an infinite and absolute ultimate cause.

2. We are forbidden to ascribe any attributes whatever to the ultimate reality; and this while the author himself freely ascribes to it the attributes of power and causality.

3. We are specifically warned against ascribing to the ultimate cause the attribute of personality; and under the term personality, the author particularly includes *intelligence* and *will*. (p. 109.)

4. The ultimate cause, thus assumed to be unknowable in its essential nature, is said to be cognizable by us only through its relative manifestations.

5. These relative manifestations are summed up under the heads of space, time, matter, motion, and force, of which force is said to be the ultimate of ultimates; the conceptions of space, time, matter, and motion, being built up of experiences of force. (p. 235.)

6. Our cognition of objective forces comes to us through the conscious exertion of our own voluntary force; and hence the force of which we are conscious becomes to us the type or symbol of all forces.

7. Since force is regarded as the proximate relative manifestation of the ultimate cause, to which no attributes whatever are to be ascribed, we are warned against assimilating the

cosmical force to the force of which we are conscious, lest, thereby we should ascribe personality to the ultimate cause.

8. The personality of the ultimate cause seems to be rejected on the assumption, that it is incompatible with any rational doctrine of evolution; since the uncertainties of voluntary agency would introduce an incalculable element among the facts to be co-ordinated.

9. After the personality of the ultimate cause, in the relative phase of cosmical force, has been set aside, our personal force, nay, all the phenomena of life, mind, and society became like, or mere modes of the impersonal cosmical force.

10. Thus the human personality becomes subjected to the law of necessity and the last, possible disturbing, or incalculable element is eliminated from the facts which enter into the theory of evolution.

11. In this way the ultimate cause becomes co-extensive with all orders of phenomena by being reduced, together with all phenomena, to the common level of matter, motion, and force.

It may be presumed that the reader has now a tolerably clear apprehension of the creed, to which the religious world are invited by Mr. Spencer to be reconciled. It is impossible to doubt the sincerity and earnestness of the author, in the proffer which he brings. Yet it is certain that an equal sincerity and earnestness, on the other side, will fail to be satisfied with Mr. Spencer's creed, as the vital substance and whole content of religion. Indeed he himself anticipates a temporary rejection of the proffered terms of agreement, by the believers in a personal God. Yet he does not despair of the ultimate acceptance of the terms which he offers.

Anticipating some disappointment on the part of the worshippers of a personal God, the author encourages them to think of something higher than personality. He thinks the believers in a personal God "make the erroneous assumption, that the choice is between personality and something lower than personality; whereas the choice is rather between personality and something higher." He goes on to ask, "Is it not just possible that there is a mode of being as much transcending intelligence and will, as these transcend mechanical motion?" (p. 109.) He then lectures the hesitating theist on

the audacity and impiety of presuming "to penetrate the secrets of the power manifested to us through all existence." He thinks we may "without hesitation affirm that a sincere recognition of the truth that our own and all other existence, is a mystery absolutely and forever beyond our comprehension, contains more true religion than all the dogmatic theology ever written." (pp. 110, 112.) And so Mr. Spencer would seem to sum up the whole of religion in *the sincere recognition of the incomprehensible mystery of all existence.*

As regards the choice between personality and something higher, we remark that there can be no alternative choice, unless both of the alternatives are cognizable by the chooser. That the choice suggested may take place, the *something higher* must be as comprehensible as personality. But the author admits that "we are totally unable to conceive any such higher mode of being." (p. 109.) This being the case, he proposes to us an alternative choice, with one of the alternatives inaccessible to consciousness. A favorite *reductio ad absurdum*, with Mr. Spencer is that of a supposed relation, with one of the terms of the relation wanting. (pp. 241, 243, 257.) Is this any more absurd than a supposable alternative choice, with one of the alternatives wanting? But if the proposed choice were possible, the alleged *something higher* must be a comprehensible attribute; and to ascribe any conceivable attribute to the ultimate cause, would involve the same impiety against which the author so strongly remonstrates.

The charge of impiety which the author brings against the believers in the personality of the ultimate existence is noticeable only for its groundlessness. So far as we are able to comprehend Mr. Spencer's idea of piety, it consists in a reverent reserve, as regards any attempted intrusion on the hallowed ground of mystery, and in a humble recognition of man's inability to penetrate the secrets of the power which is behind phenomena. The doctrine of the personality of the ultimate existence, includes and fosters all that is good and noble in these traits of mind. As regards the incomprehensible mystery of our own existence, the personality of which we are conscious, is the greatest mystery of all; because it includes all that is highest and deepest in the nature of man. And so in ascribing personality to the ultimate existence, we do not

assume to solve all mystery, but we do rise in contemplation to a higher region of mystery than that reached by the author, in the mere ascription of causality. Thus, so far as religion nourishes itself upon mystery, the doctrine of personality has the advantage, in this respect, over that of mere dynamical causality. One of Mr. Spencer's attempted refutations of the doctrine of a divine personality, virtually admits the deeper mystery of this doctrine as compared with that of simple causality. He urges as an objection to the doctrine, its deep mystery, or inconceivability in the concrete. He objects to the doctrine, which assumes that there is conscious mind at work in natural phenomena, that it is impossible to follow its operations in conception; that is, the doctrine involves too deep a mystery for the mastery of the human intelligence. In urging this objection he strives to overwhelm the imagination of the reader with the thought of connecting conscious mind with all the countless evolutions going on in the realms of infinite space, including the supposed evolutions and known revolutions of planetary systems with all the conceivable physical movements and organic processes, which may be transpiring in each celestial orb. (*Popular Science Monthly*, July, 1872.) We freely admit the deeper mystery of the doctrine of a divine personality as compared with that of mere physical causality; and even on Mr. Spencer's low conception of religion, we claim for the doctrine a profounder religious character than that which belongs to the author's doctrine of the ultimate cause.

Mr. Spencer admits, that the belief in a divine personality has always been very satisfactory to the human race. (p. 114.) We have seen even from the author's standpoint, good religious reasons for this general satisfaction. We proceed to point out some logical reasons, why the belief in a personal God should be more satisfactory than any creed which ignores or denies the personality of the ultimate cause. And here we return to the author's claim—which we adopt as our own—that the ultimate "cause is co-extensive with all orders of phenomena." (p. 223.)

We have seen how the author essays to bring all phenomena within the agency of an impersonal first cause, by trying to reduce the phenomena of intelligence and voluntary activity to the sphere of physical causation;—to the dynamics of matter,

motion, and force. And we have witnessed as the result of the effort, a confusion of ideas, which is a sufficient refutation of the claim set up by the author. If, therefore, personality means anything which is not embraced within the sphere of physical causation, if it characterizes an especial order of phenomena, never to be confounded with the dynamics of matter, then personality must belong to the nature of the ultimate cause, to make it co-extensive with all orders of phenomena. Personality is a phenomenon of finite existence; there must therefore be a correlated personality of the infinite ultimate existence. The human personality, acting in accordance with plan, adjusting means to ends, presents an order of phenomena, which ought to be matched by the personality of the ultimate cause, carrying out an infinite plan with infinite complexities of adjusted instrumentalities. We pass to notice the evidence of the existence of such a plan and such adjustments.

In speaking of the recognition of the ultimate cause, the author says, "We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some power by which we are acted upon." (p. 99.) Again he asserts that "there is an indestructible consciousness of power behind appearances." (*Popular Science Monthly*, Feb., 1874). When Mr. Spencer speaks of our being acted upon by a power behind phenomena, we are to understand, in accordance with his theory, that he has in mind *dynamical* action; as this is the only mode of activity which he recognizes. Now if the simplest phenomenon compels us to recognize a power behind it by which we are acted upon, we think it may be made apparent, that the highest order of phenomena presented to our consciousness equally compels us to recognize a *personal power* behind these higher phenomena.

Mr. Spencer tells us, "thought cannot be prevented from passing beyond appearance, and trying to conceive a cause behind." (*Popular Science Monthly*, Feb., 1874.) This is an admission that an imperative law of thought compels us to recognize cause behind appearances. Accordingly he recognizes the "indestructible consciousness of power behind appearances," as a valid reason for believing in the existence of an ultimate cause, or rather as being itself a valid belief in such

existence. We affirm that there is an equally imperative law of thought, which compels every thinking person to pass beyond an especial class of phenomena, to conceive of *personal agency* behind. There is not simply an "*indestructible consciousness of power*," but of *personal power* behind appearances; and this "*indestructible consciousness*" is the basis of a valid belief in the existence of a personal Creator.

These phenomena, which Mr. Spencer is pleased to designate under the name of appearances, must, according to his theory, address themselves to our consciousness through some mode of *dynamical* impression on our sentient organism. If consciousness actually stopped at the simple cognition of this dynamical impression, then thought need not go beyond the vague indefinite cognition of power behind appearances, and the recognition of this power as the cause of the appearances. But besides this dynamical impression, cognized in every sense-perception, there is another cognition, or appearance in consciousness, which carries the reason beyond the mere indefinite consciousness of power or cause behind phenomena. While the cognition of these simple dynamical impressions imperatively demands the recognition of power or cause behind, the relation and succession of these impressions in space and time take shape in consciousness, as the cognition of a system of order, consisting of "useful working collocation,"* adaptation, and the adjustment of means to ends. If the simple cognition of dynamical impression carries along with it an indestructible consciousness of power or cause behind appearances, this higher cognition of intelligible and intelligent adjustment, by a logical necessity equally imperative, carries along with it an "indestructible consciousness" of intelligent voluntary agency behind the observed system of order. Just as the simplest sense-perception, by an imperative law of thought, generates an "indestructible consciousness" of *dynamical cause*, so the complex perception of a great system of cosmical order, pervaded in every part by "useful working collocation," adaptation, and adjustment of means to ends, by a law of thought equally imperative, generates an "indestructible consciousness" of *personal cause* behind the intelligible cosmos.

* *The Nation*, Jan. 15, 1874.

ARTICLE III.—THE PARDONING POWER.

It is sometimes a comforting thought that in all the actions of our daily lives we are working out the laws of nature. We seem obliged to act on settled principles, whether we have any or not. We may be, and perhaps generally are, quite blind to the nature of our acts; we may even refuse to think what we are doing; and yet we are all the time fulfilling the divine plan. It is even possible for people to deny the existence of the very principle that their deeds illustrate and make plain to everybody else. No one would maintain that it was possible to have sunshine without having shadow; but many persons seem disposed to maintain an equally absurd proposition, that there should be no such thing as punishment, although their every-day experience might have taught them better. The whole world has borne punishment in childhood; the greater part are or will be parents and inflict punishment. And in the exercise of the inalienable right of unmarried Yankees to teach school, the disagreeable necessity of punishment will present itself. Whatever may be the theories of the parent or the teacher, they will alike find that punishment in some form is not to be separated from government. It may be nothing but negative punishment, the withholding of reward or praise, nothing even but a frown or a grieved look; but it is punishment, if it is meant to cause certain acts to be followed by more pain or less pleasure than others; the result being, of course, that the motives for avoiding such acts become more powerful.

The real hardship and practical difficulty of punishment is that it is painful not only to the guilty but to the innocent. This is the ground of the common confusion of thought on this matter, and the explanation of that sentimental tenderness of heart, which is, as Mill says, "little better than a timid shrinking from the infliction of anything like pain, next neighbor to the cowardice which shrinks from necessary endurance of it." Doubtless there is much scepticism in the mind of the boy who is told by his teacher, as he inflicts chastisement, "I

do it for your good ;" "You will live to thank me for this flogging ;" "I tell you every blow gives me more pain than it does you." But the teacher is right after all. At least he *should* feel as he says he does ; although it is very true that many, perhaps most of those who inflict punishment, do it hastily. Too often with parents as well as teachers it is a word and a blow. It is little more than a gratification of anger or revenge. Probably in our own experience we have found how hard it is to refrain from punishing when we are indignant at an offense ; and how hard it is to punish when our wrath has cooled. But it must be maintained, in opposition to blind fury on the one hand and to morbid sensitiveness on the other, that it is wrong to punish in anger when it is easy, and it is right and necessary to punish in calmness when it is hard.

There is, however, a silver lining to this dark cloud. The disagreeable duty of punishment may be often relieved by the exercise of pardon ; and the relief is great to both parties. Every one can recollect how when a child he was burdened with a sense of guilt, often with a fear of punishment added, and how his heart was in a moment lightened as he saw the frown on his father's face give place to a forgiving smile. Perhaps no pleasure since then has been so keen or so pure. And on the father's part the relief is even greater, for to inflict punishment on his child is to inflict pain on himself for no ill desert of his own. His anger is gone, the offender is his child and dear to him, a thousand extenuating circumstances occur to him, there is the penitent face, the pleading eye, and it seems not only pleasant but noble to pardon.

"The quality of mercy is not strained ;
"It droppeth, as the gentle rain from heaven
"Upon the place beneath : it is twice blessed ;
"It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes.
"'Tis mightiest in the mightiest ; it becomes
"The throned monarch better than his crown ;
"His sceptre shows the force of temporal power,
"The attribute to awe and majesty,
"Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings ;
"But mercy is above this sceptred sway ;
"It is enthroned in the hearts of kings ;
"It is an attribute to God himself ;
"And earthly power doth then show likest God's,
"When mercy seasons justice." *Merchant of Venice*, Act IV, Sc.

Now it seems the most natural thing in the world to transfer this generous feeling about pardon to other cases than those which have been mentioned as examples. About Christmas time, when we think of God's forgiving love toward us, when our hearts are warmed with love toward all men, when we have, in short, a general overflow of good feeling, we pick up the newspaper and read with a sensation of actual virtue of the Governor's pardon graciously extended to some deserving convict. We read the account of the uniform good conduct of the prisoner, of the long years he has spent in jail, of his surprise as he hears his name called out, his utter astonishment as he sees the formal document produced; we see him overwhelmed and broken down by sudden joy as the thought of freedom, home, friends, flashes upon him; we follow him in thought to his meeting with the aged mother, whose gray hairs shall now go down with gladness instead of sorrow to the grave; with the wife, just now worse than widowed, and the children, worse than fatherless, now all restored and united in happiness; and we are hard-hearted indeed if our lips do not tremble a little, and our eyes for a moment grow dim. Surely if one pardon can cause so much happiness, it were a pity that there are not more.

Yet if we reflect sufficiently, we must be reluctantly driven to admit that this pardoning power, so far from being a blessing, is a curse. As most of us have learned in our first experience with the poor, the charitable deeds that filled us with pleasure as we performed them were often an injury to those whom we meant to benefit, and a cause of subsequent grief to ourselves. Where we thought to relieve suffering we increased laziness, when we had sent away one full, we were visited by a dozen empty, when we had given what we could spare to those who did not deserve it, we were obliged to let the worthy suffer unrelieved. It is a fact none the less true because it is painful, horrible as it may seem to the sentimental view, that our good impulses must be checked and held under by reason, or they will certainly cause more suffering than good, not only to others but to ourselves.

We shall find, if we have patience to listen to reason, that our feelings, by their impetuosity, have hurried us over an important

line, that between the family and the State. We thought of the child and the good results of pardoning him, and we leaped at once to the conclusion that the same good results might be expected from pardoning the criminal. The one has broken the commands of his father, the other has broken the commands of the State; nothing is more natural than to say that like treatment will lead to like results, the cases being similar. The cases, however, are not similar, and it is of the utmost importance that the difference between them be clearly understood.

First, the relations of the offense to the offender. The father knows the disposition of the child. He is able to see when punishment should be inflicted and when it would do more harm than good. He can tell when it has endured long enough to accomplish its purpose. He can so explain the nature of the offense to the child, that punishment may be replaced by pardon, with the full assurance that the offense will not be repeated. Secondly, as to the relations of the offense to other members of the family. (Where other persons are involved, the case comes to resemble that of the State and the criminal, and the difficulty of remitting punishment is seriously increased.) Here the father can explain to the injured ones the penitence of the offender, and assure them that they will have no cause to regret leniency; and can at the same time explain to all, the nature of the wrong done and its consequences, so that the thought of pardon will not lessen their resistance to temptation. In all these cases the justification of the pardon is of course the fact that punishment has really in some way been inflicted; the painful consequences of the offense have been made clear.

In not one of these conditions can the State occupy the place of a father. It does not know the disposition of the criminal; it cannot see when the character would be more benefited by pardon than by punishment; it cannot tell when penitence has been secured; it cannot be sure that pardon will be a guaranty of good behavior. If any one regard this as too sweeping an assertion, at least it cannot be denied that the knowledge of the State in these respects must be extremely imperfect. But it would make no difference if the State were able to judge in the first class of relations as clearly as the father; in the second class, the relations of the offense to the community, it is in the

nature of the case impossible. A family of a dozen persons may be regulated by one parent, but the thorough knowledge which he possesses, through personal acquaintance with the character of every member, cannot be possessed by the State, or by any number of officers of the State, under any conceivable circumstances. This is the fundamental difference in the two cases. The object of the State in punishing is to a very small extent the good of the individual; it is the good of the whole community. It is well that the criminal himself should be convinced that the consequences of his crime are painful and the crime is to be in the future avoided; but it is of far greater importance that all men who may be tempted to commit that crime should have clear ideas of the pain which they will be likely to suffer. Now to hope to explain to that unknown multitude, the future criminal offenders, a large part of whom cannot read—to hope to explain to this class the grounds of pardon, in such a way that they will be more inclined than before to shun the crime, is to indulge a hope discouraged by experience as well as reason.

Of course, it is not meant to assert that the State does not, in the opinion of many, occupy the place of parent toward its subjects. After many centuries of tribulation, the idea has been beaten into the heads of most men, that the religious beliefs of its subjects cannot be regulated by the State with much success; and that however abominable heresy may be, the inquisition is a worse evil. Still there is quite a number of persons, it appears, that agitate themselves about getting the constitution of the United States amended so as to provide for the existence of God. It would be foolish to suppose that we have fully grasped the magnitude of the difference between democratical and monarchical government. If we may reason from the pride our wealthy fellow citizens seem to take in displaying helmets and coronets upon their coach panels, (a pride that took on an air of burlesque when Mr. Tweed ornamented his property with the Tweeddale arms,) there is still a good deal of reverence felt for antiquity. The thought of being descended from persons who really existed three or four hundred years ago, is still enough to dazzle many an upright and clear-headed man; and few of the sternest democrats can behold for the first time a real,

genuine king, the titled representative of ages of royalty, without having to struggle against the feeling that there is in him something more than in ordinary flesh and blood.

"Not all the water in the rough, rude sea
 "Can wash the balm from an anointed king.
 "The breath of worldly men cannot depose
 "The deputy elected by the Lord ;
 "For every man that Bolingbroke hath pressed,
 "To lift shrewed steel against our golden crown,
 "God for his Richard hath in heavenly pay
 "A glorious angel: ——."
 "—— we thought ourselves thy lawful king;
 "And if we be, how dare thy joints forget
 "To pay their awful duty to our presence?
 "If we be not, show us the hand of God
 "That hath dismissed us from our stewardship;
 "For well we know, no hand of blood or bone
 "Can gripe the sacred handle of our sceptre,
 "Unless he do profane, steal, or usurp."
 "—— my Master, God omnipotent,
 "Is mustering in his clouds, on our behalf,
 "Armies of pestilence; and they shall strike
 "Your children yet unborn, and unbegot,
 "That lift your vassal hands against my head,
 "And threat the glory of my precious crown."

—*King Richard II*, Act III, Sc. 2 and 3.

It is only by a strong effort and long reasoning that we are able to tear from our minds this inveterate tradition that rulers are superior beings, and state clearly to ourselves the fact, that in this country, however it may elsewhere be, the State is nothing but the people, who have agreed upon certain rules as necessary to protect themselves against the selfishness of the evil-disposed among mankind; and the government nothing but the men chosen by the people to see that such new rules are made as are necessary and to enforce whatever rules are made. Perhaps to a people as sensible of the humorous as the Yankees are, the real difference between a monarchy and a democracy is brought out clearly enough, when we compare the ideas excited by the royal pardon as we imagine it conferred by the chivalric princes that figure in Scott's novels, and those aroused by the spectacle of Andy Johnson, in the exercise of his sovereign prerogative, dispensing free grace to all counterfeiters, or President

Grant forgiving those sweet offenders, the introducers of obscene articles into girls' schools. And if we descend a little and observe our sensations at the idea of a governor of Louisiana pardoning a plunderer of the public treasury, or a governor of Georgia pardoning a forger of railroad bonds, it will be hard not to admit that this "gracious prerogative" belongs to a different age and a different theory of government from our own.

But if we abandon the paternal theory of government, and look on the State as a mere business organization of the people to secure protection in pursuits not injurious to the common welfare, does it follow that the pardoning power must also be abandoned? On this theory there is no room for sentiment. It is the business of the State to accomplish its purpose in the most efficient manner.

Of course, no wrong act is to be committed under the pretence of good ends, but also no act that may not seem wrong is to be done unless it conduce to the ends for which the State exists. Now it is useless for human beings to try to give to actions their proper reward. However prone we are to judge one another, there is no authority, either in reason or revelation, for supposing that we are competent to the task. We are all sinners and unfit to sit in judgment; that is the prerogative of the Searcher of Hearts and of Him alone. But what men can and must do, if they would preserve their lives, is to say of certain acts, they shall not be done. If they are done, we will make it so unpleasant for the doer that he will not be likely to do them again; and we will let this be so widely known that all other men, when tempted to these acts, will be likely to be discouraged from doing them by thinking of the disagreeable consequences. In short, we must recur to the idea with which we started, and regard punishment inflicted by the State as whatever consequence appointed by law to an act tends to deter men from committing that act. If it were found that men were more effectually than in any other way kept from crime, by giving criminals their liberty instead of shutting them up, by clothing them in broadcloth rather than in parti-colored garments, and lodging them in dwellings of brown stone and plate glass in place of granite and iron, it would not only be allowable, but right to so treat them; the experiment, however, has

been recently tried in New York City and has been abandoned as a failure. In order, therefore, to find out whether it is the business of the State to grant pardons, we have only to answer the question: "Does the granting of pardons tend to encourage crime, or to deter from crime? Does the remission of punishment increase the good effects of punishment, or does it lessen those effects?" These questions may be answered in two ways; by showing the necessary conditions of effective punishment, and by observing the effect of pardon on those conditions.

The first condition is that the penalty be suited to the offense, or, to speak precisely, that the offender have no reasonable ground for thinking himself unjustly treated; that is, more hardly dealt with than other men. This suggests the answer to a question that may arise: "If the end of punishment is simply to deter, and not to reward men for their acts according to abstract justice, why not employ torture and hanging for every crime?" According to tradition, Draco, an early law-giver of Athens, attempted to inflict punishment in this manner, but without success. Certain acts cause far more suffering and injury than others and it is therefore necessary to discourage them by severer penalties. Whether men regard punishment as the proper reward of crime in itself, or as meant to deter from crime, they will feel the inequity of making all penalties equal. When one man commits a murder with the grossest cruelty and is hung for it, and another man is hung for entering a house and stealing five shillings, it is clear that the latter can have no good opinion of the law. His own outraged feelings would not be of so much importance, as he is to be hung and will be out of the way; but the feelings of others are to be considered. In England, within fifty years there were nearly thirty offenses punishable with death, and the natural result was a hatred of the law and a general sympathy among the lower classes with criminals. Not having attained to the height of seeing that all sin is equally blameworthy, men reasoned: "Here is murder, a great crime, punished with death, and stealing, a little crime, punished with death. So then this power that makes the laws does not see any difference between murder and stealing. If that is justice, I'll none of it." All men,

however low, have reason and conscience, and no man commits a crime without in some way justifying himself. No really bad man believes himself to be thoroughly bad; as soon as he does he is on the way to be a good man. He will allow that he did wrong, that he committed a crime, but he will invariably point to some justification of his act. If he do not, he is either justifying himself in secret, or else he is penitent and no longer thoroughly bad. Now whatever justification the man may find, it should be nothing in the laws. If the laws are not just, the criminal at once becomes a martyr. If any man or class of men feel oppressed by the law, all the real power of the law is gone. All the punishment in the world will then produce nothing but anger and bitterness, and the ferocious spirit of revenge that has been so strikingly displayed in Ireland, supposed in England to be due to the ineradicable savageness of the Irish race, until improved laws caused the disappearance of the evil. In a word, where punishment seems unjust to the offender, the thought of it, instead of deterring him from crime, has the opposite effect; it exasperates him and drives him desperate. The "dangerous classes" are not really dangerous until they come to believe that the laws are directed against them and not against all offenders of whatever rank; then they look on themselves as persecuted, and on society as hostile, and the natural instinct of self-defense drives them to revenge.

In general, there must be the same relation in the popular mind between penalties as between offenses. If one crime is commonly looked on as twice as bad as another, the punishment should be twice as severe, so near as can be estimated. Of course, there may be cases where the laws are ahead of the people, or more often where the people are ahead of the laws, but these are only the unavoidable errors belonging to a state of progress.

A second and still more important condition of the efficacy of punishment is certainty. Frequent changes in the punishment of the same offense have a most pernicious effect; in fact, the very same effect as is produced by the meddling of Congress with the standard of value, a spirit of speculation. The law is to the common mind a standard of right and wrong, and right and wrong are revered as eternal principles. But if the law can and does alter these principles by punishing an

offense at one time and at another letting it go unpunished, the foundations of morality are shaken. The criminal will reason with himself that if an act is not always punished it cannot be always wrong, and he will very logically go further and say that some acts that are now punished probably do not deserve punishment. If the law is guided by no fixed standard, then it is no guide for him. He cannot understand the special reasons that may seem good ground for making an exception in a particular case. All he knows is that one man was punished and another who did the same thing was pardoned; and so there is a chance for him to escape, if he violates the law.

Offer an inveterate drunkard a glass of liquor. At the sight of it his fearful thirst rises like a giant. Say to him, "Do you not know that this liquor means certain death to you?" He will reply, "Yes, I know that if I do not stop drinking I shall die, but I cannot control myself, I must drink." "You cannot help it?" "No, I cannot, the appetite is too strong." But pour a dose of strychnine into the liquor and offer it to him. The case is altered. He says no longer, "I cannot help drinking it," but, "I cannot drink it." Certain death was to be the result in both cases, but clearly the conviction of certainty was stronger in the latter case. And just this conviction of the certainty of punishment it is of the highest importance to establish in the mind of every one tempted to crime. It is not enough that there be a very high degree of probability of the execution of the law, for men will run almost any risk if there is a chance of escape. There is a very high degree of probability that no lottery ticket will draw a prize, but the gambling spirit is so strong in men that even churches, disregarding the laws of the land, find the raffle a sure source of income; while some governments establish lotteries as a judicious mode of taxing their subjects. If there is but one chance in a hundred of escape, men will go through fire and water and perform prodigies of valor; but if there is absolutely no chance, it is not every day that a Marcus Curtius or an Arnold Winkelried will be found. Now there will always be crimes, because there will always be more or less chance of escape from detection and punishment. But for the State to do or allow anything that tends to make punishment more uncertain than it unavoidably

is, is to deliberately tie its own hands, to lay obstacles in its own path, to handicap itself for the race.

There are other conditions of effective punishment besides these two, equal treatment of criminals and certainty, but these are the necessary conditions. It is plain that an irresponsible pardoning power, acting under no law but the pleasure of an individual, is not a part of either of these conditions. We may now proceed to consider the effect of this power on these conditions, and others that may incidentally present themselves, in a more specific manner; and to examine the arguments that are employed to justify the existence of this power. Let us begin by taking the opinions of Beccaria, of Blackstone, and of Kent, in the order in which they were given. Beccaria says: "As punishment becomes more mild, clemency and pardon are less necessary. Happy the nation in which they will be considered as dangerous." "Clemency, which has often been deemed a sufficient substitute for every other virtue in sovereigns, should be excluded in perfect legislation, where punishments are mild and the proceedings in criminal cases regular and expeditious. This truth will seem cruel to those who live in countries where, from the absurdity of the laws and the severity of punishments, pardons and the clemency of the prince are necessary. It is indeed one of the noblest prerogatives of the throne, but at the same time a tacit disapprobation of the laws. Clemency is a virtue which belongs to the legislator and not to the executor of the laws; a virtue which ought to shine in the code and not in private judgment. To show mankind that crimes are sometimes pardoned, and punishment is not the necessary consequence, is to nourish the flattering hope of impunity and is the cause of their considering every punishment inflicted as an act of injustice and oppression. The prince, in pardoning, gives up the public security in favor of an individual and by his ill-judged benevolence proclaims a public act of impunity. Let the executors of the laws be inexorable, but let the legislator be tender, indulgent, and humane. . . . A small crime is sometimes pardoned, if the person offended chooses to forgive the offender. This may be an act of good nature and humanity, but it is contrary to the good of the public; for although a private citizen may dispense with satisfaction for the injury he

has received, he cannot remove the necessity of example. The right of punishing belongs not to any individual in particular but to society in general, or the sovereign. He may renounce his own portion of this right, but cannot give up that of others."

Blackstone's comments on this subject are as follows: ". . . The last and surest resort is in the king's most gracious pardon; the granting of which is the most amiable prerogative of the crown. Laws (says an able writer) cannot be founded on principles of compassion to guilt; yet justice, by the constitution of England, is bound to be administered in mercy; this is promised by the king in his coronation oath, and it is that act of his government which is the most personal and most entirely his own. The king himself condemns no man; that rugged task he leaves to his courts of justice; the great operation of his sceptre is mercy. . . . This is indeed one of the great advantages of monarchy in general above any other form of government; that there is a magistrate who has it in his power to extend mercy wherever he thinks it is deserved; holding a court of equity in his own breast to soften the rigor of the general law in such criminal cases as merit an exemption from punishment. Pardons, according to some theorists (Beccaria), should be excluded in perfect legislation, where punishments are mild but certain; for that the clemency of the prince seems a tacit disapprobation of the laws. But the exclusion of pardons must necessarily introduce a very dangerous power in the judge or jury, that of construing the criminal law by the spirit instead of the letter; or else it must be holden, what no man will seriously allow, that the situation and circumstances of the offender (though they alter not the essence of the crime) ought to make no distinction in the punishment. In democracies, however, this power of pardon can never subsist; for there nothing higher is acknowledged than the magistrate who administers the laws; and it would be impolitic for the power of judging and of pardoning to centre in one and the same person. This (as the prudent Montesquieu observes) would oblige him very often to contradict himself, to make and to unmake his decisions; it would tend to confound all ideas of right among the mass of the people; as they would find it

difficult to tell whether a prisoner were discharged by his innocence or obtained a pardon through favor. In Holland, therefore, if there be no stadtholder there is no power of pardoning lodged in any other member of the State. But in monarchies the king acts in a superior sphere ; and though he regulates the whole government as the first mover, yet he does not appear in any of the disagreeable or invidious parts of it. Whenever the nation see him personally engaged, it is only in works of legislature, magnificence, or compassion. To him, therefore, the people look up as the fountain of nothing but bounty and grace ; and these repeated acts of goodness coming immediately from his own hand endear the sovereign to his subjects and contribute more than anything to root in their hearts that filial affection and personal loyalty which are the sure establishment of a prince."

The prevailing view is undoubtedly that of Kent: "The Marquis Beccaria has contended that the power of pardon does not exist under a perfect administration of law, and that the admission of the power is a tacit acknowledgment of the infirmity of the course of justice. And where is the administration of justice, it may be asked, that is free from infirmity? Were it possible in every instance to maintain a just proportion between the crime and the penalty, and were the rules of testimony and the mode of trial so perfect as to preclude every possibility of mistake or injustice, there would be some color for the admission of this plausible theory. But even in that case, policy would sometimes require a remission of punishment strictly due for a crime certainly ascertained. The very notion of mercy implies the accuracy of the claims of justice. An inexorable government, says Mr. Yorke in his considerations on the law of forfeiture, will not only carry justice in some instances to the height of injury, but with respect to itself it will be dangerously just. The clemency of Massachusetts in 1786, after an unprovoked and wanton rebellion, in not inflicting a single capital punishment, contributed by the judicious manner in which its clemency was applied, to the more firm establishment of their government. And this power of pardon will appear to be more essential when we consider that under the most correct administration of the law men will sometimes fall a

prey to the vindictiveness of accusers, the inaccuracy of testimony, and the fallibility of jurors. Notwithstanding this power is clearly supported on principles of policy if not of justice, English lawyers of the first class and highest reputation have strangely concluded that it cannot exist in a republic, because nothing higher is acknowledged than the magistrate. Instead of falling into such an erroneous conclusion, it might fairly be insisted that the power may exist with greater safety in free States than in any other forms of government; because abuses of the discretion unavoidably confided to the magistrate in granting pardons are much better guarded against by the sense of the responsibility under which he acts."

Blackstone seems to have the same appreciation of the advantages of evading responsibility that animated Vincentio, the Duke of Vienna :

"Friar. It rested in your grace
 "To unloose this tied-up justice when you pleased ;
 "And it in you more dreadful would have seemed,
 "Than in lord Angelo.
"Duke. I do fear, too dreadful :
 "Sith 't was my fault to give the people scope,
 "T would be my tyranny to strike, and gall them
 "For what I bid them do ; for we bid this be done,
 "When evil deeds have their permissive pass,
 "And not the punishment. Therefore, indeed, my father,
 "I have on Angelo imposed the office ;
 "Who may, in the ambush of my name, strike home,
 "And yet my nature never in the sight,
 "To do it slander."

—*Measure for Measure*, Act 1, Sc. IV.

Of course, the views of Blackstone when he talks of the king as "holding a court of equity in his own breast,"—that he "acts in a superior sphere—does not appear in any of the disagreeable or invidious parts," have no particular weight with men of modern times, who believe that kings are made of flesh and blood like other people, and who are not in the habit of looking up to that fellow citizen whom they have chosen for a time to administer their laws, as a "fountain of nothing but bounty and grace." "Filial affection" and "personal loyalty" towards the governors of our States, are sentiments that are a trifle out of date.

The only argument adduced by Blackstone is this : the exclusion of pardons must necessarily introduce a very dangerous power in the judge or jury, that of construing the criminal law by the spirit instead of the letter ; or else it must be holden that the situation and circumstances of the offender ought to make no distinction in the punishment. It is hard to understand the force of this unless we consider the bloodthirstiness of the English criminal code at that time, when some relaxation of its severity may well have seemed indispensable. But with a criminal code like ours, where crimes are classified according to "the situation and circumstances of the offender," and where the judge has the further power of sentencing to various degrees of punishment in his discretion, and where juries refuse to convict if they think the probable punishment too severe, there is certainly no ground for saying there is no distinction between punishments. In fact, Blackstone himself, led away by his loyalty, gives the most effective answer to the advocates of a pardoning power. In a democracy, he thinks, "it would tend to confound all ideas of right among the mass of the people ; as they would find it difficult to tell whether a prisoner were discharged by his innocence or obtained a pardon through favor." We do sometimes find this difficulty in our democracy, but if Blackstone had cast the beam of monarchy out of his own eye, he might have seen more clearly that the real mote was not in the form of government but in the pardoning power itself. Unless, indeed, he supposed that in a democracy the judge must be also the legislature and the executive. His reference to Montesquieu favors this view, although Kent does not allude to it in his reply.

The views of Kent are certainly stated in a far more judicious way than those of Blackstone, and undoubtedly express the common opinion. There are, however, two fallacies underlying his arguments. In the first place, he does not deny that the pardoning power has no place in a perfect administration of law, but contents himself with saying there is no perfect administration. It seems strange that it should have escaped his notice that this argument would check at the outset all change whatsoever, and stop the march of progress. Stated briefly, it is this : no system of government, education, or any-

thing else is perfect; therefore devices for remedying imperfection are necessary; therefore they must never be done away with. It is true enough our administration of law is defective, and it is equally true that if the defects cannot be removed it will never be any better.

But the more serious fallacy, and the one which is really at the bottom of all the feeling in favor of the existence of this power, is this: the president or governor is better able to decide whether a prisoner deserves punishment, and how much he deserves, than the judge and jury that tried and sentenced him. In this simple form probably few of those who practically admit the doctrine would accept it; but a close examination will detect this principle as underlying most of the arguments that are employed to defend this "amiable prerogative."

"Were it possible," says Kent, "to maintain a just proportion between the crime and the penalty," (implying that the executive can tell better how to maintain this proportion than the judge and jury that have heard the evidence), "and were the rules of testimony and the modes of trial so perfect as to preclude every possibility of mistake or injustice," (implying also that the executive can tell better about the testimony and mode of trial than the judge and jury), "there would be some color for the admission of this plausible theory." Think of the governor of the State of New York considering fifteen hundred (1,500) applications for pardon in a single year, and whether in every case there was a due proportion between the crime and the penalty; examining, of course, all the evidence on both sides; reviewing the testimony and mode of trial in every case, a task requiring great legal knowledge as well as a thorough perusal of the reports. Reflect that he hears evidence only on one side, that there is no prosecuting officer to expose false testimony, and that pardons are asked as personal favors. Consider that all this is but a small part of the duties of a governor, and consider, on the other hand, how long a time the decision of these cases would take a judge and jury sitting constantly and having no other business to attend to, and decide whether it is likely that justice is furthered by such means. It would be quite safe to assert that punishment will

be neither equal nor certain under this system. But it is not necessary to depend on *a priori* reasoning. We can cite the testimony of Governor Hartranft of Pennsylvania in his last message. He says :

" A year's experience in the pardoning power has confirmed me in the opinion, expressed in my inaugural, that it is unwise and unjust to impose this responsibility upon a single individual. The importunities of distressed relatives, the personal appeals of men of character and reputation, the inconsiderate and indiscriminate manner in which petitions are signed by responsible parties, the absence of protests in almost every case, and disproportion between the offense and the penalties frequently imposed, are all calculated to embarrass and prevent a right conclusion. When it is considered, also, that the Executive, in any application, is forbidden to enlist his sympathies, while his discretion is presumed to be proof against ingenuity and falsehood, the perplexity of his situation can readily be conceived."

Add to this the single fact that in some States this power has been so exercised that on an average the convict sentenced for life or for twenty years spends a shorter time in prison than the one sentenced for ten years, and only a little longer time than the one sentenced for five years. It does not take a high degree of intelligence in a criminal to enable him to draw the inference that it is for his interest to commit a crime that will give him a long sentence; the effect on public safety need not be explained. But it may be well to draw the sympathy of the tender-hearted to the case of the poor wretch that spends five years in jail for some drunken excess, when he sees murderers and burglars pardoned out before him.

It may, however, be admitted that these abuses are deplorable, and yet it may be maintained that they cannot be avoided. After all, it will be urged, there is and always must be a great deal of imperfection and injustice in the course of law, and some higher power is needed to step in and remedy cases of obvious and gross injustice. It is no doubt to be greatly regretted that undeserving persons are pardoned, but it would be still more unfortunate for those who deserve pardon not to obtain it. It is an old and sound maxim of law that it is better that ten guilty men should escape rather than one innocent man should be punished. It is probable that this feeling still remains in the minds of most readers. Although the principles already explained, if strictly applied, would do away with it, it may be perhaps more effectively removed by a careful study

of the cases in which it is thought necessary that pardon be granted. In some States the governor sends to the legislature a list of all those whom he has pardoned, stating the crime, sentence, time stricken off, and the grounds of pardon in every case. An examination of these reports for a term of years may be fairly expected to show all the usual grounds for pardon, and to show or suggest most of the possible grounds. It will be unavoidably tedious, but in no other way can a conclusion be reached that will command respect and acceptance. If there is any room for defending an institution or an abuse by a resort to vague generalities, that method of defense will always be employed; not with any wrong intent in many cases, but simply because no one is able to give up a cherished belief or prejudice at once, and when unable to find specific arguments, the use of indefinite terms serves to conceal the awkwardness of the truth that one is really but defending a position because he has determined to defend it; one simply *cannot* admit that he is in the wrong without going through a long process of argument, for self-love will not allow it. But when all specific arguments that are adduced have been rebutted, it may be fairly claimed that a cause is lost that is driven to defend itself by vague expressions and abstractions. "The interests of justice would not be furthered by the punishment of this prisoner," is not a statement that can have any influence unless it be explained *how* the interests of justice are affected. And if it be clearly shown in every case that is brought up, that a pardon will not promote the interests of justice, then we may safely conclude, in defiance of generalities, that the pardoning power should not exist. It is to be feared, however, if we contrast the indignation that stirred the blood of our ancestors at the very name of general warrant or bill of attainder, with the meekness with which we have borne the customs-laws of the present day, that there is sad reason to believe that many things questionable in themselves will now be overlooked if they are done in "the interests of justice."

Let us consider some of the more striking cases first. At the request of the Russian minister, a man convicted of rape and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment was pardoned after serving three years, with the understanding that he was to

leave the country, which he did. What is the lesson to be learnt from this? Apparently that our laws are not made for foreigners, and that they may violate them with comparative impunity. Or else, that if criminals will leave the country they may have their penalties remitted, which would be a good rule if it did not work both ways, as other countries would soon make clear to us. In fact, criminals often manifest a great desire to leave the scene of their crime, and are only brought back after a long chase and a great expenditure of labor and money. Shall we say to them: "Wait and be convicted, when if you are willing to run away a pardon shall be granted you." This would beyond all question be an extremely popular mode of punishment and far cheaper than imprisonment. But on the other hand, would the crime of rape be discouraged? This is not a slight offense but a serious crime, almost as serious as murder. But if it is to be pardoned at the intercession of a foreign minister provided the criminal leave the country, this should be clearly understood, and should be embodied in the law on this subject; otherwise the crime might be committed under a misunderstanding, and the unfortunate offender, falling into the hands of hard-hearted executives, might languish out the full term of his sentence. We have already seen that the first requisite of effectual punishment is equal treatment of all by the law. Now if the conditions which are here assigned as grounds of pardon are legitimate grounds, then they are legitimate grounds in all other cases where the circumstances are similar. Then they should be stated in the law, as an act of justice. Or if they are not legitimate in other cases, they are not in this. In any event there is no need of a pardoning power for such cases.

Another case was that of a man also convicted of rape (this crime for some reason is generally treated with great tenderness by the pardoning power), and sentenced for fifteen years, who was pardoned after serving two months. The grounds assigned here are certainly far more reasonable than in the previous case, the prisoner having saved a building from destruction by fire and having protected the life of a keeper against an assault by convicts. These are meritorious acts, but are men to escape punishment for crime because they interpose to save

life and property? Shall we say to men, if you will save the life of a keeper you may commit a rape with impunity? Is it to be a general rule that anyone who protects a keeper shall be pardoned? If not, why is an exception made in this case? If it is to be the general practice, it should be a part of the law that pardon in such cases is to be granted, otherwise the principle of equal justice is violated. But in that case there is no need of the pardoning power. This case is an excellent example of the vicious ethics of the "Jim Bludsoe" school. Since this character lost his life in trying to save the lives of his passengers, it is inferred that bigamy or murder, or whatever previous eccentricity he may have been guilty of, will be pardoned by God; hence it would be only right, if he had lived, that he should not have been punished by man for his violations of law.

It may be urged that such conduct as that of this convict must be encouraged in order to promote good discipline in the prison. If this be true, a liberal reward in money might be offered: but the principle is a wrong one. Assaults on keepers should be checked by severe penalties, not by pardons to those who take the keeper's part. This latter method may be consistently employed when the State pays rewards to members of the community outside of jail who act as peacemakers; no longer punishing the man that assaults another, but paying the man that hinders the assault from being fatal.

There follow a large number of cases that may, to save time, be grouped together. The grounds of pardon are here: many recommendations; the prisoner to leave the State, to enter business, to settle an estate; youth; ignorance; previous good character; the prisoner led into crime by others; mitigating circumstances; inability to pay fine; weakness of prisoners' intellect.

It may be said in general that these grounds are not to be held to relieve criminals from punishment. Recommendations are obviously to be obtained according to the station in life of the prisoner and the political and social influence that he can command. But it is just as important that a person of high position that commits a crime should be punished, as that one of low degree should be, perhaps even more important, for the

lower classes, as already pointed out, are on the watch for any partiality in the execution of the laws, as a justification for breaking them. So the fact that a criminal will leave the State, points to the fact that criminals thus pardoned will enter the State. It is certainly a disregard of the comity that should prevail between communities. So a chance to enter business is of course very much to be desired for a criminal when his term of punishment has expired, but it does not appear reasonable that punishment should be remitted on this account. And the fact that a prisoner is needed to settle the estate of his father cannot be held to be a fit ground for exemption from punishment. So with youth, ignorance, good character, and other mitigating circumstances; these are all taken into account by the law, and have been weighed by the judge and jury, and yet sentence has been pronounced. They should not be again brought forward to do away with the sentence that was given in view of them. The fact that the prisoner was led into crime by others does not acquit him of blame. The fact that he is unable to pay his fine should not relieve him from punishment; unless the fine was additional to imprisonment, when it becomes a debt, and freedom from imprisonment for debt should be provided by law. And the fact that the prisoner is of unsound mind is a fact to be settled by the jury at the time of trial.

It is of course impossible to follow out the argument in detail in all these cases, but they may be safely tested in this way. Are the grounds alleged for pardon such that they could have been considered by the judge and jury at the time of trial? If so, it is more likely that the judge and jury have arrived at a right conclusion by devoting their time to a fair hearing of the evidence on both sides, than that the governor should arrive at a right conclusion by an unavoidably hasty consideration of the entreaties and witnesses on one side only. It must not be lost sight of that the governor of a large State can, in the nature of the case, devote but a small portion of his time to this department of his duties. If he have to consider fifteen hundred applications during the year, that would suppose that he can consider five every day, to do which with any regard to justice would certainly occupy most of his waking

hours. If governors nowadays were statesmen of the type of the framers of our constitution, this dangerous power might be with safety left in their hands; but fidelity to duty in opposition to the dictates of policy is not the distinguishing feature of our public functionaries.*

In the cases we have now considered, the pardoning power must be regarded as defeating the ends of justice: both because it is impossible that the executive should have a better knowledge of the facts than the courts, and because if the grounds assigned for pardon are proper in one case, it is partial and unjust that they should not be established by law rather than

* Extract from the *Life of John Jay*, vol. 1, page 396.

"The petitions for pardon were numerous and they were frequently presented under circumstances which required great firmness to resist them. In two instances the governors of neighboring States applied to him by letter, soliciting the pardon of convicts from their States, who happened to be respectably connected. In another case the clergy, magistrates, and inhabitants of a town in Connecticut united in a petition in behalf of a fellow-townsmen. But perhaps in no instance did the governor find it more difficult to withstand the solicitations of his friends, and the impulses of his own feelings, as in one which excited a general and painful interest. The son of a worthy revolutionary officer, who had lost a limb in the public service, had been convicted of forgery and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The aged and broken-hearted parent repaired from a distant part of the State to the capital to invoke in person the clemency of the executive, bringing with him from the towns through which he passed petitions urging his suit; while the governor's most confidential friends, and the great officers of State, solicited him in private, to liberate the prisoner in consideration of the father. But "all was in vain." The following letter seems to have been written on this occasion, to General Williams.

"SIR:—I have been favored with yours of the —, mentioning that the friends of — are anxious for his release from prison, and that the people appear to be satisfied with the punishment he has received. How far these circumstances afford proper reasons and principles whereon to found a pardon, is a question which after due consideration will not, I presume, appear very difficult to decide.

The power of pardoning is committed by the constitution to the prudence and discretion, and not to the wishes or feelings of the governor. If it was committed to the latter very few convicts would be long imprisoned. I believe it to be my *duty* to pardon all who in my judgment ought to be pardoned, and to refuse pardons to all who on principles of sound policy and justice ought not to have them. To pardon or not to pardon does not depend on my will, but on my judgment; and for the impartial and discreet exercise of this authority I am and ought to be highly responsible.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

JOHN JAY."

by the caprice of successive governors. There remains a more important class of cases where justice is sometimes obviously outraged by the infliction of punishment, and where some such expedient as the pardoning power may well be regarded as indispensable.

In a number of cases the law has been changed since sentence was pronounced ; a criminal, for example, was sentenced for ten years for an offense afterwards made punishable by five years imprisonment. It is held that the prisoner should have the benefit of this change. *Ex post facto* laws are prohibited because it is unjust that a man be punished for an act that was not punishable at the time it was committed. A rigid application of this principle would require that a man suffer the penalty attached to his offense when he committed it. He had the consequences of his act in view, he knew what he had to expect if convicted, and if his trial was fair he has no ground for complaint. The fact that the penalty has been changed since his act was committed could have had no influence on his action. But it is not necessary to press this principle to an extreme. The law-making power could have easily inserted in the changed law a provision that offenders under the old law should be set free after they had served the shortened term. If the old law was regarded as unjust, a common regard for justice would require that this be done. The fact that no such provision was made, must be taken to show that it was not intended that the new law should be retro-active. In a matter so plainly within the ken and power of the legislature, the intrusion of the pardoning power is to be regretted. But a study of the Parable of the Laborers in the Vineyard will show that the injustice in these cases is apparent only and not real.

In a few cases the ground assigned for pardon is the belief of the prison keepers that the convict is reformed. This is a legitimate reason for relaxing the severity of punishment, and is, by a very wise provision in some States, allowed to shorten the term of confinement ; or strictly speaking, good behavior is allowed this encouragement. But to pardon a man when his keepers believe he is reformed is to constitute them a court of justice, with no security that justice will be regarded. Or if this be legitimate, then it should be so stated in the law, that all may have equal treatment.

The practice of pardoning offenders who are at the point of death or incurably diseased, in order that they may enjoy the comforts of home, must be held to be humane, and with proper safeguards unobjectionable. But there is no need of employing the governor to decide in such cases. It is plain that he has not the time at his command, and it must often occur that painful injustice is done by his inability to attend at once to cases that demand instant action. In fact, it is several times reported that the pardon reached the prison after the death of the prisoner. The certificate of the attending physician might be made by law as efficacious as the governor's pardon. There would doubtless be abuses, but it is to be remembered that the governor now acts on the advice of the physician, and the abuses would be perhaps fewer if one person were responsible rather than two. In any case, the matter should be regulated by law, not by the chance of the governor's being able to act in time.

A prisoner is sometimes pardoned in order to bear witness against a more serious offender. If the testimony of a convict is unworthy of credence, will the fact that he has been pardoned make it worthy? If there are legal technicalities in the way of using such testimony, they are founded in wisdom or they are not. If they are, they should be respected, and if they are not, they should not be evaded, but the law should be improved.

The remaining cases may be briefly summed up as cases where it is held that the punishment is too severe for the offense, where there is doubt as to the guilt of the prisoner, or where there is clear proof of his innocence. As to the first we must enquire as before, whether it is likely that the governor is better able to arrive at the truth than a court of justice. If there is no new evidence in the case the answer must be in the negative. If there is new evidence, then, as well as where there is doubt of guilt or proof of innocence, punishment should certainly not be inflicted. But it by no means follows that a pardon should be granted. This is in many instances no remedy for the injustice done. If a man has been pronounced guilty of a crime of which he is innocent, the injustice can only be repaired by a full and fair acquittal in a court of justice. Par-

dons are granted for too many other reasons to answer as a proof of innocence. That provision of law which forbids a judge to grant relief after sentence has been pronounced, even though it then appears that the prisoner is innocent, must result in injustice. A new trial should be granted whenever satisfactory proof is offered that evidence likely to change the verdict can be produced ; provided, of course, it be *new* evidence, such as could not have been offered at the first trial. On the presentation of satisfactory reasons, to be determined by law, the court of errors or appeals might be empowered to order another trial, or itself to re-open the case. Or a court might be constituted for the sole purpose of hearing appeals in criminal cases, the grounds of appeal being of course prescribed by law and not left to the discretion of the court. As it is now, the governor is really a court of appeals. But how can justice be done by a court of one judge, with little time in any case to devote to a duty for which all of his time would not be enough ; exposed to influences of all kinds, and hearing whatever appeals, groundless or otherwise, any one may choose to present ; a court that owes its existence to the favors of politicians and that must treat their requests with deference ; a court where only the piteous side of justice is presented by the friends of the criminal, while the interests of the community have no advocate to plead their cause ! Such a court has all the faults that a court can have.

It may, however, be urged that until the necessary alterations in law have been made, the pardoning power should remain. This is really the fallacy pointed out in the remarks of Kent. It may safely be said that as long as there are provisions to repair the effects of carelessness and ignorance, the careless and ignorant will not trouble themselves to improve. If the legislature will vote a deficiency bill for every excess of expenditure over appropriation, the appropriations will always be exceeded. And if the executive will repair the damage done by bad laws, the legislature will not mend them. President Grant pointed out the true principle in his first message, though he may have since forgotten it. He said that the proper way to secure good laws was to rigidly enforce the bad ones. Let the governor decline to pardon, but let him report to the

legislature the cases where injustice is worked by the laws, and leave them their proper responsibility of making laws that will not work injustice. The governor now reports cases where the judge and jury seem to have thought that it made little difference what their verdict and sentence was, for the governor would rectify it if it was unjust. Were they altogether wrong in this view? Is not this the natural consequence of a system where one man can overthrow the proceedings of judge and jury because he thinks the offense was done in a drunken frolic, or the result of carelessness rather than criminal intent, or the prisoner should have had better counsel, or the evil consequences of the crime were not very serious, after all?

A searching critic may still say: "Granted all this, but with changing circumstances there must ever arise new and unforeseen contingencies, that would not fall under the conditions legally specified as necessary for granting an appeal. Here without the pardoning power there would inevitably result gross injustice." This is in the main correct, but the remedy should be in the power of reprieve, not of pardon. Punishment should be suspended until after the next session of the legislature; when if they chose to take no action in the matter after their attention had been called to the injustice of their laws, responsibility would rest with them. Such a power of reprieve is (or has been) granted to the governor, in certain cases, by the State of Vermont.

It may occur to one acquainted with the constitutions of the different States, that in New Jersey there is a court of pardons, and that the governor has no powers in this matter except as a member of this court. Here then we might expect to find a more perfect administration of justice and less crime than in other States. But in point of fact there are more pardons granted in New Jersey than in most States, the number pardoned from the State prison having exceeded 130 in a single year of late, (one-sixth part of the whole number of convicts,) while the amount of crime, if measured by the number of convictions, is very great. This does not look very hopeful for the proposed court of pardons. But the explanation of this state of affairs is not far to seek. New Jersey lies between New York and Philadelphia, and whatever her laws, must be

exposed to the incursions of hosts of the criminal class. This will explain the large amount of crime. The number of pardons is to be explained by the fact that there are no laws regulating appeals for pardon or the granting them, but everything is left to the discretion of the court. Of course, this method of constituting a court of pardons is better than to leave everything in the hands of the governor. But it is better only in this respect, that the number of judges may cause more fairness in decision. The judges (the governor, lieutenant governor, and six judges of the court of appeals constitute the court) are still overworked, and are not, in any proper sense of the word, a court, for they have no laws to guide them. They at once make the law by which pardons are bestowed, decide whether a prisoner is to come within that law, and execute their own sentence; a union of the three functions of government that is universally condemned. In justice to this court of New Jersey, it should be added that of late years the number of occupants of the State prison has been twice, and almost three times the number for which the buildings were intended, and the court of pardons may well have felt that common decency required that such overcrowding should not be perpetrated in the name of the State. It must still be maintained, however, that the providing of prisons for those who are sentenced to confinement by their laws, is the proper business of the legislature, and that they will attend to this matter much more quickly if the court of pardons will not repair the consequences of their neglect.

In the State of Connecticut pardons are granted by the legislature. In consequence of the publicity thus ensured the number of applications for pardon is not more than thirty or forty a year, while the number granted is only six to ten. And it is only fair to allow that this fact may have a considerable influence in causing the comparative immunity from crime enjoyed by this State. Although there are many obvious reasons against endowing the legislature with this power, it yet seems remarkable that the inspectors of the State prison should recommend, as they recently did, that pardons should be granted by the governor, as in other States. It is to be hoped that any change that is made, may be in a different direction.

It may be well to remind the reader that it is not the aim of this argument to secure greater severity in punishment. It may well be that the deterrent effect of imprisonment will not be lessened by shortening the term. This question can only be settled by experiment. But no satisfactory result can be reached unless the fundamental conditions, equality and certainty of punishment, be regarded. The true aim of punishment is mercy. Not the blind, cruel mercy that sees only the wretched criminal, but the more enlightened mercy that sees also the sufferings he has caused. Sympathy belongs not only to the murderer but to the victim of murder, and to his family and friends. As we enlarge our view it becomes more and more clear that the pardon of a criminal is but a refinement of cruelty to those who are tempted to crime, teaching them that they may hope to avert those consequences of their acts that the very existence of civilization requires shall not be averted; a lesson that men are only too ready to learn. Sooner or later, a misguided leniency will bring its sure result in an increase of crime; and then follows the injustice of a sudden access of severity in the execution of the laws. First, men are told that they may hope for milder punishment than the laws provide; then, when they have learned the lesson and act accordingly, faith is broken with them and the full penalty of the law is inflicted. When men can hope for favor they will cease to fear justice.

The main points of this somewhat prolonged argument may be with advantage briefly summed up in conclusion. We saw that punishment in some form is an unavoidable evil; that unless the absurdity be committed of maintaining that all acts must be followed by the same consequences, those acts which are injurious to the community must be followed by more unpleasant consequences than others; and that these unpleasant consequences constitute punishment, because they tend to deter from the acts which they attend. But unfortunately these consequences are unpleasant, not only to the doers of the obnoxious acts, but to others. The infliction of punishment is painful to the innocent as well as the guilty. And while justice requires that punishment should not be inflicted during the heat of indignation that follows the crime, yet when this

indignation is allowed to cool, the motive to punish has in great part disappeared. Hence arises the disposition to do away with punishment, wholly or partly, that is, to pardon. It was seen that this might be safely done in the family, because the nature of wrong acts could be there explained, so that the relief from punishment need not result in increase of wrong-doing. And it is easy to suppose that the State stands to its subjects in the relation of a father to his children. The mistake soon appears. We find that it is hopeless for the State to attain such acquaintance with all its offending subjects as to be able to judge when punishment may be remitted to their advantage. And even if this were not the case it would yet be utterly impossible for the State to explain to that ignorant multitude that will grow up into habits of crime, the grounds on which pardons are granted, so that they will not look on them as reasons for hoping that they may escape punishment. It was admitted, however, that this belief in the parental functions of the State is still widely prevalent, owing perhaps to the poetic glamour that surrounds the office of king, and the slowly dying belief in his divine authority.

Abandoning this view and adopting the theory that the State is merely the people governing by the choice of some of their number to execute the laws which the whole people have agreed upon, the question arose whether the pardoning power of the executive should not be retained. The business of the State is to enforce its laws in the most effective way consistent with justice. It is impossible to reward acts according to their real merits. But crime can be repressed; and the question then is whether pardoning criminals tends to lessen crime, for if so the State should pardon them. To answer this question requires a knowledge of the conditions of effective punishment. These were found to be two: the first, equality, that is that like offences done under like circumstances should receive like punishment. This forbids excessively severe punishments, for these must be reserved for the most heinous crimes. And the cause of the necessity of equality was seen to lie in the disposition of men to justify themselves by any partiality shown in the treatment of others, a disposition which it is of the highest importance to modern society should find no justification in

the course of the laws. The second condition we found to be certainty in the execution of the laws. The law, standing as a rule of right to common folk, should not be variable. And if there be any, the slightest, belief that punishment will not be inflicted, the gaming propensity of men will, as in the case of lotteries, lead them to run heavier risks than the odds warrant. Any act of the State, therefore, that hinders the effectiveness of these conditions must be regarded as unwise.

Clearly, then, pardon, if an act of favor, is no part of these conditions. What justification, then, can be offered of the existence of this power? The opinions of eminent jurists were quoted, of whom one, the Marquis Beccaria, was unable to reconcile this power with a sound system of justice. Blackstone, dazzled by the divine perfections of George III, was seen to be an unfit guide for modern times, while the view of Kent is exposed to two objections. It seems to justify abuses on the ground of the necessary imperfection of human justice; and it assumes that the executive is better able to decide what is required by justice than a judge and jury. This assumption was shown to be unfounded by considering the amount of time required by the governor of a large State to examine all the applications for pardon, compared with the time at his disposal, the lack of evidence, undue influence, want of publicity and other conditions. This opinion was confirmed by the testimony of Governor Hartranft. And the startling fact appeared that long sentences often meant less time in prison than nominally shorter sentences.

The objection, however, arose, that these abuses, though deplorable, cannot be avoided. Owing to the imperfection of the administration of justice, the innocent will sometimes be condemned, and it is better that many improper pardons be granted rather than one proper one be refused. This is but a restatement of the argument of Kent, but unless answered it is decisive. It can be fully answered only by an examination of the grounds on which pardons are, as a matter of fact, granted. This examination showed that cases where pardons were granted as a matter of favor, were promotive of more injustice than justice. That in cases where there had been a fair trial, and no new evidence had appeared, it was unreasonable to

suppose that a person in the circumstances of the governor of a State could decide so well what was just as a regularly constituted court; else, indeed, what use of judge and jury? Moreover, in cases where the operation of the laws was thought too severe, it was pointed out that the legislature was the proper body to act, and that whatever tended to relieve them of their responsibility, tended to perpetuate the evils complained of. And in cases where after sentence was pronounced new evidence appeared that the prisoner was innocent, it plainly appeared that a pardon was not the proper means of remedying injustice; a law rather should be enacted, fixing the conditions of appeal for new trial, or a specially constituted court should take cognizance of such cases, not, as in New Jersey, to grant pardons at their discretion, but to secure when necessary a re-trial. These cases embrace the entire subject, and in none of them does it appear that the pardoning power should exist. Nor can we admit it as a make-shift until something better is provided; for to do so removes the motive to provide anything better. Even in cases that escaped all legal prevision, the power of reprieve would be sufficient to protect the innocent.

Not only, then, mercy to the criminal class, but the safety of the community requires that this power be abolished. No thoughtful person can survey the political future of the United States without seeing that, whatever may be the final result, there is to be a season of great peril to republican institutions. The class of men that will henceforth, for a season at least, occupy the position of governor, will not be men of the stamp of John Jay. Despotic power is not gained by a standing army only; the power of emptying the prisons can be of fearful service. Already the example of some of the Southern States warns us what use can be made of this power when once the proletariat has learned its own strength. Equal and certain justice is a fundamental condition of the existence of our American republics. Under the present system we shall more and more widely depart from this condition.

ARTICLE IV.—MATTHEW ARNOLD'S "LITERATURE AND
DOGMA."

Literature and Dogma. An Essay toward a better apprehension of the Bible. By MATTHEW ARNOLD, D.C.L. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co.

WITH the professed aim of this book we must declare ourselves to be in hearty sympathy. Matthew Arnold is certainly not the only, nor the first man that has seen the necessity of some religious re-adjustments, to meet the exigences of the age and of coming ages—re-adjustments not of fundamental and essential truths—these are "the same yesterday, to-day, and forever,"—but in our modes of statement and in our organic arrangements. Systems of religious thought and modes of ecclesiastical organization which to a great extent originated, or at least derived their present form and spirit, from dark ages of prevailing ignorance, superstition, and spiritual despotism, cannot be reasonably presumed to be well suited to an age of higher culture, both in the direction of literature and of science, than any that has preceded it. Any man that ever thinks can see—must see—that if Christianity is to stand up as a controlling power in the midst of the intense illumination of such an age, it must be by completely divesting herself of all those forms of thought and government with which she has allied herself in the dark and gloomy ages through which she has made her way. The assumption is not an unreasonable one, that in her progress through these ages, she may have absorbed into herself more or less of what Mr. Arnold calls "extra belief," not pertaining to her as she came from her divine author; and that that "extra belief" obscures her great essential truths, and places her under a necessity of defending much that is indefensible, and in attempting to defend which she must be easily vanquished by her enemies. If she is to stand and be mighty in an age of literature and science and culture, it must be by putting off all these old and tattered and filthy garments,

in which benighted men and ages have arrayed her, and wearing only those beautiful garments of purity and charity in which she was originally arrayed.

The question really and fairly at issue between Christianity and those enemies who assail it from the side of culture and science, is not whether the system of speculative thought relative to the topics with which Christianity is conversant that has come down to us from the times of Augustine, or that ecclesiastical system which grew up in the declining period of the Roman Empire, can be successfully defended ; but whether the religion of the Bible can be defended. No man has any claim to be considered a true friend of the Christian cause who will not recognize this distinction, and who will not unite his best endeavors with those of all good men of all parties, in an effort to eliminate from Christianity, as it now appears before the world, all foreign elements which have been incorporated with it in bygone ages of darkness and ignorance, and present it to the men of this age in the purity and simplicity of its original conception in the thought of its Founder.

Mr. Arnold professes to have this end only in view in the book we have in hand. This avowed aim of the book is commendable. Such a re-adjustment of the Christianity of our day is a necessity of the nineteenth century. It is a condition of its successful vindication against the assaults of its modern enemies, and of its being accepted by those populations of the world to whom it is now offered by the Christian missionary, and of its prevalence and beneficent power in coming ages. So far we have no controversy with our author.

But has he succeeded in the re-adjustment which he has proposed and attempted ? We propose in this Essay to answer this question, and very freely to point out the very grave and, as it seems to us, fatal errors into which he has fallen. That we may do this justly and fairly, it is incumbent on us first to give attention to the central idea of the book, for it has a central idea, of which the author is never unmindful. It is very fairly indicated by the title, "*Literature and Dogma.*" It may be thus stated, that the language of the Bible is that of literature, and not of dogmatism ; that it is to be treated as the language of the people and not of system-makers and dogmatists ; and

that whenever this rule is violated great injustice is done to the book, and its teachings are likely to be greatly perverted and distorted.

The correctness of this position we cannot for one moment hesitate to concede. The Bible may contain the elements out of which a system of theology can be constructed. But if it does contain such materials, they are not systematically stated in logical form. It is not a book of dogmatic propositions and terms employed with technical accuracy. Its forms of presentation are popular and concrete, and its language is that of the people. On this point, therefore, we think no intelligent advocate of the Bible will have any controversy with our author.

We meet the author, then, on his own chosen ground of literary criticism. As a critic, has he dealt fairly and wisely with the Bible? In order to answer this question, let us first examine his treatment of two words, "God" and "righteousness." In dealing with these two terms, the author says, "If there be any thing with which metaphysics have nothing to do, and where a plain man, without skill to walk in the arduous paths of abstruse reasoning, may yet find himself at home, it is religion." This is quite true. And yet if that plain man, say David or Isaiah, has written out an account of his religious experience and life, in his own plain way, it may be a very important qualification for the just criticism of that composition that the critic should be a sound metaphysician. It may still be true that Mr. Arnold's being "so notoriously deficient in every thing of that kind" may be a disqualification, and not, as he claims, a qualification for the task of literary criticism he has undertaken. He is bound fairly to meet the question, what did these writers mean by the words "God" and "righteousness?" They were no dogmatists, to be sure, but they were men for all that; and if we would know what they meant by such words, we must inquire what are the universal intuitions of the human soul in relation to God and moral duty? No man can answer this question without metaphysical speculation and abstruse reasoning, and no man who has not so qualified himself can be a sound critic of the theology and morality of the Bible.

Mr. Arnold says, "morality" represents for everybody a thoroughly definite and ascertained idea." And yet it cannot be denied that men's ideas of morality have differed through as wide a range as their ideas of God. In no one thing have the teachings of the Bible done more for mankind than by rendering their idea of moral duty clear, definite, and comprehensive. At the present time, the moral teaching of the Bible is not more accurately comprehended than its teachings respecting God. The morality of the Bible is like its idea of God, progressive through all the ages over which divine revelation extends, and both ideas culminate at last in Jesus Christ.

The author is perfectly right in maintaining that "righteousness is a special object of Bible religion." It is its whole object, its sole aim. But he fails greatly when he asserts that religion is "conduct," and "conduct is *three-fourths of life*." If religion is conduct, then conduct is the whole of life. Our author makes conduct to respect the regulation of all those appetites which have reference to the preservation of life and the reproduction of the race. But if religion is conduct, then conduct is the regulation of all our appetites, desires, and propensities. It is true, religion does not teach æsthetics, but it does prescribe the ends and aims to which æsthetic culture is to be consecrated, and the limit to which, in the case of each individual, it may be pursued. The law of morality is truly enunciated by the Apostle: "Whether, therefore, ye eat or drink, or whatever ye do, do all to the glory of God." If God has fitted one to do more for human well-being by the creations of the artist than in any other way, religion prescribes such a use of that man's life as a high moral duty, as truly as it forbids him to waste his talents in sensuality and debauchery. All, therefore, which our author says of religion having reference to "three-fourths of life" falls to the ground. Righteousness is not the mere regulation of the appetites which relate to self-preservation and the reproduction of the race. It suggests the only true aim of all life, and furnishes the proper impelling power to all our activities. *I ought*, not only teaches me to restrain my appetites within the limits of moderation, but to love my neighbor as myself, and fully to exert my active powers in efforts to promote universal well-being. *I ought*, is an original

intuition of human reason, informed, enlightened, exalted by the teachings of Moses and the Prophets, and perfected by the wondrous words and still more wondrous deeds and voluntarily endured sufferings of the Man Christ Jesus. Mr. Arnold has failed in his criticism, both by not apprehending morality as an original intuition of reason, and by not appreciating its maturity and completion in the life and death of the Christ of God.

He has drawn a distinction between morality and religion, but in this he again fails. Morality he makes to be mere ethics, practical duty. Religion is "ethics heightened, enkindled, lit up by feeling." He quotes many examples of the use of language to sustain this distinction. To economize space, we must make one serve as a specimen of them all. He quotes Cicero as saying, "Hold off from sensuality, for if you give yourself up to it, you will find yourself unable to think of any thing else." "This," he says, "is morality." In contrast with this he quotes our Lord's words, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God," as a specimen of religion. We willingly accept the two examples as fairly exemplifying the difference between morality and religion. But has Mr. Arnold truly indicated the difference between them? Is it merely a difference in the amount of feeling manifested in the two cases? We can have very little confidence in the criticism of the man that thinks so. The real difference is that Cicero presents morality in its merely human and earthly relations. Jesus presents morality as sustained and exalted by the known will and emotions, and moral authority of God. The former is morality as an atheist might look upon it; the latter is morality as it must ever be viewed by the devout worshipper of the God of the Bible. This conducts us to the true distinction. Religion is morality sustained, exalted, and enforced by the devout worship of the only living and true God as revealed in the Bible.

This brings us to examine the soundness of Mr. Arnold's criticism in treating the word "God." This is certainly the most remarkable feature of the book. In his treatment of this topic, Mr. Arnold manifests a certain animosity and bitterness not quite easy, at first sight, to be accounted for. It seems that

on some occasion, notorious to the English public, but of no special interest to ourselves, the Bishop of Gloucester had spoken of the "blessed truth that the God of the Universe is a *person*." This utterance of the Right Reverend Bishop seems to have excited in Mr. Arnold's mind a very remarkable degree of anger and contempt, which so pervade the book, as almost to suggest the suspicion that the book was written to give them utterance. Indeed, we see abundant evidence that Mr. Arnold is maddened and rendered desperate by the arrogant assumptions of the English hierarchy, and yet, like his father before him, so dazzled by its splendors as to be blind to the chains that bind him, and to the iron that enters into his soul. We would like to join the distinguished son of Dr. Thomas Arnold, in a good hearty protest against the hideous usurpations of the English Established Church. But of our enjoying this pleasure we see no prospect. He says, "We may leave all questions about the Church, its rise and its organizations, out of sight altogether. Much as is made of them, they are comparatively unimportant." While this is his view of that matter, it is in our heart to say to him, Dear critic, keep your temper. Things are quite as well in that direction as you have any right to expect they will be. Under the present organization of the English Church it is not probable that her dignitaries will either be more wise or less arrogant than at present. You have not nearly so much cause to be angry on the present occasion as you seem to think you have. It will not be denied that the word "God," in the Old Testament and the New, is the language, not of dogmatism, but of literature, poetry, eloquence. But this doth not forbid the inquiry, what does it mean? for surely it has meaning. And the only true criticism is that which can help us to answer this question rightly. There are laws of language, and laws of thought, which must guide us in this inquiry, and such a knowledge of metaphysics as will qualify us to understand these laws, we must call to our aid on this occasion. We are quite aware that David and Isaiah are not metaphysical writers, but for that very reason it is all the more certain that they have used language in accordance with those laws of thought which underlie all human knowing and believing.

In examining this point it is fair, first, to notice the author's own definition of the word God as used in the Bible. And yet we ought not to say definition, he does not propound it as a definition ; indeed, he would be quite shocked at such a suggestion. He proposes that, in order to disentangle our religion from all the cavils of unbelief, we limit our notion of God to the conception of "an enduring power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness." This conception he claims is real and solid, and capable of being verified. If we will confine ourselves to this restricted view of God, science will go with us, and the schism between religion and science will be healed. He admits that "the people of Israel came, by tradition, emotion, imagination, to attach more than this plain sense" to the words and phrases by which God is described. But this plain, restricted sense he thinks will fully answer our purpose for bringing the Bible before the mind of the world as a power for righteousness. And he would advise us, in order to secure for that book its legitimate influence in the world, to confine our conception of God to this cold, narrow, and restricted definition. This, according to Mr. Arnold, is the result of literary criticism applied to the Bible. Is it fair, is it wise, is it just criticism ?

In our ignorance, we had supposed that a true criticism must sympathise with the warmth, the glow, the fervor of literature. But such criticism as this is colder than the driest, hardest metaphysics, and more merciless than the dissecting knife of the anatomist. The author says, "by tradition, by emotion, by imagination, the Hebrews no doubt came to attach more than this plain sense to these phrases." We wonder when they "came to" it? and when the "tradition" commenced which betrayed them into such folly ; just such "Aberglaube" for all the world as the Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester preach in our degenerate days ! If the Bible must be treated thus, in order to make it a book capable of defence and perpetuity, it is surely no book for plain men. To interpret and defend it requires more power of abstruse thought than all the dignitaries of the English Church lay claim to. A plain man could more easily master all the intricacies of metaphysical theology, than appreciate the application of such a criticism to the Psalms of David.

Let us try it upon an example. "As a father pitieth his children so the Lord pitieth them that fear him; for He knoweth our frame, He remembereth that we are dust." Let us read this according to the conception of our critic. As a father pitieth his children, so "an enduring Power, not ourselves," pitieth them that fear it: for it knoweth our frame, it remembereth that we are dust. We use the impersonal pronoun of necessity, in order to carry out the conception of our author. For if we use "He" we at once invest "an enduring Power not ourselves" with personality, and reinstate that idea of the personality of God which Mr. Arnold thinks it so important to eliminate. Indeed, we do not eliminate it by using the impersonal pronoun, for an impersonal Power can neither pity nor know. It is impossible to reduce this grand utterance of the Psalmist within the limits of this restricted conception of God, without converting it into absurdity and nonsense. Yet this example from the Old Testament is only one of thousands which might be cited. Such criticism would convert a very large portion of the book into absurd and meaningless nonsense. This, we may be sure, is not sound, just criticism. We might as well subject the glorious human form to the dissecting knife of the anatomist, in order to secure its presentation in its own proper beauty, as to give the Bible into such hands to secure for it the reverence and submission of an age of culture. We may be quite sure those men of science who assail the notion of a personal God with undisguised antipathy, do not ask and will not accept at our hands any such enervated, emasculated Bible. They must be converted to a humble faith in that God of Israel whom the Psalmist adored and loved, or they will reject the Bible because it draws all its inspiration and power from a doctrine which seems to them inconsistent with their systems of science.

Let us, if possible, speak the whole truth in reference to this matter. That which offends in the doctrine of a personal God, is that worship, that affectionate and reverential adoration, that trust in a Heavenly Father, that prayer to God for help in our times of sorrow and conscious weakness and dependence, that devout belief in a creating and ruling God, of which the Bible is full, and which can no more be eliminated from the religion

of the Bible than veins and arteries can be eliminated from the human body without destroying life. Criticism never attempted a more hopeless task than that of rendering the Bible acceptable to men who reject and despise the doctrine that "the God of the Universe is a Person."

But Mr. Arnold tells us, we are to remember that those writers who applied such language to God were poets and orators, and therefore when under the influence of emotion used personification of course. All this is mere anthropomorphism. Goethe is quoted as saying "*Man never knows how anthropomorphic he is.*" Anthropomorphic, indeed, Israel was, if he believed in no personal God. He prayed to a power which he did not believe to possess any personal attributes, worshipped it, built altars, and the tabernacle in the wilderness, and the temple at Jerusalem, and solemnly dedicated them to it, and ages after offered holocausts to it. We are told they were poets, orators, and under the influence of strong emotion at the clear perception that "there is an enduring power not ourselves that works for righteousness." The men of these modern ages have come to the knowledge of another enduring power, not ourselves, that works for the order, and harmony, and perpetuity of the material universe. And there have been in these ages poets, orators, and a great deal of emotion about this newly-found power. But men do not pray to the force of gravity, they do not sing hymns to it, they do not rear altars and temples for its worship, they do not talk of "serving it" and "pleasing it." Why was Israel, why are all men so "anthropomorphic" in speaking of God, even Goethe himself? so that when he stood on the top of Brocken the words which rose naturally to his lips were, "Lord, what is man that thou mindest him, or the son of man that thou visitest him." "Is Saul also among the prophets?" Has Goethe united with the "Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester" in confessing "the blessed truth that the God of the universe is a person." This rank and irrepressible growth of all humanity has a root somewhere, and it is time we make an honest effort to find it. This universal anthropomorphism is a phenomenon to be accounted for. And we shall not be deterred from an effort to account for it by any solemn protest that Israel was not skilled in metaphysical

speculations. Israel was human and used language according to the same laws which underlie all human speech. We must discover what those laws are, or we can never soundly criticise the theological literature of Jew or Gentile.

Why then did Israel always invest "the Eternal" with personal attributes, not only in his eloquence, his poetry, but in his architecture, in his laws, in his armies, in the whole practical life of the nation? And why in this regard have all men, all nations, in all ages done the same?

One answer only can satisfy this inquiry. Man—not Israel—not the Aryan—not any particular race—but man, sees in effect cause, in adaptation of means to ends design, in design purpose, character, personality, in nature God, in himself a being made in the image of God. Such an intuition of God explains the reason why men worship him, and pray to him, and build altars and temples and offer holocausts to him. Such an intuition unclouded by superstition, informed and exalted by the influence of men who had stood in the very presence-chamber of divinity, is the inspiring, life-giving principle of the Old Testament and the New. It was this that made the Psalmist exclaim, "As a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him." It was this that made even Goethe, with all his contemptuous unbelief, exclaim, in a moment of honest emotion in presence of nature, "Lord, what is man that thou art mindful of him, or the son of man that thou visitest him." In that moment the great high priest of godless culture made an honest utterance of the voice of nature that spoke within him.

There is an anthropomorphism, not only in the Bible, but in all literature. But it furnishes no explanation of the personal attributes ascribed to God in the Bible. It is itself a phenomenon needing to be explained. We are told the Greeks, the Romans, the Egyptians personified the productive powers and forces in nature. But why did they? Because they saw in nature every where the manifestation of personal attributes, mind, soul, will, character. Our minds manifest their powers and workings only through bodily senses and organs. Therefore it is that we conceive of God and all other spiritual beings anthropomorphically. If it were possible so to instruct and

train the human mind, that this intuition of mind in nature should no longer exist, literature would cease to be anthropomorphic. It would become as atheistic as the coldest materialist could desire. But to educate humanity out of its original intuitions, is the most hopeless task that science has ever undertaken. Goethe, we have seen, could not educate himself out of the intuition of God in nature.

At this stage of our discussion it is perfectly apparent why Mr. Arnold fell into error, when he attempted to draw the line between morality and religion. God, he assumed, is the mere symbol of emotion, a mere creation of the imagination under the influence of strong feeling. When Jesus said, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God," Mr. Arnold assumes that it was of course not to be supposed that Jesus believed in a personal God at all, but that he was speaking under the influence of strong feeling, and therefore personified the "enduring power, not ourselves, that works for righteousness." This "religion is morality touched with feeling." Grant to a man who proposes to apply criticism to the elucidation of the Bible, the liberty of making such assumptions at pleasure, without any necessity of even attempting the proof, and he must be a very dull man if he can not make any thing out of any thing. Yet such an assumption as this Mr. Arnold smuggles into the very first chapter of his book, without even an attempt at proof. He does it almost "on the sly." Verily, this is the man who is going to make our Bible presentable to an age of culture and science, by the application of sound criticism. For our part, we must heartily join with the Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester in exulting in the "blessed truth that the God of the universe is a person,"—certainly, that the God of the Bible is.

But after all Mr. Arnold tells us that science will never receive this conception of God, because it cannot be verified. What then does the author mean by verification? Does he mean, to test by experiment? This mode of verification is by no means possible through all the realms of matter. By an induction founded on observation and experiment we establish a law of matter. We apply that law without the slightest hesitation to innumerable substances which we have not examined

and which it is impossible we ever should examine. What is our authority for doing so? Not experiment, for experiment we cannot have. Our only authority for applying the law to cases which we have not examined is dependent on an assumption which the nature of the human mind and the nature of things compel us to make, that the universe is made according to a consistent and rational plan. Such is the undoubting confidence with which the universal human race receives that assumption, that without the least misgiving we apply that law to the very limits of the material universe. Yet any verification of the law outside the range of observation and experiment, other than this universal and necessary assumption, is in the nature of the case impossible. We can have no verification of any truth, except to reduce it to some one of those necessary and universal assumptions which are the criteria of all truth.

This very law of induction is itself a sufficient verification of the conception of a personal God. We cannot help assuming, that the universe is constructed according to a consistent and rational plan; and consistent and rational plan in the creation is an attribute of a personal God. It is rational mind in nature. If we have not rational mind, a reasonable plan in nature, it not only follows that we have no God, but no science as well. Induction becomes impossible, science perishes, and the universe becomes a chaos.

The rejection of the intuition of God for the want of verification is a virtual denial of mental or moral science. Take as an example moral accountability. All moral science rests on the assumption that men are morally free and accountable for their conduct. But how shall this assumption be "verified?" Not certainly by observation or experiment. Observation and experiment can decide nothing of the matter. In one only way can this foundation principle of all moral science and moral law be verified. It is an original intuition—an assumption as inevitable to a human being as the conception of his own existence. If such an intuition is not a criterion of truth, then are there no criteria of truth: moral science and moral law are mere chimeras. The intuition of a personal God in nature needs no verification any more than any other necessary category of the human mind. There is nothing for it but that men

of science, meaning mere physical science, must live in ignorance and darkness, respecting God, till they can escape that mental narrowness which disqualifies them to accept any truth which cannot be verified by the coarse processes of weight and measurement.

We come, therefore, to the conclusion that the Bible, in respect to the law of righteousness and the conception of a personal God, needs not for its defence, and cannot without committing suicide accept, such help as Mr. Matthew Arnold proffers.

But our task is by no means yet done. Our author not only proposes to relieve the Bible of the doctrine of a personal God, but of all responsibility for any claim to either prophecy or miracle, or any thing whatever of the supernatural. To any of our readers who may not have read the book, or otherwise become acquainted with the author's ideas, it must seem a puzzle how any one can wholly reject the supernatural, and yet claim to appear as the advocate of the Bible. Yet precisely such a claim does Mr. Arnold seek to establish for himself and his book. Some explanation is, therefore, at this point necessary, of the author's ideas, in order that our criticisms upon them may be intelligible. That many supernatural occurrences are narrated in the Bible, our author of course admits. But these are to be set down to the ignorance, the superstition, and consequent blunders of the writers. No doubt the authors of the four gospels have ascribed many stupendous miracles to Jesus himself. But it was their mistake. Jesus never wrought any miracles, or pretended to work any. In his conversations with his disciples he even denied plainly enough that he possessed any miraculous powers. The disciples reported after the crucifixion that he had risen from the dead, and that he ascended up into heaven in their sight. But there was never any foundation for such reports. They were mere rumors, that grew by gradual accretions, during the first century, and were taken up and recorded by the four evangelists in their books, but without any sufficient authority. These reports were generally received as true by the Christians of the first age, and by after ages; but Jesus was in no way responsible for their origin. The age was superstitious and credulous, and received with ready credulity any marvels respecting so wonderful a person,

and thus the Church's belief in the supernatural in all ages of her history originated.

So of prophecy: Jesus never believed in any promised, predicted Messiah, much less ever pretended to be such himself. All such ideas were mere Jewish superstition. There were no prophecies of Christ in the Old Testament, nor prophecies of any thing else. The whole notion of prophecy is a delusion, for which we are to hold the Jews of the later ages of Judaism responsible, and which we must entirely eliminate from the Bible, if we would give it any chance of retaining its influence in the ages of culture.

Such are the results to which the author thinks we are inevitably conducted by the application of a just criticism to the Bible. And he professes to believe, and we suppose does really believe, that the Bible, as thus expurgated, will retain its power over the present and coming ages, as the Book of religion. Our question returns upon us. Is this criticism sound and just? Are its results to be accepted? Has Arnold the son legitimately attained these results, by applying to Hebrew history and literature, those same principles of historical criticism which Arnold the father applied, with results so decisive, to Roman history and literature?

It is important here to remark, that the author's ideas just explained are logically consequent on that denial of a personal Creator on which we have already commented. It is a great mistake of the defenders of the Bible to employ themselves in demolishing this and that particular form of unbelief. All the forms of recent scepticism are legitimate growths from one and the same root. That root is Sadduceeism, the denial of angel or spirit, or any form of mind, personality, independent of a corporeal organization. Of course, the existence of the human soul after the dissolution of the body, and of a personal Creator, is alike rejected. If no Creator then no creation. Hence comes a so-called science which "finds in matter the promise and potency of every form of life." But a miracle, say the feeding of five thousand men with a few loaves of bread, is a creation. If, therefore, a personal Creator and a creation are denied, then miracles must be denied also. On the other hand, admit a personal Creator and a creation, and no man can tell us when the exer

tion of creative power ceased. It remains a reasonable expectation that it will be exerted whenever, in the thought of an all-wise and all-powerful Creator, the best good requires it. We have these two entirely opposite systems of thought, and each is within itself complete and consistent. The one is, no personal Creator, no creation, and of course no miracle, no supernatural. The other is, a personal Creator, a creation of the heavens and the earth, and of course a miracle in no wise improbable whenever an emergency shall arise requiring it. Of course, when Mr. Arnold suggested in his first chapter to eliminate from the Bible the conception of a personal God, he sapped the very foundation of a supernatural religion, and of course necessitated all the other sweeping negations of his book.

But Mr. Arnold does not openly employ this premise, which he has so artfully sought to establish in his first chapter, in his argument against miracles. Indeed, he professes that it is not his object to argue against miracles at all. But he assures us that faith in them is declining, and is sure to decline more and more; and advises us that, inasmuch as belief in the supernatural is doomed to inevitable decay, we should cease to hold it as a part of our religion, lest men should renounce our religion on account of finding it in so distasteful an alliance. He even approaches the subject with a certain degree of reverence. He admits that "miracles, when fully believed, are felt by men in general to be a source of authority." To deny this "is absurd." And absurd enough it is. But it is an absurdity into which most of the assailants of miracles rush with reckless haste. He also admits that "it is almost impossible to exaggerate the proneness of the human mind to take miracles as evidence, and to seek for miracles as evidence; and the extent to which religion, and religion of a true and admirable kind, has been and is still held in connection with reliance on miracles." These two admissions strike to the very root of the matter, or at least would have done if the last had been a little more accurate in its expression; if instead of saying "has been and is still held in connection with reliance on miracles," he had said what the truth requires, that it has gained a reception in the world against the most bitter and relentless opposition, through the authority of

the miracles which its preachers claimed to perform as an attestation of it as a revelation from God. How important these admissions are we shall see as we proceed.

After having made these admissions, which surely decency demanded of one who claims a place among the most zealous admirers and defenders of the Bible, he opens an attack upon the miracles of the Bible, which in point of insidious unfairness and utter want of candor is unsurpassed by any utterance of unbelief which has fallen under our notice. He begins by an effort to confound and mingle together in a common class the miracles of the New Testament and those of the Papal Church in all subsequent ages, and weakly tries to conceal from view the obvious and palpable differences in the two cases by which the miracles of the New Testament are so grandly distinguished. He pronounces the distinctions so ably pointed out by Archbishop Whately, between the miracles of the New Testament and all other pretensions to miraculous power, "mere extravagances," without one word of argument to make good his assertion against the authority of so sound a thinker. It is simply Matthew Arnold's contemptuous assertion, against Archbishop Whately's argument; a position which a son of Dr. Thomas Arnold would not have been very willing to occupy if he had been a modest man. He then presents to us this alternative. "One of two things must be made out in order to place either the Bible miracles alone, or the Bible miracles and the miracles of the Catholic Church with them in a class by themselves,—either they must be shown to have arisen at a time eminently unfavorable to amplification, and the production of legend, or they must be shown to be recorded in documents of an eminently historic mode of birth and publication." Our author knows well enough that in respect to the miracles of the Roman Catholic Church neither of these things can be made out, and no intelligent Catholic would attempt it. He would simply demand faith in the miracles of the Church on the authority of the Church herself, while he rests the authority of the Church on the miracles of the Bible. Our author has made no contribution to the literature of the subject by suggesting the necessity of making out the two things which he insists on. The defenders of Christianity have recognized this

necessity for ages. Precisely these two things they have made out by a chain of argument which is not to be broken or weakened by the two or three flimsy and unfairly selected examples which our author has adduced. No Christian writer of any authority would regard the miracle of the falling down of the walls of Jericho, standing by itself, as sustained by satisfactory historic evidence. For the most part, the miracles of the Old Testament are received by the modern believer on account of their relation to the New Testament. It is difficult to see how a man of Mr. Arnold's reading could have cited that case without a consciousness that he was dealing with the subject unfairly. Mr. Arnold is too well informed not to know that no intelligent advocate of Christianity ever thought of constructing an argument for miracles out of such an example as the miracle which occurred at the martyrdom of Stephen. There are many narrations of miracles which we all admit would have no validity as evidence, when taken by themselves, and which Christians receive only because of their historic connection with other miracles which are supported by high historic evidence. A man who will not see, or seeing will not acknowledge, the distinction in this regard between the miracle last mentioned and the restoring the blind man to sight (John 9th), or the healing of the lame man at the Beautiful gate of the temple, is hardly to be argued with. We do not care to waste words on such an antagonist. Yet precisely this unfairness and want of candor is apparent in every example which Mr. Arnold cites for the purpose of breaking down the distinction between the miracles of the Bible and those of the Roman Catholic Church and of profane history.

But it is unnecessary to dwell on this part of the subject. All this will pass for nothing with candid and thoughtful men, and for such only we write. Indeed, we should have let it pass without any notice, but that it seemed right that it should be made apparent to what extent Mr. Arnold, while professing himself to be among the most reverent advocates of the Bible, assimilates himself in spirit and aim to the bitterest of its enemies.

The only point of his argument against the credibility of miracles which is any real contribution to the literature of the

subject is his attempt to account for the origin and early existence of the reports of miracles, without admitting their truth. It is precisely here that all the efforts of unbelief have failed in their onset upon the Christian argument. Here is the testimony, here are the facts. How can the existence of this testimony, these facts, be accounted for, on the supposition that the miracles were never wrought? Precisely this weak place in the argument of unbelief Mr. Arnold attempts to strengthen. If he has succeeded he has accomplished much. Has he succeeded?

His explanation of the matter is, that these reports of marvelous and miraculous events grew up by slow and gradual accretions, as tradition was busy in passing the story from one credulous man to another, till finally they became incorporated in the books which have transmitted them to our times, just as all the other legendary literature of the world has originated; that there really is no reason why we should repose any more confidence in the marvelous stories of the Bible, say of the New Testament, than in those of Grecian and Roman history, or those of the early and mediæval church; that literature shows that such marvelous stories are a normal product of human nature, and that wherever we meet them, we are to refer them to the same causes and treat them as alike unworthy of confidence. This is Mr. Arnold's view stated in its full strength.

All the plausibility of this argument is derived from assuming that things are alike, and therefore are of the same class, which certainly are not alike, and therefore belong to different classes. The miracles of the Bible, for example the resurrection of Christ, are not like the marvels and wonders of Greek and Roman mythology or of ancient history. In respect to these latter no one pretends to know where or when they originated, no historical witness is in any way responsible for them, the authors who have transmitted them to us do not pretend themselves to believe them, nobody ever had any motive for disbelieving them, or calling them in question; they have simply floated along on the stream of tradition, buoyed up by the love of the marvelous in human nature. On the other hand, we know when and where the story of Christ's resurrec-

tion originated: it is solemnly vouched for as a fact by persons living at the time, intimately acquainted with Jesus, and personally active in the events with which the story is connected. On its reception as a fact or its rejection as a falsehood, depended the result of the greatest religious conflict of any age; power, and wealth, and learning, and influence were all on the side of those who disbelieved it; to prevent its spread the most bitter persecution of those who propagated the story was every where resorted to; and yet from the very time and place of the alleged crucifixion and resurrection, a religious revolution commenced, proceeding everywhere upon the belief of this miracle as a fact, a revolution which in a brief period overturned the religions of the civilized world, and established in their stead a new religion, which everywhere held as the fundamental article of its creed, that Jesus Christ rose from the dead the third day. To say, then, that these miracles of the Bible are like the marvels and wonders of Livy and Tacitus, or like the prodigies of any Pagan mythology, is not argument, it is not criticism; it is simply confounding things that essentially differ; it is perverting history, misstating facts, to help the reader to draw false conclusions by furnishing him with false premises. The distinctions we have pointed out between the Christian and Pagan miracles are not "mere extravagances," but historic facts of solemn weight and importance.

Neither are the Christian miracles like those of the Roman Catholic Church. When these latter miracles gained currency, they were for the most part, if not without an exception, backed by the faith of the multitude and the power and influence of the governing and influential classes: nobody had any motive for calling them in question; they were alleged in support of a religion which all believed in and desired to exalt and honor; in short, they have come down to us unsustained by any historic argument. What Mr. Arnold expects to gain for the cause of truth by placing events so entirely unlike in the same class and insisting that they are due to the same causes, it is not possible for us to discern. The author says: "To pick Scripture miracles one by one to pieces is an odious and repulsive task." We should think so, to a man that sincerely reverences the Bible. But to throw discredit and contempt upon

them all in gross, by asserting their similarity in character to reports of the marvelous from which they do in point of fact differ in all their most essential and characteristic features, does not seem to be, to our author, "an odious and repulsive task" at all. He does it with a will, and expects it to be received as sound, enlightened criticism, and very helpful to the Christian cause.

Perhaps we have given more space to these really stale arguments against miracles than we ought. We could not well pass them unnoticed. It is far more important to our purpose to remark that the author's view of the subject entirely fails to account for the facts which certainly did occur. There is no escaping the fact that, commencing at Jerusalem very soon after the crucifixion, within a period of thirty-five years, the religion greatly prevailed, and Christian churches were extensively established over a large part of the Roman empire. Tacitus' account of the condition of Christianity at Rome at the time of the burning of the city under Nero proves this. It is equally undeniable that it went on, spreading with such irresistible power that in a comparatively short time it became the religion of the empire. How is this to be explained? What was it that gave the name of Jesus Christ such power from Jerusalem to Greece, and Italy, and Gaul, and Britain? According to Mr. Arnold, there was no miracle. These reports were all after-thoughts of his ignorant and superstitious disciples, growing up by little and little, as the story of Jesus was reported orally from man to man and from country to country. The resurrection was only an incredible story springing up and gaining currency in the same way, a product of pious fraud, excited enthusiasm, and love of the marvelous. Jesus never pretended to be the Christ, or to be a fulfillment of ancient prophecy at all. He was crucified as a malefactor, and buried in a malefactor's grave, and this was the end of his career. He never had any means of influence even on the Jewish mind, except the peculiarity of his ethical teachings. Any pretensions to miraculous powers, which might have been set up for him during his lifetime, if unsustained by facts, must have provoked the hatred and contempt of the leading classes, who were certainly his enemies, and made them feel that he deserved his cruel and ignominious

death, as a deceiver of the people. We do not hesitate to affirm that had these been the facts, his reputation even at Jerusalem would never have recovered from the ignominy of that malefactor's death. His name would not have been heard in the speech of his countrymen fifty years after his death. His morality, though divine, was not at all appreciated by the Jews of that generation. The sermon on the mount and the parable of the prodigal son could not have inspired much enthusiasm in such an age, among such a people. According to our author, his chosen disciples did not understand him, and have terribly misrepresented him, and are terribly misrepresenting him to-day, in those very Bibles of which the author professes to be an earnest advocate. The very discourses they delivered to the people had little to say of his morality, but instead, were full of the absurd and false story of his having come to life after his crucifixion, and flimsy proofs from ancient prophecy of his being the promised Messiah.

For extending his influence beyond Jerusalem and the land of Israel, the disciples had, according to our author's theory, still fewer advantages, nothing, absolutely nothing, but the ethics of their crucified and dishonored Master. They must have gone everywhere preaching in the name of an ignominious criminal, a morality of quiet, gentle, forgiving benevolence, to an age of pride, violence, and ambition. To this must be added the prejudice and contempt which they everywhere encountered as Jews. Ethical lectures have never been a power in any age; they are not in our own, and when the author shall have succeeded in reducing all our religious teaching to the dimensions of his theory, he will see how feeble such teaching is. Still more feeble would the mere ethical discourses of Jews delivered to Greeks and Romans; and when delivered in the name of a crucified master, they could have been only contemptible.

Now we submit to the candid reader, that to have spread his fame and his influence from Jerusalem to Rome in thirty-five years, and filled the empire with assemblies of his avowed and zealous followers under these conditions, was simply impossible. Mr. Arnold would excuse us from believing in miracles, but he imposes a far heavier tax on our credulity, by requiring us to believe that Christianity could have been thus propagated over the Roman empire in the time of the Cæsars.

If we will give heed to the facts as they have come down to us, we know well how it was done. We know causes which are entirely adequate to the effects produced. Let us admit the truth of the evangelic narrative, and all is easy of explanation. The force that accomplished that mightiest religious revolution of history was not the miracles alone, it was the wondrous personage Jesus Christ in all the aspects in which he is presented. Especially it was his miracles informed and inspired, and pervaded by his exalted views of morality, of God, and of the moral universe. Who ever heard without awe those words from John's gospel, "I am the resurrection and the life. He that believeth in me, though he were dead yet shall he live?" Yet these divine words, that have thrilled men's souls through the ages, are inseparably intertwined with the graphic narrative of the raising of Lazarus from the dead.

Take another example, the scene in the garden of Gethsemane. It may be safely affirmed that no other narrative of personal experience ever affected human thought, opinion, and character more profoundly than this. In presence of it the most daring and hardened impiety is, for the moment at least, subdued and awe-stricken. It has impressed itself ineffaceably upon all Christian ages in all Christian lands. It can never perish from human literature and sacred remembrance. To what then does this solemn tragedy owe its power over the human heart? To the fact that Jesus was the Messiah of ancient prophecy; that he was himself a prophet, and foresaw with perfect clearness the events that were before him, the palace of the High Priest, the judgment hall of Pilate, Calvary; that he saw that the great work of human salvation which he had on his hands could be accomplished only by drinking the bitter cup which was about to be presented to his lips; that the agony of his spirit in the prospect was such as to cause the sweat to trickle down to the ground like drops of blood, and to draw from him the prayer, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me;" yet too intent on his mission of love to defend himself by the miraculous powers of which he had given so many proofs, or to save himself by flight, which he could easily have done, for the power of his persecutors extended but a little way from Jerusalem; that he therefore

suffered himself to be "led as a lamb to the slaughter." Take from this scene all the supernatural; reduce him from the Messiah to an ordinary, weak, and helpless man; take from him his prophetic power, and let him be only a good man, with no knowledge of what was about to happen to him, and no peculiar necessity of offering himself an unresisting victim to his enemies, and the whole scene dwindles to an ordinary experience of a humble and suffering saint, the equal of which may be found thousands of times among his faithful followers, no one of which would make any impression on the world beyond the circle of immediate friends and admirers. Indeed, for his neglect to save himself by flight, we cannot, in this view of the facts, help blaming him as weak and pusillanimous, especially when we take into the account the agony of his apprehension of what might be before him. The power of the narrative lies in his consciousness of his high function as the Messiah, and the Saviour, and his clear prophetic knowledge of what was before him. It is these considerations only which have made the "agony in the garden" a mighty moral force in the world for eighteen centuries. In the crucifixion of such a being as a malefactor, followed almost immediately by the testimony of his plain, straightforward, honest disciples, that he had risen from the dead, and that they had seen him many times after his resurrection; and in their bold and fearless assertion of his resurrection before the rulers of the nation, who had procured his crucifixion, there was a power that shook Jerusalem as with an earthquake. Three thousand gave in their adhesion to him in a single day, and the prevalence of the religion could not be resisted, or ever afterwards arrested.

One cause only can ever explain the prevalence of Christianity after the crucifixion, and the permanent establishment of the Christian Church. That cause is the combination of the high supernatural powers and relations of Jesus Christ with that unique morality and theology which Jesus taught, which alone of all the thinking of the world solves the problems of human life and destiny. The morality without the supernatural relations and powers would have been, in that age, comparatively powerless, and never heard of beyond the limits of Palestine. The pretension to miracles, to the supernatural,

without the high and unique morality, would have been incredible and contemptible, and would have been rejected with scorn. The power of the two combined not only filled Jerusalem with the doctrine, and carried it to the extreme limits of the empire, but have borne it along over eighteen centuries, and will bear it along to the limits of the earth, and to the consummation of all things.

There is no philosophy, no wisdom in the supercilious contempt with which Mr. Arnold rejects the supernatural. It is a maxim of all sound philosophy that facts must be accounted for. This is not only true of the facts which meet us in the material world, the facts of weight and measurement, but of those also which occur in the development of human nature in its social and religious aspects. The time is not distant when we shall have a philosophy as reverently considerate of the great permanent facts of human nature, as of the phenomena of the glaciers, or the relations of genera and species in living beings. It is a fatal mistake of Mr. Arnold and of many other thinkers of our day, that they reach conclusions the most sweeping, and construct systems for which they claim universality, in utter disregard of many of the most universal, unquestionable, and characteristic facts of humanity. Such conclusions should not obtain our assent, such systems have no claim to our acceptance. We have already referred to Mr. Arnold's admission that "miracles when fully believed are felt by men in general to be a source of authority." He says it is "absurd to deny it." No doubt of it. There is not a man of us who, had he been present when Jesus of Nazareth called Lazarus out of the grave where he had already lain four days, would not, at least for the moment, have believed that the being who possessed such powers over matter, life, and death, could be trusted to tell us the invisible things of God and the world unseen. Mr. Arnold himself would have accepted the conclusion. But is such a fact as this of no significance? According to Mr. Arnold's theory, none at all. No account whatever is made of it. Can this be a philosophical procedure? Is it easy to believe that such a "*Consensus generis humani*" is a delusion? Is it not far more natural to suppose that it points to some real and permanent relationship between the physical

laws that prevail around us, and the moral government under which we live? Such a fact taken in connexion with that other admission of our author, that "it is almost impossible to exaggerate the proneness of the human mind to take miracles as evidence and to seek for miracles as evidence," must surely point to some lesson important for men to learn. If a universal appetite for animal food indicates that man was intended in part to be nourished by it, why does not such a universal expectation of receiving religious instruction through miracles indicate that this is one of God's ways of giving instruction to his creature man?

If this nearly universal expectation of receiving religious instruction through miracles does not indicate a plan of the Creator so to reveal himself, what does it indicate? Has God made man to be the easy dupe of any impostor who might wish to profit by his weakness? Has he made the race vainly to pursue a phantom, an absurdity? Is it not far more probable that rash and self-confident men have misinterpreted the facts of human nature? We have shown that two diametrically opposite systems of thought are contending for the dominion of the human mind for the future. One of them is no personality, no mind, no conscious spirit existing apart from an organized body, and therefore no Creator, no creation, no miracle, and no life after death. The other is a personal God, a Creator, a creation, and therefore miracle, which is creation, when the well-being of man requires it, and an immortal future. The longing expectation of receiving instruction concerning God's will and man's duty and destiny through miracles, which is admitted to have prevailed through the ages, gives clear indication that human nature is on the side of that system of thought which begins in the intuition of a personal God. And that self-styled philosopher who takes sides with the opposing system has the facts of human nature against him, and they will prove too strong for him. There are in the universe no facts better established, or better worthy the careful, thoughtful study of the scientific inquirer, than the phenomena of man's moral and religious nature. No system of thought can be true which overlooks them.

It is necessary to Mr. Arnold's system of thought to eliminate prophecy from the Bible as well as miracle, for prophecy is supernatural, and it implies a personal, conscious, knowing God. For such a God there is no place in his mind. Of prophecy, therefore, the Bible must be expurgated. In this attempt it seems to us his efforts are lame and singularly unsuccessful. There are points of exegesis here that are interesting and important, which we can not discuss. It would extend this Article to an unreasonable length, and our own special studies have not been such as to qualify us to deal with this class of questions with facility. But our author's signal failure in this branch of his subject is conspicuous enough, without an especial examination of prophecy. He admits that there was, at the time when Jesus appeared, a general expectation of a Messiah, a Christ who should fulfill a long line of ancient prophecies, as they were interpreted by that age, and bring great deliverance to the Lord's people. He claims, indeed, that these interpretations of the ancient writings were false, an "aberglaube," an "extra belief," unwarranted by the Psalms and the Prophets; but he admits that such an expectation was general and inspired a great deal of enthusiasm in that age. Here, then, is a coincidence which for the author's system is very awkward.

Just at the time when that expectation was at its height, a personage really did appear in the land of Israel, who was, by our author's own confession, worthy of the loftiest strains of the poet's lyre, and the most fervid utterances of the seer's foresight, a personage who came charged with incalculable blessings, not only to the Jew but to all the world, emphatically the revealer of the true religion (the author will not permit us to say God) to mankind. "Aberglaube" was in the right. Its most sanguine interpretations of the prophets were verified by the fact.

Nor is this all. Though Jesus never regarded himself as the Messiah, (so teaches our author,) and never believed in or countenanced the Messianic interpretation of the prophets, yet, in his efforts to get the ear of the people, he was obliged to connect himself in their minds with their notions of the Messiah. When they asked him, "Art thou the Christ?" his

answer was "I am." Mr. Arnold justifies this "pious fraud," (for such it would have been,) from the consideration that the notion of the Messiah entertained by the Jews of that time was utterly false and corrupting, so corrupting that nothing could be done for them unless they could be induced to accept as the promised Messiah such an one as Jesus, instead of the hero and conqueror they were looking for, and therefore he told them that he was the Messiah that was to come, thus assenting and giving his sanction to that false interpretation of the prophets. And more, and for the author worse than this, he highly commended Peter for saying, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," and that not before the multitude, but in a confidential conversation with his disciples. The author can not escape from this example except by saying that this is one of the numerous mistakes of the apostle, growing out of their utter incompetency to understand Jesus. But to this we reply, if the apostles are not trustworthy witnesses to such a fact as this, what do we know of Jesus?

The fact is undeniable, and criticism can throw no doubt over it, that Jesus was received and followed by his own disciples, he was believed in by all the thousands who gave in their adhesion to him at Jerusalem directly after the crucifixion, and by all the hundreds of thousands who composed the early churches, as the Christ, the Messiah, the fulfillment of ancient prophecy. Of the truth of this the very word Christian is a standing, and will be an everlasting, monument. As Archbishop Whately suggested, the Christians did not designate themselves by that name. Of this the New Testament is ample proof. Their Jewish enemies would never have called them Christians; for the very question at issue with them was, whether Jesus was the Christ, and they denied it. The name Christian must then have been given them by their Pagan enemies, in derision. The disciples were always talking of their founder, not by his name Jesus, but by his high prophetic designation, Christ. Their enemies therefore said of them, they are Christians. Yet in opposition to all this Mr. Arnold affirms that Jesus did not represent himself as the fulfillment of Messianic prophecy, as the Messiah, the Christ. If criticism can make this out of the patent facts of the case, it can make

any thing out of any thing. When Mr. Arnold denies that Jesus represented himself as the prophetic Messiah, the real meaning is, that he wishes he had not done so.

There is perhaps no fact pertaining to the Messianic prophecies more striking and wonderful than the almost contradictory character of the symbols under which the coming One was described. In some of the prophecies he is presented under images which represent power, the monarch, the conqueror; in others he appears under emblems which indicate lowliness, gentleness, humility, unresisting suffering. Mr. Arnold admits that Jesus saw that these were to be fulfilled in the same person, and that he was the first who ever had perceived it. If there was no prophecy, this is another most marvelous coincidence. Undoubtedly Jesus did thus interpret prophecy and so teach his disciples. Accordingly, we find that in the fifth chapter of Revelation, Christ is represented almost in the same sentence, first, under the symbol of a lion, and then under that of a lamb. This is striking enough, yet Mr. Arnold thinks Jesus was no believer in prophecy.

We cannot bring our remarks on this book to a close without briefly noticing the condition in which Mr. Arnold's criticism would leave our Bible and our religion. When we have sacrificed all which he would require us to sacrifice to the demands of modern unbelief, what would remain for the religion of the future? We ought very seriously to consider this, before we consent to follow our author's advice. The proposition with which the book opens, that we relinquish our faith in a personal God, of course implies that worship is absurd. No man can worship an abstraction or an unconscious impersonal law. Prayer is not to be thought of, for who would think of praying to the law of gravitation, or the power of electricity, or to any other power not being invested with consciousness, affection, will, character? To say "Our Father, which art in heaven," is as senseless as though the words were addressed to the moon or the planet Jupiter. Filial reverence for God is impossible. Trust in God as a friend is a delusion, for there is no friendship or affection in an impersonal power. When the Psalmist said, "As a father pitieth his children so the Lord pitieth them that fear him," he talked but wildly and at random. Every altar ever

built, every holocaust ever offered, every temple ever erected for the worship of God, was an act of pitiable superstition. If there is no personal God, then of course is there no divine Saviour. Jesus was not the Christ, for prophecy was but a groundless pretension to an impossible prescience of the future. If there is no personal Creator, then no creation and no miracle, and the supernatural in every form vanishes from our religion. Our Bible may be and is still full of claims to the supernatural and the prophetic, but they are false pretensions, which mar the sacred volume, and we must hasten to clear our religion of all such follies, and charge all this over to the ignorance and blindness of the different writers of the book, for which our religion is not held in the least responsible. If there is no miracle, then is not Christ risen from the dead, and his ascension into heaven is but an incredible fable. All the reported interviews of Christ with his disciples after the pretended resurrection are groundless fables also. There is then no living Saviour to be with his people, to govern his Church, and finally come to the judgment.

What then remains? The bare ethics of the Bible as exhibited in the preceptive teaching of Christ and other great and good men in their merely human relations and lives. The highest, infinitely the most impressive, moral teaching of Christ himself forever vanishes from such a religion. The unique and most affecting of all lessons of self-sacrifice for the good of others came from Gethsemane and Calvary, where we see Jesus the Christ giving himself up a voluntary victim for the salvation of the world. For this there is no place in Mr. Arnold's system. His righteousness can go no further than the regulation of those appetites which have reference to the preservation of life and the reproduction of the race. This is all that will remain of our religion when Mr. Arnold's criticism has done its work.

Will the world, will the skepticism of science and culture accept such a religion and reverence such a Bible? Will the Bible, with Mr. Arnold's estimate of it, be an object of reverent and earnest study to coming ages of refinement and scientific culture? With all this mass of fable and superstition, and folly and delusion, which Mr. Arnold teaches us to find in it, will it continue to be regarded as the Book of religion for the human

race, for the sake of the few grains of ethical truth, which are scattered here and there among its confused masses of incredible fiction and childish love of the marvelous? We submit this question to the consideration of the wise. Mr. Arnold's object in writing his book is to conciliate to the Bible the affectionate reverence of all coming ages. We most assuredly think, that if he has succeeded in his argument, he has certainly defeated the professed object of his book.

We cannot forbear saying also, that if Mr. Arnold's argument is sound and his conclusions are to be received, then the religion which was established in the world by the apostles was not the religion of Jesus, and the churches which they founded were not his churches. Their preaching, as they have transmitted it to us (and they certainly were competent to report their own preaching correctly), did not exhibit the true Jesus at all, but Jesus the Christ, and Jesus as raised from the dead. No well-informed man can deny, or will attempt to deny, that the two doctrines on which that religion was chiefly founded were the Messiahship of Jesus and his resurrection from the grave after the crucifixion. Grant that those two doctrines are true, and we can all see how all that is great and good and fitted to bless mankind in the Christ of the New Testament, is so intertwined with these two doctrines as to insure its presence and evergrowing power wherever they are received. They are the everlasting pillars around which all the living truths and precious moralities of the Gospel entwine in ever-increasing greenness and beauty, yielding their precious fruit for the healing of the nations.

But if these two doctrines are but the "aberglaube" of Christ's ignorant disciples, if they are but delusion and fable, to be rejected by every intelligent man, then was the preaching of the apostles, as for example Peter's on the day of Pentecost, fundamentally false, and the churches of the apostles, founded on delusion and falsehood, never could have become vehicles for conveying the living truth of Jesus to coming ages. Then were the successes of the apostles not the successes of Jesus, but of a wild and extravagant enthusiasm with which Jesus would have had no sympathy.

As we intimated in the beginning of this Article, we vividly feel that the Christian forces of this age need readjustment, to prepare the Church for the mighty conflicts of the present and the immediate future. Christianity did not come through those dark and bloody and superstitious ages untarnished, at least in her garments. The time has fully come when she needs the fine linen clean and white. But in any attempt at the readjustment she may need, we hope the Church may be saved from following the lead of any such thinkers as Matthew Arnold.

ARTICLE V.—GROTE AND CURTIUS.

Grote's History of Greece. I–XII. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1854–56.

Curtius's History of Greece. I–V. New York: Scribner & Co. 1871–74.

THE appearance of another history of Greece in English dress, the first since Grote's of nearly the same scale and standing with that great work, suggests, naturally, comparison between the two. Though they treat the same subject and use in general the same materials, yet they differ so widely, not only in views on particular points, but in general method and conception of the subject, as to be independent authorities, in some measure supplementary of each other, and to make a comparison between them instructive. The striking difference in the size of the two works is probably due, mainly, to the fact that the German book was published as one of a series, to which also Mommsen's *History of Rome* and Preller's *Manuals of Mythology* belong, under certain restrictions as to size and style. To this fact also, perhaps, is to be ascribed the comparative absence of discussion from Curtius's pages, for which in all but the first volume we are indemnified in some measure by notes, which, besides some very condensed discussion, contain valuable references to authorities ancient and modern. The first volume of Curtius appeared in 1857, the year after Grote's last volume was published, but the second did not follow until 1865, the third in 1867. The American reprint of the English translation is in five volumes, issued between 1871 and 1874.

The difference in the first suggestion of the two works seems to be connected intimately with a fundamental difference in their execution. Curtius, apparently, was invited by his publisher to prepare this book for their series. He must have recognized it as the suitable opportunity to put forth in an accessible and attractive form the results of his life-long studies, and

to gather up the fruits of modern scholarship in so far as a history of Greece can include them. This, then, is the character of his work,—it is a presentation of the life of ancient Greece as modern scholarship has unfolded it, with the special developments and modifications to which the author's own study has led him. Grote's work, on the other hand, was from beginning to end peculiarly personal and private. According to his wife's account in her life of her husband, the idea of writing the book was suggested to him by her in 1823. The work was pursued steadily, with an interval of about ten years (1833–43), during which he was in Parliament, until in 1846 the first two volumes appeared. This suggestion of Mrs. Grote's sprang, as she tells us, from her "hearing the subject of Greek history frequently discussed at their house, and knowing how attractive the study was in her husband's eyes." It is interesting to notice how, for some time before this suggestion was made, his private studies, carried on without any stimulus or motive from outside, were tending in that direction. Then the work itself bears in every chapter the stamp of his individual character, the evidence of having been wrought out by a single mind, grasping, ordering, and interpreting by its own independent judgment materials furnished from the greatest variety of sources. No one who had read a single chapter could imagine that Grote disregarded what others had done before him in his line of work, but no one could fail to see that in every case he made up for himself his own opinions. We do not mean to deny a similar independence of judgment in the case of Curtius, but it is far more manifest in Grote, partly because his was the prior work of the modern school, partly because he admits the reader so freely to a knowledge of the reasons of his opinions.

To some readers the most striking characteristic of Grote's history is that on so many points his views differ from those prevalent before his time. It may be worth while to give a summary of the principal novelties in his opinions, and to notice how far Curtius agrees with him in each case. The first and perhaps the most important of all is the denial of historic quality to the whole mass of myths, for the reasons, in brief, that there is no contemporary evidence for the alleged persons and events in them, and that in what he calls "the age of his-

torical faith, as distinguished from the later age of historical reason," a story needs only to be in harmony with the popular imagination and feeling in order to be universally accepted as true; "and to question its truth is to incur obloquy." This view Curtius does not accept, but endeavors to construct a history of the pre-historic age, regarding the myths as stories of tribal or national movements, under the veil of personal actions, and combining them with the records of other nations, the recurrence of geographical names in different localities, and the scanty monuments in Greece itself, in order to determine the probable events they indicate. Then the tradition that Lykurgus distributed the land of Sparta into 9000 equal lots is shown by Grote to have no authority earlier than Plutarch, and to have arisen probably from the attempt at an old-Spartan reform in the time of Agis and Kleomenes. But Curtius speaks of it as "a thoroughly trustworthy tradition" and goes on to expound the relations of the fact as being such beyond doubt. Grote distinguishes four steps in the development of the Athenian democratic constitution, in the changes wrought successively by Solon, Kleisthenes, Aristides, and Perikles. Curtius seems to recur to the old view in ascribing nearly all the important institutions to the time of Solon, and regarding the changes introduced by the other statesmen named as merely means to secure the more efficient working of his arrangements. Grote was the first to point out the true purpose of the singular political practise called Ostracism, and to vindicate it as a reasonable and successful device for a necessary end. Curtius treats it much more briefly, but to the same effect. Grote traces the gradual growth of the maritime empire of Athens, making a distinction between her position as leader of a confederacy of allies and as mistress of subject States, and showing that the change was gradual, unforeseen, and in some measure forced upon her; and in this Curtius agrees with him. As to the character and position of the Athenian demagogues, Grote endeavored to show that they do not deserve the condemnation they have generally received, which was started by the abuse heaped upon Kleon by Aristophanes, but that he, as others, corresponded to the opposition leaders in our modern legislative bodies, and ought to be judged with corresponding

discrimination. In this view Curtius does not follow him, but accepts the representation of Kleon in Aristophanes and denounces the demagogues as others have done. So, too, in regard to the Sophists, particularly in the earlier instances of the use of that name, Grote argued with much earnestness and force against the particular bad meaning given to it, urging that Plato was "the first to use the word in an invidious sense;" that originally it marked superior ability and was applied to teachers generally, including Plato himself and his master Sokrates, and of course did not denote any special school or set of principles; that it was only to Sokrates and his immediate followers that taking pay seemed unworthy of a teacher, from their peculiar conception of the relation; and, finally, that in point of fact the Athenian youth were not corrupted by the teaching of those who were called Sophists. Curtius agrees with Grote, as every one will, as to the absence of bad sense from the word in its original use, but recognizes a pernicious influence in the body of men who led the speculative thought of Greece about the end of the fifth century B. C., which seems to him to justify the use of the word in the Platonic sense. The dialogue between the Athenian envoys and the government of Melos, which Thirlwall and Grote agree in regarding as a dramatic fiction of the historian's, Curtius speaks of as a historical fact. In his account of the effect upon the minds of the Athenians of the mutilation of the *Hermæ*, Grote depicts strikingly the shock to the religious sensitiveness of the people, illustrating it by parallels from modern times, and showing that the frenzy of the Athenians was not due to peculiar superstition or infantile rage, but might be shown by any people in similar circumstances. Curtius, in his treatment of the same event, makes more prominent the use made of it by the political partisans, regarding it rather as it bears upon his narrative than as material for philosophical investigation.

It is interesting to consider, in connection with books like these, the life and pursuits of the author, in so far as they bear upon the character of the book and may properly be discussed. Grote was not a university man, but, on leaving Charterhouse school, at the age of sixteen, went at once into business. He was actively employed in a banking house as clerk and as

partner from 1810 to 1843, and during the last ten years of that period was a member of Parliament for the City of London. By this practical acquaintance with business and politics he gained, as has often been remarked, an unusual but invaluable preparation for understanding the working of the popular government of Athens and the complicated politics of the ancient Greek world. Thukydides and, in less degree, Xenophon seem to have had something of the same kind of preparation for their historical work, and Gibbon records the service which his experience in the Hampshire militia had rendered him in writing of war. But from the beginning of his business life, Grote occupied himself in private study on various subjects, mainly in the line of metaphysics, the sciences of politics and of trade, and ancient literature, this last apparently encroaching, as time went on, upon the others. For illustration, his diary in 1822 records his reading Wolf's *Prolegomena to Homer*, beginning in the evening of Dec. 5th and finishing it before breakfast on the 8th, which he regards as slow progress, "from taking constant notes." The same day (which by the way was Sunday), after breakfast, he began *Diodorus Siculus* and read 35 pages by two o'clock, "as I found it necessary to take down notes of considerable length." It appears from the rapidity with which the book finally came out, nearly two volumes a year, that the bulk of the reading necessary for it must have been done during these twenty years before the author entered Parliament. During this time his friends were among the leading Liberals in politics and moral science, and particularly influential upon his intellectual character were Ricardo, Bentham, and James Mill. The influence of this school of philosophy appears, perhaps, more clearly in his *Plato*, but is still to be observed in the *History*. Thus we see that the historian of Greece was an English Liberal, a man of affairs, and a speculative thinker. We think we are not mistaken in connecting with his English basis of character and business training his method of treating the myths, his careful study of the Athenian constitution, his severe judgment of Alexander, and with his political sentiments his dislike of the Spartan system and its effects, his sympathy with the free governments of antiquity, his defence of the demagogues and the sophists. Englishman as he was, he made

himself, by study and habit, at home in the Greek world, and able to look upon events in its life as if he had been an Athenian. His book is a study of Greek politics and not less of Greek character; hence his keen interest in the persons of Sokrates, of Brasidas, of Kallikratidas, and of Timoleon.

Curtius, on the other hand, is a German scholar. He is now sixty years old, and for the last half of his life since he left the university he has been a professor of philology, in the University of Berlin from 1844 to 1856, then in that of Göttingen until 1869, and since then at Berlin again. Thus he has lived in the centre of the influences of the land of scholarship, under the constant stimulus of his teachers, his colleagues, and his pupils, knowing continually what others were doing, or where there was an opening for work on a neglected subject, having for his daily business the study and explanation of ancient literature. His own special line of study has been in the geography, topography, antiquities, and art of the Greeks. Besides a number of essays on these topics, he has published a book on the Peloponnesus, founded on his own careful and thorough observations. Thus it will be seen how complete a contrast his life has been to Grote's, and in his History there is naturally a corresponding difference. It shows no such lively personal sympathy with individual characters, unless perhaps with Perikles and some of the leaders in literature and philosophy, nor such keen interest in the constitutional experiments of the Greek communities. It deals with the myths on a constructive method, such as is the standing reproach of German scholarship in the eyes of the English, who either swallow the myths whole or reject them utterly. It gives an impression of almost impersonal authorship to one who takes it up after reading Grote, and has a sort of unvarying coolness of moral tone, looking at every event as a phenomenon to be noted by science and explained in cause and bearing, but never a thing to rejoice or sorrow over. It is in presenting the results of the more recent scholarship, and in the history and criticism of art and literature, that the value of Curtius's work, in our judgment, consists.

In fact, Grote's work seems deficient in its treatment of literature and art, with one notable exception. His chapters on the

origin of myths, the Homeric poems, and the Homeric society are of great interest and inestimable value. But no other name in literature is treated so fully, and it is plain that the exception is made in this case because of the writer's interest in and novel theory about the mythical period. Every line of Homer is of importance to a man discussing that subject, and indeed we think we are justified in ascribing Grote's remarkable comprehension of the Greek mind in no small degree to his intimate familiarity with the Homeric poems. Of Hesiod likewise he speaks at some length in his first and second volumes, but it is not so much as an author filling a place in the history of literature, but rather as a source of information as to the growth of myths and as to the ideas of the Greeks in that early age, that he treats of him. There is also a chapter on the early Lyric poets and the art of their time in the fourth volume, but after this he is almost silent upon such topics, as if the growing interest of the politics and philosophy of the Greeks, to his mind, crowded out everything else. As to Pindar, for instance, though he refers to his poems often as historical authorities, he says nothing of him as a man or as a poet beyond a single page as to his treatment of the myths; so all that he has to say of the great tragic poets is contained within two pages, though he gives several pages to the rise of dramatic poetry and to Aristophanes, apparently because these subjects as he treats them bear upon his views as to the demagogues and the sophists. So of Herodotus and Thucydides he speaks but briefly, although of course the subject matter of their works is the basis of a large part of his narrative and discussion. He seems to have abstained from mention of the sculptors and painters, and of the dramatic poets before Æschylus and after Euripides, because in most cases there could be only "second-hand criticism," as he calls it, in the absence of any remains of their work, and he preferred to deal with positive evidence only.

Curtius has made up for us in great measure this deficiency, so far as it is possible to do so in the compass of a general history. He gives, it is true, no such discussion of the unity and authorship of the Homeric poems, presenting simply his theory of their origin. This theory,—to yield to the temptation to state it,—is that at the time of the migrations to Asia Minor the

Achæan leaders of Æolian emigrants, "in order to support themselves during the slow progress of the struggle" which they must carry on to dispossess the Dardanian inhabitants, "fortified themselves with songs of the deeds of their lords-in-war, the Atreidæ, and celebrated these heroes not only as examples but as predecessors in the fight" in this very region; that these songs being popular, were then gradually spread until they came to the knowledge of the Ionian colonists farther south on the same shore, particularly at Smyrna, who took them up and gave them in their own dialect an immortal form. The student of Homer will find much to interest him in the thirty pages on the subject in Curtius, but they can hardly be compared in value with Grote's half-volume. For the later authors, on the other hand, we find the treatment in Curtius more satisfactory. It is not that he always gives more space to the individual, for the limits allowed to the books in this series hardly admit of that; and this seems to be the reason for his stopping at the battle of Chæroneia (whereas Grote goes on through the life of Alexander), for his omitting to narrate Sicilian history after the defeat of the Athenian expedition, and for other like cases. But he mentions many names which are not to be found in Grote, and in all his treatment seems to have in mind the development of literature as an independent matter and to regard each author in his relative position and influence, so that one might compile a history of Greek literature by extracts from Curtius, and it would be, except in the earlier part, about as good as any we have in English. Particularly in regard to the dramatic poets after Euripides, and the philosophic schools before and after Sokrates, we find much that is interesting and valuable. So too on the subject of art in all its departments, this history is better, considering how much it comprehends, than anything that we know in English. To be sure, it contains much "second-hand criticism," borrowed, that is, from Greek writers, and referring to men whose work is not preserved to our day, and much theorizing as to the origin and purpose of what is preserved; but then the combination of hints from all sources, the use of inscriptions, coins, and post-classical writers, the careful criticism of existing monuments, adds greatly to our knowledge, if only it is judiciously done. The whole history

differs from Grote's in that it demands of the reader a much more implicit confidence in the author, whereas Grote always gives us his evidence for a statement and his reasons for an opinion, and never ventures far without positive authority. We think Curtius fully deserves the confidence he demands, though in a few cases his statements seem more positive than the evidence justifies.

ARTICLE VI.—DR. BACON'S "GENESIS OF THE NEW
ENGLAND CHURCHES."

The Genesis of the New England Churches. By LEONARD BACON: with illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, Franklin square. 1874.

No one would be likely to open a volume from the pen of Dr. Leonard Bacon, bearing the above title, and not anticipate a rich, entertaining, and instructive book. With his general ability as a writer, on whatever subject engages his attention, and with his special love of every thing pertaining to the history of the early New England fathers, one could be sure beforehand that the work would not only repay perusal, but a careful and critical study. Many students in Yale College, over a range of forty years past, will bear free and hearty testimony to the profitable instructions they have received, in this department, from the lips of Dr. Bacon: not as a teacher in the University, but in his larger capacity, as a teacher of the people. They will recall those Sunday nights, in the old Center Church meeting-house, when to full audiences and to attentive listeners he was wont to unfold, from time to time, in varied series of discourses, some section of local or general New England history. Through a life which has now reached a vigorous old age, hardly any man among us has done more to make known unto the children the sacred memorials of the fathers. He has wrought long and patiently, in the spirit of the old Hebrew song: "Walk about Zion, and go round about her: tell the towers thereof. Mark ye well her bulwarks, consider her palaces; that ye may tell it to the generation following."

If one were to open the volume before us with no knowledge whatever as to its authorship, he would speedily discover that it was not the work of a young man, rushing into print, with his newly-gathered facts. Even if it were possible for a youthful author to have possessed himself of every historical fact and incident here embodied, his book would be a very different one from this. The richest part of the volume is that

which is between and behind the printed lines. All recently acquired knowledge is, at the best, only partial and half-way knowledge. When one listens, for the first time, to some grand musical overture, he has not really heard it, however much he may have thought himself delighted. Those subtle influences of sound must play about the soul again and again, with long intervals between, before the power to hear is fully awake. And it is much the same in the general action of the mind. When one first traverses a particular field of history, he sees only the dry bones of this history, the skeleton forms, without the grace of life and motion. The delicate interlockings of part with part—the flesh that clothes and the sinews that move,—these belong to a later stage of knowledge. History, in this its more perfected form, becomes almost a transcript of life itself, where not a moment lies idle—where all spaces are filled—where human passions are in perpetual play—where a thousand busy forces are forever working off their results and passing them on to the future.

In the work before us we clearly trace the effects of a long-continued process of thought, analysis, assimilation. It is the ripe fruit of a long life—a life that yet shows no decay, but has all its functions in full exercise. The field of history here traversed has been held under such close and thoughtful contemplation for so many years, that the agencies at work in it have been comprehended in something like their manifold relations.

And yet many readers, as they notice the title and open the book, may be disappointed at finding it so largely occupied with persons and events on the other side of the water, and in remoter generations. They may have anticipated that the narrative would begin with the settlements on our own shores, and cover the early periods of our own colonial history, perhaps for a century. But it must be remembered that this is the "Genesis" of our Churches. We hear of another volume, to be called the "Exodus," which we trust may be completed, and which will doubtless cover the essential ground above indicated. Indeed, the present volume brings the Pilgrims to their abode at Plymouth, and follows them on through ten years of their settlement at that place. It then pauses to take

a hasty glance at the first planters in the Massachusetts Bay, and the founding of the Church at Salem, and there the narrative stops. But the author is true to his title. His aim was, first of all, to search out the causes and courses of events in the old world, by which these New England churches were brought into being.

As to the facts of the book, Dr. Bacon lays no claim to be a discoverer. The materials which he has used lie open to all. His own statement, in the preface, on this point is frank and modest. He says of the volume, "It makes no profession of bringing to light new facts from documents heretofore unedited, or from black-letter books heretofore overlooked. It simply tells an old story, giving perhaps here and there a new interpretation or a new emphasis to some undisputed fact. My purpose has been to tell this story clearly and fairly, not for the instruction or delight of antiquarians, nor merely for those with whom church history is a professional study, but for all sorts of intelligent and thoughtful readers. He who writes only for scholars, or for the men of some learned profession, can say, 'Fit audience let me find, though few;' but my labor has been thrown away if the story which I have written is not so told as to invite the attention and to stir the sympathies of the many. . . . The story which I tell is the story of an idea slowly making its way against prejudices, interests, and passions—a story of faith and martyrdom, of heroic endeavor and heroic constancy. It includes only so much of secular history as is involved in the history of the idea, and of the men whom it possessed, and who labored and suffered to make it a reality in the world of fact."

The first and second chapters of the book are occupied with the elemental facts of New Testament history, and with the corrupting changes and departures from the simple apostolic idea of doctrine and polity. The third chapter opens to us the age of Luther and the Reformation, with its protest against false and corrupt doctrines—with its reconstruction of theology, but with little regard to the forms of ecclesiastical polity. It points out distinctly the political and secular elements which mingled with the religions in the years following the Reformation, and which led to the construction of the great national

Churches of Protestant Europe. It then passes, in the fourth chapter, to the English reformation, and the gradual growth, from generation to generation, of the Puritan idea and the Puritan party in the kingdom. Here the narrative reaches the chief field of its action and becomes more slow and careful in its movement, unfolding, step by step, the progress of thought and incident. It notes the spiritual reformation, that silently began in England, under Wycliffe and the Lollards, a hundred and fifty years before Luther opened his fierce and daring controversy. It shows how this pure stream of spiritual thought and holy feeling, flowing downward from Wycliffe, met and mingled with the turbid waters of political strife and ambition, when king and nobles, not for Christ's sake, but their own, broke away from the galling yoke of papal supremacy. This last was a reformation not worthy of the name—a thing of outward form, without spiritual reality—a compound of earthly aims and wicked passions, where the sovereign was merely put in the place of the Pope, and one tyrant was exchanged for another. And so began that long and heroic struggle for religious truth and purity, in which individual men, here and there over all England, still keeping themselves within the pale of the English Church, dared in many things to refuse obedience to the ruling powers, and patiently suffered the cruel consequences.

In the reign of Elizabeth, 1558–1603, we discover the germs of a new idea. In secret places, good men had been saying to themselves and to each other, "How long, O Lord, how long!" There began to be a sense of profitless, unrewarded toil, in the attempt to infuse a true spiritual life into the corrupt body of the English Church. Here and there was a man, who seemed to hear a voice from heaven saying, "Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues." The origin and growth of this idea begins to be traced in the fifth chapter, which bears the suggestive title, taken from the language of the more advanced minds of that day, "Reformation without tarrying for any." In this, and in several chapters following, covering the reign of Elizabeth, the progress of this thought, and what it cost to those who held it, are graphically depicted. We have the story,

tenderly told, of John Copping and Elias Thacker, of Henry Barrowe and John Greenwood, of Francis Johnson and John Penry, who with their associates of lesser name "counted not their lives dear unto themselves," if they might establish the truth of God, and the purity of Christian worship in the England which they loved. Robert Browne, who seemed to rise at first like a guiding star to this little company, and who gave his name to this select companionship, afterwards set ingloriously in shame and darkness. That name hung like a dead weight upon the Separatists for a century afterwards. Even a man like Cotton Mather, from his more easy and comfortable surroundings, in the Massachusetts Bay, was not above flinging this name at the Pilgrims, down at Plymouth, seventy years and more after the landing. Had he set himself, instead, upon the work of imitating their humble virtues, and their clear discernment of Christian realities, his own name, honored as it is, would have been still more bright and shining. But Robert Browne became a heavy load, which the early Pilgrims had to bear in their toilsome journey. To quote from the volume before us, "Robert Browne was not a martyr. He was not of the stuff that martyrs are made of. The passion that impelled him was the love of agitation. When that passion had partly spent itself, he did what mere agitators often do as they grow older—he turned conservative and betrayed the cause for which he had contended." This man not only was not a martyr, but after boasting how many prisons he had been in for conscience' sake, became scandalous in his life, and at last was ready to "crouch" before the English Church "for a piece of silver and a morsel of bread," and say, "Put me, I pray thee, into one of the priests' offices, that I may eat a piece of bread:" and the English Church, that could not bear a Puritan or a Separatist, however meek and holy in life, and orderly in all moral conduct, could bear *him*, with all his shame and guilt upon him, and could put him into a comfortable living. It was a curious combination of ideas, that after he had written so much to prove that the Church of England was *no church*, he should at last come to occupy one of her parishes, bearing the odd name of "Achurch." This wretched old man was alive when the Pilgrims came to Plymouth, and lived on ten years longer,

dying in 1630, and his name was a most convenient weapon, wherewith their enemies could taunt and tax them.

But though Browne became a renegade, a crown of glory rests upon the heads of his early associates, and their names shall be kept in everlasting remembrance. Dr. Bacon has told the story of the sufferings and heroic faith of Copping, Thacker, Penry and the rest, in a way to make a deep impression upon his readers. The eyes moisten, as we follow them through their painful fortunes. Not in a fit of momentary passion and impulse, but in their calmest and most reflective hours, and with much of that spirit of forgiveness which Christ exercised towards his murderers, they "died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them."

In the tenth chapter of the volume, we reach the formation of the Scrooby Church in the north of England, far away from London and the scenes described in the preceding chapters. The waves of persecution had rolled so fiercely over the first Separatists around the central city of the kingdom, as to baffle their attempts at organization. They could die, one by one, for their faith, but they could not combine and maintain public ordinances in the face of this overwhelming power. And so it is to the Scrooby Church that we have to look for the first compacted organization which was able to bear the brunt of those times, and maintain a continued existence to after generations. It is true, the old London or Southwark Church, with which the above named martyrs had been associated, was not absolutely crushed into non-existence, but it was driven asunder and scattered to the four winds, to be afterwards, in some sense, gathered and reformed in Amsterdam. But the Scrooby Church, after its formation, and amid all its strange vicissitudes, appears to us in the form of unbroken and continued life.

This was near the time when the long and persecuting reign of Elizabeth was drawing to a close. She died soon after, in 1603, and James I. came from Scotland to take her place. The hopes that had been formed from his Presbyterian education and the general atmosphere in which he had before lived, were speedily dissipated. He took the earliest opportunity to throw himself into the arms of the persecuting party of the

Church of England, and to further all its violent measures. And there was this additional burden to be borne under his reign, that he could not play the part of a simple, straightforward tryant, and there end the matter. He must needs show himself, all the while, such an unreasoning, self-conceited dotard, that serious-minded, thinking men were compelled to feel that the land was governed by a fool. If with the same essential qualities of mind and character, he had been one of the common people, he might, by a rigid course of daily discipline, have been trained into some feeble measure of common sense. But he was a king, on the throne of a great and powerful nation, and there were sycophants enough about him to keep him under the impression, all the while, that he was the very Solomon of the age.

It was under such general conditions as these that the Scrooby Church came into existence and entered upon its course of eventful history. Happily it was so far apart from the great central thoroughfares of the kingdom, that, in its early days, it escaped, in some measure, the close and rigid scrutiny which might otherwise have been exercised over it. In that distant and lonely corner of the land, where the county lines of Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, and Yorkshire draw near together, and in an age when all movement was difficult and slow, this little company of Christ's true and sincere followers were left for a time very much to themselves.

From the point where the narrative reaches this Scrooby Church, and onward, we have the elements of a continuous story, and the interest gathers and deepens to the end. It is a story too, which, for healthy and intelligent minds, will have more than the fascination of a novel; for truth like that here embodied is not only "stranger than fiction," but it is far more profoundly interesting. This story has been often told, and well told; sometimes in a fragmentary way and sometimes more continuously. Our Pilgrim literature is already rich in its memorial volumes. But we are quite sure, on the whole, that the story has never been so well told before. And this, as has been already intimated, is not due to the discovery of new facts, but to the skillful way in which the old facts have been collocated and arranged. Facts can be so stated that the most interested mind will go to sleep under the

operation ; or they can be so exhibited as to charm the dullest ear to listen. "Hold the light for me so that you can see plainly yourself, and then I can see," is a wise old piece of advice in which many a boy has been indoctrinated. In this case, it is the clear vision of the author that gives a clear vision to us. He sees the path he is traveling so distinctly, that he makes us see it. All objects stand out in graphic fullness and detail.

We look in upon the quiet little assemblies gathered in the house of William Brewster—the old manor-house of Scrooby. We follow them through those early years of peace, before the storm of persecution began to break about them, while yet they "took sweet counsel together and walked to the house of God in company," under the pastoral guidance of Richard Clyfton and John Robinson. There was also another little assembly of like-minded Christian people, whose place of meeting was some miles away, in the town of Gainsborough, and this was under the spiritual direction of John Smyth, a man of high culture and standing in the English Church, but he had chosen to cast in his lot with these despised and simple-hearted people. These two congregations, the one meeting at Scrooby and the other at Gainsborough, were only as parts of one whole, gathering in this manner because of the distance that must be traversed to bring them together in one place. "Their fears, their hopes, their aims were one," and there was also a large fellowship, counsel, companionship between them.

But these days of quiet, undisturbed Christian enjoyment were few. The officers of government and the keen-eyed defenders of ecclesiastical supremacy were on their track. The trick of the tryant is old and familiar. It was Elijah that "troubled Israel" in the days of Ahab. It was Daniel and his companions that threatened the overthrow of all law and order in Babylon. The few Christians in the days of Nero were plotting for the subversion of the mighty Roman empire. And, in one sense, the tyrant judges rightly. He sees where his danger lies. And so it was a thing not to be endured in England, in the days of King James I., that a few Christian people should meet, to sing and pray together and study the word of God, outside the supervision and manipulation of the English Church. This was an offense so great that all ordinary crimes sank into significance beside it.

King James, on his first coming from Scotland to take the English throne, had declared in respect to all such people that he would "harry them out of the land." But now, when these people could no longer meet together in a quiet way, all that they asked for was, that they might be permitted to leave their native land in peace. Much as it would cost them to separate themselves from their old homes and the England which they loved, for Christ's sake they were ready to do this, and set up their simple worship on an alien shore. But now, instead of "harrying them out of the land," all cruel and wicked devices, on the part of government officers, were resorted to in order to prevent them from leaving the English shores. The simple story of what these men and women suffered that they might reach their place of voluntary exile in Holland—the haughty disregard of all their private rights—the shameful liberties taken and the insults offered—the treachery and deception practiced upon them—this story cannot be read in this day, by American freemen, without a boiling indignation. Nor can it be read without a recognition also of the fact, that the liberty we enjoy has been a thing of slow growth, and many by-gone generations have travailed in toil and suffering to give it to us.

But we cannot follow this story, step by step, through the life in Holland, and the emigration to the new world. Our limits forbid, and we desire to suggest some general thoughts awakened by the reading of this graphic narrative. Suffice it to repeat what we have already said, that from this point onward to the end of the volume, there is a steady growth of interest. Sometimes we read a book which gains our general respect, and having begun it, a certain sense of duty constrains us to finish it. We notice the whole number of pages, and feel a kind of relief when we have reached the midway point in our passage. Our joy increases as we watch the diminishing bulk of the closing leaves, and we are happiest when we have fairly reached the end. An important duty is done. But the law of this book, in its effect upon the mind of the reader, is exactly the opposite of this. We linger amid the closing chapters, and do not wish to contemplate the fact that the narrative is, by and by, to stop. We would cherish and prolong the pleasure of the reading. Especially, after the Pilgrims

have reached Plymouth, we sit and watch the changing pictures of their hard and simple life—their toil and suffering—their faith and patience—their wise and sagacious counsels in things earthly and things heavenly—their strength to do, and their patience to endure—their keen-eyed diplomacy by which they baffled alike the selfish policy of their friends and the hatred of their enemies—their confidence in God and their uplifting courage in the days of sorest danger and distress—their kind and friendly intercourse with their Indian neighbors, until these swarthy dwellers in the forest were taught practically to know what good faith and the Christian law of love mean—these and a thousand little unnamed things which belong to real life every where, make up a narrative exceedingly instructive and charming. The story at last becomes like the sacred confidences of friend with friend. After the formal calls are over, and the ceremonial guests have departed, when the night deepens and the doors are shut, we gather closer around the warm and genial hearthstone, and we talk, with no sense of the flow of time, while our hearts burn within us; so does this story become to us, as it winds in and out, and lingers amid the old memorials of the Pilgrims in their first years at Plymouth.

Among the general impressions left upon the mind by the reading of this book, this one stands out very clearly, viz: that not for worldly and temporal ends, but for Christ's sake and His Gospel, did these persecuted Pilgrims sit down upon these wild shores. This truth, the Christian men and women of New England have never doubted, but the fact is so emphasized and corroborated in this narrative, that it will be hard for the sceptic to stand against it. It is a sad fact in this world that no Christian civilization has ever yet been high and perfect enough, so that it did not breed many men, who have found their most delightful occupation in sitting upon the gravestones of their pious ancestors and trying to discover what sharp and funny things can be said against them. And so we have always had among us many individuals, sons of New England, who were bound to believe, and make others believe so far as they could, that it was only for purposes of worldly gain that the Pilgrims of Plymouth, and the Puritans

of the Bay, first sought this New England wilderness. Not conscious themselves of any motive above the selfish and earth-born, they have been stout in their belief and declaration, that no one has ever acted from any higher consideration. But he who can read these records of the men and women at Plymouth, and not see that the earthly was subordinated to the heavenly, must have a strange way of studying history. What these people passed through, in their first year, would have annihilated any scheme resting upon a purely earthly basis. Evils less than theirs did annihilate many an earthly scheme for planting colonies here. Trading and commercial enterprises were tried here before the Pilgrims settled at Plymouth. Enterprises of this kind were going on around them during the early years of their abode on these shores, but these plans and combinations for money went utterly to nought,—were dissolved and scattered before the fierce blasts of adversity, which fell upon them—no fiercer certainly than those with which those poor Pilgrims down at Plymouth were visited. Does an army stand firm in battle array when half the number with which it went into the battle is lying dead upon the plain, and a majority of its living members are wounded and disabled? Long before such a crisis is reached, the trumpet sounds a retreat. But this was just the condition of that Pilgrim band as the weary months of that first winter drew to a close, and not a suggestion do we hear of failure and discomfiture. When the spring days came, and the harbor was unlocked, the *May Flower* spread its white sails and passed out of their sight on its return to England, but the Pilgrims stayed fast by the graves of their dead. Here was an underlying motive mightier than the earthly, and nothing but the enduring strength of this motive gave them the victory.

Most people are not aware that there ever was any other attempt at colonizing New England, except this at Plymouth, until the Puritans began to gather in Salem and Charlestown and Boston in 1629. The great majority of readers practically think of the Plymouth settlers as the first Englishmen that ever set foot on the New England shores; the only white men that the Indians ever saw, up to the time when the Massachusetts Colony began to break ground in the Bay. But the

Indians all along this eastern shore had been acquainted with Englishmen, and that too to their cost, before the Pilgrims came hither. The Plymouth people had not merely to show themselves just and true and friendly in their relations with the Indians. They had also to efface the impressions of fraud and cruelty and wrong which had been left among these children of the forest by earlier visitors from England, who came here for other ends. It would be instructive, were there time, to point out and dwell upon the particulars of the chief trading expeditions which ante-dated or were nearly cotemporary with the settlement at Plymouth, just to show how incoherent and short-lived they were, and how speedily they went to pieces under the weight of earthly disaster. So small is the place they fill in the records of those years, that they practically disappear from history, and the general mind takes no note of them. It stands out before the fair-minded historical student as a demonstration, that nothing but vital religious principle could have been strong enough to secure the succession in this Plymouth settlement and to pass it on to its magnificent inheritance of the future. In this volume we watch this interest, when it seems outwardly only a little flickering flame, which one strong breath would forever extinguish. But it was the bush that "burned with fire, and the bush was not consumed," because the oil of divine grace and strength was ministered through secret channels which no wordly eye could see. And all this stands out in the book before us with wonderful fullness and clearness, not so much because it is made the subject of special argument, but it reveals itself in the surrounding facts and in the progress of events.

Again, this volume helps to make clearer, what was plain enough perhaps before to many minds, viz: that the leading men among the Pilgrims were men of a strong and broad understanding—clear comprehension of principles—men who, without once stopping to recognize the fact, or taking to themselves any glory for it, had really thought farther into the future than any other men of their generation. Joined with these far-reaching and revolutionary ideas, they had also, what we do not always find in bold reformers, a tolerance and forbearance, patience, meekness, gentleness, such as make their

characters truly admirable and worthy of our closest study. We can safely challenge all the world to come and exercise the sharpest scrutiny. All we ask is, that men shall study till they see and understand the case as it is, and there need be no fear as to the result. Yet these people—these Pilgrim men and women, had been treated in England as though they were but the offscouring of the earth. As the hunter points out the wild game in the woods, and lets loose his hungry dogs upon it, so they had been pointed out for sport and abuse, to coarse-minded, vulgar officials—minions of power, who took a low delight in all their distress and suffering. But time works out its grand compensations. "He hath cast down the mighty from their seats and exalted them of low degree." As the case stands to-day, compare the life, the character, the manhood of such men as William Brewster and William Bradford, with that of the mean and contemptible monarch who then occupied the throne of England, and with many of the leading men in Church and State, who fawned and bent the knee before him.

And in respect to this symmetry of moral character and breadth of understanding, it is not to be denied that the leading men of Plymouth were superior to the leading men in the Bay. It was not the fashion in the early New England generations to think so. Life rolled in fuller, stronger tides about the Bay, and it was a matter of small consequence what those poor people down at Plymouth might be thinking or doing. No great good was expected to come from that little Nazareth. And yet, even then, little Plymouth had done far more than she was credited for, in shaping the institutions, civil and religious, in the Massachusetts Bay. As Dr. Bacon has very clearly pointed out, the first Puritan Church, founded in Salem, was not shaped after any pre-conceived model, brought out with the Puritan emigrants from England. 'It took its mould partly from nature and the surrounding circumstances, and partly from the wise suggestions of good old Dr. Fuller (deacon and doctor), of the Plymouth Church, in his conversations with Gov. Endicott. And this result too was the fulfillment of a kind of prophecy uttered by John Robinson, in his farewell address to the departing Pilgrims. "For, said he, there will be no difference between the unconformable ministers and you, when

they come to the practice of the ordinances out of the kingdom." That Robinson should have uttered those words nine years before the organization of the first Puritan Church "out of the kingdom," shows us not only his own deep sagacity as a religious thinker, but, by inference, it shows us also what we are now endeavoring to illustrate, that the thinking habit, on the religious and ecclesiastical questions of that day, among these leading men of the Pilgrims, was more profound and exhaustive than anywhere else.

The "unconformable ministers" were those who were not Separatists, men who still kept themselves within the fold of the English Church,—Puritans, as they are known in history; who, in respect to their opposition to many of the rites and usages of that Church, were also called non-conformists. Robinson foresaw, that when those men should come to organize a church, away from England, in the shadows of the wilderness, it would have to take shape according to the Pilgrim idea of a church. But these "conformable ministers" had had no such revelation at that time. They were groping their way in ecclesiastical darkness. When those first large companies of Puritans came over in 1629 and '30, they brought no church model with them, and were really in the dark as to the precise shape which their religious institutions should take. We admire that touching little address of Higginson, which he uttered from the stern of the ship, as the shores of their loved England were receding from the view: "We will not say, as the Separatists were wont to say," etc. It is not to be denied that his words have in them an exceeding tenderness and beauty. But they show us also that, ecclesiastically speaking, he was "going out, not knowing whither he went." They show us, that for him the umbilical cord had not yet been cut. He was still held within the confines of his infantile existence, and had not entered upon a self-thinking, individual, independent life. But Robinson and his leading associates had pondered these problems—had thought them out to the end. Robinson saw (for the pattern had been shown him in the mount) what essential shape that first church at Salem would take, years before its existence; while to the very men that organized it, it sprang up like a new and strange revelation out of the wilderness soil.

Did the limits of our Article allow, it would be an agreeable and instructive exercise to pass these leading men of Plymouth before us one by one, William Brewster, William Bradford, Edward Winslow, Isaac Allerton, John Carver, Myles Standish, Samuel Fuller, John Alden, John Howland, and others—to dwell for a little time upon their previous personal histories and their individual characters—to point out their several experiences and the way in which the hand of God had led them, one by one, to prepare them for their work. It was a strange outward culture through which they had individually passed, but this culture meeting with and being shaped by the grace of God in their hearts, had wrought a wonderful ripeness of understanding and Christian character. Even plucky Myles Standish, who was not of the church, and who seems at first view a little out of place in this sacred companionship, was, after all, a very important member of the little confederacy. Considering the uneasy elements that were stirring around them, in the shape of untutored savages lurking in the woods, and more rascally white men, who were coming to these shores as fugitives from law, or as mere hap-hazard adventurers, there was a natural place in this Plymouth commonwealth for the bold and fiery little captain. We have heard of an honest-hearted young fellow, who without much experience, undertook to do the shopping in the meat, vegetable, and grocery line, for a small family. Being perfectly fair and unsophisticated in all his transactions, he found himself so often cheated and abused, that he came home one day in the full conviction that in these times there must be one person in every Christian family to lie, cheat, and steal for the family. We sometimes think of Myles Standish, down among the Plymouth Pilgrims, a little in this same way. Inevitably there was some rough work to be done, and he was the man to do it promptly and thoroughly. It was a small army that he led, and it would doubtless have been amusing to the great captains of Europe, had they seen him marshal his little company and lead them out upon some important military expedition. But few or many, it is sufficient to say, that he executed his orders with so little delay, that the standing army did not become a heavy tax upon the resources of the State, and was a most important balance-wheel in those early days of Pilgrim history.

But there was another side in the character of Myles Standish, in which he appears before us with all the sympathy and gentleness of a woman, tending the sick in that first terrible winter and performing for them the most humble and lowly offices. And, in spite of his seeming roughness, he must have been a man of the Pilgrim way of thinking, else he would never have linked his fortunes so closely to theirs, and cast in his lot with them through all those years of toil, hardship, and adversity.

The present volume of Dr. Bacon does not reach downward in time far enough to present the proper basis for the discussion of the question as to the different influences and tendencies, political and ecclesiastical, which have flowed out from Plymouth on the one hand, and the Massachusetts Bay on the other, into the shapings of general society and the direction of our national life. This is a large and intensely interesting question, and one which the present generation is much better able to discuss intelligently than former generations have been. But while we do not propose to enter upon this question in an extended way, it may be proper to say, in general, that if Plymouth could have had a larger share, a more ruling voice in the first fifty years of New England history, we should have been saved from some of the grand mistakes which society has had to endure and outlive. Plymouth, if left alone, would never have been likely to perpetrate the *Half-way Covenant* scheme of 1662, which trailed its weary and disastrous way among us for more than a century afterwards. At Plymouth the elements were not present for the construction or even the suggestion of such a scheme. It rose into being out of the conditions of society in the Bay. Nor, if Plymouth had been left to herself, should we ever have had the Cambridge Platform or the Saybrook Platform in some of their most arbitrary and objectionable features. The draft of the Cambridge Platform, which, in general, was accepted and adopted by the Synod of 1648, came from the pen of Richard Mather. There were associated with him, on the committee to prepare plans or drafts for the action of the Synod, John Cotton of Boston, and Ralph Partridge of Duxbury, in the old colony. Mr. Cotton, busy with his important charge in Boston, and with his many public cares, does not appear to have

made any draft by himself, but knowing that his more retired neighbor, Mr. Richard Mather of Dorchester, was of the same essential way of thinking on ecclesiastical matters with himself, he entrusted the work to him. Both these men were already public writers on Church government, and their views were well known. Mr. Ralph Partridge of Duxbury was also an able man, and it has always been understood that he prepared a scheme of his own to be presented to the Synod, but as might naturally be expected, in a body constituted as that was, his plan did not prevail. What ever became of the manuscript draft from the pen of Mr. Partridge, has been a puzzling question with New England antiquarians. But recently some light has been shed upon the subject. There has long been slumbering in the Antiquarian Library of Worcester an old manuscript which had come down from the early days, but which bore no name, and its history and design were not apparent upon a hasty glance. Recently, Rev. H. M. Dexter, D.D., has identified this manuscript as the one presented by Mr. Partridge to the Synod of 1648, and in due time it is to be published, with historical and explanatory notes. If Mr. Partridge, in preparing it, really embodied the Plymouth ideas, as they were current in the old Colony at the time the Synod met, it will be an interesting document to study. His attempt might possibly have been, knowing how the currents were then running, to prepare what he supposed might be acceptable to the majority of the Synod, in which case the document would be less valuable. But if we find the Plymouth ideas in it, we shall be likely to find something quite different from the ideas embodied in the Cambridge Platform. But little Plymouth was mostly ignored in that day. The wisdom which was then abroad and popular was not her wisdom. But after long and patient waiting, her day has come at length, and it is not difficult now to see that she thought deeper, purer, better thoughts on matters of Church and State, than those which were then uppermost. "The conies are but a feeble folk, yet make they their homes in the rocks."

It is a most interesting and suggestive exercise to open, side by side, the first volume of the Plymouth Colonial Records and the first volume of the Massachusetts Colonial Records—to run

the eye along from page to page, on a comparative view, and see what was going on in the two places at one and the same time. Here were English-born people, only recently transferred to these shores, but so separated by the wilderness that intervened and by their diverse ecclesiastical origin, that they were almost as much apart practically as if they had had their habitations on distant continents. Each Colony went on very much in its own way, with small regard to the other. By virtue of their common humanity, their kinship of race, and their exposure to the same general outward conditions, their common earthly wants and occupations were much the same. But there is a nice and subtle difference between the two records. . Take the year 1633, (for in that year the Plymouth published records begin,) when Boston and Charlestown are only four years old, and it is easy to see that life is much more full, noisy, tumultuous in the Bay than at Plymouth. There is more of rough and coarse crime, due partly to the larger population. The cases at Plymouth which require adjudication are rather of a civil order, such as arise from misunderstandings between man and man. Not that real crime is wholly absent from Plymouth, but it is less violent and less in amount.

It is a significant fact, and, according to our present habits, not a little amusing, that the first entry in the Plymouth volume should be the following: "It was enacted by publick consent of the freemen of this society of New Plymouth, that if now or heereafter, any were elected to the office of Governour, and would not stand to the election, nor hold and execute the office for his yeare, that then he be amerced in twenty pounds sterling fine; and in case refused to be paid upon the lawfull demand of the ensuing Governour then to be levied out of the goods or chattels of the said pson so refusing.

"And it was further ordered and decreed, that if any were elected to the office of Councill and refused to hold the place, that then he be amerced in ten pounds sterling fine; and in case refused to be paid, to be forthwith levied."

It would seem from this record that the present rage for office-holding could not have come down to us from Plymouth. In this year 1633, there appear by these records to have been in Plymouth sixty-eight men who were freemen and who were

entitled to vote and hold office. By another list furnished for the same year, we have the names of those who were subject to taxation. A public tax was laid, and ninety individuals, of whom two were widows, were the tax-payers. This shows no large disparity between the freemen and the tax-payers; and several who were not freemen at the time the tax was levied became so very soon afterwards. It was very different in the Massachusetts Bay, where none but Church members were admitted freemen. In 1640, Thomas Lechford, writing upon this point, tells us: "Now the most of the persons at New England, (meaning especially Massachusetts Bay) are not admitted of their Church and therefore are not freemen." "The most" may be interpreted as a majority merely, but is probably used in a much larger sense. This restriction as to Church membership did not prevail at Plymouth, and though regard was there had to character and standing in those who were to share in the duties and privileges of government, yet the system was in general large and liberal.

But we must bring our Article to a close. This volume of Dr. Bacon was written for the people, and we trust it will be widely read by the people. And if it is so read it will be of great service in diffusing a larger information and a more life-like knowledge of the Pilgrim Fathers—what kind of men they were in their private characters and what were their public ends and aims. Ancestral pride may grow into repulsive forms, but it is a good thing for any man to have an ancestry of which he has no occasion to be ashamed. We did not all spring from the Pilgrim Fathers, it is true. Indeed, only a small portion even of the old New England population can trace its origin to this source. But it is a case where we ought to be permitted to choose our own ancestry, for it is a spiritual and ecclesiastical ancestry that we are after, "For he is not a Jew which is one outwardly, . . . but he is a Jew which is one inwardly." And more and more, every year, as we read the signs of the times, the Plymouth stock, so to speak, is rising in the market of the world. The value of those men, not as actors only, but as thinkers—as men who founded institutions and gave a new direction to civilization itself, is, and will be more and more appreciated as the generations pass by, and the years of the race accumulate.

ARTICLE VII.—THE GENESIS OF RIGHTS IN NATURAL
LAW.

IN his treatise on *International Law*, Dr. Woolsey assumes, as the basis or starting point of the science, "certain conceptions which we call rights." He says, "In order to protect the individual members of society from one another, and to make just society possible, the Creator of man has implanted" these conceptions in his nature. "These," he adds, "are the foundations of the System of Justice, and the ultimate standard with which laws are compared, to ascertain whether they are just or unjust."

The question may very properly be asked, what is the origin, philosophically considered, of these "implanted" conceptions, which constitute the "ultimate standard?" Must they be sought for simply in the individual consciousness as original principles, and are they to be found defined in consciousness, or are they developed from certain logical antecedents, and in order to define them must we appeal to something beside the simple intuitions of consciousness?

It will generally be conceded that there must be an objective beauty as well as a subjective sensibility that enables us to apprehend it; that there must be an objective right as well as a *moral sense*, however variously the latter term may be defined or explained. Our conceptions of right, in like manner, demand for their explanation more than subjective sensibility, or what is evolved from consciousness. Indeed, the theory of implanted conceptions approximates very closely to that of "innate ideas," and while obnoxious to the same criticism, offers no satisfactory account of "conceptions which we call rights."

The attempt to define rights shows that ideas of personality, personal relations, and obligations are involved in it. These must be apprehended before any correct conception of rights is possible. In other words, we must first attend to what is implied in natural law, or we lack what is absolutely essential to the basis as well as definition of rights. Hobbes' theory of

rights harmonized logically enough with his theory concerning natural law, but was radically false because it rested on a false foundation. He gave to every man a right to all things—a right to which might only could give valid effect. So that in reality, before the conflicting claims of individuals were settled by the “Leviathan,” right was practically synonymous with might, and based upon it. It would be difficult to prove him in error, if we concede to him, what he assumes, that natural law does not come in or find place till the conflict of individual rights is adjusted by authority.

Very properly, we reject a theory of rights which initiates a moral and political chaos, from which a “Leviathan” is needed to evolve order. Natural law does not come in subsequent to “rights.” It logically precedes them. Whatever exists, comes into being under law—the law of its nature and relations, by which it is conditioned. The restrictions it imposes apply to rights, and assist us to define them.

As to the term law, it is used in various senses, and oftentimes without any discrimination between them. If, with Dr. Hopkins, we define law to be force working by rule, it may be applied exclusively to the force, as when we speak of what a law, in the sense of power, effects; or to the mode in which it works, and here we apply it to chemical combinations; or to the phraseology in which the letter of the law finds expression; or it may be employed in a variety of other senses that must by no means be confounded. The attempt to define it so that it shall apply alike in the physical and moral sphere, may give evidence of adroit generalization or marshalling of words, but it is only confusing when it ignores or leaves out of sight the radical distinction between physical and moral law. Yet, bearing this in mind, we may accept for the present that generic idea of law which involves conditions and restrictions to which the subject of law must conform, leaving to an after stage of discussion the specifying of what is peculiar to the moral sphere.

To law of some kind then, all which exists must be subject, for the simple reason that nothing created can exist without conditions and relations. If we could suppose only a single particle of matter to exist in the universe, it would sustain re-

lations to time and space. Unless it is absolutely simple, indivisible, and without parts, it would possess a constitution, the elements of which would sustain mutual relations, so that in this way, also, it would be limited and conditioned. If another particle of matter is called into being, new relations, and consequently new limitations would supervene, and with every addition made to the sum of being, new limitations would be imposed, which as the conditions of existence or operation, would be in their nature equivalent to law.

In such a case as this, therefore, law would be simply—as expressed—the definition of the mutual relations of things as constituted by their maker (or of these relations with their necessary results), while the establishing or constituting of these relations—a synonym for creation—would be legislation in its most sovereign and absolute sense. But in this case, no moral element would be involved. The characteristic of physical law is simply that it requires invariable sequence, and that obedience to or compliance with it is a matter of necessity with which conscious volition has nothing to do.

But when we pass into the moral sphere a new element is introduced. Here mutual relations also exist, conditioning and limiting whatsoever they reach, but out of these relations spring mutual obligations, and it is to the obligations rather than the relations that we apply the term law. The relations, however, are not to be lost sight of. They are absolutely essential to an intelligent and just definition of the obligations which arise out of them, and must be exactly conformed to them. The relation of parent and child, of teacher and pupil, of employer and employed, must be kept in view if we attempt to designate the duties or obligations that spring out of their several relations. When these relations are clearly stated and apprehended, law, as expressed, will simply define what is to be inferred from them, while law, as the original or creative force, simply constitutes the relations themselves. But as law implies superior power or authority, exercised over what is subject to it, we must, to complete our conception of law, introduce into it this idea. Physical law, therefore, is the authoritative establishing (or defining) of the mutual relations of things, by which they are limited or conditioned; while moral law is the authoritative establishing (or defining) of the obligations springing from the mutual relations of beings and things.

To moral law, man, as a moral agent, is born subject. Whatever rights he may have or claim, must be held or claimed under that law, or in harmony with it. Antecedent to all civil relations, this law is binding, and thus, as obligatory in a state of nature—a non-civil state—is designated properly natural law. Existing under it, man can be said at first to know no other right than what is implied in such existence. Natural law, without lingering over any question of rights, proceeds at once to define obligations, and in doing so, for the first time evolves the conception of rights. It classifies man's relations, in order to distribute and define his duties. It shows how he stands related to his own being, and deduces the duties he owes to himself; how he stands related to his fellow beings, and deduces the duties he owes to them; how he stands related to his Maker, and deduces the duties which he owes to one who is at once his Creator, Ruler, Father, and Judge.

Here, then, is the basis for the three great divisions of natural law, made familiar to us in the pages of the old writers and authorities, who, like Puffendorf, have elaborately discussed the subject. Let us take up the first of these, the duty which man owes to himself, and see what it involves. Such duty exists. The very command to love our neighbor as ourselves, sometimes quoted to show that virtue consists in loving our neighbor, implies as the basis and measure of duty, love to ourselves. Natural law recognizes it under the head of the great law of self-preservation, most comprehensive in its scope. Each thing or being that exists originates from a force out of itself, and comes into being with the necessity of self-assertion imposed upon it. It must assert itself for what it is. This law is universal in its application. It applies to the clod, the crystal, the brute, the man, the angel. The extension and impenetrability of the stone are but forms of its unconscious self-assertion. The germination of the seed, the growth of the tree, the expansion of the flower, are but the self-assertion of vital organisms. Animal life, also, conforms to the law of self-preservation, when it expands its powers, or resists what would interfere with its integrity or normal development. In like manner, man, with his complex nature, physical, intellectual, emotional, moral, must conform to the same law, modified only by its objects.

He is to love himself, or in other words, to comply with the natural law of self-preservation.

But to do this, he must not only see that his physical wants are supplied, that food and clothing and shelter are provided for his body, but he must meet, as far as the resources at his command will allow, the demands of his conscious and rational being. Just as he should secure for his lungs the healthful air, and for his stomach the healthful food which they demand, so also it is his duty to provide for his intellectual development, for his moral perfection, in a word, for his attainment of that standard of acquisition, expansion, and perfection of all the powers of his being which is possible in the nature and conditions of that being. Just as he is, by the law of self-preservation, bound to resist the injury that violence might inflict upon his person, so he is bound to ward off all intellectual or moral wrong. All this is required by a simple regard to the law of self-preservation.

Up to this point, it is evident, we have been dealing formally with questions of obligation. Natural law has simply defined a man's duty to himself. It has said negatively, man has no right to destroy himself, to mutilate his person, to pervert the design of his own being; and so far it is a denial of rights. But it has also said positively that man is bound to seek the development and perfection of his own being, and has thus made it imperative upon him to use the means at his command in order to attain this end. These means are essential in order to the discharge of duty. They are of the nature of talents put into one's hand, which he is to employ. Whatever is requisite to compliance with the law of self-preservation, taken in its broad but just sense, belongs to him. It is his *right*. If, to attain the end in view, he must have a free use of his faculties, that freedom is his right. If he must have the free use of the light and the air, that free use is his right. If he needs the soil to cultivate, the forest to furnish him timber, the mine to furnish him metals, and these are essential to the great end of his being, then these are his right. If the experience and accumulated wisdom of the past are necessary, he has a right to demand them of those who have them to bestow.

Here, therefore, in this department of natural law we have a basis for rights, and at the same time the means of at least

negatively defining them. Every faculty of body, mind, and spirit has its right to development and to the means of development, but so far as we have proceeded, nothing more. A man cannot claim the globe, he cannot claim a continent, unless that globe or that continent is essential to compliance with the law of self-preservation, properly understood. Hobbes' theory of unlimited right finds no place here. Natural law does not admit it; is inconsistent with it. Rights are only the reverse of duties, and exist only as they are implied in duties. In this division of natural law, rights and duties may even be said to be identical, except that they wear different aspects according to our point of observation. Viewed from the point of natural law, rights are simply duties, or what is involved in them. Viewed from the position of the subject of obligation, duties are rights, or involve rights.

Leaving for after consideration such modification of these conclusions as result from their relation to the second department of natural law, we find that rights result from duties, and that their inviolability consists in the fact that they are implied in them. We can logically approach the subject of rights only from the direction of duty, and through the portals of natural law. This may not be in accordance with some popular, or even some elaborated theories, but it is the inevitable conclusion of sound reasoning, and it is the only fitting basis for a science of rights. Ulrici (*Grundzüge der Practischen Philosophie, Naturrecht, &c.*) has well said, "In truth, man is not born with rights, but only with duties, and therefore he has only the right to demand that the possibility to discharge his duty be assured him. His rights flow only from his duties, and can be deduced from them alone." The objections to this position which are noticed and met in his pages cannot here be considered. It is enough to say that they vanish before his lucid argumentation.

But when man is considered as a social being, and is found sustaining social relations, our attention is invited to another of the great divisions of natural law, and here we find that the rights which man possesses in virtue of the duties incumbent upon him are brought into contact with the rights of others, and to some extent are modified by the new class of duties corresponding to these rights. He meets with others, who, like

himself, are born under natural law, and have duties to themselves to discharge, while possessing the rights involved in the discharge of those duties. In these new relations, his freedom is necessarily subjected to new conditions and limitations. It becomes therefore an important question, what these are, and how far, and how far only, do they extend.

He must surrender what is actually requisite to the common good, what is necessary to put others, as subject to common duties, and claiming common rights, on an equality with himself. He must respect their rights, as they do his. But here the question meets us, how can he surrender his rights, if he holds them as essential to the discharge of duty, and possesses none which are not covered and protected by the sanctity of duty?

In reply to this, it may be said that in that aggregate of rights which man, as the subject of obligation, takes with him into society, there is a diversity which becomes manifest, when he assumes new relations to his fellow men. Existing by himself, it might be his duty to consume the entire portion of food which in given circumstances he has at his command. His duty to regard his own health and strength might require it. But place a starving brother at his side, and that duty is modified. Now he is under obligations to divide with another his scant store. In like manner, countless other instances might be supposed in which he would be brought under obligation to do or forego that which but for society would have been a matter, possibly of indifference, or perhaps one in which duty to himself would have dictated a different course.

Here then is a broad field of social and civil duties which must be so adjusted that social equality shall result, and just those rights which the individual takes with him into society be surrendered. and these only, which are requisite to the end in view. Some of these, as we have seen, can and must be surrendered. Their exercise is limited by new social relations. But how far may this surrender extend, and what is its necessary limit?

Here, again, we must have recourse to what is prescribed by the law of self-preservation. That law imposes duties, but these duties admit of a classification subordinate to the great end or ultimate duty of the perfection of the moral nature. Just as it

is the duty of a man to sacrifice his finger rather than his hand, his arm rather than his life, when the alternative is presented, and this is demanded by the law of self-preservation, so when the question is raised between physical comfort on one side, and a concession to the claims of humanity or conscience on the other, the former, which in other circumstances might have claims of duty to enforce it, must give way to the latter, and the means which a man might employ to beautify or furnish his dwelling may be, and should be, surrendered to feed the starving, clothe the naked, or protect the community from impending calamity. A man might even feel himself justified—like the Moravian missionaries in one instance—in parting with his freedom, in order that as a slave he might accomplish for his fellow slaves a work of humanity and Christian charity, which otherwise would be impossible.

But to this surrender there are limits, and these are reached when a man is called to part with anything which is essential to the discharge of those duties on which his moral integrity, and the attainment of the great end recognized in the law of self-preservation, depend. Here we are confronted with that which is inalienable—that which the man, however favorably disposed, is not himself at liberty to surrender. Thus natural law at once indicates how rights originate, and at the same time, how they are or may be limited. It shows us on what ground we may predicate of some that they are alienable, and of others that they are inalienable. It sweeps aside all those theories of right which give them the logical precedence of duties, or made them independent of duty. It puts a check upon the radical and ruinous tendencies of the age which would disintegrate society in the interests of individualism, and impel men to clamor for all sorts of rights which approximate to the standard of unrestricted license.

But it is in natural law that we are steadily confronted with the truth of manifold application in constitutional and international spheres—that rights and duties are correlatives. This is not true in the same sense, or in the same respect, in the first department of it, as in the second. In the first, rights and duties are, *in their substance*, identical, since what is a duty is also a right, and what is absolute duty, no man or body of men may arbitrarily limit, so that duties and rights are only different as

pects of the same thing, according to the point from which they are viewed. But in the second department, where we have to consider the relation of the individual to society, those rights which are identified with duty must by all others be conceded to him, while what he owes to others, they have the right to demand. His duty to them limits his rights, or rather, so far as his social relations are concerned, what these do not forbid or preclude, out of respect to the common welfare, and the rights of all others, belongs to him as his right.

Civil organization must accept these conclusions, and recognize rights for what they are—sacred in some cases as the duties out of which they spring became essential to the discharge of these duties,—inviolable in others, because encroachment upon them would be an unwarrantable intrusion upon a sphere to be legitimately reached by no measure designed simply to promote the common welfare and the equal rights of all. But a wise legislation will be cautious in admitting as rights what happens to assume the name, and what can give no warrant for itself in its being the necessary condition for the discharge of duties. We have been drifting of late years upon strange theories of human rights. We have been quiet when rights have been elevated to a position above duties, and we have silently sanctioned certain postulates fundamental to a political philosophy, from which only a political chaos can legitimately result.

It is time for us to retrace our steps—to recognize in human government something more than a compact of convenience, which expediency has made and expediency can unmake,—to trace it back to those foundations of natural law upon which alone it can safely and securely rest, to frame our legislation with strict regard to those principles of justice which constitute the *eternal unwritten law* of Sophocles, Cicero, and Hooker—in short, to do that which Daniel Webster, for once, with a sneer unworthy of himself, characterized as re-enacting the law of God. Let there be no assertion of rights that can only be arbitrarily defined, or which are shaped by the various fancies, temperaments, or interests of men, but rather let those be recognized which can assert their validity as derived from duties enjoined by natural law, and which the common welfare must allow to remain unrestricted and undisturbed.

ARTICLE VIII.—THE HEROIC AGE OF AMERICA, AND
ITS LEGACY.

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED IN THE AMERICAN CHAPEL AT BERLIN,
ON THANKSGIVING DAY, NOV. 26, 1874,

BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D., LL.D.*

THIS day belongs to Americans, and surely none will begrudge them in foreign lands the observance of a national festival which brings them into conscious and cheerful unison with the millions of their countrymen at home, in the grateful and adoring recognition of Almighty God. The spirit of nationality, in which and through which the peoples are striving toward a higher form of civil and social life, must cause each nation to respect in every other that observance of patriotic days and festivals which it would cherish for itself. As an American far from home, I keep in remembrance the birthday of Washington, the Fourth of July, the National Thanksgiving; and because I feel thus free to exhibit my own nationality, I never fail to run up my American flag in honor of the birthday of the Emperor of Germany, under whose protection I live, and on other festal days, in sympathy with the great and noble German nation, which having done so much for Science, Letters, and Art, is now, under its new political form, to do its noblest work for the peace of Europe, and for the deliverance of civil society from the curse of ecclesiastical control.

The better this festival of ours is understood, the more will it be appreciated and perhaps imitated also in Europe. Our German friends, however, will get a strange notion of its history and significance if they trust to the American correspondents

* The Rev. Joseph P. Thompson, D.D., LL.D., now a resident of Berlin, formerly one of the editors of the *New Englander*, has been, from the first, one of the most frequent contributors to its pages. The subscribers to this Journal will read with pleasure the Thanksgiving Address, delivered by him Nov. 26, 1874, in the American Chapel at Berlin, to his countrymen who are living in that city. We republish the Address from the *International Gazette of Berlin*.—EDS. *NEW ENGLANDER*.

of their own journals for information touching American life and institutions. The foreign correspondents of American newspapers have won no small reputation for boldness and skill of invention; and it must be said of some of them that they possess not only that creative faculty which brings things that are out of things that are not, but that more marvelous power that creates things that are not out of things that are! But in all these respects they must yield the palm to the German in America who writes about Americans and their ways, to the newspapers of Germany. Not long ago, I read in a leading newspaper of Berlin a letter from America describing our Thanksgiving day. Of course, the writer began with saying that the Americans have no geniality, no mirthfulness, no holidays, no festivals. This desolate and gloomy condition of the national mind he ascribed of course to the Puritans, who, he said, would never allow of any holiday but the Sabbath, and this they enforced with more than Jewish rigor. Of late, however, the President of the United States had hit upon the idea of a national Thanksgiving; and this was so taking, especially with young people, that even the stiff old Puritans of New England were forced to observe it, though they tried to make it as solemn as their Sabbath! Now, as you all know, we are a very good-natured people; so good-natured as to bear to be caricatured, and also too good-natured to allow our innocent neighbors to be humbugged; and as I was a subscriber to this paper, and had some little knowledge of the editor, I wrote to him—My dear sir, It seems a pity that the German people who so love the truth of history should have such a story put off upon them as matter of fact. Thanksgiving day was a device of those same sour, solemn Puritans. It was observed in Puritan New England alone for 150 years before there was any United States. For a long time after the Revolution. it was exclusively a festival of New England; by degrees it spread into other States through New England immigration; and it was only during the late war that President Lincoln seized the occasion of making this old Puritan Thanksgiving a national festival. I said also to the editor,—The Germans ought to know, that in 1632 the Puritans in Massachusetts appointed a special Thanksgiving for the vic-

tories of Gustavus Adolphus, that first made Prussia secure in that Protestantism which is to-day her pride and her power. Well—the editor could not find room for these facts of history, because his columns were so crowded with news! It is proper to add that this paper has lately died,—perhaps from a plethora of news.

This oldest festival, dating from the heroic age of America, is the best expression of our national spirit—combining into one conception productive enterprise, domestic felicity, and religious devotion; for Thanksgiving day represents the fruits of industry turned to family festivity and sanctified by prayer. The Pilgrims were believers; no Haeckel nor Huxley had taught them that man is but a material machine, no Tyndall that prayer is but a powerless superstition. If their beliefs are indeed to be set aside by materialists as superstition, let us at least be thankful that the superstition lived long enough to produce such heroes! And for one, I shall stand by those heroes, till materialism shall produce a race more worthy of my trust and homage. My theme to-day is, *The Heroic Age of America and its Legacy to be Guarded by us.*

That which made men of culture and women of refinement willing to suffer persecution, imprisonment, banishment from the comforts of an English home, exile across the sea, cold, hunger, pestilence, death—and all this for ideas and principles that are to-day the richest treasure and the brightest hope for humanity—whether you call it superstition or faith, was the stuff of which heroes were made, and by which a nation was nurtured to its manhood. It is by the inspiration of that heroic age that the nation has lived through all the changes of the past, and by conserving this it shall live through all the commotions of the present. For myself, so rooted am I in the lessons of this heroic age, that I have no fear for the stability of the institutions of the United States, whatever excitements or perils may seem to threaten them. In a life not yet long, I have seen the country ruined five times by financial panics, only to rise again stronger and richer than before. In my boyhood I saw it turned into a military despotism by General Jackson, and now a second time I have seen it turned into a “military despotism” by General Grant! and I have no doubt

it would thrive equally under the military despotism of General Sherman, or General Sheridan, or any other general—except *one* whom it could not survive! I remember that during the war of President Jackson upon the United States bank monopoly, the streets of Philadelphia were placarded with appeals to rise and save the country from its military tyrant. “Three millions of colonists,” said one, “could defy and conquer George III, and shall thirteen millions of freemen be made slaves by *Andrew Jackson!*” To-day, every body is glad that Jackson broke down the bank, and would be still more glad to get the old hero’s hard money currency. At every Presidential election, I have seen the country either actually destroyed through bribery and corruption, or certain to be destroyed if the other party should prevail; and from 1830 to 1860 the Union was dissolved at least once during every session of Congress. Yet we still sing with Longfellow,

Thou, too, sail on, O Ship of State!
Sail on, O Union, strong and great!
Humanity with all its fears,
With all the hopes of future years,
Is hanging breathless on thy fate.
We know what Master laid thy keel,
What workmen wrought thy ribs of steel,
Who made each mast, and sail, and rope,
What anvil rang, what hammers beat,
In what a forge and what a heat,
Were shaped the anchors of thy hope!
Fear not each sudden sound and shock,
’Tis of the wave and not the rock,
’Tis but the flapping of the sail,
And not a rent made by the gale!
In spite of rock and tempest’s roar,
In spite of false lights on the shore,
Sail on, nor fear to breast the sea!
Our hearts, our hopes, are all with thee:
Our hearts, our hopes, our prayers, our tears,
Our faith triumphant o’er our fears,
Are all with thee—are all with thee.

Why is it that the nation is not ruined, that liberty is not destroyed, that the Union is not dissolved, that we never have rushed, and are never going to rush into anarchy or into despotism? It is because such institutions were given us by the wisdom and virtue of an heroic age.

But I shall be met at once with the taunt so common in Europe, that Americans have no history; that we are too young to draw motive or inspiration from the past. Some will naturally enough confound the centenary of our Independence in 1876 with the whole period of our national life; but as a people we are older by a third of a century than the era of the Great Elector, and older than the Union of Brandenburg and Prussia.

Still I shall be told, that we have had no great era of development from an antiquity hoary with ruins and hung round with traditions. True, the people of the United States cannot trace their origin through those gradations which are said to mark the growth of great peoples from the age of stone; but though we had no iron age, we look back to men of iron as our founders; no mythical heroes, but "there were giants in those days;" no era of the gods, but there were men who "walked with God;" no mailed knights carrying the Crusader's cross to win the Holy Sepulchre, yet there were Pilgrims carrying the living Christ to subdue a continent to his kingdom. Is America young? So the Roman Catholic Church taunts Protestantism with its youth—"your Church dates only from Luther, ours from Peter." But Protestantism answers, ours was not a birth but a restoration; we recovered the Church not from the hand of Peter, but from that of Christ: and so America can say, the whole Past is ours, but we recovered man from oppression, we recovered truth from tradition, we recovered liberty from tyranny. Our development dates from the age when England was resplendent with the names of Spenser, Shakspeare, Sidney, and Ben Jonson, of Bishops Hall and Hooker, and with the rising glory of Bacon, who made both history and science possible; from the age when Germany had experienced her emancipation from spiritual thralldom through the mighty throes of the Reformation; from the age when Holland, by the wise counsels and heroic sacrifices of William the Silent, had given Europe the example of a free State; from the age when Calvin had wrought out the sovereignty of God in ordaining, and Arminius the freedom of man in willing: it was when the seventeenth century had opened under the concentrated light and warmth of these productive influences in literature, in poli-

tics, in theology, that the Pilgrims, nurtured in England, domiciled in Holland, set forth for America, carrying with them the most advanced ideas of Church and of State, and leaving behind them the traditions, the encumbrances, the obscurations of the past. It has been fitly said of them, that "God sifted the wheat of the Old World for this planting of the New." Of the heroism with which they entered upon their voyage in the *Mayflower*, with which they met the hardships of the first winter at Plymouth and the perils from the Indians, I will not here stop to speak; but let me ask you to stand with me upon a morning of April, 1622, by the rock where the Pilgrims landed four months before; in those four months they have had no tidings nor token from dear friends in England nor in Holland, their second home; in those four months, of the hundred who landed, forty-four have been laid away in graves dug through the snow on yonder hill.—graves not marked nor separated by any stone or sign, lest the stealthy Indian creeping in at night might count the dead and see how the colony was wasting. And now the little band are standing here to see the *Mayflower* sail away, severing the last link that bound them to the Old World; yet not one of them asks nor consents to go with her on her homeward voyage! They watch her till her hull sinks below the horizon, till the last shimmering of her sails fades away; then with that same old superstition turn back to build foundations for a nation, for the Church of God. In the following September we look in upon them again, now gathered in the house that served them for a fort, for a church, and for the affairs of government; their harvest has been gathered, the wheat and the peas they brought with them have come to naught, but they have raised a store of native corn, and the woods are full of game and the sea of fish; and though no ship had yet visited them from England, and they may have to face another winter of cold and hardship, yet they think it meet thus to come together to give thanks to God for his great goodness and mercy. If any can mock at this as superstition, the Lord deliver me from the wisdom of the wise, and grant me to die in the faith of the heroes!

I might fill the hour with tales of the heroism of endurance, of exploration, of enterprise, as colonies were multiplied and

the wilderness was encroached upon ; as, for instance, that wonderful migration through the pathless woods for the planting of Connecticut, when men and women accustomed to comfort and ease went on foot through the forest, sleeping at night on the bare ground, with the risk of wild beasts and savage men ; of the noble courage of Roger Williams, who trusted himself alone to assuage the Pequods mustering for war ; I might go back to the perils and escapes of the first settlement in Virginia, or come down to the later wars with the Indians and French ; I might follow the course of emigration westward : every where it is the same story of heroic men and women nurturing a nation up to its manhood. And when the hour of that manhood came, we see assembled the company of fifty-five men who subscribed that Declaration of Independence in which they pledged to each other "their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor;" signed it with the scaffold in view : Franklin saying, "Now we must all hang together, or we shall be hanged separately;" Witherspoon, the Calvinistic divine, saying: "I have some property, some reputation, a family—I lay these all upon the altar of my country ; my gray head must soon go down to the grave, but I would rather lay it on the block of the executioner than refuse to put my hand to this document;" John Adams, the guiding mind of the Revolution, as Sam Adams was its burning heart, saying, "We may die, die colonists, die slaves ; die it may be ignominiously and on the scaffold ; be it so, I shall be ready ; but while I do live let me have a country, or at least the hope of a country, and that a free country;" Charles Carroll, who being congratulated by his colleagues that he might escape, as there were many of his name, going back to the table and with that bold free hand that stares upon us from the parchment, adding, "*of Carrollton*," saying, "now they'll know where to find me;" the band of worthies from Virginia, of heroes from all the South ; and in the legislature of Virginia that modest young hero had already said, "I will equip a thousand men at my own cost and march in person for the relief of Boston"—the youth who grew to be the Father of his Country and the hero of all mankind. These men were born of the heroic spirit of America, they represented the life of her people. Mr. Josiah Quincy once narrated to me how in his boyhood he used

to go to read to John Adams, then towards his ninetieth year. The delight of the old patriot was to listen to *Cicero de Senectute*, and he would take up in advance the glowing periods, saying, "*O praeclarum diem, quum in illud divinum animorum concilium coetumque proficiscar, quumque ex hac turba et colluvione discedam ! Proficiscar enim non ad eos solum viros, de quibus ante dixi, verum etiam ad Catonem meum, quo nemo vir melior natus est, nemo pietate praestantior ; cuius a me corpus crematum est—quod contra decuit, ab illo meum—animus vero non me deserens, sed respectans in ea profecto loca discessit, quo mihi ipsi cernebat esse veniendum.*"

Grand old hero ! thus joining the patriotic fellowships of earth to the company of the spirits of the just. One day young Quincy said to him, "It is disputed whether you, Mr. Adams, or Mr. Jefferson, or Franklin, started the idea of independence ; pray tell me how it was ?" "Neither Jefferson, nor Franklin, nor I can claim that honor ; independence sprang from the hearts of the people. When I was a student of law, I taught school at Worcester, and boarded round in the families of the farmers ; and as I heard them talk, I got such ideas of the State, of liberty, and of patriotism, as satisfied me we must come to this at last." Yes, the seed of heroes was sown so thickly in the soil that it could bear no other fruit. I have a right to give this testimony. Born in the city of Penn, schooled in the very hall where the Continental Congress had its first debates, accustomed to hear from my father how his grandsire gave his yet young life in the bloody defence of Ridgefield, accustomed from an elder source to hear the tradition of the ancestral mother who was set up in the pillory in England for quitting the Establishment and going to a Puritan conventicle, and for gathering children in her house to read to them the Bible that was hidden in her footstool, and who crossed the sea to the infant colony of Massachusetts, saying, "though wild beasts and savages are there, there is freedom to worship God,"—born in this atmosphere, and sharing this inheritance, I dare to stand up in presence of the heroic names and memories of the old world and say, we too have had our age of heroes ; I dare to stand before the proudest nobility of Europe and say, we too are of noble blood—aye, the noblest blood of earth, the blood

that freely spent itself for principle, for liberty, for man, for God.

But it is time that we should turn to the legacy of this heroic age. This may be summed up in the three terms, *self-government in the State, freedom for the Church, good will toward mankind*. The first item of this legacy is institutional liberty of action with constitutional unity of administration; in other words, local self-government combined with concerted and regulated unity—providing equally against centralization and disintegration. Fix your thoughts, I pray you, upon these terms and the things that they define; for in these lie the essence, the beauty, the strength of American institutions, and the warrant of their perpetuity.

George Eliot says: "Among all forms of mistake, prophecy is the most gratuitous;" yet I will risk one prophecy. No intelligent German, and almost no intelligent Englishman, expects or desires that his country shall become a Republic. I respect the judgment and the feelings of Germans and Englishmen; indeed, why should *they* wish for a change? Yet they are constantly saying, "the United States will become a monarchy or a despotism." Now I predict that Germany will five times, and England ten times sooner become a Republic, than the United States will become a monarchy or a despotism; and as a man of intelligence, I have the same right to be believed when I speak for my country; but I will give reasons.

Why is it that France and Spain have so often failed in the attempt to govern themselves through republican forms? One cause of this failure is common to both—the sad necessity for every government of Europe of maintaining a huge standing army for defence. The Swiss Republic is safe, first through the everlasting fortresses of the mountains, and next through the mutual jealousies and, we may hope, the good faith of the greater powers. But this aside, in France there has always been a tendency to centralization, to concentrate all government in the capital; in Spain, on the other hand, a tendency to extreme localization through the jealousy of rival provinces. But in America local independence and comprehensive unity were combined from the first,—the Plymouth democracy the type of the one, the New England confederation of the other. Here

in Prussia we have lately seen the National Parliament giving to the *Kreis* or county—almost forcing upon it—a larger measure of local freedom. In New England the State was built up from the county, the county from the township, and this again from the little school district. Thus from his very infancy the American citizen is surrounded with the institutions of liberty which are at the same time its munitions; he is trained to self-government in the least affairs, the affairs that most nearly touch himself, and for the larger affairs is trained to combination with others in a representative government, of powers carefully limited and clearly defined. That has been our success in the past and that is our surety for the future. As Mr. Parkman has finely said: "The New England colonists were far less fugitives from oppression than voluntary exiles seeking the realization of an idea. They were neither peasants nor soldiers, but a substantial Puritan yeomanry, led by Puritan gentlemen and divines in thorough sympathy with them. They were neither sent out by the king, governed by him, nor helped by him. They grew up in utter neglect, and continued neglect was the only boon they asked. Till their increasing strength roused the jealousy of the Crown, they were virtually independent: a republic, but by no means a democracy. They chose their own governor and all their rulers from among themselves, made their own government and paid for it, supported their own clergy, defended themselves, and educated themselves. Under the hard and repellent surface of New England society lay the true foundations of a stable freedom—conscience, reflection, faith, patience, and public spirit. The cement of common interests, hopes, and duties compacted the whole people like a rock of conglomerate, while the people of New France remained in a state of political segregation, like a basket of pebbles held together by the enclosure that surrounds them."

Now both these principles—that of local self-government and that of regulated co-operation—grew out of the Pilgrim conception of man and of the Church. Here we come back once more to their religious belief, or if you will have it so, their superstition. Some recent scientists would derive man from a simian ancestry, and would develop consciousness and

conscience out of material forces and laws; and when Positivism would furnish us with an ideal for reverence or worship, it finds this only in the sum total of humanity. But the Pilgrim conception was not *Menschheit* but *man*; not a mystic, collective, ideal humanity, but mankind made up of men, each of whom was a personal soul. To the Pilgrim, man was the child of God; man had the divine image in intelligence, in conscience, in will; man, though fallen, was loved and cared for by his Father in heaven; man was worth so much to himself, so much to the creation, so much to God, that the Son of God came to redeem him; man was lord of nature and heir to immortality in the kingdom of God; and because of this inherent, this inalienable, this inestimable, this imperishable worth of man, because every man in Christ was a king and a priest, therefore no tyranny of State or Church should come between this soul and God. Such men were brethren in the Church, equals in the State; and while the independence of each rested upon his personality as a soul, the rights of each should be respected in the brotherhood of all. That conception of humanity towards which Buckle and Comte and Mill and Spencer have laboriously but ineffectually striven, was first proclaimed in the gospel, and first formulated by the Pilgrim in the Church and in the State.

The second item of this legacy is the absolute freedom of religion. The Puritans who came over and settled Massachusetts Bay were by no means perfect on this point either in their conception or their practice; but the Pilgrim colony of Plymouth, made up of Separatists, founded in conscience, guarded the rights of conscience. The Pilgrims never persecuted; and they had no real Church Establishment. There is a spice of drollery in their dealing with the consciences of others, and a practical wisdom by which modern governments might profit. Their first Christmas fell on a Monday; on the Sabbath they had rested and worshipped God, though they were not yet housed; but of Christmas it is said, with a certain emphasis, they worked all that day. By the next Christmas, there were some new comers in the colony who held to the old Church observances. There was then a law that every man should do so much work towards the common stock; but these men said it

was against their conscience to work on Christmas day, and Governor Bradford answered that he would respect their conscience and excuse them. In the afternoon he found them all playing at ball, and pitching bars in the public street: so he took away their balls and bars, saying he would not interfere with their consciences in worship, but it was against *his* conscience that they should be at play while others were at work for them. He thus laid down the sound principle that conscience should be respected in its own sphere, but not to be allowed as a pretext for evading the laws of the State or disturbing the public order. Penn, the Quaker, proclaimed liberty of conscience upon the principle of justice: "We must give the liberty we ask. We cannot be false to our principles though it were to relieve ourselves; for we would have none to suffer for dissent on any hand." Calvert, the Catholic, approached the same religious liberty in Maryland; but above all, Roger Williams was at once apostle, prophet, confessor of religious liberty for mankind. It is said that Thomas Jefferson derived his first conception of a republican government from observing a Baptist church; and we know that the fear of a State Church, to be enforced upon the colonies, hastened the Revolution.

The third item of this legacy is the cosmopolitan spirit. We have seen what was the doctrine of the Pilgrims as to man; their practice was love to man as man. This showed itself in all their dealings with the Indians; as in their first welcome of Samoset, and in Governor Winslow's saluting Massasoit "with words of love and peace," and remaining unarmed as a hostage in their camp while the Indians made a treaty with the colonists. We meet the same spirit again in Penn, who, though sole proprietor of his territory, proclaimed it a free colony for all mankind; and in treating with the Indians he said, "I will not call you children, for parents are sometimes too severe with their children; nor yet brothers, for brothers sometimes quarrel; our friendship is not a chain that the rains might rust or a falling tree could break; rather it is like one man's body in two parts, for we are all one flesh and blood." And in reporting the treaty he said, "To the poor dark souls around us we teach their rights as men." It was the custom both in Penn's colony

and in the New England colonies, when difficulties arose with the Indians, to have a jury composed equally of both sides, thus anticipating a feature of the science of International Law.

All honor to Ethnology for what it has done to realize the affinities of races; all honor to Philology for tracing the root-affinities of human tongues; but when we would see both these achievements in their noblest form, we must follow the cultured and scholarly Eliot, as he leaves his attached church and friends in Roxbury, believing that the savages could be better civilized by the gospel than by gunpowder, and goes to the Indian settlement, and sits in grimy, filthy wigwams, that he may reduce a barbarous tongue to written form, and translate into it the word of God; or we must go to Stockbridge, where Jonathan Edwards—whose equal as a philosopher we must seek in Kant, and then wait a century for another—divides his time between the profoundest speculations on the human mind, and teaching the Indians around him to read the Bible, that he may evoke from their dark minds a spark of that immortal fire that glows in him like the seraphim. America has been always true to this legacy of a world-wide humanity, offering to all a home under the protection of equal laws.

May I ask your patience a few moments longer, while I speak of guarding this rich and precious legacy, this glorious heritage of the heroic age?

First, in civil affairs must we be more watchful for the perfect enjoyment and exercise of liberty. I disdain to speak of the necessity of purity at the polls, for every instinct of honor, of manliness, of self-protection must prompt to that. My appeal is for the rescue of liberty from the tyranny of majorities, from the tyranny of the press, and the tyranny of public opinion. How long shall we be content to vibrate between majorities, now of this party and now of that, each over-riding the other and undoing its work? It is not enough that every man has a right to vote—nay, that right alone may be a peril to liberty itself; but every man has the right to be reasonably and fairly represented, as to his essential interests and welfare, in the government of the country. If I am a Republican, what right have I to rule forever a Democrat by sheer force of num-

bers, enforcing my opinions and my policy without thought or care for his? If we would not have liberty a mere football in the game of parties, we must devise some method of election, like that of Illinois for instance, by which the rights of minorities shall be fairly consulted, and government shall be not for a party, but for the citizen. And to this end, personal liberty of thought, of opinion, of action, must be asserted and firmly held against the tyranny of the press and of public opinion. We must stand for the right of a man to be true to himself against the clamor of press or party. We want character, reputation, personality, in one word *manhood* restored to its primitive worth! Then good and honest men will consent to take offices from which they now shrink as from a pit of slime; then politicians will not be made vile through being always represented and denounced as vile; then children will not grow up to think that political success is to be won by the sacrifice of personal honor.

"There is a bondage worse to bear,
Than his who breathes, by roof, and floor, and wall
Pent in, a tyrants' solitary thrall;
'T is his who walks about in the open air,
One of a nation who, henceforth, must wear
Their fetters in their souls. * * *
* * * * Never be it ours
To see the sun how brightly it will shine,
And know that noble feelings, manly powers,
Instead of gathering strength, must droop and pine,
And earth with all her pleasant fruits and flowers
Fade, and participate in man's decline."

But to preserve intact our civil freedom and personal liberty, we must be watchful for religious liberty against all the subtle assaults of recent times. We must stand guard at the door of the School, that no sect creep in there in disguise to pervert and prostitute our public instruction to its own ends. We must stand guard at the door of the Treasury, that no sect thrust its hand in upon the sly to appropriate public funds to its own support. And we must stand guard at the door of the Convention, that no sect enter into alliance with a political party to give to a church so much as the semblance of power in the government of the State.

Last of all shall we be true to our inheritance by manifesting the spirit of cosmopolitan brotherhood. As travelers or residents abroad, let affability, generosity, magnanimity be the traits by which we recommend America; ours the uncritical spirit, the disposition to see good in all, to receive good from all, and to dispense good to all. At home, our study should be not only the material benefit of all who come among us, but by the spirit of peace and goodwill, to hasten the moral unity of the nations. At a time when so large a part of Christendom is straining its utmost powers in preparations for war, it is hard to believe the saying of President Grant in his last inaugural, "The nations are fast becoming so civilized as to feel that there is a better way to settle their difficulties than by fighting." But the nations do feel this notwithstanding; they are learning the lesson; the good time *is* coming. Oh! let it be the proud mission of the United States to give again the example of government at home without an army, and the settlement of difficulties abroad without the sword. Oh come the day when Reason and Law shall govern the world, and he alone shall be hailed as hero—to be honored in statue and in song—who has done most or suffered most for the good of his fellow man. Then, in the cycle of history shall the heroic age of America return once more; and there upon that Plymouth Bay, where now the ocean cable links the old world to the new, shall be seen the Pilgrim standing with head uncovered but crowned with heavenly glory, and lips parted not in prayer but in praise, that the kingdom of Christ has been established in those "remote parts of the world," where once this "unconscious hero" offered himself as "a stepping stone unto others for the performance of so great a work."

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND PHILOSOPHICAL.

THE PARACLETE.*—The anonymous author of a volume like *The Paraclete* cannot long remain unknown to the public, and we do but give voice to our own inferences when we ascribe it to the Rev. Joseph Parker of London, the author of *Ecce Deus*. The theme is one of the most fascinating to the exegete, the theologian, or the student of history. It is also a theme which in many of its most important relations has been singularly overlooked by modern preachers and writers. The author of this treatise has one merit at least; he has appreciated its importance, and has asserted this in utterances of no little fervor and power. In spite of a certain abruptness and incoherence of argument, and few, or not a few, excesses of imagination and emotional appeal, the volume is instinct with electrical power, and abounds in passages of glowing eloquence. What is more important, the eloquence is addressed very largely to the conscience, and is fitted to convince men "of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment." We find it not infrequently an extravagance, which we cannot but feel is "overdoing;" but we find, on the other hand, so much eloquent and fervid truth as compensates many times over for some very serious faults of statement and of illustration. The writer enters very warmly into the very spirit and power of the Gospel, and the fearlessness with which he deals with its modern opponents and rejectors is very refreshing to an earnest mind. The author is not illiberal, though eminently aggressive. He does not dishonor modern science and culture although he exposes the dogmatism of the one and the superficialness of the other, but he does set forth with fervid words the claims of the Incarnation of God, as a man who reverences His majesty and has been subdued and won by His love.

The treatise is divided into two parts; the first expository and affirmative, and the second critical and controversial. In this are

* *The Paraclete*: An Essay on the Personality and Ministry of the Holy Ghost, with some reference to current discussions. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co. 1874.

to be found "the reference to current discussions," in the form of very able and certainly very trenchant criticisms of Mr. Mill, Mr. Huxley, Mr. Tyndall, and Mr. Herbert Spencer. Though scientific and metaphysical discussions seem somewhat out of place in a work upon the Holy Spirit, and though the tone of these critical animadversions is not always what is usually conceded as "edifying," yet the discussions are able, and the earnestness and fervor of the author invest them with dignity.

Preachers will find this volume eminently quickening and useful, provided they are inspired to imitate only its excellencies.

GOD IN HUMAN THOUGHT.*—Dr. Gillett's elaborate work on *God in Human Thought* began with special researches in respect to Bishop Butler's analogy. His attention had been called to the condition of opinion in England when this work was written, and to the active controversies which had agitated England nearly a century before. The brief but significant sketch which Butler gives of the state of opinion concerning Natural and Revealed Religion in his time, had aroused the curiosity of our author as it had excited many others, with this difference in his case, that he was animated by it to a careful and thorough study of the principal writers on both sides, who had immediately preceded Butler. But he was not satisfied with these limits; although he might well have been content with having furnished the most minute, and on the whole the most complete account of this long-continued controversy which is to be found in the English language. Having finished this history, he was led to attempt a complete review of all the discussions upon the topics of Natural Religion which are to be found in ancient literature. Hence the title of his work, *God in Human Thought*. We question somewhat whether it would not have been wiser to have confined his researches within somewhat narrower limits. But we are not disposed to complain of a work which is marked with so much fidelity of execution and so much honesty of purpose as the two volumes before us. The research and painstaking which have been expended upon the work deserve the highest commendation. The pertinacity with which the author has followed out his bibliographic researches in a field parts of

* *God in Human Thought*; or, Natural Theology traced in Literature, ancient and modern, to the time of Bishop Butler, with a closing chapter on the Moral System and an English Bibliography, from Spenser to Butler. By E. H. GILLETT, Professor of Political Economy in the University of the City of New York, etc. In two volumes. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co. 1874.

which had never before been gleaned, gives to this work a value which cannot easily be overrated. The picture of English thought and speculation during all the seething period which preceded and followed the great rebellion and the glorious revolution is at once complete and graphic, and the candid, and copious, and solid analyses and critical remarks are creditable to the author's acuteness and his fairness. He has had the advantage of following several able works which traversed the same ground, but his own contributions are more complete. We congratulate the author on achieving his task so well, and we congratulate the public on the important addition to its stores of knowledge and criticism, upon a theme which is always important, and which at present occupies the anxious thoughts of multitudes of men. We had scarcely expected to notice any omission in the bibliography of so careful and untiring an adept as Dr. Gillett. We do not find in his Index or his Bibliography either of the following referred to: John Brown, *Essays on Shaftesbury's Characteristics*, 1751, Philip Skelton, *Opheomaches, or Deism Revealed*, 1749. We ought not to omit to notice the concluding chapter on the Moral System, in which the author sets forth the argument of Butler in a positive form and gives a wider application.

VAN OOSTERZEE'S CHRISTIAN DOGMATICS.*—These volumes are a worthy companion to the work of Ueberweg on the History of Philosophy, which was the first installment of "the Philosophical and Theological Library." We might have preferred to use the *Theology of Nitzsch*, carefully translated and edited, but the labor of translating it would have been very great, and the miserable translation, forming a part of Clark's Library, could not have been adopted. Van Oosterzee is a learned, judicious, moderate theologian of the Church of Holland; soundly evangelical, without being rigid in his opinions, willing to admit difficulties where they exist, and to tolerate differences of judgment on controverted points. On such topics as Inspiration, and the Atonement, he writes in a tone of fairness, and with an appreciation of modern discussions. The references to books are mainly to Dutch and German authors. A more full bibliography is a desideratum. On

* *Christian Dogmatics*: A Text-book for Academical instruction and private study. By J. G. VAN OOSTERZEE, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Utrecht. Translated by John Watson Watson, B.A., and Maurice L. Evans, B.A. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co. 1874.

the whole, we commend the work to ministers and theological students as a valuable and able system of Christian doctrine; a system which is free from narrow and extreme views, and is more nearly on a level with the liberal evangelical thought of the times than any other work in English with which we are acquainted.

HENRY ROGERS' LECTURES ON THE SUPERHUMAN ORIGIN OF THE BIBLE* inferred from itself are written with the spirit which characterizes all his writings in defense of Revelation. They treat of the following topics: Some traits of the Bible which seem at variance with certain principles and tendencies of human nature; auxiliary arguments drawn from certain traits of the New Testament as contrasted with what might have been expected from the antecedents of the writers; arguments derived from coincidences between certain statements of Scripture and certain facts of History; indications of the unity of the Bible; a reply to certain objections founded on certain peculiarities of form and structure exhibited in the Bible; on certain peculiarities of style in the Scriptural writings; on the exceptional position of the Bible in the world; on certain analogies between the Bible and the constitution and course of nature.

These topics are all treated with the spirit and ingenuity which characterize Mr. Rogers' writings. We apprehend, however, that in the controversy between the assailants of Revelation and those who defend it, neither the attack nor the defence are carried along the whole line in a general assault and defence, but that the chief interest in the contest gathers about, here and there, some important redoubt or position, on the taking or holding of which everything depends. The discussions of Mr. Rogers are in one sense fully abreast with the times and are always eloquent and interesting.

DR. PEABODY'S COURSE OF LECTURES ON CHRISTIANITY AND SCIENCE† consists of ten Lectures, which were delivered on the Ely Foundation of the Union Theological Seminary in 1874. They are written in the flowing and elevated style which the

* *The Superhuman Origin of the Bible Inferred from Itself.* By HENRY ROGERS, author of "The Eclipse of Faith." New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1874.

† *Christianity and Science.* A series of Lectures, delivered in New York in 1874, on the Ely Foundation of the Union Theological Seminary. By ANDREW P. PEABODY, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Christian Morals in Harvard University. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1874.

accomplished author never fails to use, and in the spiritual conceptions of Christ and Christianity by which his writings are always distinguished. Many of the positions taken in these discourses are strong and striking. Many single arguments are forcibly presented and eloquently illustrated. The ethical and spiritual superiority of the Christian system above every other are powerfully vindicated. The character and claims of Christ as a supernatural personage in human history, are asserted in terms that are neither doubtful nor compromising. Looked at as a collection of striking thoughts or arguments, the volume should rank very high for its beauty and its strength. Considered as a strong and coherent argument, it lacks clearness in its statement of the matter of Christianity and logical sharpness and coherence. This is especially unfortunate in an argument that proposes to place Christianity on a strictly scientific basis. The evidence for Christianity is arranged under the three heads of Testimony, Experiment, and Intuition, neither of which is sharply separated from the other, as actually treated and applied by the author. The intuition which is said to confirm the divine origin of Christianity is surely not the same as scientific intuition. It is the same with experiment, only the experiment is internal and is made the basis of a brief but decisive argument, such as is open to the common sense of the feeblest understanding, and the most uninstructed human being.

Notwithstanding these deficiencies, the volume is characterized by so much beauty and spiritual power, and eloquent illustration and enforcement, as to deserve a wide circulation.

STRENGTH AND BEAUTY.*—It is enough to recommend this work,—rightly described as “Discussions for Young Men,”—that it is from the pen of Dr. Hopkins, and in his own best method and style. It is without preface, and consists of nineteen discourses—the title of the first being given to the volume—which, as we are told and should readily conjecture, were originally “baccalaureate” addresses. They are not the less sermons for the omissions of the texts, which may be often easily supplied from the introductions. As might be expected from the author, they all have to do with great principles of thought and action, and while profound in their views, are singularly clear in statements and illus-

* *Strength and Beauty.* Discussions for Young Men. By MARK HOPKINS, D.D. New York: Dodd & Mead, Publishers. pp. 361.

trations. Among the particular titles, besides that of the volume, we may mention "the Manifoldness of Man," "God's method of social unity," "the Bible and Pantheism," "the Body the Temple of God," "Faith, Philosophy, and Reason," "Higher and lower good." Among those that at once drew our attention is that on "Spirit, Soul, and Body," or man's "tripartite" constitution, in which we observe that he assigns more than most writers do to the second as compared with the first of these divisions. And here we find an instance of the changes that have taken place among New England divines at once in philosophy and theology, in the mode of thinking and still more in forms of statement, when it is said (p. 189), "In it (the spirit) there may be a consciousness of the immediate presence of God with us." Nor do we dissent from the freedom of the statement. The mechanical appearance of the book, as well as the excellence of its contents, makes it an admirable gift, for the season, to young men.

THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY.*—President McCosh's elaborate work upon the Scottish Philosophy cannot fail to be warmly welcomed by every student of speculative science. It is written *con amore*, as it could not fail to be, by a son of the North, who was himself trained in the philosophy which has made Scotland so honorable, and in its university lectures, which have never failed to recognize philosophy as the Queen of the Sciences, ever since Hutcheson, more than one hundred and fifty years ago, attracted students to Glasgow, from England and Ireland, as well as from the parishes of Scotland. The plan proposed by Dr. McCosh gave ample liberty in selecting his materials, and he has produced a work which is unlike an ordinary history of philosophy, and includes much information and many sketches of men and of society which are interesting to the general reader. The treatise will become a standard book of reference, and a necessity for the library of every student. It is printed in a style which befits its place in our literature.

It consists of fifty-eight Articles or Chapters, and an Appendix of those valuable MSS. collections, and a carefully compiled index.

* *The Scottish Philosophy*; Biographical, Expository, Critical, from Hutcheson to Hamilton. By JAMES MCCOSH, LL.D., D.D., President of the College of New Jersey, Princeton. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1875.

JOHN STUART MILL'S THREE ESSAYS ON RELIGION* are likely to be received with no greater favor, to say the least, than his autobiography. We are told by the *Pall Mall Budget* that his disciples in England have received them "with mixed feelings of surprise, disappointment, and of something closely bordering on irritation." Whether these feelings of displeasure are occasioned by the weakness of his reasoning, or the largeness of his concessions, or the inconsistency of his conclusions, it would not be easy to decide. The Essay on Nature, which was written somewhat earlier than the second and more than a decade before the last, is singularly paradoxical and offensive to the common judgment of men in respect to the so-called Law of Nature as the foundation and standard of rectitude. The author denies that the designs of Nature can be interpreted at all, or at least he fails entirely to seize hold of the element of design as always implied by all those naturalists, both ethnic and Christian, who have ever proposed Nature as a rule of character or life. Starting with these grievous oversights, of which in his usual bland simplicity, or sublime self-conceit, he seems to be profoundly unconscious, he proceeds to argue that Nature is the worst of all models for any man to attempt to imitate, forasmuch as her conduct is, to make the best of it, utterly atrocious—that a man's duty and happiness is to improve upon her and reform her, and by art, and so to rise above and overcome Nature. He then contends positively, as he must, that there is no decisive evidence that absolute and omnipotent goodness controls Nature, that at best the evidence which is decisive indicates a beneficent power contending against maleficent and malignant influences. What the proof is that the better will finally prevail, or that the two forces are not destined to alternate success and defeat, he does not show. His argument would seem to assume that a partial triumph is possible over Nature by art, but with him this can only be an assumption. Assumptions of this sort, however, when unsupported by induction and experiment, are forbidden by the teachings and spirit of his philosophy.

The second Essay is on the Utility of Religion. In this the philosopher argues that far too much has been conceded in favor of the necessity and utility of religion, by both Deists and Christians. He contends that it will be found, on a closer and critical examination, that the good effects usually ascribed to religion—as

* *Three Essays on Religion.* By JOHN STUART MILL. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1874.

social and ethical restraint—should not be referred to religious inculcations and motives so much as to the influence of man upon man, and especially of the older upon the younger. In other words, society and education are the real energies, for which religious forces have received excessive and undue credit. He argues, moreover, that a regard to another life is not itself fitted to exert the very powerful influence over mankind which is ordinarily ascribed to it, for the reason that as men rise in the scale of moral culture they become gradually indifferent to personal immortality, and on the whole prefer the rest of annihilation to the wearisome and satiated activities of prolonged existence. Still further, this fancied influence of another life appeals only to the idealizing influences of the imagination, and as the imagination may be trained by culture to look forward to a personal existence as perpetuated in the good which the individual may continue to effect in succeeding generations, there is no longer room because there is no longer occasion for an appeal to the hopes of another life. In one respect, however, he concedes that religion does appeal to our natural and inextinguishable feelings, i.e., to the strong wish of meeting again the friends from whom we have been parted by death.

The third Essay, on Theism, was written at a later period, some two or three years before the author's decease. It obviously contains the last thoughts of the author upon Theism and Christianity, all of which are eminently characteristic. Aiming, as he does, to hold the balance evenly between the proved and the unproved, he sometimes surprises his readers by an unlooked-for concession and then again astonishes them with a position in the opposite direction which is singularly paradoxical and perverse. The remarks upon Christ and Christianity are eminently pathetic in one aspect and absurd and inconsistent on the other. His comments upon the gospel of John and the conversion of Paul are equally weak. After distinctly recognizing the truth that miracles are possible and with a certain amount of evidence might be worthy of credit, he finally concludes that there is no reason to believe that miracles have ever been wrought. What is most interesting in this Essay, however, is the argument that the hope of a personal immortality is on the whole most salutary and desirable for man and that there are indications that such a hope may be allowed by a philosopher, though only as a hope.

Comment upon the doctrines of these essays is entirely unnecessary. This much is certain, that they will do far greater good

than harm. Those who reject Theism and Christianity will find little in them to strengthen their positions. Those who are doubtful in their faith will be repelled rather than attracted by the arguments of Mill. Those who are believers will find abundant confirmation of the excellence and reasonableness of their faith, in the weakness and occasional fatuity of this rejector of God and of Christ.

THE TRANSLATION OF ST. AUGUSTINE.*—Two new volumes, the second of the Lectures or Tractates on John's Gospel, and the second of the Anti-Pelagian Writings, have lately appeared. In the latter volume are included three treatises. If the ideas of Augustine on marriage and the sexual relations are sometimes absurd, they testify at least to the great reaction against sensuality which his own mind had experienced, in consequence of his practical reception of Christianity.

CHRISTIAN TRUTH AND MODERN OPINION.†—The seven sermons on Christian Truth and Modern Opinion were preached in New York by the following clergymen of the Protestant Episcopal Church, viz : C. S. Henry, D.D., The Christian Doctrine of Providence; Hugh Miller Thompson, D.D., The Christian Doctrine of Prayer; E. A. Washburn, D.D., Moral Responsibility and Physical Law; J. H. Rylance, D.D., The Relation of Miracles to the Christian Faith; Rt. Rev. T. M. Clark, D.D., LL.D., Immortality; John Cotton Smith, Evolution and a Personal Creator.

These sermons are all well written. Two or three of them indicate a thorough knowledge and a comprehensive grasp of the subject, and they are all well adapted to interest the public in its present active concern with all the topics that are discussed.

SYNOPTICAL LECTURES ON THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE.‡—This book, from an Edinburgh press, though issued by New York publishers, is the second of three series, each in one volume, the first of which has reached a second edition. It includes the

* *The Translation of St. Augustine.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark & Co. New York: Scribner, Welford, & Co.

† *Christian Truth and Modern Opinion.* Seven Sermons preached in New York by Clergymen of the Protestant Episcopal Church. New York: Thomas Whitaker.

‡ *Synoptical Lectures on the Books of Holy Scripture.* Second Series. Isaiah—Acta. By the Rev. DONALD FRASER, D.D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. pp. 307.

Prophets, so-called, beginning with Isaiah and completing the Old Testament, with a preliminary Lecture on the "Hebrew Prophets," and the four Gospels, with the Acts of the Apostles, after a Lecture on the "Transition to the New Testament,"—in all twenty-four Lectures, of twelve or fifteen pages each. It is not a commentary, nor a course of sermons on successive passages or subjects, but is intended to give an account of each canonical book, its contents, character, and author, such as usually introduces a formal commentary, only for the use of general readers rather than to aid critical investigations. As the author tells us, "An attempt is made to survey each book of Scripture so as to apprehend generally its scope and contents, as one may view a city from the top of a tower in order to gain an idea of its arrangements and its salient features, that he may, therefore, more intelligently traverse it, and explore it in detail." No doubt by such help, the systematic reading of the successive parts of the Bible may become more intelligent, interesting, and profitable, and having read several of these Lectures, we think favorably of their fitness for this intended use. They show an acquaintance with the larger literature of the several subjects, yet are not encumbered with pedantry or idle disquisitions. Their style is all that can be desired in such composition. We commend them to Bible readers generally.

JAMES'S "GRACE FOR GRACE.*—The late Rev. William James, the writer of the letters from which the volume entitled *Grace for Grace* is made up, was held in the highest esteem by his numerous friends, for his earnest Christian spirit, his penetrating understanding, and his eminently Christian eloquence as a writer and preacher. Those of our readers who are acquainted with him through the memorial volume, which contained a sketch of his life and two of his sermons, will be glad to learn of the publication of this volume of extracts from his letters, to one or two intimate personal friends. The letters concern the experiences of the Christian life. The extracts were made by the lady to whom the most of the letters were addressed, and they have been arranged under four titles, viz: I. The Gift of Grace, free justification and full salvation for the soul through Christ the Redeemer. II. Growth in Grace, promoted in the soul through the ministry of trial. Fruits of Grace. III. Fruits of Grace, the response of

* *Grace for Grace.* Letters of Rev. WILLIAM JAMES. New York: Dodd & Mead.

the soul in voluntary self-sacrifice. IV. Triumphs of Grace, the soul's conquest over sin, progress in holiness, and final perfection in glory.

A superficial examination of the volume will convince the reader that the work is very unlike many, not to say most, of the works of the kind. A careful reading will only deepen these first impressions. The naturalness of the sentiments expressed, the freedom from conventional or stereotyped phraseology, its elevation above the narrowness of scholastic and sectarian nomenclature, its wise discrimination between that which is genuine and spurious in Christian experience, its even-handed appreciation of the freedom of the offers of the gospel on the one hand and the completeness of the unselfishness which the acceptance of Christ presupposes, the intensity of human affection which glows in all its earnest pages, and the entire absence of all offensive cant, mock humility, and pharisaic assumption, are features which exalt this unpretending volume to a high pre-eminence among the works with which it would naturally be compared. We wish for it the widest possible circulation.

MISCELLANEOUS.

THE EARTH AS MODIFIED BY HUMAN ACTION.*—The original of this work, under the title "Man and Nature," is so well known and has been so widely read, that it would be superfluous to enlarge upon its erudition, ability, and interest. During the several years in which it has been before the public, Mr. Marsh has been diligently accumulating additions to the abundant stores of thought and research from which that volume was drawn, and has so far enlarged and recast the work that a change of title has been adopted with its republication. We somewhat regret this last alteration. The book, with all its additions and improvements, is more like "Man and Nature" revised than like a new work, and the change of title has a flavor of trade management which a book like this can afford to be independent of. Mr. Marsh has accomplished a number of able and distinguished literary achievements, but it is probable that he will be longest and most widely remembered by this remarkable work. It is rare indeed that there is found embodied in so popular and attractive a

* *The Earth as Modified by Human Action.* A new edition of *Man and Nature*. By GEORGE P. MARSH. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co., No. 654 Broadway. 1874.

form such an immense extent and variety of study and attainment. It is impossible not to read the book through, and it is impossible not to read the whole of it. The notes, which constitute perhaps the larger part of the volume, are in themselves an encyclopædia of curious and interesting facts, intermingled with acute and sagacious remarks and reflections. Some of Mr. Marsh's statements and deductions, however, we should be inclined to question were they not made by so careful an authority. For instance, he refers to the fact that the writers of antiquity make scarcely any allusion to the phosphorescence of the sea, and conjectures as one mode of accounting for it, that whales being then less hunted than in modern times, were far more numerous, and the luminous animalculæ, their food, were thus more generally destroyed. In alluding to the greatly increased and increasing demand for lumber within a few years past, he informs us that not less than three or four thousand well-grown pines are annually converted in the United States into twenty million lucifer matches,—that our railroads have already called for about one hundred and sixteen millions of ties, and are annually robbing our forests of thirty millions more, and adds the appalling statement that in the city of Paris alone there are manufactured every year over twenty-eight millions of drums for boys, with fifty-six millions of drumsticks. Could any argument for the preservation of forests be stronger than this?

It is fortunate for this country that so able an advocate for the trees as Mr. Marsh has already arrested the public attention. We doubt not that if the present work could be read by the American people as universally as its interest deserves and its importance demands, its beneficial influence upon their material prosperity in the course of a single generation would be almost incalculable. We trust that many future editions may be called for, and if a new title at every edition shall widen its circulation, we will not complain of such change.

MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION.*—After a somewhat careful examination of this book, we take pleasure in commending it as the best “Manual of the Constitution” for the purposes of educa-

* *Manual of the Constitution of the United States.* Designed for the instruction of the American Youth in the Duties, Obligations, and Rights of Citizenship. By ISRAEL WARD ANDREWS, D.D., President of Marietta College. Wilson, Hinckle & Co., 137 Walnut street, Cincinnati; 28 Bond street, New York.

tion, and for general practical use, which has come under our notice. The author says in his preface that it grew out of the necessities and experience of the class-room; that he found himself greatly embarrassed in the instruction of students by the want of some work combining, with an exposition of constitutional principles, a summary of the legislative provisions in which they have been embodied. The work before us accordingly contains, in a condensed form, not only a treatise on the Constitution article by article, but a large amount of historical and legal information illustrating the development, and practical application and workings of these Constitutional provisions in the government of the country. The material is judiciously selected and arranged, and answers may be found on every page to questions which otherwise could be solved only by laborious research. Thus under the heading "*Clause 7, To establish post-offices and post roads,*" we have nearly six pages of matter relating to the rise and growth of the Post-office Department; statistics of its organization and operations, salaries of officers, and cost of transporting mails; the laws relating to mailable matter and postage, with the changes that have been made at different periods in the postal rates; the systems of registration, money orders, and free delivery; account of the growth and abolition of the franking privilege; accounts of the laws relating to mail routes, and a discussion of the proposed adoption of the telegraph by the Post-office Department. A work so copious in its plan and details might easily have been made too voluminous for its principal purpose, but the author has well preserved the *juste milieu* between barrenness and over-abundance, and has produced a book not only very useful for purposes of reference, but quite interesting to the student and general reader.

WHITTIER'S HAZEL BLOSSOMS.*—Mr. Whittier, in calling this collection of his latest poems "*Hazel Blossoms,*" like Mr. Longfellow in naming his last volume "*Aftermath,*" adverts thoughtfully and gracefully to his own life as in its autumnal season and to any presumed lack of vigor in its productions. But the second crop of grass is reckoned as sweet as any other, if not as available for all purposes, and we own no falling off of satisfaction when

"Last of their floral sisterhood
The hazel's yellow blossoms shine,
The tawny gold of Afric's mine."

* *Hazel Blossoms.* By JOHN GREENLEAF WHITTIER. Boston: Jas. R. Osgood & Co. 1875. pp. 133.

These two poets, at once admired and beloved by cultivated readers and also by "the common people," give us their mellow and rich fruitage without associations or suggestions of decay. Mr. Whittier has penned nothing more characteristic of his best gifts than the prefatory verses in this volume, particularly where he sings:—

"Sufficeth me the gift to light
With latest bloom the dark cold days;
To call some hidden spring to sight
That, in these dry and dusty ways,
Shall sing its pleasant song of praise."

The principal poem in the collection, covering sixteen pages, is his tribute to Summer, which impresses us with its discrimination and candor no less than its fervor and force. Fourteen poems follow, most of which will be at once recognized as already admired in magazines, such as "The Friend's Burial," "John Underhill," and "Conductor Bradley." Besides every more exclusive claim of a poet, the author has the merit of bringing to light, and most happily idealizing in his verse, many historical and biographical incidents, which are henceforth associated with his own fame. We need not say that whatever may be his theme, it is not only adorned by his poetic art but hallowed by his high moral nature. This volume is further enriched by the addition of nine poems from the pen of his deceased sister, Elizabeth H. Whittier,—*"the few poetical pieces which she left behind her,"* as he tells us in an introductory note, and which are thus published *"in compliance with the desire of dear friends."* Like so many of her brother's productions, they fitly commemorate incidents or persons that deeply interested her, and show that she partook of his imaginativeness and sensibility. His many friends who were strangers to her personally were yet touched by the intelligence of her death, as knowing how large a part she had made of the happiness of his home in Amesbury, and to those who, like the writer, have since been privileged to visit him there, the recollection of her portrait associates itself most pleasantly with these productions of her pen, which cannot but be welcomed with her brother's in this beautiful volume.

CORRESPONDENCE OF WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING, D.D., AND LUCY AIKIN, FROM 1826 TO 1842.*—It seems as if there were more

* *Correspondence of William Ellery Channing, D.D., and Lucy Aikin, from 1826 to 1842.* Edited by ANNA LETITIA LE BRETON. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1874. pp. 426.

instances in England than in this country, though indeed we have here notable examples too, of families partaking of high literary culture and eminence, in several branches and through more than one generation. The Aikins were thus distinguished. Lucy Aikin, herself well-known as a historian and biographer, was a daughter and a brother of men who figured in the literature and science of their time, and a niece of Mrs. Barbauld. It appears that Dr. Channing, having met her at Mrs. Barbauld's house, sent her his *Essay on Milton*, for which she returned her acknowledgments, and "thus began a correspondence which continued for nearly twenty years, and ended only with his death," which took place in 1842. It was agreed between the writers that "the whole of the correspondence should belong to the survivor," and upon her death in 1864 it was committed to her niece, the present editor. No doubt it would have been published sooner but for Miss Aikin's long life of eighty-three years, and would have appealed to fresher recollections of Dr. Channing. He is well enough remembered, however, to give great interest to his part of the correspondence, and, indeed, his old admirers will find a peculiar pleasure in this new access to his mind in its free and animated intercourse with a friend so appreciative and gifted. Parts of his letters are omitted in deference to his own disparaging estimate, and the responsibility for the selection and publication is assumed by his nephew and biographer, Rev. W. H. Channing, in conjunction with the editor. Of the two correspondents, Miss Aikin, we think, will interest the largest number of readers, her sex putting her at no disadvantage in this kind of composition. We hardly find in either the grace and sparkle of the most eminent letter-writers. Both attract us, however, by fine thoughts, high aims, warm sympathies, and their well-known excellences of style. In this last respect, indeed, Dr. Channing's writings, whether his letters or discourses, should have a high place among "studies" in rhetoric, especially for the purity of language and simplicity in the structure of sentences, that along with his chastened fervor drew to him so many readers at home and abroad, and made him even more fascinating in public address. Of course compliments are not wanting between such correspondents, as when Miss Aikin tells him of her pleasure in hearing "a literary friend decidedly pronouncing Dr. Channing the most eloquent living writer of the English language." (p. 16.) Their subjects are diversified, and now to older readers the more interesting as shown under the

aspects of that generation and history,—English politics, moral reforms, questions in philosophy, and theological controversies, chiefly from the English stand-point, and in the tone of the Unitarianism of that day. It is amusing to see with what confidence judgments were passed and expectations cherished on opinions and systems that survive and flourish still; how easy it was to construe orthodoxy into narrowness, fanaticism, or hypocrisy. It would be amusing, if it were not sad, to see the present position of the “advanced” followers of the so-called “liberals” of that time, who would have recoiled as soon as any from such developments. In temper toward the “orthodox” the American preacher appears to more advantage than the English lady, who betrays her vehement antagonism to the system and spirit of the “Evangelicals,” while compelled to acknowledge their missionary and philanthropic zeal, sense of duty, and exemplary goodness. (p. 30.) And Dr. Channing, perhaps partly from his position, has a higher appreciation of the Puritan character. To us her frequent and petulant flings at Calvinists and their opinions savor more of the uncharitable “narrowness” she is so ready to impute, than of the “liberality” arrogated by her set.

PROFESSOR TORREY'S LECTURES ON FINE ART* come to us under the disadvantages of being a posthumous publication, which disadvantages have been overcome to a large extent by careful editing from loving hands. It consists of fifteen chapters, with an appendix, and although it is ordinarily hazardous to pronounce with confidence upon any theory of art, we are confident that this will be pronounced one of the most carefully considered and the most thoroughly philosophical contributions to this subject, which have ever been given to the public by any American writer. The author was one of our most accomplished scholars, with a dash of genius in his nature, and he delivered these lectures for a series of years to the students of the University of Vermont with very great acceptance. They are eminently suggestive and independent, and although it might be objected by some critics that they are somewhat technically metaphysical, this does not interfere with their adaptedness to the general reader, who will bring to their perusal a thoughtful and earnest attention.

* *A Theory of Fine Art.* By JOSEPH TORREY, late Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy in the University of Vermont. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co. 1874.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

MR. BANCROFT'S TENTH VOLUME.*—During the forty years which have elapsed since the first volume of Mr. Bancroft's great work saw the light, he has had a signally fortunate career, both as a statesman and a man of letters. Gibbon claimed to have derived even from his brief connection with the militia "a clearer notion of the phalanx and the legion," and "the captain of the Hampshire Grenadiers," he said, "has not been useless to the historian of the Roman Empire." In a much higher degree must the public and official services of Mr. Bancroft, as a cabinet minister and a diplomatist, which have brought him into close relations with so many eminent persons, and have made him familiar with the motives and methods of political action, have qualified him for the high literary task which he set before him in his youth, and which well-merited honor and distinction in another field have never tempted him to drop from his hands. To act history is surely one important preparation for writing history. In the stations which Mr. Bancroft has so honorably filled at home and in foreign courts, he has had very rare opportunities for pursuing his researches, both in the archives of governments and in the printed and manuscript collections of private individuals. His personal accomplishments as a scholar, while they have redounded to the credit of his country, have opened up to him peculiar and extraordinary facilities for prosecuting his investigations, and of these advantages he has made the best use; sparing no labor and expense in his search for hidden facts respecting American history. No diary or letter, no despatch or memorandum, at home or abroad, which could throw a ray of light on his subject, has escaped the sweep of his far-reaching net. The issue of his first volume made public the comprehensive design of his work, and thus invited from all quarters contributions of a documentary character.

One conspicuous merit of Mr. Bancroft's history is found in the thorough and conscientious studies on which it has thus been founded. It is no hasty performance, no summary and compilation of the results of other men's inquiries. It is the result of investigations which have been extended over a half century. Whatever criticisms this history might have provoked, there can be no question respecting the extent and carefulness of the researches of which it is the monument.

* *History of the United States, from the Discovery of the American Continent.* By GEORGE BANCROFT. Vol. X. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1874.

Another feature of Mr. Bancroft's work is the connection in which American history is set with European, of which American history, though in some sense independent, is really a branch. Events and changes in European history which led to the colonization of America, and to the development of the American types of political and social order, are described with an amplitude of learning which leaves nothing to be desired. At the same time, this history is genuinely American in its tone and spirit. There is a certain patriotic enthusiasm for liberty, human rights, and representative government, which frequently finds explicit expression. The popularity of the work abroad has not been purchased by the utterance of any misgivings as to the justice and desirableness of the characteristic institutions which have grown up on this side of the Atlantic.

Akin to this last quality, is the introduction of notices of the progress of speculative thought in England and on the Continent, which had more or less bearing on the course of events in America and on the growth of our civil polity. Mr. Bancroft's metaphysical studies have given him a predilection for views of this nature, as they appear in the masters of philosophical thought. In short, his work is far from being of a local or provincial cast; it has a certain catholic quality, and this has contributed in no small measure to insure for it the welcome which it has received from European scholars.

HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA.*—The second volume of Vice-President Wilson's History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America covers the period which begins with the admission of Florida as a State in 1845 and ends with the election of Abraham Lincoln as President. This period includes the most interesting political events in the struggle against slavery. The narrative is written in a style similar to that of the previous volume. It abounds in interesting details, and pictures the more striking scenes and events in bold and lively description. Although it may not supersede the necessity of a more philosophical history, and should always be read with the recollection that its author was one of the first and foremost of the antagonists of slavery, it can never cease to possess an independent value, as an elaborate and careful record of

* *History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America.* By HENRY WILSON. Vol. II. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1874.

the principal incidents in this greatest social and political revolution of the present century. We sincerely hope that the author may complete the record which he has thus far so successfully composed.

HON. JOHN BIGELOW'S *LIFE OF FRANKLIN** is in fact an extension of Franklin's Autobiography, by means of selections from his diary and correspondence. These records have, most of them, been already accessible, but Mr. Bigelow has very wisely judged that a selection from them might be so prepared as, by the addition of a few foot-notes, to make Franklin tell the whole story of his life. The editor has brought to his work a pious interest in the memory of Franklin, a large experience in public affairs gained from his residence at Paris, as Minister of the Government under President Lincoln, and a practised pen as the able editor of the *New York Evening Post* for many years previous. His carefully edited edition of Franklin's Autobiography served also to train him in the capacity which he has so successfully employed in this unique and admirable work.

In the preface to the volume before us, the author gives a summary view of the main points which his inquiries have enabled him to elucidate. "The embarrassments of Vergennes, arising alike from his entanglements respecting Gibraltar, and the urgency of his king for peace, explain and justify the proceedings of the American commissioners in signing preliminaries of peace in advance. It will appear how much Frederic the Second aided America, by encouraging France to enter into war for her independence. The interest of this exposition is heightened rather than impaired by the fact that his motives sprang from his love to his own people. It also becomes certain that the Empress Catherine promulgated her naval code, not in ignorance of its character, as has been hitherto stated, but with a full knowledge of what she was doing; and that she practiced on the British minister at Petersburg no other cajolery than was needed to make him the channel through which the code was communicated to Great Britain, so that direct crimination might be avoided. The contemporary documents show that England made war on the Dutch republic solely to prevent her from being received into the armed

* *The Life of Benjamin Franklin, written by himself.* Now first edited from original manuscripts and from his printed correspondence and other writings. By JOHN BIGELOW. In 3 volumes. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1874.

neutrality. I have been able from new materials to trace the division between the North and the South, arising from slavery, further back than had as yet been done. As to separatism, or the exaggerated expression of what we call States Rights, it did not grow out of the existence of slavery, but out of an element in human nature. The much agitated question as to the time and manner of the abolition of slavery in Massachusetts finds itself solved without going from home: the witness was at the door. The conduct of Shelburne in making peace between the two countries is made clear from his own words and acts. The part taken by Franklin in initiating and presenting the negotiation for peace is illustrated, not from his own letters alone, but from those of Oswald and others. In England it was never misapprehended. It is worth nothing, that though the negotiations on each side reciprocally marked the boundary agreed upon by a well-defined line on the map, yet, during the strife that was kept up about it for half a century, the American government did not catch a glimpse of this evidence till a treaty of compromise was ratified, and the map of Oswald was not produced till the British ministry that made the compromise had to defend it in parliament. It appears further that, late as was the participation of John Adams in the negotiation, he came in time to secure to New England its true boundary on the North-east."

We notice that several reviewers of this volume speak of it as if it were the last of the series, and the completion of the work. The author does not make the statement. We trust that another volume from the same glowing pen may describe the formation of the constitution, and that still another may treat of the administration of Washington, and of the rise of the two great parties which divided the country under his successors.

FREEMAN'S HISTORY OF THE NORMAN CONQUEST OF ENGLAND.*
—This work has taken its place among the foremost historical works which have been added to English literature in recent times. Mr. Freeman has explored the Anglo-Saxon monuments with an exhaustive diligence; nor has he neglected any other source of knowledge which could throw light upon his subject. If parts of his work must seem prolix to the ordinary reader, other passages

* *The History of the Norman Conquest of England; its causes and its results.* By EDWARD A. FREEMAN, M.A., Hon. D.C.L. etc. Revised Amer. edition. Oxford and New York: Macmillan & Co. 4 vols. 1874.

are entertaining and even brilliant. The battle of Hastings, for example, in addition to the correctness of the detailed narration, is described in a spirited and graphic style. Mr. Freeman is a warm Saxon in his sympathies, and through a great part of his work makes the impression that he and his fellow-countrymen of the present day belong to a conquered and down-trodden race. He has revived Darwin's obsolete Saxon words—"baneless," for example—and evinces likewise his Saxon loyalty by reverting to the ancient orthography in respect to proper names. The time and character of this history are open, in some respects, to criticism; yet its merits so far preponderate over its faults as to justify the general verdict of praise with which it has been received in England and abroad.

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NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CXXXI.

APRIL, 1875.

ARTICLE I.—THE LETTERS OF SARA COLERIDGE.

Memoir and Letters of Sara Coleridge. Edited by her daughter.
New York : Harper & Brothers, publishers, Franklin Square.
1874.

WERE some hard-hearted dogmatist of the metaphysico-theological type that is said to have a cannon-ball where the heart ought to be—were some such ungracious cynic disposed to sneer at woman's intellect and to doubt her ability to pursue abstract and philosophical studies, we would commend such a one to the perusal of Sara Coleridge's thoughtful writings. Followed up by the study of Mary Somerville's works in astronomy and the higher mathematics, he might in time be pretty well cured of his scepticism. He could not say, in regard to the first-mentioned of these women at least, that hers was an exceptional case ; that this poet's daughter, who had the features of a Greek muse, or a Sappho, with poetic soul to match, was a masculine-minded woman. Not at all. She was no "strong-minded" abhorrence of gods and men. She was "a spirit and a woman too." The strength as well as subtlety of

her intellect was all "pure womanly." She does not seem to have belonged to the cerulean-hose order. There was no fear that she would be seen with dishevelled hair and ink on her thumb. As the daughter of Coleridge, the neice of the learned bibliopole, Dr. Southey, and brought up in his library at "Greta Hall," and gifted herself with rare intellectual powers, it was not strange that she took as naturally to books as the roots of a willow-tree seek the water. Her memoir—which like Mary Somerville's, recently published, is partly autobiographical—reveals a life without special incident. She was born in 1802, lived most of her youth, during her father's restless changes of abode, with her uncle Southey at Keswick, was married to her cousin in 1829, passed most of her married life in London, became a widow at forty, and died in 1852 at the age of forty-nine. She was early celebrated for her classic beauty of feature and form, though of rather a diminutive type, which she derived from her mother; but, intellectually, she was her father's child. It is indeed said of her, that "her father had looked down into her eyes and left in them the light of his own;" but the light in those marvelously large grey eyes was a serener ray that beamed more clearly into the mysterious depths of the soul. In that intuitive faculty which reaches the heart of things she showed original power. While the mind of Sara Coleridge was keen in its intellectual processes, was capable even of abstract thought, she had a depth of sympathetic *insight* surpassed by that of few theologians.

She seems like one of the "wise women" that we read of in Scripture and classic literature. As strong men were led by the ancient German priestess in war and peace, and above all in religion, so this clear-eyed woman had conferred upon her a fine sense of spiritual things, a quiet inner sight, without the madness of the old priestess and prophetess. She had the keen sense and at the same time the trusting faith, the love, the purity, which constitute the interpreter of divine things. Our Lord himself declared that the truth was revealed to the obedient and loving heart. *Pectus est quod facit theologum*. While there must be the intellect there must also be the heart; or this really proud name of "theologian" means nothing, and can raise no spirits from the vast deep of the spiritual and divine.

The intellect and the heart must go together. The mind which is sound in its reasoning faculties, but at the same time sensitive in its spiritual perceptions, capable of moving in "the ampler ether and diviner air" of pure intuition, child-like yet seraphic, human as well as divine in its sympathies, taught by the heart and led by the Spirit of truth, which is also the Spirit of divine wisdom and love—this is the true theologic, or divining, mind, which is safest and surest. Better follow its unambitious upward leading than to follow the mere logical understanding which is the slave of its own narrow evolution of ideas, and which in its syllogistic and sophistical method of reasoning makes no real advance, and runs into endless circles of unproductive thought.

In the following passage from a letter to a friend, Mrs. Coleridge thus discourses upon this very point, which passage will give a notion of the character of these "letters;" in which passage, it is to be noticed, she does not ignore the intellect—how could a daughter of the author of "Aids to Reflection" do so—regarded as a factor in the knowledge of divine truth:—

"This cannot be an answer to yours, dear friend; but in reply to some of your concluding sentences, I would reiterate my former assertions, that my father's religious views have in reality no more connection with the reasoning faculty—neither more nor less—than yours or any one's else; although he has written so much about reason and the understanding. His theory of faith pre-eminently appeals to the *heart*, to the moral and spiritual being. He never supposed that the inspiration of Scripture, a spiritual subject, could be known or apprehended by mere intelligence. But he did maintain that the human mind is one, though it has many different powers, and that the moral and spiritual only subsist by the co-inherence of the intelligential—that reason and will are necessary each to the other, so that the one is what it is as existing in union with the other. Have you not a *doctrine* of inspiration as well as *feelings* on the subject? If yes, by what faculty of your mind is that doctrine apprehended? Has reason, has thought, nothing to do with it? And have the heart and spirit naught to do with the views you seem to reject? My father does not judge of Inspiration by the intellect one iota more than others. Nay, I am sure his objection to the views he rejects is because they are so heartless, so empty, and unmeaning. Why should you assume that he judges Inspiration more than you judge it, by the view you take? On the subject of Reason and its province in religion, my father says nothing that has not been said by Christian philosophers and great divines of all ages. To say otherwise than as my father says, on this point, if carried out, is sheer Romanism. Denial of it is a denial of the Reformation, and makes every act of the Reformers flat rebellion and falsehood.

What think you is my last appeal which is not your last appeal? Whither can either of us go as the last resort, the ultimatum of our religious search, but to the depths of the human spirit, the heart and conscience of which Reason is the pervading light, and in which God and his truth are mirrored? Have you then any place or object of appeal beyond this? Can you contemplate God and Christ except in your own soul?" (p. 339.)

Were such a letter as this received by us without preparation suddenly some fine morning from a female friend, it might cause a shock. But when it comes along in a series of letters of much the same tone and import, it seems quite simple and natural. The writer was as earnestly and unconsciously engaged in such thoughts as some women are engaged in the matter of fashionable dress and society. She felt herself called to be the defender of her father's ideas. Here the acuteness and variety of her powers were brought out.

She was an enthusiastic Coleridgean in philosophy. She entered profoundly into that system of metaphysics which added new brilliancy, life, and depth to English speculative studies. At the same time she was independent—as she was able to be—in her opinions on psychological subjects, and she showed considerable force in the field of pure theology, where her contemplative spirit, almost unerring in its sympathy with spiritual truth, aided her. After the death of her husband, Henry Nelson Coleridge, who was her father's literary executor and the editor of "Coleridge's Table Talk," she assumed herself the editorship of Coleridge's works. In this great labor of love, without designing it, she became an original author of many elaborate essays in which a prodigality of learning and thought are displayed. Among the most important of these papers might be mentioned the "Essay on Rationalism with a special application to the Doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration," appended to Vol. ii of the "Aids to Reflection;" the introduction to the "Biographia Literaria;" and a Preface to the collection of her father's political writings, entitled, "Essays on her own Times, by S. T. Coleridge." In her early youth, under the guidance of her uncle Southey, whom she pronounces to be "on the whole the best man she was ever acquainted with," her predilection was for literary and linguistic studies. This was the period when Wordsworth's fine poem of the "Triad" was written, in which she is thus alluded to:—

"Last of the Three, though eldest born,
 Reveal thyself, like pensive morn,
 Touched by the skylark's earliest note,
 Ere humbler gladness be afloat;
 Of dawn or eve, fair vision of the west,
 Come with each anxious hope subdued
 By woman's gentle fortitude,
 Each grief, through meekness, settling into rest.
 Or I would have thee when some high wrought page
 Of a closed volume lingering in thy hand,
 Has raised thy spirit to a peaceful stand
 Among the glories of a happier age.
 Her brow hath opened on me, see it there
 Brightening the umbrage of her hair,
 So gleams the crescent moon, that loves
 To be descried through shady groves.
 Tenderest bloom is on her cheek.
 Wish not for a richer streak,
 Nor dread the depth of meditative eye,
 But let thy love upon that azure field
 Of thoughtfulness and beauty, yield
 Its homage, offered up in purity.
 What wouldst thou more? In sunny glade,
 Or under leaves of thickest shade,
 Was such a stillness ere diffused
 Since earth grew calm while angels mused?"

The deep calm, the subjective life which she lived from her youth, is reflected in these lines as in the bosom of a still lake. She became a proficient in Greek, Latin, French, German, Italian, and Spanish; so much so in the Latin, that when she was twenty years old, she published a work in three octavo volumes, entitled "*An Account of the Abipones, an Equestrian people of Paraguay.*" From the Latin of Martin Dobrizhoffer, eighteen years a missionary in that country." Coleridge said of this work—"My dear daughter's translation of this book is, in my judgment, unsurpassed for pure mother-English by any thing I have read for a long time." Her literary taste was always exquisite as well as healthily vigorous. In this respect her "Letters" afford many examples; and these have the more value since they are "letters of friendship, not of authorship;" they spring from a sole desire to express herself to her dearest friends, without the intention of public display—as we see in the letters of Mad. de Sevigné—on subjects of her sincerest, deepest thought. She opens her whole soul. She speaks

ardently and with charming candor, as well oftentimes with power. Take, for example, her criticism upon Dante:—

"How can one enter into the *spitefulness* (if Dante had not been spiteful he couldn't have written it) with which they proposed that Virgil should stay with them, and Dante find his way home by himself; how can one see them tearing off as hard as they could go to bar the entrance! Milton could not have conceived this intensity of narrow malice; he could not have brought his rich and genial mind, his noble imagination, down to it. It may truly be said that Dante brings the violence and turbulence of the infernal world into heaven—witness his twenty-seventh canto of the 'Paradise,' which is all denunciation after the splendid introduction, yet comprises, to my mind, with slight exceptions, almost the whole power of his "Paradise," on the merits of which, as at present advised, I quite agree with Landor; while Milton invests even the realms below and their fallen inhabitants with a touch of heavenly beauty and splendor. And is this in an irreligious spirit? Oh! far from it. This is consonant with religious truth and with the Bible, which leads us to look upon the world of moral evil as a wreck, a ruin, rather than a mere mass and congeries of hideous abominations. It is this which renders Milton's descriptions so *pathetic*: sympathy with human nature, with fallen, finite nature, pervades the whole. If this be 'cotton-wool,' then cotton-wool forever, say I. But this cotton-wool I believe to be a part of the substance of Christianity. For pure, unmixed wickedness, we can have no feeling; we can but shudder and turn away. Dante utterly wants this genial, expansive tenderness of soul; whenever he is touching, it is in the remembrance of something personal—his own exile, or his love for little Beatrice Portinari, or the sorrow of his patron's daughter, Francesca. Let him loose from these personal bandages, and he is perpetually raging and scorning, or else lecturing, as in the 'Paradise.' How ferociously does he insult the sufferers in the 'Inferno'—actual, individual men! You say this is but imagination. Truly, if it were not, the author would have been worthy of the maniac's cell, chains, and darkness; but surely the heart tinctures the imagination. I know my father's remark upon this very point, and admit its truth as a general remark; but I think it is not strictly applicable to Dante. His pictures *are* like visions of heart-anger and scorn, not mere extravagant flights of merry petulance or pure, high-flown abstractions, but have something in them deep, earnest, real, and individualizing. It is a hard turn of mind, to say the best of it. Carlyle does Dante more than justice—rather say, generous injustice—on this point, when he tells us of his softness, tenderness, and pitifulness, at the same time extolling his rigor. Rigor is all very well in the right place; but such rigor as Dante's could scarce be approved by Him who said 'Judge not, lest ye be judged.' It is well enough to be rigid against the *passion of anger*, but not to stick a certain Filippo Argenti up to the neck in a lake of such foulness as few men could have conceived or described, and then to express a 'fearful joy'—or what is fearful to the reader, rather than himself—in seeing the other condemned ones fall furiously upon him, and duck him in it all but to suffocation! And he makes Virgil (who would have been above such school-boy savagery) hug and kiss him for it, and apply to him the words of our Blessed Saviour—Luke ii, 27! Dante ought to have looked upon the tortures of the lower kingdom with awe and a sorrowful shuddering, not with triumphant delight and horrid mirth. But the whole conception was barbarous, though powerfully executed.

You must not think that I am wholly an armadillo or rhinocerean, insensible to the merits of Dante, from what I have said. I think that his 'Divina Commedia' is one of the great poems of the world; but of all the great poems of the world, I think it the least abounding in grace and loveliness and splendor. There is no strain in it so fine as the address to Venus at the beginning of Lucretius's great poem; scarce anything so brightly beautiful as passages in Goethe's great drama. I think, certainly, that the religious spirit displayed in it, especially in the 'Purgatorio,' is earnest and deep, but far from pure or thoroughly elevated. If you set up a claim for Dante, that his is the great catholic, Christian mind, then *αποσταται*—I am off, and to a great distance. The following description of Carlyle seems to me to point at what is Dante's characteristic power: 'The very movements in Dante have something brief, swift, decisive—almost military. The fiery, swift, Italian nature of the man—so silent, passionate—with its quick, abrupt movements, its silent, pale rages—speaks itself in these things.' Yes; it is in this fiery energy, these 'pale rages,' that Dante's chief power shows itself, it seems to me, not in genial beauty and lovingness, not in a wide, rich spirit of philosophy."

We quote this in full because we believe there is truth in it, although it may be exaggerated; but we ask, could Carlyle, or Francis Jeffrey, or any other burly literary surgeon, have done the criticism with bolder hand, with firmer nerve!

Milton is Mrs. Coleridge's favorite poet. She does not seem to have taken particularly to Shakespeare, which is certainly not in her favor; but she lavishes praises on Milton. He is congenial with her classic tastes; and with her pure-robed mind, that loved to sit in quiet contemplation and listen to the heavenly strains of the angelic bard. She gives him the superiority to Homer even, not in liveliness, action, progressive movement, but in ideality, in abstract imaginative vastness and force.

Brought up as she was in the society of great poets and under the shadow of Skiddaw, baptized by a plunge in infancy into the rushing waters of the Greta, and endowed herself with no slight poetic power, as some of her fragmentary poems testify, she became herself a very accomplished poetical critic. She profoundly understood Wordsworth's poetry, and she earnestly espoused his cause when it was unfashionable to do so; at the same time, she discriminated between the genuine aboriginal strength of his earlier pieces and the artificial strains of some of his later and more pretentious poems. Thus she preferred his rugged "Resolution and Independence," and above all his pathetic "White Doe of Rylstone" to his "Laodamia" and poems of that studied type. She had walked hand in hand with him as a little girl when he strode on wrapt in meditation, or in

company with "the wild-eyed, impetuous Dora," and that true poet's sister, Dorothea, over the hills and dales of "rocky Cumberland;" she plucked for him the mountain-daisies, and chatted with him of her wild fancies; she dwelt with him and talked with him upon his own imaginative themes and read to him his songs; she was part and parcel of the flowers, woods, mountains, waterfalls, voices, and nature itself in which he lived and by which he was inspired; and while she loved her father's thoughtfully harmonious verse and possessed much of his sweetness, she was, mentally, in a poetic sense, more a child of Wordsworth than of Coleridge, or a child of nature rather than of art: in metaphysical studies this was not so, for in these she inherited her father's tastes and something of his genius.

She is outspoken in her literary opinions; thus she utterly contemned, or, using a stronger word, hated Cowper's *Iliad*; admired, but qualifiedly, Joanna Baillie's plays; and saw nothing but the most commonplace and tedious twaddle in good Hannah More's writings. She discerned what there was of beauty in Keats, but saw clearly his want of strength and born effeminacy. She died with her faculties unimpaired to the last in 1852, and therefore lived long enough to read the poetry of Mrs. Browning, or Elizabeth Barrett, and to highly enjoy Tennyson, Ruskin, Dickens, and Thackeray. She makes no mention of Robert Browning; she could hardly have known George Eliot's remarkable novels. But after all, what has happened in the English literary world for the last quarter of a century to compare at all with the "Lake poets?" We ourselves are still living in the light, spreading wider and wider and growing stronger and stronger, of their coming. All we have now of poetic power and glory belongs to their epoch, and no greater than they, as yet, have since them arisen. Coleridge's daughter twinkled as a small but bright star in their brilliant constellation. We will quote some of her criticism upon Keats, and then turn to the higher and more uncommon characteristics of her mind. In a letter to Aubrey de Vere, dated Eton, September, 1845, she says:—

"I admire Keats extremely, but I think that he wants solidity. His path is all flowers, and leads to nothing but flowers. The end of the 'Endymion' is no

point; when we arrive there, it is looking down a land of flowers, stretching on *ad infinitum*, the separate parts indistinguishable. I admire all the minor poems which you have marked, three of them especially. In the 'Grecian Urn' I dislike the third stanza; it drags out the substance of the preceding stanzas, which, after all, is stuff of *fancy*, not of the higher *imagination*, to weariness; and it ends with an unpleasant image, expressed in no very good English. 'High Sorrowful' is Keat's English, if English at all.

I must say that, spite of the beautiful poetry, as far as words and images go, I've no patience with that Adonis lying asleep on a couch, with his 'white arm' and 'faint damask mouth,' like a 'dew-lipped rose,' with lilies all above him, and Cupids all round him. If Venus were in love with such a girl-man as that, she was a greater fool than the world has ever known yet, and didn't know what a handsome man is, or what sort of a gentleman is 'worthy of a lady's eye,' even as far as the mere outward man is concerned. I do think it rather effeminate in a young man to have even dreamed such a dream, or presented his own sex to himself in such a pretty-girl form. And where is the sense or the beauty of setting one woman opposite another, for a pair of lovers, instead of an Apollo and a Venus? This effeminacy is the weak part of Keats. Shelley has none of it. There is no greater stickler than I am for the rights of woman—not the right of speaking in Parliament and voting at elections, but of having her own sex to herself, and all the homage due to its attractions. There is one merit in Byron; he is always manly. The weaknesses he has are weaknesses of an imperfect man, not a want of manliness." (p. 236.)

Sara Coleridge's decided taste for metaphysical studies was justified by the ease and power with which she moved in them. In a letter to Mr. Quillinan, the husband of Dora Wordsworth, in 1850, she speaks of the utility of those studies:—

"But one thing I must disown. Where upon earth (in the apartment of some gnome, I suppose, that lives under Loughrigg, in a darksome grot) did you learn that I supposed that you 'who do not study metaphysics all day long,' can not understand S. T. C.? All the most valuable part of my father's writings can, of course, be understood, as the writings of Jeremy Taylor, or Milton, or Gibbon, or Pascal, or Dante, or Shakspeare, without specific study of mental metaphysics or any other *science*. Still I do think that some careful study of psychology, some systematic metaphysical training, ought to form part of every man's education, and more especially of every man who is destined for one of the learned professions, and still more especially for men who undertake to write on controversial divinity. A writer on doctrine and the *rationale* of religious belief ought at least to know those principles of psychology and other branches of metaphysics in which all schools agree, and to have had some exercise of thought in this particular direction, and of course such a study must improve the faculty of insight into all works of reasoning which treat of the higher subjects of human thought." (p. 427.)

She compares metaphysical works to "alum," which, though melting slowly into the medium of the public mind, yet, when

time has been given for the operation, they impregnate more strongly than a less dense and solid substance, which dissolves sooner, has power to do. .

As illustrated by the example of her father, she held that with all deep and earnest thinkers their religious teaching is interwoven inextricably with their metaphysics, and that these must stand or fall together. Coleridge's view of Inspiration, for example, as being the product of his intellectual system, she thought was the only one which, in the main, would hold its ground against advancing thought, and was in fact the most spiritually satisfying.

The Coleridgean view of the relations of Faith to Reason she adduces as another illustration of the same principle. In a letter to Edward Quillinan, dated Sept. 10, 1850, she says :—

“What I said to you the other day about the inseparability of faith from reason was only an attempt to express a characteristic doctrine of my father's, which has planted itself fairly in my mind. I spoke of reason, not as the faculty of *reasoning*, of reflecting, weighing, judging, comparing, but as the organ of spiritual truth, the eye of the mind, which perceives the substantial ideas of verities of religion as the bodily eye sees colors and shapes. It seems to me that a tenet which does not embody some idea which our mental eye can behold, is no proper object of faith. St. Paul says that we are to *know* the things that are given us of God, that they are to be spiritually *discerned*, that God *reveals* them to the faithful, *yea*, the deep things of God. Our saving faith consists, I think, in a spiritual beholding, a perception of truth of the highest order which purifies the heart, and changes the soul from glory to glory, while it gazes on the image of the divine perfections. The holy apostle prays that ‘the eyes of our understanding being enlightened,’ we may *know* Jesus Christ, and what is the hope of His calling. The doctrine of implicit faith, that men are saved by believing *something* to be true of which they have no idea or knowledge, I cannot find in the Bible. My not finding would be nothing, if others could find and show it to me. But who can show it there? It seems to me to be a doctrine of fallible men, not of Christ himself, who always speaks of His teaching as being in accordance with the constitution and faculties which God has given us, as having its *witness* in our own hearts and minds, if they are not darkened by clouds of prejudice and passion. Reason is alike in all mankind; I therefore arrogate nothing to myself in particular when I express my agreement with the maxim of my father and many other thoughtful men, that faith consists in a spiritual beholding, ‘the evidence of things not seen’ with the bodily eye. ‘By faith we *understand*,’ says the writer to the Hebrews, ‘that the worlds were framed by the word of God.’”

The Divinity of our Saviour, His Atonement, Justification by Faith, all the great doctrines of our religion, have been shown by the great fathers and doctors of the Church to be doctrines of reason, which may be spiritually discerned. If it were not for the witness of our hearts and minds to these great truths, I can hardly

imagine that they would be generally received. The outward evidences are not appreciated by the masses, and by themselves would never suffice, I think, to a hearty reception of the Gospel. We are early *told* that the Bible is the Word of God, and believe it implicitly. But if we did not find and feel it to be divine, as our minds unfold and we begin to inquire and seek a reason for our beliefs, surely this early faith would fall from us as the seed-leaves from the growing plant, the husk from the blossom and fruit.

I cannot think that there is *outward* proof of the divinity of the Bible at all adequate to its general reception. People do not always theorize rightly on their faith; but many think they have had proof of their religion *ab extra*, when in reality it clings to them from its direct appeals to their heart and spiritual sense." (p. 461.)

We recognize the Coleridgean view in this; and perhaps it is a question, or probably no question at all, that had Coleridge not thus thought would his daughter have thus thought. In theology, however, she showed some scintillations of original thought, as her more elaborate theological essays prove. While many of her theological tendencies were toward Augustinianism and even to German Theology of the old mystical type, yet she was sharply New-School in her notion of the Will. She says:—

"It seems to me, after circumnavigating this doctrine of the Tracts, as often as Cooke sailed round the world, that, from whatever point of view you consider it—whether from the nature of our spiritual being, or from the language of Scripture, or from the universal usage of the term regeneration—when it is not applied technically to baptism, but used according to the idea of a spiritually new birth—whether we try it by the nature of will, or by the *facts* of the moral *phenomena* visible in the baptized—it is equally untenable. I seem to see the lines of truth converging to one centre from off the different points of circumference. Change the will from carnal to spiritual, from enslaved to emancipate, from contrariety to reason, to coincidence and confluence with it, is the central truth. Substitute for this a mystic non-moral spiritualization, and you may labor forever before you can make all the different facts that relate to the subject of spiritual new birth converge and meet together in this notion for a centre.

The Spiritual in man is the Will; the Will, because it is will, can only be changed by its own act, under a higher impulsion.

St. John declares that the regenerate can not live in sin. We find that none abstain from sin but by acts of will, and an energy of submission to God. Thus the idea of a spiritual being born into a divine and sinless nature, and St. John's description, taken in the plain, undistorted sense, perfectly coincide." (p. 418.)

Upon the subject of Regeneration and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit she thought and wrote much. It was one of the great topics that absorbed her mind. She had, it was said of

her, "a passion for descending into the depths of the spiritual being of man;" and it was just in this invisible realm of the spiritual where it meets the supernatural, and is influenced by the agencies and modes of divine operation as revealed through Scripture, the history of the Church of Christ, and human consciousness, that she delighted to dwell. We know of few words of theologians on this great doctrine that are more clear as well as comprehensive than are the remarks and reasonings to be found in her writings. Her thoughts on this subject are generally in connection with the "Baptismal Regeneration controversy" then raging in England, in which she took an intense interest, fighting against her prepossessions as a woman of culture and devotional taste for the Tractarian side, as she felt the strong grasp of Pusey and Newman upon her mind. By the way, she gives a graphic picture of Dr. Pusey's preaching, which is worth transcribing:

"We have had Pusey and Manning preaching here lately, the former three times. Pusey's middle sermon, preached in the evening, was the perfection of his *style*. But it is wrong to talk of *style* in respect of a preacher whose very merit consists in aiming at no *style* at all. He is constantly, to my feelings, more impressive than any one else in the pulpit, though he has not one of the graces of oratory. His discourse is generally a rhapsody, describing, with infinite repetition and accumulativeness, the wickedness of sin, the worthlessness of earth, and the blessedness of heaven. He is as still as a statue all the time he is uttering it, looks as white as a sheet, and is as monotonous in delivery as possible. While listening to him, you do not seem to see and hear a *preacher*, but to have visible before you a most earnest and devout spirit, striving to carry out in this world a high religious theory." (p. 232.)

We quote a few passages on the subject of Regeneration which will show how stubbornly she maintained the evangelical ground against the Tractarian, as well as mystical (or falsely mystical) views:

"It is an undoubted truth that the manner in which God operates upon man is and must be as unintelligible to man as the way in which God created him at first; but does it flow from this truth, or does it appear from the tenor of Scripture, that Christ, who constantly appealed to the reason and the will of His hearers (as Newman himself urges against the Predestinarians), ever spoke of divine operations on man, the *effect* of which he might not judge by intelligible signs. The Syrian was commanded to bathe in a certain river, and how it was that bathing in that river could heal his leprosy, it was not given him to know. But was he commanded to believe that he had been healed of the leprosy, while to all outward appearance, and by all the signs which such a thing can be judged of, the leprosy remained just as before? Surely it is not from the expressions of Scrip-

ture, but from the supposed necessary consequences of certain doctrines, *according to a certain mode of reasoning*, that the non-intelligibility of the *effects* of God's working is contended for. Newman himself urges that baptism is scarcely ever named in Scripture without the mention of spiritual grace; that baptism is constantly connected with regeneration. And then I would ask, is not spiritual grace constantly mentioned in Scripture, either with an implication or a full and particular description of those good dispositions and actions which are to proceed from it, and which men may judge of, as of a tree from its fruits? And is regeneration ever mentioned in Scripture in such a way as to preclude the notion that it is identical with *newness of life*? and is not *newness of life*, according to the Saviour and St. Paul, identical with doing justice and judgment for Christ's sake, doing righteously because of feeling righteously? Are we ever led by the language of Scripture to suppose that regeneration is a mystical something, which, though it may, and in certain circumstances must, produce goodness and holiness, yet of *its own nature* need not absolutely do so; which may exist in unconscious subjects, as in infants, acknowledged incapable of faith and repentance, which might, as to its own essence (though the contrary is actually the case), exist even in the worst of men? In short, that regeneration is the receiving of a new nature—a more divine, and yet not better or more powerful nature. Surely here are words without thoughts." (p. 144.)

"By *actual regeneration*, I mean that change of the soul from evil to good by the Spirit of the Redeemer, which fits it for eternal bliss. This is the idea contained in the Scripture, where to be a son of God and to be freed from sin are identified. Regeneration *in this sense* is very fully described by Southey and Taylor, and many others (not merely evangelical) divines. St. Paul speaks of the same thing when he talks of the 'new creature' which is the soul of man renewed by the Spirit, its disposition raised and purified, grace and goodness predominating in it, and sin being put down. Now no divine ever has said, or can say, that regeneration in this (which I must own I consider its proper and primary) sense is produced in the moment of baptism.

Holding fast by this idea of regeneration given by reason and Revelation, I hold it right to say that no *really* regenerate person ever became reprobate and ungodly, or ever ceased to be a true follower of Christ. If a man falls away from grace, as the Epistle of the Hebrews affirms that men may, it is because he never received grace more than partially, he did not *so* receive it as to prevent the sinful principle, though latent, from being the master principle of his spirit. So far, I own, my doctrine coincides with that of Calvin, and I think that our Saviour's words plainly affirm what I have just expressed. If there is no such thing as a state of the soul as preclusive of a final fall and general corruption, as the state of a butterfly is preclusive of a relapse into the caterpillar, how should Christ so positively have predicted that his sheep should never perish, that no one should pluck them out of his hand? St. Augustine, that sophisticator of theology (of whom the late Bishop Butler said that, if he and Pelagius had been hung upon two cross-sticks, it would have been all the better for the Church), was the first, I believe, who brought in the notion of the possible fall of the regenerate." (p. 249.)

Her views might be commended even now to those in her own Church, and to that party in the hitherto staunchly con-

servative Episcopal Church in this country at the present time, who confess to the dogma of passive instantaneous regeneration at the moment of baptism; as if the spiritual change were irrespective of the Holy Spirit, or also of the will and moral being of the subject of it, and had no actual power to keep off sin from the soul and produce a holy life.

In like manner, that same party in a Protestant Church—the ritualistic offspring of a nobler Tractarian parentage—who avow the out-and-out Romish doctrine of the “Real Presence,” might learn wisdom, as it seems to us, from the reverent and very interesting views of Sara Coleridge on the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper; which views do not rest in commonly received Protestant Zwinglean theory of bald outward representation, or symbolism, but, in some essential respects also resemble those of Calvin in regard to the real inward *spiritual* presence of the Lord at the Supper as conditioned upon the believer’s faith, thus enriching the barrenness of the Protestant conception, and better satisfying the spiritual mind, the devotional sentiment, while steering clear world-wide of all Popish Transubstantiation ideas.

This untitled theologian held independent and peculiar views of the doctrine of the Resurrection, considering it to be wholly a spiritual change as regards even the body—but she defends her theory with much ingenious reasoning, which we have not space to give. In a word, she maintained that the essential principle of life does not depend upon the material organism, so that the raised body is not in any proper sense of that term identical with the material body, or even a continuation of it; and that Paul so emphatically declared it when he said, “Now then I say, brethren, that flesh and blood can not inherit the kingdom of God.” There is a form that is not material. A material form is divisive and disjunctive, but not so the essential body, or bodily principle. Of this bodily principle we only know this, that it is the power within us which is one and simple, and which constructs our outward material organism; but, though we may not be able now to conceive it, cannot this power, independently of the organism in which it now exists, be conceived of as a *form* indicating the existence of the finite, distinct, individual being—that this

is the human body independent of matter, the soul-form, the "spiritual body" which in another state of existence may represent our very selves freed from a material organism? This spiritual body, as Paul affirms, is opposed to the material body—it has nothing to do with it.

"Make the flesh and blood ever so thin, fine, and aerial, still the difference betwixt that and any other flesh and blood will be one of degree, not of kind. But the apostle does not promise us a body of refined flesh and blood, such as, according to some theologians, Adam had before the fall, but sets aside our Adamite body altogether; and seems, indeed, to imply that the first man had no spirituality at any time, for he is opposed to the second man as being of the earth, earthy, as if in his character of the *first man*, and not as fallen man, he was the source of earthiness, the Lord from heaven alone being the foundation of the spiritual." (p. 244.)

We have not space to follow the views of Mrs. Coleridge in other matters of interpretation, yet it is noteworthy, if her theological opinions are not always of the very highest value, what breadth of view, mingling charity with science, faith with reason, there is often in this gentle woman's utterances. They are interesting, we think, because they are a woman's, and for that reason we have dwelt longer upon them than they perhaps intrinsically merit. In woman's faith the spirit of the Church lies. Woman was one of the chief agencies by which Christianity was introduced into Europe. As in the hymns of the Church the real spirit of divine unity breathes, so in woman's unerring and profound sympathy with the mind and heart of Christ the spirituality of our religion finds its true home. Mrs. Coleridge was always induced to make more of the spirit than of the letter, and doubtless went farther in this than do some good Christians. She thought that right opinions were hardly to be called right opinions if they were not held in a right spirit; and she says on this point:

"It is a fortunate thing to be induced by any circumstances to adopt the most edifying opinions, whichever they may be; but of still more consequence is the manner in which we hold and maintain them. Indeed, even in the most vital considerations, the *manner of holding it* is always more than the speculative, abstract creed. I never can forget that the most (apparently) Christian-spirited creature I ever knew was a Unitarian!" (p. 89.)

Her Christlike spirit, wide in its charity, forms the nucleus of a similar spirit on which the one true Catholic Church of

Christ is really to be founded. We hail such souls. There are not too many of them in this world. She was a genuine Protestant; Luther was her great hero of heroes; yet her heart went out in search for all who had the spirit of Christ, who were not against him and who gathered with him by whatever name called, and separated even by whatever dogmatic differences; yet the Church of Rome was not the one Church to her; she looked for a far wider, purer, higher and more spiritually comprehensive communion than that. Listen how Luther-like and bold she talks to a High Church friend with strong proclivities toward the Romish Church:—

“As for reunion with the Church of Rome—I verily think that no one can exceed me in desire for the union of all Christendom, that all who call upon the name of the Lord, and acknowledge the moral law of the New Testament, and the necessity of obeying it, should be in communion with each other—the millions of Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists in America, as well as the Romanists of Italy and Spain. But such a union cannot be without concessions on the one side or the other, if not on both, unless the parties were to change their minds to a great extent, in which case the debate and the difficulty would be at an end; and I for one could never give up or adopt what would satisfy either body. I suppose, however, that you have a desire for a reunion with *Rome* of a very different kind from any you may entertain for union with all Christians; you look upon Rome as a branch of the true Church, and the others above named as out of the pale of the true Church. With this feeling I cannot pretend to have much sympathy, though it may be my error and misfortune not to have it. I think that the Congregationalists belong to the Church of Christ as well as the others. The Church of Rome I am accustomed to regard not as the aggregate of Christians professing Romish doctrine, but as the body of the Romish clergy, together with the system of religious administration upon which they proceed. For the former, the multitude of Romish individuals, I have no feelings of dislike or disrespect whatever—I believe that numbers of them are full of true religion and virtue, and worship God in spirit and in truth! The Romish clergy, considered in their corporate capacity, I cannot but look upon as full of worldly wisdom and worldly iniquity, and I think, as you do of the Reformation, that Old Nick contemplates it—i. e., this body—with great satisfaction, the cockles of his heart leaping up with delight at the view. My uncle Southey was abused for calling the system of the Romish Church ‘a monstrous structure of imposture and wickedness;’ yet I think he did a good deal to substantiate the charge; he certainly had far more *information* on the subject than our young inamoratos of the modern Romish Church can any of them boast, and he had no sort of sympathy with Dissenters and Low Churchmen to inspire him with enmity against the opposite quarter of Christendom. Still I am endeavoring to get rid of Protestant prejudice—of all feelings and views merely formed on habit, apart from reflection and genuine spiritual perception—and to consider quietly whether or no there be not some good even in the Romish ecclesiastical system; and some

good I do believe there is, *especially for the lower orders*, as I also think there is some good in the Methodist system, with which, as well as with the religious practices of the strict Evangelicals, Blanco White is always comparing the system in which he, to his misery, was brought up. But I own it seems to me that the good, whatever it may be, is inextricable from the evil, both from the nature of the thing, and also because the Romish body has never been known to make any real concession of any kind or sort—none that was not meant as a mere temporary expedient, to be withdrawn on the earliest opportunity; and looking upon it as I do, as a *power of this world*, aiming at political dominion, and not inspired, as a body, with any pure zeal for the furtherance of the *truth*, be it what it may, I cannot believe it ever will." (p. 233.)

Her views and meditations upon the Church, its idea, its unity, its future character, are perhaps among the most subtle and original of her writings; for it was a rich mine of thought to her, and seemed to branch and flash out before her as if leading to some invisible and glorious city of gold, that should some day be revealed to her and all believers in its pure and heavenly splendor.

As a humble, every-day Christian and follower of the Lord, Sara Coleridge left a beautiful record. While intimate with and related to the most intellectually distinguished persons of her time—with Southey, Wordsworth, Dr. Arnold, De Quincy, Charles Lamb, Carlyle, Joanna Baillie, Mrs. Howitt, Edward Quillinan, Henry Taylor, Frederick Maurice, Hartley Coleridge,* and those of her own illustrious name who represent, even now, one of the most cultured families in England—she was a modest, retiring woman, a faithful daughter, mother, sister, friend. Her studies and intellectual achievements were accomplished quietly, in the intervals of domestic occupation, springing from the affections, and with the motive to please and aid those whom she loved. For this reason, this volume should take its place with the letters of the Hare family—"*Memorials of a*

* The writer of this, when a young man, once saw Hartley Coleridge, the year before his death. He was standing, with a smiling face, bare-headed in the sun, at the door of a humble thatch-roofed cottage not far from Rydal Mount, Wordsworth's dwelling. If the writer had then known as much as he now does of the life, sorrows and poetry of this singular man, who, if he had not inherited the weakness of will as he did the genius of his father, would have been a great poet, perhaps even in advance of all the "Lake poets" in depth and subtle spirituality of thought—how gladly he would have sought the opportunity to know him better. In many respects, the brother and sister were closely allied in their spiritual and poetic natures.

Quiet Life"—now so widely read in our country; and, though not on the whole so useful a book, it is perhaps more intellectually quickening, inasmuch as its writer is a person of superior mind to the accomplished female writers in that rather wearisomely good book.

In her religious character she seems to have come near the true secret of life; her mind could move at once and be at rest. She understood what was spiritual peace. She had the heavenly mind, tranquil with a hope that had its conversation on high, when she looked for the Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ. At the same time, she thought that "a great deal of religion required a great deal of looking after;" therefore she was not of the marked pietistic or demonstrative sort, and she preserved her individual genius, human nature, and native humor, and had little pretensions to the character of a saint at all, knowing perhaps how easily spiritual humility may become spiritual pride. But her life and letters breathe a sweet and noble Christian faith, a profound quietude of spirit, fixed intelligently, lovingly, everlastingly, on that immovable center where her soul reposed. In fact, as her biographer says of her, "religion made her what she was." Her mind wrought in entire submission to the will and revelation of God. There are few finer letters to be found addressed to persons in affliction and trouble of mind than her letter to her mother dated Oct. 24, 1836. The closing words, thoughts and scenes of her life, in which she longed for her childhood's home in Keswick vale once more, and for the sight of the Bassenthwaite and Skiddaw mountains, even as she longed for the heavenly hills, and seemingly with the same going out of desire, are full of touching poetry—that of a religious soul standing on the border-land and in the light which comes from eternity mixing the affections of earth with those of heaven.

We have been impressed with one thought above all others in reading this memoir and these letters of Mrs. Coleridge, that is, the fact of the great power of this quiet soul, who did not seek public life in any form, as an *educator*. As an educated woman acting upon the minds of others, her influence was incalculable, and we feel that no educating force is, after all, really so powerful as that of a highly cultivated woman. In her

case it rayed out in all directions, but its focus of light was her own home. She was the mother and moulder of her children's minds. Her thoughts and suggestions on the education of the young are golden. She wrote a fairy-tale, "*Phantasmion*," that we have not read (and probably could not get through), but which her American friend, Prof. Henry Reed, of Philadelphia, called the finest thing of the kind since Fouque's "*Undine*"—solely for the purpose of training the imagination of her little son Herbert. She taught him from his infancy how to observe facts in nature. She walked with him over the meadows and by the sea-shore as his mentor, his angel. She instructed him when older how to think and write, leading him on in English history and poetry, and disciplining him solidly in principles of metre and verse. She went along with him in his classical studies—her special delights—reading with him critically, when an Oxford student of high standing, the Greek plays, Pindar, and other authors. She corresponded with him constantly upon educational matters, upon philosophy and metaphysics, upon government, morals, and political economy. She caught with him the new movements in language and science which have come over the modern mind, and she rejoiced that she had lived to see the day. Here was a mother indeed. Why do we not have more examples of such women, whose love is the most quickening home and seed-plot of their children's minds and hearts? What a race of demigods—rather of Christian men—might spring from such a training—training so sweet and gentle, like nature's dews, constant, invisible—or like nature's clear light that is as warm as the noonday sun, with a love which is next only in tenderness and truth to the love of God. It is true that women of genius, or even of superior minds, are no more common than men of genius. It is true that without Coleridge the poet and philosopher we could not have Coleridge's daughter; and of course we admit that a general argument for the education of women could not be founded on the example of a few superior minds like those of Mary Somerville and Sara Coleridge. Neither would we advocate the attempt to make (intellectually) women into men, totally disregarding those differences of mind which correlate the differences of sex. We are not yet even decided in favor of the

wisdom of the co-educational theory, which is based upon an entire similarity of the mental constitution of the sexes. But we believe that women as a class should be better educated—should have more advantages afforded them for a systematic and solid intellectual training, for a broader and richer culture. As it now is, this culture, whenever obtained, is obtained by accident, or the pure force of circumstances. It is in opposition to an unintelligent public opinion. A shy little sonsie Scotch girl picks it up stealthily and in an out-of-the-way sea-side hamlet; she is considered to be a fit subject for a straight jacket. Another cribs it from her uncle's library, and she is looked upon as a wonder, a phenomenon. It may be that Vassar College is an experiment that will not succeed, and we have no doubt that its present course of study will have to be considerably modified; yet it is a noble attempt, worthy of the encouragement of the most thoughtful; and by some such plan for the more ample and thorough education of women, wisely conducted, how much of true talent, of genius it may be, for the study of the languages, for physical science, literature, and art, and possibly for business and political life, would be developed, and what an amazing influence in an educational and moral point of view would be gained. Let us be thankful for now and then an example of what can be done in this direction in individual cases.

It may be said that it would have been better if Sara Coleridge, daughter, wife, and mother of literary men, had given her whole mind to the culinary department and other household duties, in the place of studying Greek, metaphysics, and theology. "Heaven defend us from such a prodigiously learned wife!" it is exclaimed. But we have no proof that she was lacking in the essential qualities of a good housewife; and while thus not losing sight of the mint, anise, and cummin, she gave her main attention to the weightier matters of the household law; she was a more faithful mother than many mothers are; she nourished and cared for the souls of her children; she sat at the feet of the Great Teacher as he came into the house.

It is a noble and blessed thing to see lived by a man or a woman an ideal life—a life which has set before itself some ideal that lifts it above the base level of sordid earthly cares.

Such a life lifts up others and the race. At this day, when the higher education of women is discussed often with a great deal of intemperate zeal on the one side and scorn or indifference on the other, do not the wise life and diligent works of such a mind as that of Sara Coleridge exhibit a type and in some sense utter a prophecy of what in time to come Christianity may do for woman?

ARTICLE II.—THE METAPHYSICAL IDEA OF ETERNITY.*

NOAH WEBSTER defines eternity as "duration or continuance without beginning or end." It is safe to say that most men admit the substantial truth of this definition. That God never began to be, and never will cease to be, is, beyond a doubt, the form in which the notion of his eternity is usually conceived. Most certain it is that the child does not get beyond this conclusion. As certain is it that few men have any other notion of eternity than simply that it is unlimited time. Nevertheless the fact stands forth that the vast majority of those who have attempted to investigate the metaphysical idea of eternity have denied point blank the validity of the common mode of conception. Instead of saying that eternity is time, though unlimited time, they have preferred to say that it is not time at all. The two notions are set over against each other as mutually repugnant. This doctrine may indeed seem to have the support of popular assent, inasmuch as it is common to use the terms, time and eternity, temporal and eternal, as contraries. This, however, by no means invalidates our assertion that eternity is commonly conceived as a form of time. Nothing more is designed by this current phraseology than to distinguish time spent on this side of the grave or of the judgment from the time which will be spent on the other. We venture to say that few who in school-boy days used to read the poem on Time, where it is said of the angel,

"By heavens," he said, "I swear the mystery's o'er;
Time was," he cried, "but time shall be no more,"

if they stopped to consider the meaning at all, did not rather think that, if the angel spoke the truth, the real mystery had only just begun.

* Perhaps an apology is due for the use of the terms "timeless" and "timelessness" in this Article, words which, in the sense here assigned to them, are not authorized by the dictionaries. But they explain themselves, and cannot well be avoided without tedious circumlocutions.

But the disagreement between the metaphysicians and the common people is a fact; and so uniform a verdict, pronounced by thinkers of otherwise widely diverse tendencies of thought, cannot have had its origin in mere caprice. Without now entering upon a minute analysis of the grounds on which the metaphysical doctrine rests, we may observe that, generally speaking, they are two (1.) A real difficulty is encountered whenever an attempt is made to gain a clear and positive conception of an existence in time without beginning or end. The attempt involves the notion of a whole which is yet not a whole, of an eternity made up of two eternities—a *parte ante* and a *parte post*—the one constantly diminishing, the other constantly increasing, yet both infinitely, i. e., equally long. (2.) On the theological side a difficulty is founded on the notion that time is a limitation. Finite beings live only in the present; the past is gone, and the future is not yet; no one is at any time in possession of all that he may be—in short, existence in time seems to involve change and imperfection. But these cannot be attributed to God; hence it appears necessary to affirm that he does not exist in time. Thus it has happened that in various forms the doctrine of the timelessness of God's existence has been held by theologians and philosophers, with only an occasional protest, down to the present time. What the schoolmen said of eternity, can, with equal propriety at least, be said of their doctrine of eternity: it is a *nunc stans*.

Our present purpose is to inquire whether the vulgar notion of eternity has anything to say for itself, over against the great army of metaphysicians.

In this discussion we must deal first with definitions. It is necessary to get, if possible, a clear conception of what is meant by those whom we oppose. And here we are at once confronted with the observation that the opposers of the common notion of eternity are themselves by no means agreed as to what the true notion is. The only point in which they agree is in the negative doctrine that eternity is not time. While objecting that the common notion is merely negative, and while claiming that they alone attach to the notion of God's eternal existence the highest kind of positiveness, they are yet unable to unite in declaring what the positive notion

really is, and consequently the net result is a mere negation after all. The common view is that eternity is time which has not a beginning or an end; the metaphysical view is reduced down to the proposition that eternity is not time at all. We should expect this result, when we observe that these attempts to define eternity all turn upon the notion of time, while yet they deny that eternity is time. Let us now proceed to consider some of these attempts more in detail. They generally set out with a definition or assumption of the notion of time, and then show how the notion of eternity differs from it.

Perhaps the most common definition of time is that it is *duration*. And there being a difficulty in conceiving God's existence as characterized by duration, it is pronounced durationless. But to this it must be replied, in the first place, that, even if this statement were admitted to be correct, it would help us very little towards getting a *positive* notion of eternity. But, in the second place, we remark that the definition of time as duration is not accurate, so that, even though God's existence were proved to be durationless, it would not thereby be necessarily proved to be timeless. What is duration? As an abstract, verbal substantive, the word evidently conveys no notion, except as *something* is conceived which *endures*. And when we say that something endures, what is meant but that the same thing which *did* exist still *does* exist? in other words, that the same thing continues to exist from one point of *time* to another? That is, the notion of time is presupposed in the notion of duration. The latter term may be defined by making use of the former; but not *vice versa*. To deny to an existent being duration, can therefore have no meaning but that the being exists at one point of time, but neither before nor after. Since the term "duration" denotes not time itself, but merely a certain relation to time, it follows that the denial of that relation by no means necessarily involves the negation of time itself. A durationless existence can be nothing but a *momentary* existence in *time*. If the metaphysical difficulty is urged, that even a moment, as the term is here used, must be conceived as being of a certain length, though infinitesimally short, and so as involving the idea of duration, we reply that the difficulty, so far as it affects the present problem, is one of

the metaphysician's own making. By merely denying to God duration, he must mean, either that God exists in an indivisibly short moment of time, or that he does not exist at all; for if he merely means that God exists, but does not exist in time, then he should say so; by introducing the term "duration" he only confuses his meaning. To say that God's existence is timeless, may or may not be true: but it is certain that the affirmation is neither illustrated nor substantiated by pronouncing that existence to be without duration.

Substantially the same criticism is to be passed on that mode of distinguishing time from eternity according to which the essential characteristic of time is *succession*. Indeed, the notion of duration and that of succession are sometimes identified, as, e. g., by Pres. Dwight, who says: "All creatures change incessantly; and no idea can be formed of their duration but that of a continual succession of changes."* Time, then, according to this, consists of a succession of events. Eternity, on the contrary, is characterized by the absence of succession. Thus Charnock says: "Of a creature it may be said that he was, or he is, or he shall be; of God it cannot be said, but only he is."† . . . "There is no succession in God. To have no succession, nothing first or last, notes the perfection of a being in regard of its essence."‡ To be sure, Charnock himself, in flat contradiction of all this, says in the immediate connection, "God *was* before the beginning of it [the world]."|| Again, he says, "The being of God is permanent and remains entire, with all its perfections unchanged in an infinite duration."§ Yet shortly after: "All duration includes *prius et posterius*."¶ Accordingly, in God there is no "first or last," but there is a "*prius et posterius*!" But we may well excuse contradictions which are almost unavoidable when one attempts to maintain an obscure proposition with intelligible language. Charnock undoubtedly meant the same as all defenders of the *eternitas simultaneitatis* had meant. He meant the same thing as Augus-

* *Theology*, Sermon v.

† *On the Existence and Attributes of God*, vol. i, p. 284 (R. Carter & Bros.). Quite similar to Plato's language in *Timaeus* (Bohn's ed., vol. ii, p. 341).

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 281.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 286.

tine meant, when he declared that in eternity there is "*nec praeteritum quidquam . . . nec futurum, sed praesens tantum*;"* the same as Anselm wished to express by saying, "*Necesse est eam [summam essentiam] simul totam omnibus et singulis locis et temporibus praesentem esse.*"† He meant the same as Edwards had in mind when he wrote, "God's eternity is nothing else but the perfect and immediate possession of the whole of his unlimited being together and at once."‡ But what is meant by them all, when they talk of this absence of succession, this simultaneity, in the eternity of God? From the word "succession" we get no idea, except as we conceive two or more events or states as *succeeding* one another, that is, as taking place at different periods of *time*. The notion of time is here, as in the previous case, presupposed in the definition of it. Accordingly, to deny that eternity is characterized by succession is by no means equivalent to denying that it is in kind the same as time. By denying to two events succession and affirming their simultaneity, we only deny one relation of time and affirm another. We only assert that the events take place, not at *different* times, but at the *same* time. We are still in the magic circle. Not the slightest progress is made towards distinguishing eternity from time as something specifically different. The only progress is from an indefinitely long period of time to an infinitesimally short one. In so far as the affirmation has any sense, it implies that God exists at one moment, in which moment he finds himself able to think all, to will all, and to do all that the interests of the universe require, and that thenceforth he does not exist at all. But this is not meant. Oh, no. It is only meant that eternity is not time. Possibly it is not: but nothing is more certain than that this proposition receives no elucidation when eternity is called simultaneity. We are none the better able to see how eternity is *no* time, when it is added that all which takes place in eternity takes place at the *same* time.

* *Enarratio in Ps. 2*, opera, vol. iv, p. 6 (Gaume Freres, Paris, 1835).

† *Monologium* (Migne's *Patrologia*, vol. clviii, p. 175).

‡ *Freedom of the Will*, part iv, sec. 8. Comp. also Locke, *Essay*, etc., vol. i, p. 71 (London, 1751); Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, p. 644 (London, 1678). Dick's *Theology*, vol. i, p. 173 (Philadelphia, 1836); Woods, *Lectures*, vol. i, p. 224.

It is only another form of the foregoing method of distinguishing eternity from time when the latter is identified with *changeableness*. Says Prof. Calderwood: "What we call time is the duration or continuance of changeable existence. If this be true, it began when changeable existence was originated by the Creator From these considerations it is manifest that when we say that the Infinite Being is not subject to the law of time, we say only in other terms that he is *unchangeable* in his existence."* So Charnock says: "The creatures are in a perpetual flux; something is acquired, or something lost, every day; . . . but God hath his whole being in one and the same point or moment of eternity. . . . He is what he always was, and he is what he always will be. . . . God possesses his being in one indivisible point, having neither beginning, end, nor middle."† More pointed and concise still is Augustine's statement: "Times are made by the alterations of things."‡ To the same effect is Dr. Julius Müller's affirmation: "*Die Form des Werdens ist die Zeit.*"§ The reasoning of such philosophers is very simple: Whatever exists in time is changeable; God is not changeable; therefore God does not exist in time. The syllogism is perfect so far as its form is concerned. The only fault is that the major premise is a bare assumption. It is undoubtedly true that whatever is changeable exists in time; but the converse of a true proposition is as apt to be false as to be true. The notion of change *implies* that of time, but does not *constitute* it. So far from it, that the very *opposite* of the notion of change *equally* implies that of time. To say that God does not change, is to say that he *is* at *one* time what he *was* or *will be* at *another*. Indeed, it is a singular phenomenon that so many theologians who first profess to demonstrate that there is in God's eternity no succession, should afterwards find it necessary to enter into another argument to prove God's immutability. If there is no *before* nor *after* in his existence, of course they have no occasion to demonstrate the impossibility

* *Philosophy of the Infinite*, pp. 305, 306 (Macmillan & Co.).

† *On the Attributes*, pp. 283, 284.

‡ *Confessions*, p. 340 (Shedd's ed.).

§ "The form of Becoming [i. e., the condition of things as passing from one state to another] is time."—*Lehre von der Sünde*, 5th ed., vol. ii, p. 126. See also Ridgley, *Body of Divinity*, vol. i, p. 132 sq.

of his being different *now* from what he was *before*. Schleiermacher saw this, and after giving as his definition of eternity, that it is "the absolutely timeless, causative power of God, conditioning not only all things temporal, but time itself,"* he says, "If the notion of eternity is so taken, there is no occasion for considering immutability as a separate attribute." Very true; the logic is perfect; but what must we think of the lexicography? Without time there can be no change; but when it is said that without change there can be no time, we must enter our protest in the name of both logic and metaphysics. No progress then is made by this attempt to define eternity. The failure is, if possible, more palpable than in the cases before adduced. Once more, therefore, we must insist that the distinction of eternity from time, so far as these specifications affect the matter, amounts simply to the assertion that the one is not the other. The definition is lost in a negation.

Another mode of defining time consists in making it a mere *relation* of things or ideas, especially that of *motion*. Aristotle defines time as the number of motion.† The temptation to resolve time into a relation of different motions grows naturally out of the fact that our only mode of measuring time is derived from observation of the motion of the sun and other heavenly bodies. The Aristotelian definition has been revived by some modern philosophers. Herbert says: "Time is the number of change."‡ Gruppe, a strenuous opposer of speculative philosophy, who with great earnestness insists on the inductive method as the only proper one in all philosophy, affirms that the notion of time, as well as that of space, is the result of a long process of abstraction. Time, he says, is nothing but the relation between two or more motions.§ Trendelenburg also makes the idea of time dependent on motion, but speaks of it as produced by the constructive motion of the mind. "By means of motion," he says, "time is in space, and space in time. Time and space are in motion so inseparably interwoven and wrought into one another that they vanish into one another."|| Let us now consider this idea. In these definitions so much is

* *Der Christliche Glaube*, p. 268 (5th ed., 1861).

† *Physics*, iv, 14.

‡ *Metaphysik*, ii, p. 328.

§ *Wendepunkt der Philosophie im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*.

|| *Logische Untersuchungen*, p. 216.

common, that motion is made in thought to *precede* time, and the latter notion to depend on the former. Just the opposite is the fact. In the idea of motion must be implied that of an object moving, and also that of at least two places where the object is conceived as being. Now the most obvious reflection of a plain man in regard to the case would be that he could not conceive of the object getting from one place to another unless at least a little *time* is allowed for the movement. He would say that, unless this condition is granted, he cannot think of the same object as present in both places, for then it must be present in both places at the same *time*; and this to his mind would be a sheer contradiction. But suppose we concede that such a man's thinking apparatus is not delicate enough for the problem before us: let it be imagined to be possible that one may think of an object as moving from one place to another without also thinking of time as presupposed in the process. What then, we ask, should ever induce us to add the notion of time at all? If it is said that our comparison, our measure, of motion yields the idea, we ask what *is* this measure or number of motion which takes place *before* time is thought of? The mere expression, measure of motion, most naturally suggests the thought of *space* rather than of *time*. If anything is measured besides the space passed through, this measure must relate to the *velocity* or to the *uniformity* of the motion. But how can velocity be measured, how can the notion of it exist, unless one first conceives of a certain length of *time* during which a given distance is passed through? Given the distance, the motion can be called swift only as the *time* occupied in the motion is short. If the measuring process relates to the uniformity of the same motion, then nothing can be meant but that in equal periods of *time* equal or unequal portions of space are passed through. If we assume, however, with Gruppe, that the notion of time results from the comparison of the motion of different bodies, we meet with the same difficulties. It is not explained *what kind* of relation constitutes time. Some of the most obvious relations of different motions to each other are confined to the idea of space, e. g., the *direction* of two motions. The mere expression, relation of motions, unless more particularly defined, would at least as naturally be understood

to refer to the direction of two motions as to anything else. What is the relation of motions which is called time? Obviously, it can be nothing else than the variety in the *rapidity* of different motions. But what does this mean except that one object moves in the same period of *time* farther than another? But without the previous idea of time, where is the possibility of any such measurement? If it is said that the velocity of moving bodies cannot be compared without a fixed measure of time, and that this measure is furnished only by the motion of bodies, e. g., of the earth, we reply, this is true; definite and uniform *measures* of time we do get only from moving bodies. Were there no such uniform motion of planets or of other bodies; were we left to mere conjecture, to the capricious influence of mental moods which make the same period of time *seem* longer or shorter to different persons or under different circumstances, we should have no trustworthy measure of time. But the very fact that we can conceive this lack shows that the notion of time would not perish because of the lack. Because we may not know *how much* time has passed away, we never infer that *no* time has passed. Let us see what the theory under consideration would lead to, when consistently carried out. According to it, if all motion were at once to cease, time would cease also. When the angel to whom we have alluded had set one foot on the sea and one on solid land, and pronounced time to be no more, it would seem that he could have made his word good only by putting an end to all motion. There he stands, and so long (we beg pardon for using a term which implies the passage of time when the absence of it is described; but our language is not yet equal to the demands of this theory; and so we must say, so long) as he stands perfectly still, and not even a ripple is made on the water, nor an insect stirs on the land, so long there is no time; but should he lift a foot, should even a butterfly move his wings for another flight, the eternity is over. We hardly need to add anything more in refutation of the theory, nor to remark that by such an attempt to define time the conception of eternity is not explained. It is not even touched. Since the thought of an object or of all objects *remaining* (i. e., continuing from one point of time to another) in a state of *rest* no less involves the thought of time

than does that of an object moving, it is obvious that a denial of motion in space is anything but an affirmation of existence out of time.*

By Kant's theory, that time and space are mere subjective forms or conditions of sensuous perception, the Gordian knot is simply cut. As between his view, however, and that of those who had allowed to time and space objective reality in regard to everything but God, we cannot but think his to be the more consistent. "With what right," he asks with reason, speaking of this distinction, "can this be made, when already both time and space have been made forms of things as such, and in fact forms which, being conditions of the existence of things *a priori*, still remain, even though the things themselves should be done away? For as conditions of all existence in general, they would have to be of God's existence also."† Very well put; and it comported with the boldness of Kant's metaphysical genius to conclude, not that his predecessors had gone too far, in denying to God the limitations of time and space, but that they had not gone far enough. By affirming that it is only in regard to the *phenomenal* world that the idea of time has any application, and not at all to things as substances, he annihilated the distinction which had been made in this particular between the Creator and the creature. Had Kant stood where our angel did (and the confident assurance with which

* At bottom this conception of time is the same as that which makes *change* its essential quality; for all change implies some sort of motion. Trendelenburg's doctrine (apparently endorsed by Porter, *Human Intellect*, p. 558 seq.) is subtle, and may seem to be free from the obvious difficulties which beset the view above controverted. But the fallacy of his theory lies in these points: (1) He transfers without warrant the results of scientific research in the department of astronomy, chemistry, physiology, etc., to the department of consciousness, implying that, because everything *is* moving, therefore we cannot but *think* it to be moving. (2) He confounds mental action with physical motion: and, because, in thinking of time, the mind is figuratively described as passing over a certain space, therefore motion is declared to be involved in the conception of time. (3) He fails to show how the conception of motion itself is more ultimate than that of *rest*. The two conceptions imply and suggest one another. Logically neither can be said to precede the other. Or, if we were compelled to decide in favor of the priority of either, we should rather pronounce that an object is more naturally conceived as in a state of rest than in one of motion.

† *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 52.

he pronounces his critique to be the solution of the problem of ages makes the representation not inappropriate), he might have said :

" I swear the mystery's o'er ;
Time never was, and time shall be no more."

But there was the difficulty. While others had abused the established meaning of words indirectly and unconsciously, Kant advanced directly and with an almost amazing intrepidity to the work of assaulting a fundamental idea of the mind. The very boldness of the attempt it is which gives it its apparent force. It is like an unexpected attack in the rear. One is in danger of giving up all as lost before inquiring whether the onset comes from a countless host or from a corporal's guard. But whoever does not allow his self-possession to leave him, will be likely soon to fall into the following train of reflection : Time, Kant tells us, is nothing but the form of our internal sense. This proposition, whatever it may mean, can be understood only when the meaning of the subject is understood. Unless some definite notion is at the outset attached to the word "time," we might as well be told that *abracadabra* is the form of sensuous intuition. What, then, is the idea which the word, as so used, must suggest to our minds? Shall it be *that* idea which has universally been denoted by it? Impossible; for it belongs to the very kernel of that idea that time is a form, or condition, of things *as such*; not merely that things *manifest* themselves in time, but that they *exist* in time; in other words, that time is *not* a mere condition of sensuous perception. We must, therefore, not prefix *this* notion to the predicate of Kant's sentence, unless we suppose him to have wished to utter the self-contradictory proposition that what is *not* purely subjective is purely subjective. What then? What does the word "time" mean, as used by Kant? We must go for information to Kant himself; and he tells us that it means the form of our sensuous perception. Adding now the predicate, we have the startling proposition that the form of our sensuous perception is the form of our sensuous perception! It is perhaps hardly worth the while to inquire how Kant's conception of time affects that of eternity. But we may quote his definition of the latter. "The infinity of time," he says, "sig-

nifies nothing more than that a definite quantity of time is possible only through limitations of a single fundamental time. Therefore the original conception 'time' must be given as unlimited."* That is, eternity (if the word is here in place at all) is simply the form of our sensuous perception in general considered. To speak of a being as existing eternally, in the sense of existing in unlimited time, would be, according to the Kantian doctrine, meaningless language. So it may be, taking the word as he defines it. The only objection is that his definition has emptied the word of all the meaning it ever had,—a fatal objection, unless any one is to be allowed to discard at pleasure the notion which usage has joined to a word, and to declare on his own responsibility that it means something else. Should, however, this liberty be generally embraced, what a pitiable world this would be—the original confusion of Babel infinitely worse confounded. Talleyrand's satirical definition of language would be converted into a doleful truth.

Kant's speculations on time, though designed by himself to remove the difficulties which had exhibited themselves in the conception of eternity, had practically the effect of leading to a still greater complication. Hitherto the antithesis of a temporal and of an eternal form of existence had not been made sharp. The doctrine that eternity could in no sense be conceived as a form of time, had not been consistently maintained. The notion of time in all the speculations on the subject kept creeping in, and was not expelled except in a conditional and somewhat ambiguous manner. In so far as any other than our actual temporal form of existence was considered as possible, this other form was conceived as belonging more especially to the one Absolute Being. Time was regarded as having objective reality, but only for created beings. Temporal and eternal were terms nearly equivalent to finite and infinite. But Kant made the relation of time belong to us not as finite, but as sensuous, beings. He made it mark, not so much an antithesis between God and man, as between the sense and the intellect. Accordingly, the possibility was conceived of a timeless form of existence even for men; and not only was the possibility of it assumed, but the fact of such a mode of existence was

* *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 35.

assumed in order to explain the fact of human depravity. In a preëxistent state, Kant thought, man acquired by a free act out of time a proclivity to evil which cannot be accounted for on the supposition of an existence merely in time. This idea of an "intelligible" state, and of "intelligible" acts (not "intelligible" in the English sense of that word; in a double sense, we may perhaps say, not intelligible, but so-called as the characteristic of a being who perceives without the use of the senses, seeing *things* and not merely qualities), though advanced by Kant* with some reserve, has greatly influenced the speculations of later German philosophers and theologians. The "intellectual intuition" which Kant modestly hinted at as possible for purely intellectual beings, Schelling attained even while in the flesh. The terms "timeless" (*zeitlos*), "extra-temporal" (*ausserzeitlich*), and "super-temporal" (*überzeitlich*) have become common as descriptive of the mode of the Divine existence. And Daub informs us that "in that faith in the all-sufficient One, whose essence is not temporalness, an endless time, but eternity, man is lifted above the temporal life and temporal death. . . . In this faith, being reconciled with God, he is conscious of being eternal like God, before as well as after death."† The same Kantian idea plays an important part in Julius Müller's theory of preëxistence, though he rejects the doctrine that time is purely subjective. In like manner DeWette says, "We get the idea of the soul only when we give up corporeality, together with time and space, as belonging to the lower natural conception."‡ Others, turning their attention more to the future state, emphasize the idea that it is an existence out of time. Others from the same general point of view attempt to throw light on the old problem of the eternity of creation.

It is easy to see that confusion, rather than simplicity, has resulted from the impulse traceable to Kant's critique, especially as the kernel of his theory, viz: that time is predicable only of sensuous perception, is not generally adopted, while that which

* *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 223.

† *System der Christlichen Dogmatik*, vol. i, p. 392. This bold, but logical, development of the doctrine of timelessness is found in other writers also; e. g., Schleiermacher, *Monolog*, i, pp. 16, 17. Schelling, *Vom Ich*, § 15.

‡ *Ueber Religion und Theologie*, 20.

was only incidental to his theory, viz: timelessness as a possible form of existence in general, is retained. The result is that, instead of the simple notion of time, with the popular subdivision into time finite and time infinite, we are told of God's absolute timelessness; of a creation that has no beginning and no end, yet not eternal; of an existence at first timeless, and afterwards temporal; of an existence at first temporal and afterwards timeless; and so on *ad nauseam*. Kant had set the example of giving a word a meaning which did not belong to it. His example was followed, and, as is usual with imitations, the worst features of his system were copied most zealously. Accordingly, we now have a large addition to the former definitions of eternity. The old one of Boethius, still quoted with approval by modern theologians, was bad enough: "Eternitas est interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio."* The schoolmen's "punctum nunc stans," and Cowley's "eternal now," were absurd enough. But Schleiermacher tells us that eternity is neither a possession, nor a point, nor a "now," but *causality*. Julius Müller calls it "God's absolute self-production."† Martensen identifies it with *self-existence*, also defines it as *immutability*.‡ Trendelenburg says that "the infinity of space and time is one and the same, and the notion has in reference to the actual world validity only so far as there may be an *infinite motion*."§ Weisse, however, says, "Eternity is the absolute negation of all motion."|| Marheineke says that God "as eternal is the *omnipresent*."¶ And Delitzsch almost strikes us dead with terror, when he defines eternity as "a point without dimension, a centre always the same and having an absolute content, which centre, according to the unrestrained will which holds sway within it, without being conditioned from without and limited in itself, *expands or contracts* itself."***

We need not search any further. We have here already as many distinct conceptions (expressions, at least, for it is doubt-

* *De Consolatione Philosophiæ*, v. 6.

† *Lehre von der Sünde*, vol. ii, p. 205.

‡ *Christliche Dogmatik*, § 48. So Rothe, *Dogmatik*, p. 121.

§ *Logische Untersuchungen*, p. 168.

|| *Grundzüge der Metaphysik*.

¶ *Grundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik*, p. 117. In his later work (*System der Christlichen Dogmatik*, p. 105) he says, "God's essential existence in relation to his reality is eternity, and in it is involved omnipresence."

*** *Biblische Psychologie*, p. 33.

ful whether any distinct conception can be attached to many of them) as we have quoted authors. And they all differ from one another as much as from the popular notion of eternity. Is it necessary to make the remark that one is about as nearly right as the other? If one chooses to call eternity a possession, and another to call it power, who can decide which definition is preferable? If one calls it omnipresence, and another, a point without dimensions, who will undertake to act as umpire? If one calls it infinite motion, and another, the absolute negation of all motion, how are we to judge between them? If future philosophers should arise, and declare eternity to be nothing but gravitation, or electricity, or light, would not such definitions be as defensible as some of those which, as we have seen, have been with solemn earnestness advanced? If it is once granted that a word may be used in a sense utterly at variance with that which the word has always borne, what law are we to lay down as to the degree which this variance may attain? When we have once leaped out of the bounds which usage has fixed, we have no law but that of caprice. No one can argue against the position of his opponent; for the very notion of argumentation implies that there are certain definite conceptions admitted by all to be connected with certain words. When this connection is sundered, or admitted only at pleasure, there is no common ground on which the disputants can stand. They "fight as one that beateth the air."

That confusion and contradiction should attend the development of such notions, as well as inhere in the very statement of them, is to be expected. We have already noticed the folly of assuming the *eternitas simultaneitatis*, and at the same time endeavoring to prove God's immutability. No one would attempt it who really believed that there is no duration or succession in the Divine existence. It is like declaring water to be colorless and then laboriously proving that it is not green. In like manner we find, e. g., Pres. Edwards laying down this same definition of eternity, and yet at another time founding a most momentous conclusion on the doctrine of God's *foreknowledge*.* But what is *foreknowledge* in a being to whom nothing is *future*? If there is no time to him but an "eternal now,"

* *Freedom of the Will*, part ii, sect. xi.

then he simply *knows*. It is no escape from this to say that that is present to him which is future to us, and that in this sense he may be said to foreknow. *All* knowledge is present in the sense that the one knowing exercises his cognitive powers only at the time present to him. The question here is simply whether the *thing* known is present to the person knowing. Edwards's argument is that the *certainty* of future events may be inferred from their being foreknown, since foreknowledge could not exist without a previous decree. But this implies that the events in question are future to God as well as to man; for if they are not, their certainty to him rests on the same basis as that of past or present things. Either God exists in time, or his knowledge is not foreknowledge.*

Again: This effort to free God from the limitations of time occasions the saddest perplexities respecting the doctrine of *creation*. This act seems to be so vital in its relation to God's character and mode of self-manifestation, that it is not so easily disposed of as most others. The old heathen doctrine that matter is co-eternal with God was simple, but very distasteful to Christians. Yet Origen, as is well known, and many other early Christians, affirmed the eternity of matter, making, however, the careful limitation that it is eternally created. Some modern theologians, especially Rothe,† hold the same doctrine, with the modern improvement "that the creation is without beginning and end, but not eternal." This is similar to the scholastic doctrine that God's preservation of the universe is a continual creation. The impulse to resort to such a theory, aside from the question between pantheists and theists, is obvious: If God created the world at a definite period of time, then we must conceive him as acting in *time*, as changing, doing at one time what he does not at another. To avoid this conclusion, the creation is called eternal. But the idea of a *continual creation* is too self-contradictory to obtain much favor.

* See an interesting discussion of this subject in Julius Müller's *Lehre von der Sünde*, vol. ii, pp. 276-307. He, however, reaches the conclusion that, since the uncertainty (contingency) of events depending on man's free choice does not grow out of the element of *time*, therefore an *eternal* (timeless) knowledge is as difficult to reconcile with the strict freedom of man's choice as would be *foreknowledge*. Consequently he denies to God any such absolute knowledge.

† *Theologische Ethik*, § 40; *Dogmatik*, § 40.

Others, therefore, to avoid this difficulty, and also to exclude God from the limitations of time, explain that God *creates time*, though not himself in it. It is only a modification of this view, when time is represented as a necessary form of the created universe, involved in the creation, but not itself created by a separate act. It is commonly held by those who adopt this view, that God, though not existing in time, has put himself *into relation* with temporal things: the conception reminds us of a man living in Europe, quite separated by the ocean from America, yet putting himself into relation with America by means of letters or the telegraph. In other words, God's eternity is represented as something distinct from, yet existing alongside of, the temporal condition of the universe. In short, the whole conception is intelligible only as time and eternity are conceived as co-existing in, or identified with, *space*. Precisely the same confusion besets the question of the incarnation of the Logos.* Similar questions arise respecting the pre-existent and the future life. Did a timeless state precede the temporal? Will time, having once begun, ever end? If it ends, will it be at death, or at the judgment? All possible theories have their advocates. As a specimen of the arbitrariness with which statements on this point may be laid down, we would refer to the discussions of Julius Müller. "We have," he says, "by no means a right to declare that the particular form which time and space at present have for our perception and consciousness to be the only possible, the form always and everywhere valid."† This is said to prepare the way for the doctrine that a timeless existence may have preceded the present temporal one. But when we are told that we have not *always* perceived and acted in *time*, the meaning must be that there has been a *time* when there was *no time*. He goes on to say, in reference to the timeless pre-existence of man, that we are to regard "the entrance into the Now and the Here as a *progress* in the being of the individual spirit."‡ This

* On both these points vid. Dörner's able discussion of the doctrine of God's immutability, in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1856-8. Yet even Dörner, carefully as he avoids most of the contradictions of those whose views he discusses, still denies existence in time to God.

† *Lehre von der Sünde*, vol. ii, p. 127.

‡ *Ibid.*

progress must be a "becoming." But he has told us that "the form of becoming is *time*." In fact, the very idea of such a transition is absurd. A being existing out of time *begins* to exist in time. Conceive several of these timeless beings. They all enter time. Must they all enter it together? Evidently not, unless we adopt the extreme realistic doctrine of Adam's headship. But this is far from Müller's doctrine. If then all men do not enter the temporal state together, then some remain *longer* than others in the timeless state. But here again is a contradiction. We cannot avoid bringing in the conception of time. In fact, the idea that the timeless state *precedes* the temporal one is itself self-contradictory. Nor does Müller's reply to the objection remove it. He says: "That the timeless existence of a being by his entrance into time is annulled, is by no means self-contradictory. The temporal existence of conditioned beings, as a different and more real one, repudiates the timeless existence and crowds it into the background; it pre-supposes it by its very beginning, and makes it in that sense something past; it gives it thereby a limitation which it does not in itself have."* This crowding of the timeless existence into the background and giving it the appearance of being what it is not, is of itself enough to non-plus all unsophisticated minds. But our perplexity is increased when we find Dr. Müller saying: "It is self-contradictory to conceive a being as passing from a temporal into an extra-temporal existence, of his exchanging in any one moment that existence for this, and so of his beginning *in time* to be *out of time*."† But why more self-contradictory to begin in time to be timeless than *vice versa*? Why cannot the temporal state crowd the timeless one into the foreground as well as into the background? But as we belong to the unphilosophical multitude, and therefore distrust our judgment respecting the nature of this timeless existence in general, and the effect produced upon it by this crowding process in particular, we turn for light to another distinguished professor, who also believes in this extra-temporal mode of existence, and

* *Lehre von der Sünde*, vol. ii, p. 151.

† *Ibid.* We quote from the German original of Müller's work on account of the looseness and inaccuracy which characterize Mr. Urwick's translation.

of course ought to know what it is. Martensen, the Danish theologian, says: "So long as there is time, conversion is possible . . . But when time itself has passed away, it is impossible to see how conversion is any longer possible, because conversion cannot be conceived without a *history* in the conversion. . . . After this last advent [of Christ] history and historical progress will be out of the question; there will be only a life and existence in a fixed eternity."* Here then the two eminent doctors disagree. The one assumes as an axiom what the other calls a clear contradiction. Now our perplexity is complete. We ourselves have absolutely no ability to conceive of the meaning or the possibility of an existence out of time. But one doctor assures us that we have been in it; and another that we are going to be in it. Between the two, if we must choose, we are inclined to prefer Martensen; for he at least holds out to us the prospect of at length learning by experience what this queer mode of existence is; whereas Müller would have us believe that it has been crowded back irretrievably out of both consciousness and recollection.—Again: In the view of many philosophers *eternity* has a close relation to *necessity*. Thomas Aquinas says that God eternally knows all things as present, and through this knowledge they are themselves caused.† Spinoza makes "eternal" and "necessary" equivalent in meaning.‡ So Leibnitz says: "It is very certain that the notion of eternity in God is wholly different from that of time, for it consists in necessity, and that of time in contingency."| Accordingly, it is not uncommon to hear necessary truths called eternal truths. But what do we now see? Kant rises up, and finds in the abolition of time the only security for *freedom*. His lead has been followed by many philosophers and theologians. How are we to decide between these contrary views? The process of reasoning on the one side is this: Whatever is timeless cannot change; for change implies succession, and succession implies time. Whatever is eternal *is*; it must be founded in the nature of things; it must be necessary. But the reasoning on the other side is this: All tem-

* *Christliche Dogmatik*, § 286.

† *Summa Theologiae*, Pars I, Quæst. xiv, Art. vii and viii.

‡ *Ethics*, Pars I, Def. viii.

| *Opera*, vol. ii, p. 333 (Geneva, 1768).

poral events are subjected to the law of causality ; whatever is caused *must* be, is necessary ; *ergo*, only when we are free from time and sense can we enjoy the "intelligible" freedom. Here then the learned doctors are again by the ears, and we again are wholly unable to decide between them. If the difference is not merely factitious, and the strife merely about words, then it belongs to a region higher than that in which we have our conversation, and we must therefore preserve a strict neutrality. And so we might go on, and speak of other points of controversy which have arisen within the sphere of this theory of a timeless existence, such, e. g., as whether the timeless form is superior to the temporal ; whether the timeless and the temporal existence may be intermingled ; whether God might have created a world that should not exist in time ; whether the consequences of moral acts in the extra-temporal are absolutely determining for those in the temporal, etc., etc. With regard to all these problems, we can only say that they are for us as insoluble as the old one : What would happen, if an irresistible object should come into contact with an immovable ?

Surely, must be the reflection of any one who considers these things, the necessity ought to be very imperative which drives so many to adopt a theory the very statement of which, in so far as it is more than a bare negation, involves such contradictions, or consists in merely unintelligible words. What then, we ask, is the supposed necessity ? What are the difficulties involved in the more vulgar conception which seem to require the adoption of so startling a hypothesis ? And in case the difficulties are real, are they avoided by the hypothesis ? Dismissing, as almost too baseless and arbitrary to deserve so much attention as we have given it, the notion of a timeless existence as attributable to human beings, let us consider the arguments for the doctrine of timelessness as a mode of the Divine existence. There certainly is a strong presumption against it—a presumption not only growing out of the fact that the theory, as all confess, is repugnant to the natural and common convictions of men, but strengthened by the fact that the simple effort to state and develop it is fruitful only of perplexities. Nevertheless, overlooking this for the present, conceiving that the theory has a meaning, however obscure it may be to com-

mon men, we follow the theologians and philosophers in their attempt to overthrow this presumption. What are the objections to the common notion, that eternity is simply unlimited time?

We are told, in the first place, that time is a *limit*, and that consequently an unlimited being cannot exist in time. But how is time a limit? Because, it is said, whoever exists in time cannot be the whole of himself at once; he can enjoy, he can know, he can feel, only in successive moments; he cannot concentrate into one moment the experience of the past and of the future; he loses what is past, he must wait for what is to come; he is therefore confined. But so it must not and cannot be with God. Hence he must be freed from this limit. He must always be in the enjoyment and exercise of all his knowledge and powers.—Of course, now, all agree that in respect of the limitations which belong to the temporal state of men, there is a radical difference between them and God. But this proves nothing to the point. On the contrary, the very mode in which the antithesis is generally put implies that God is, after all, conceived as existing in time. Man, it is said, *is* not to-day all that he *was* or all that he *will be*. This cannot be said of God. What then? Why, that he *is* what he *was* and what he *will be*. In almost these words Charnock himself expresses it, and by his own statement implies that God exists in all time. Let us consider in this relation God's omniscience. All concede that God perfectly knows all the past and all the future. What more is needed in order to make him in this respect unlimited? Why, we are told, it is not enough that he remember and anticipate; everything must be to him real and present. Well, let it be granted that everything is present to him. Is it present *continually* or only at *one moment*? Not the latter, as all confess. The former then? If that is conceded, your case is lost, for continuance implies time. No, it is rejoined, we do not accept the dilemma; it is neither a momentary, nor a continuing present, but an absolute present. The term "absolute," a lover of perspicuity might object, does not here convey a very lucid idea. But it has a strong sound, and we will not object to its use. But we must ask what the *present* is, when we have abolished the future and the past? What meaning does the

word have except as it implies the existence of another time than the present time? If it is said that the word is used, out of its ordinary sense, to indicate that all God's knowledge is absolutely present to him, then the reply is that the same may be said of man. To him, if not an "eternal now," yet so long as he does exist, a "now does always last." With man, too, it is always to-day. No one can say that it is now yesterday or to-morrow. How then does God's present differ from this? To say, with Anselm, that God is present in all times, or, with Charnock, that "he hath his being in one moment of time as well as in infinite intervals of time," is simply to declare that God does after all exist in time, though in some peculiar way, the description of which only leaves us bewildered. A more careful way of stating the doctrine is, that the future and the past, with all their contents, are brought together in the consciousness of God, so that for him there is no succession. But if this means anything more than that God has the power of knowing all things at once, or that his knowledge of the future and of the past is as perfect and vivid as that of the present, then it must mean that future and past events *are* present; in other words, that there is no future and no past except in our fancy. Are our metaphysical friends ready to say this? Is Adam now eating the apple? Is David now hurling the stone at Goliath? Is the sun now rising on the morning of Jan. 1, 1900? It is a wretched quibble to say that these events are present to *him*, though not to *us*. Present, no doubt, in the sense of being clearly apprehended. But the question is, are they present as actual *occurrences*? Are they all *simultaneous*? Do these events follow one another or not? If they do, does God know that they do? And if he knows it, if he knows that the events are *in fact* future or past, *can* he know them as actually present, i. e., as *not* in fact future or past? But if these events do *not* follow one another, then it is not enough to say that we are limited; we are befooled; and only a few metaphysical geniuses have been fortunate (or unfortunate) enough to discover the fact.

But, it is objected in the second place, we cannot imagine the Divine existence to be characterized by succession; for this necessarily implies either that God is undergoing a process

(which no one believes), or that he is continually thinking, willing, and purposing the same things—which must be a most tiresome existence. We do not intend to elucidate the nature of the divine mind, nor to inquire how far the orthodox doctrine of immutability requires the assumption of a statue-like sameness, not only in the essential nature, but also in the mental experience and self-expression of God. We have only to ask, What is the remedy for the supposed difficulty? Merely this: God is conceived as, like men, becoming wearied, if he is obliged to think of the same thing for a long time. Therefore—what? Why, man benevolently *shortens* the time for him. God being infinite, he needs only a moment in which to do everything. Why should he keep repeating the same act? Are we told that this is a caricature? that it is not meant that God's existence is confined to a moment or short period of *time*? But, we ask, how is it known, then, that the difficulty is avoided by the theory of a timeless existence? To *us* a thing becomes wearisome only when a long enough time has elapsed to make it so. If the avoidance of the tiresomeness is the thing desired, we must shorten the time. If the thing needed in the case of God is different, then we ask, how do we know that the necessity of a repetition of the same thought is really obviated? Is the repetition *impossible*? Then this can only be, so far as human thought can see, because there is no *time* for it. We can attach no other idea to the sentence. Indeed, the style of expression used by those who put forward this theory implies the same. The past and future, we are told, are, so to speak, concentrated into a point. But if so, then what *would* take place in the endless duration *does* take place in the timeless point. Of course, then, the repetition of the same thought must be also involved. What is lost in extension is made up in intensity. If God can *do* so much more than man in a moment, why cannot he become *fatigued* also in this unextended moment? But *we* are already tired with the mere contemplation of so paltry an argument for this unintelligible eternity.

But, it is said in the third place, we are driven by a metaphysical necessity to the doctrine of God's timelessness. The mind is unable to conceive an infinitely extended duration. The effort to conceive it involves one in contradictions. At

the best it is only a *negative* conception that we reach ; whereas we need to have a *positive* conception of this glorious attribute.— We need not try to explain away or tone down the difficulties which beset the effort of the mind to grasp the conception of the infinite. Let all that Kant and Hamilton have said on this point be fully admitted. But what is the remedy? The problem is to avoid a merely negative conception. It is not enough, we are told, to call eternity time that has *not* a beginning nor an end ; we must tell what it *is*. We have already considered some of these attempts to give a definition of this *positive* eternity. We have found that, so long as the notion of time has any relation to the definitions, they consist merely in denying that eternity is characterized by this or that characteristic of finite time. In God, it is said, there is *no* succession, *no* duration, *no* change, *no* motion. Is this, then, the positiveness that is thought so indispensable? But, it is replied, we do not confine ourselves to these mere negations ; we affirm that God's existence is infinitely *elevated above* the limits of time. Indeed, but how are we to understand this elevation? Is it really supposed that by representing time as a *part of space*, and God as being outside of this part, any progress is made towards giving perspicuity to the notion of either time or eternity? The question forces itself on our prosaic mind, why it would not answer the same purpose to say that God, instead of being *above* time, is *below* it, or on *one side* of it. Why is he always put *above* it? If it is replied that the latter expression, according to the tendencies of metaphorical language, is more appropriate as descriptive of the perfection and majesty of God, we admit the plea, but deny its pertinency to the present question, which is not concerning God's majesty, but concerning his eternity ; and we wish to know what is expressed by the assertion that it is *something above* time, except merely that it is *not* time. The negative *terms* are avoided ; but the real thing asserted is just as empty a negation as that whose place it is designed to take. At the most, it is nothing more than a negative definition, coupled with the affirmation that this timeless existence is *vastly superior* to a temporal one. Which affirmation we are expected to admit on the bare testimony of the philosopher who makes it, although he has utterly failed either to *prove*

that God's existence is timeless ; or, if that be imagined to be proved, to give us any conception whatever of its *nature* ; or, even if that be imagined to be accomplished, to show *how* the timeless state is superior to the temporal one. We desire to be fair. The metaphysical difficulties besetting the common conception of eternity are real. It has been, doubtless, on account of an honest desire to avoid those difficulties that resort has been had to the doctrine of a timeless existence. But we object to this solution that it leaves us no better off than we were before. If timelessness is described as an absolutely indivisible point of time, then the metaphysical difficulty of conceiving of it is as great as that of conceiving of an infinitely extended time. If, however, as we are doubtless desired to think, timelessness is not meant to be so understood, then it is a word which, while used as the name of a real attribute, yet in fact only describes the absence of one ; eternity is simply declared to be not time ; or, worse still, it is identified with some other attribute, as omnipotence, omnipresence, or self-existence ; and we must say that by this device the metaphysical difficulty is not solved ; it is only shirked. And in order to shirk the difficulty, we are asked to violate a fundamental conception of the mind. For it is one of the most imperative laws of thought to conceive of time as an essential condition of existence. It may indeed be said that in another state the laws of our mind may be so altered that we can have a positive conception of, and belief in, this timelessness ; just as John Stuart Mill says that, so far as we know, we may at some time come to believe that two and two are equal to five. Let this be granted. Yet even when it is granted, we are not past all difficulties (assuming that it is not difficult to make such a concession) ; for it is just as difficult to conceive of an endless existence in time as a characteristic of *man*—of the immortality of the soul, of eternity *a parte post*—as it is of a time without beginning as well as without end. Consistency would require that timelessness be predicated of all existence without distinction.

But, once more, it is objected to the common notion of eternity, that if God exists in time, then he must be subject to *change*. At least, it is said, he must be changeable in such a

sense that after doing an act he must look upon as fixed what he before looked forward to as unaccomplished; when a purpose is fulfilled, it can no longer be a purpose; hence God's purposes are not eternal, are changeable. We have already seen that changelessness implies time quite as much as changeableness does. But even aside from this, we ask how, even assuming the most absolute kind of timelessness, we can be sure that God does not change. That mode of existence being confessedly inconceivable and indescribable, how do we know that it excludes the possibility of change? If it is one that admits of the formation and execution of an infinite number of purposes, why not also of a change in the purposes? At least, why not of a change in the relation which a purpose has to God's own mind? Assuming God's absolute immutability as regards all his natural and moral excellences, what is the harm, we ask, of admitting that there is change in him, so far as his relation to a changeable universe is concerned? Where do we find justification for ascribing to God such a changelessness that he cannot call his own acts future or past, while yet we ourselves are obliged so to call them? How does it dishonor God to suppose that he knows things as they are? Or how is it more creditable to the honor of God to consider his purposes and conduct so confined, and blended, and momentary that they *cannot* be changed, than to consider them maintained through endless ages, and changeless, simply because he *will* not change them?

To conclude: That the theory under discussion has a strong *presumption* against it, can be denied by no one. The burden of proof clearly lies on the side of its advocates. The natural convictions of men are against it. The metaphysician proposes to establish a doctrine which runs directly counter to these convictions. Most certainly it may be demanded that the demonstration be conclusive. No one can be required to accept the doctrine merely because another has propounded it, even though that other be Plato, or Anselm, or Leibnitz. How then are these demands met? We have seen, in the first place, that the very attempts to *state* the doctrine are utter failures, being mere negations, self-contradictory, and contradictory of each other. We have seen, further, that the difficulties under

which the popular notion is supposed to labor, even so far as they are real, are not avoided, but rather increased by the metaphysical substitute. And when we look around for positive proofs of the proposition in question, we find not one—nothing but the boldest assertions, or mere negative arguments, designed to show the objectionableness of the common view.

It might, therefore, be enough to dismiss the theory as simply unsustained. But we feel impelled to go further, and express our conviction that it is not only destitute of proof, but that it is positively mischievous. It is a notion born in heathendom, in whose rude cosmogony time was made to play a part alongside of chaos, night, Erebus, earth, air, etc., as if on the same footing and of the same nature. Later, a more aspiring philosophy sought to distinguish above all these changing elements an absolute Deity; and this was done by denying to him participation in this cosmogonic process, and among other things by declaring him to be free from the developing and wasting effects of time. And it is these results of Greek speculation which Christian philosophers have attempted to Christianize. Never was a plant transferred to a more uncongenial soil. The dogma, in so far as it has any intelligible character, is essentially pantheistic. If this world, as it appears to us, is nothing but the baseless fabric of a vision; if human life is only part of the great undivided principle; if personality and individuality are mere illusions; if moral obligation and moral evil are only imaginary; if the Brahmanistic doctrine is to be accepted, that there really is nothing but God, and that God himself, in order to be absolute, must be impersonal, unconscious, without will and without any thought, unless it be the one thought that he is God—why, then there can be no objection to saying that he exists out of time. Indeed, after having emptied the notion of the Deity of everything that really belongs to it, it would be folly to waste words to prove that such a Deity exists in time, even though it might be proved. But this is not the God of Christianity. If there is anything essential to this religion, it is that God, the Creator of the world and of man, God the eternal and omnipotent, is a person, and holds a relation to men as persons; that he loves men and because of this love is executing a work of redemp-

tion : and that in the execution of this work all the powers of nature are subsidiary to his will. If now it is objected that this cannot be true, provided God is the Infinite and the Absolute One, the Christian can only say : "Then God is *not* infinite and absolute. I believe that he is unlimited in power, independent in his existence, perfect in holiness. But if his infinity implies his impersonality, or his inability to hold a personal relation to me, then *that* infinity I discard. I am more certain of his fatherhood than I am of his metaphysical absoluteness. If he is not what I have held him to be, then I am wofully deceived ; I am of all men most miserable." This is the language of the Christian heart ; and if it is not correct, then Christianity is a lie. But how does this confession of faith harmonize with the doctrine that God does not exist in time ? It is true that Christian theologians have not been able to deny that God, in spite of his extra-temporal form of existence, does hold some sort of *relation* to temporal events. But how can this be affirmed without self-contradiction ? The Christian must not only hold that the universe in some way owes its origin to God, but also that it is *constantly sustained* by God. How can this be unless God *acts* in time ? The Christian not only believes that God's omniscience extends in an eternal manner to all events present, past, and future, but that he *each day* hears anew the morning and the evening prayer. How can this be unless God *perceives* in time ? The Christian believes not only that God, by an incomprehensible eternal decree, willed to redeem man, but that he *continually* wills the same. How can this be unless God *wills* in time ? The reasoning is exceedingly simple : Did God hear me yesterday ? Yes. Then he existed yesterday. Does God hear me to-day ? Yes. Then he exists to-day. And if he existed yesterday and exists to-day, then he exists in *time*. Else we must say : God *acts* in time, but does not *exist* in time. He created man a certain number of years ago, but he did not exist at that time ; he will in the future renovate the world, but he will not then be existent. Did ever subtlety perform a more daring feat ? Who, henceforth, if he allows this to pass for sound metaphysics, can say that the essence of the sacramental bread and wine may not be changed without involving

a change of the qualities? And even if we allow such Huidibrastic distinctions to pass unchallenged, what have we gained? Simply the melancholy satisfaction of knowing that, in having rescued God from the shackles of time, we have removed him entirely away from the universe. His omnipresence is obliterated by his eternity. For if God is *now* nowhere present, and at any other time nowhere present, then he is *never* anywhere present. Truly, if this metaphysical eternity were practically believed in, every one would be impelled to cry out with Job, "Behold I go forward, but he is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive him; on the left hand where he doth work, but I cannot behold him; he hideth himself on the right hand that I cannot see him."

This heathen, pantheistic conception of God, which so carefully excludes him from all share in the affairs of his own universe, is, moreover, exposed to one of the great objections which it makes against the common view of the Divine existence: it *limits* God, and limits him much more effectually than the most anthropomorphic view that was ever held. For it makes him unable to *feel*; it makes him unable to know events as they are known to us; it keeps him from all active, personal participation in the affairs of the world. Carried out consistently, it makes him an impersonal, unintelligent being, a mere machine—nay worse, a mere dead, characterless, unknown something. And all this, forsooth, lest the notion may somewhere creep in that God can change. All this for the sake of satisfying a supposed metaphysical necessity. And what a necessity! One that leads men to involve themselves in an inextricable maze of contradictions; to abuse language to the extent of trying to pull up the landmarks which usage has established for the meaning of words; to struggle to overcome the most fundamental laws of thought; in short, to give themselves up to the wildest caprice and the utterance of the most inexcusable absurdities. We would not make all the advocates of the notion of a timeless existence directly responsible for the extravagances of the few; but indirectly they are so. Had not Hegel's predecessors gone a considerable distance in the misuse of terms, he could never have had the face to go to the uttermost extreme. Had they not risen above the realm of common

sense in speculating on time and eternity, he would never have attained the dizzy height of nonsense from which he informs his admiring followers that time "is negativity in its relation to itself," and further, that it is "the existence [Sein] which, in that it is, is not, and in that it is not, is."* Had not the old heathen and early Christian idea of time as being a kind of substance continued to modify the speculations of later Christian philosophers, we should not in modern times meet such senseless utterances as that of Delitzsch, where he says, "Temporal history is a globe, originating in eternity, moving towards eternity, permeated by eternity, floating therefore entirely in eternity."† If metaphysicians are not to become the laughing-stock of the world, they must bear in mind the fact that, however many things there may be in heaven and earth that were not dreamt of in the old philosophy, and however desirable it may be to attain them, yet they cannot be reached by merely playing with words; and that even if some one were gifted with an insight keen enough to detect the mysteries that have been hid from ages and from generations, he would yet be as unable to reveal them as Paul was to utter the unspeakable things of the third heavens—and that for the simple reason that the medium of communication must be language, but that language can serve as such a medium only in so far as it is understood, and that it can be understood only when words are used in the sense which usage has given to them. The principle must be respected, that the laws of thought are in all sane men the same, and that therefore, if an idea is clearly grasped by one mind, it can be clearly presented to others. The day is gone by when pretensions to esoteric wisdom can pass current. When therefore any one claims that he has a better notion of what eternity is than that which the world in general holds, we have a right to expect that that notion will be intelligibly set forth. And if in the exposition he contradicts himself; if he implicitly affirms what he explicitly denies; if he utterly fails to advance a luminous statement, and in the defense of an obscure or unintelligible one uses bare assertions instead of proofs—why, then, no amount of learning or reputation can

* *Encyclopædie*, § 257.

† *Biblische Psychologie*, p. 34.

shield him from the charge, even from laymen in philosophy, of "darkening counsel by words without knowledge."

Our conclusion is not that speculation is useless, but that its abuse is useless. What we condemn in it is the vaulting ambition which o'erleaps itself, which in its unwillingness to confess the limitations of the mind, christens the unknown and then calls it known because it has a familiar name. Nor do we conclude that speculative and practical theology are destructive of one another. On the contrary, if our strictures on the particular tenet which we have considered are founded in truth, we may find therein fruitful indications that a metaphysical system which does not seek to know more than can be read from the book of consciousness and of revelation will not need to stumble at the supposed irreconcilability of common religious notions with the conclusions of a profound philosophy. It is only a false alarm which warns us that our ideas of God and of our relations to him, in so far as they acquire real and practical significance, must become erroneous. The doctrines of the Divine personality and immutability, and of the incarnation and atonement, have been burdened with imaginary metaphysical difficulties. The faith of many in the efficacy of prayer and in the reality of personal fellowship with God, has been needlessly unnerved. If Christianity and Christian experience are facts, then they cannot be rejected by any truthful scheme of philosophy. And it would be well if, in systems of Christian theology, a fundamental place were more frequently given to acknowledged Christian truths rather than to the metaphysical, and often questionable, dogmas of so-called natural theology.

ARTICLE III. — THE LAST WORK ON THE GUDRUN-DICHTUNG.

Die Entwicklung der Gudrundichtung untersucht von W. WILMANN, Lehrer am Grauen Kloster in Berlin. Halle, 1873.

THE interest and pride which German scholars have manifested during the last century in the study of the middle German poetry, especially since Lachmann, on the occasion of his "habilitation" at the Berlin University now nearly sixty years ago, chose for the subject of his thesis the *Nibelungenlied* and applied to the discussion of that poem the same methods that Wolf had applied to Homer, has led to the publication of a large body of text-books and criticisms of that sensuous and realistic literature. Of this literature the most interesting division is the fresh folk-poems, founded on old legends in which one gets a glimpse of the earnest, true, beauty-loving, and hero-worshipping old Germans. In this body of national folk-poetry, the *Nibelungenlied* and the *Gudrun* are the noblest monuments, the Iliad and the Odyssey of the middle German classics—the one full of battle and storm, with a bad woman at the bottom of all the tragedy, in which the godlike Achilles, vulnerable but in one point, is slain; and the other telling in part of the sea and its dangers and celebrating the fidelity of a second Penelope amid trials and temptations not less severe than assailed the great prototype. There is more unity in the *Nibelungenlied*, but a no less genuine poetry in the *Gudrun*. If its heroes are less valiant and godlike than Siegfried, its heroine brings into prominent view those characteristics of woman's nature which have since the revival in art inspired the pencil of painters, and which no modern poem celebrates more fitly than this German classic. The intricate confusion of this poem, of which but one manuscript exists, and the consequent difficulty with which it comes into unity for the mind, are to be regarded as evidences of the strong hold which it had on the affections of the people, and of the temptation, which it presented, as a

common store-house of beauty and incident, to those who improved and recited the old poetry. It would have, therefore, always attracted rather than repelled scholars, if its confusion had not been so absolutely hopeless. Yet even as it is, it has had many diligent students, and some of the acutest scholars have directed efforts to its elucidation. It was a favorite of the Grimms, and Müllenhoff, the most learned of the lovers of old German, applied to it the same criticism that his master Lachmann had applied to the *Nibelungenleid*. Within a year or two Herr Wilmanns, the editor of an excellent edition of *Walther von der Vogelweide*, has obtained new results, and if the poem is obscured and overgrown in many parts by the rubbish of mediæval interpolators and poetasters, Herr Wilmanns deserves at least the credit of having suggested for many of the verses of this poem a new order and a possible harmony with their surroundings, and of having been the first to introduce a method, by which isolated beauties may become united to form organized parts of a still imperfectly organic whole.

A fair idea of Wilmanns' proceeding will be better secured by glancing at the work and especially at the results of his important predecessors in the same field. And here we take Wilmanns as authority.

Ettmüller, in a volume issued in 1841, attempted and believed that he had succeeded in distinguishing the portions of the poem which belonged to the old genuine folk-poem from the work of the frequent enlarging and improving (?) poets. Not satisfied with assuming credit for a work so praiseworthy and difficult, he discovered that these later improvers were four in number, and assigned in his notes to some one of these every verse in the poem not imputed by him to the original author.

Müllenhoff, who that year was listening to Wilhelm Grimm's lectures on this poem, did not find Ettmüller's principles of division and title to discovery so obviously irrefutable as Ettmüller himself did, but judging that one who claimed such penetration might lack scientific exactness, proceeded to investigate the poem himself, and denied subsequently to Ettmüller any knowledge of what an epic national poem is, and advanced opinions of his own in regard to the poem that have since had weight, with the Lachmann school, at least. He rejected

the possibility of distinguishing from one another all the different interpolations, and though holding that the original genuine part of the *Gudrun* is the work of one poet, and finding traces of at least three interpolations, he did not believe that the poet began with the plan of working up the entire legend and writing one part straightway after another, for no folk-poem, he would say, arises in that way; but a poet rather composed one part, and then subsequently another part, and the dictating of the poem to be written down was undoubtedly much later; and thus the poem as a whole is, in his judgment, a collection of single poems.

In later times there has been less adherence to Müllenhoff's view than formerly. Bartsch, who has made studies in nearly every corner of the field of early German, as well as early French, has published, in the preface to his edition of the *Gudrun*, an earnest if not convincing defence of the one author theory, and claims to find in that confusion, which most scholars have recognized, a consistent treatment, and is eloquent over the clearness and beauty of the combined impression of the whole. Wilmanns' aim was, as he tells us, not to analyze and dismember, as Müllenhoff and Ettmüller had done, nor, starting from a predetermination to find no need of analysis and discrimination, to exclaim over a oneness and symmetry purely subjective, as was the method of Bartsch, but to comprehend that given in its totality. For this work his judicial-mindedness and understanding of poetry qualified him; and he claims to have arrived at four principles.

First. In many passages the verses are not arranged as the poet intended. There was one "worker" (bearbeiter) of the *Gudrun* legend who composed numerous additions, but did not sufficiently indicate where they belong, and did not even revise the copy of the enlarged work.

Second. There must have been at least two versions of the *Gudrun* in the genuine *Gudrun* verse. Many difficulties of the poem can be removed only by the assumption of a union of these two versions.

Third. The contents of the original poetry rest upon a union (contamination*) of three legends; those of Hilda, Herwig, and

* The German word for the blending of two or more versions.

Gudrun. If the poet himself planned the union, he must necessarily have projected and intended to complete the entire poem.

Fourth. A restoration of the original poem is not to be thought of. What has been published hitherto as genuine poems shows itself in many passages to be a combination of elements of different origin.

Before proceeding to examine somewhat the discussions of Herr Wilmanns, it should be stated that most previous students of this poem have agreed in holding that the first form of the poem as a whole comprehended but a small part of the poem, which we have, and that some of the present stanzas can with considerable certainty be assigned to the early and original nucleus. The chief tests for distinguishing the newer verses are, as far as form goes, two.

First, the rhymes in the *cæsura* are, on evidence satisfactory to most scholars, believed to mark interpolated verses; verses that are newer than a good deal of the poem.

Second, the occurrence now and then of an exact *Niebelungen* verse, from which form the Gudrun verse so definitely and peculiarly differs, that it is not probable that the transformation of a genuine Gudrun stanza into a *Niebelungen* stanza would occur to any improver. The older and more familiar *Niebelungen* stanza would be more likely to slip from the pen of the interpolator.

Partly for the sake of giving an impression of the metre, and partly that the want of connection between successive stanzas and that Herr Wilmanns' treatment in some parts of the poem may be noted, a translation of some stanzas is given. Here are four stanzas in the half-lines of the Gudrun metre, from the third or Gudrun part of the poem, the twentieth adventure, representing the efforts made by Hartmuth and his friends, during Gudrun's captivity among them, to secure for Hartmuth Gudrun's love.

987. Then also from that country went King Hartmuth;
 He guided to a fortress, Gudrun the good;
 There must she longer tarry, than could give her pleasure;
 Truly was she homeless, the prey of need and sorrow without measure.

988. When thus the noble maiden, in the fortress sat
 Where one still hoped to crown her, the king did order that
 They all without exception, should gladly wait upon her,
 So would she forget no one, but each reward with highest wealth and
 honor.
989. Then spake Gerlind the old one: I wonder when the maid
 Around my Hartmuth's body, her tender arms will braid,
 The young and princely scion, so worthy her caressing;
 His love with perfect reason, she may regard as heaven's choicest blessing.
990. That overheard fair Gudrun; the homeless maid did say,
 For you, oh lady Gerlind! that were an evil day,
 Were you compelled t'embrace him whose sword had slain your nearest;
 I wonder if to serve him, could ever seem to you of all things dearest.

A few following verses are rendered in prose.

991. Make no more objections said the queen,
 Happily shall it be ended: therefore take him at once—
 I swear by my head, that I will ever reward thee for it,
 And if thou wouldest be called queen, I will willingly give thee my crown.
992. She spake in impatience: That I will not wear.
 Thou durst not say to me of his great possessions
 That I should love the hero for his wealth.
 I hope not to remain here. I long every day to get away from here.
993. The young lord in the land, the king Hartmuth,
 Thought the speech a shame: it did not please him at all well.
 He said, if I am not to win the fair maiden
 The fair one shall expect no favors from me.
994. Then the ugly Gerlind spake to Hartmuth,
 The wise one knows how to train a misbehaved child.
 If you will let me train her, Sir Hartmuth!
 I hope still to effect it that she check her arrogance.
995. I will of course allow you, said Hartmuth then,
 If I myself cannot do it, that you undertake
 To train the maiden well for the honor of you both.
 She is a stranger here in the land, therefore shall you Lady instruct her
 kindly.
996. Gudrun the beautiful, before he went away,
 The young king left to the training of his mother.
 The young queen took it very sorely to heart.
 The instruction of Gerlind, however given, she did not let please her at
 all—

This last stanza Herr Wilmanns regards, we believe, rightly,
 as belonging after the first one rendered. His words on the

passage are as follows: "Stanza 987 relates that Hartmuth has left the country and conveyed Gudrun to a fortress, where she was obliged to languish longer than was agreeable to her. In the following stanza, which has rhymes in the cæsuras, and seems by the expression 'sat in the fortress,' to be connected with the preceding stanza, he recommends Gudrun to the affection of the rest, and promises through her a reward to those who would be kind to the beloved. In the following strophe, also with rhymes in the cæsura, Gerlind inquires when Hartmuth is to be united to Gudrun. Gudrun rejects such a suggestion with derision; hard words are used; Hartmuth declares in his impatience that he will trouble himself no more about the maiden, derives, however, new confidence from the words of his mother, and leaves the maiden to her training. The whole passage is exceedingly strange. How shall Gerlind just now, when Hartmuth is on the point of leaving the country, come to bring the wedding to discussion. Of the eight stanzas [beginning with 987] only two, 989 and 993, have no cæsural rhymes, and one of these, as has already been shown [in an earlier discussion], has another belonging. 987 to 994, inclusive, are interpolated; originally 995 followed 986. This (995) defines explicitly what in that was given in a general way. Gudrun suffered anguish and need, because Hartmuth, before going away, entrusted her to his mother." The above gives an idea of Herr Wilmanns' method. By a careful study and comparison of that part of the poem which refers to the efforts made by Hartmuth and his family to secure the love of Gudrun for Hartmuth, after she had been abducted and carried to Normandy, Herr Wilmanns has proved, that either two departures of Hartmuth for war during Gudrun's captivity, and two committals (one for three and a half years, and one for seven) of Gudrun to his mother, the bad Gerlind, must be admitted, or that these two absences are the differing statements of two "bearbeiter" respecting one single event. The latter is more probable, as no definite mention is made of a second campaign, as second, and Herr Wilmanns has made out two distinct and complete narratives, differing as to the duration of the absence, but in the main features corresponding with each other. In these two accounts the order of the stanzas as arranged by Herr

Wilmanns might be regarded as in some degree arbitrarily determined; but no one can deny that it is at least logical. Possibly it rests too much in his mind on the logic, which suggests the question whether in an age of such simplicity regarding literary work as must have been the time when the amplifications of this charming legend were composed, there could be any logical or rhetorical order not determined by the natural feelings of the actors. Herr Wilmanns seems to answer this question affirmatively, and to suppose that the poet would, for instance, arrange the reasons for Gudrun's rejection of Hartmuth's suit in an ascending gradation. One may accept the order of reasons which he assigns, and the poem for the most part indicates, without accepting his grounds for them. The reasons as arranged by him are, first, the ill-treatment which she was receiving from Hartmuth and his friends; second, the murder of her father and other relatives in battle when she was abducted; third, the fidelity of her heart to her old lover, Herwig. Herr Wilmanns finds here a climax. Rather, one would say, she gives the nearest reason for refusal first, and each succeeding reason grows more remote in time and space. First, her present suffering, then the murder of her father on the Wülpensand at the time of her abduction, then her faithful attachment to him whom before that murder she loved. She cannot give this last reason first, not because it is the weightiest (that is true enough), but because to give it first would only aggravate the resentment which her refusal must awaken; whereas, after the other two reasons, which are enough to make the union impossible, this, to her the deepest ground of refusal, can be assigned and made less, not more, prominent, as Herr Wilmanns implies. What would Gudrun care for Herr Wilmanns' climax in this condition of affairs? All her answer must be shaped to consist, if possible, with her own exemption from additional suffering. To return from this digression, the following is a prose translation of one account of Hartmuth's departure for the war, which Herr Wilmanns has educed from the poem.

Stanza 986. Then departed from the country Sir Hartmuth. He conducted to a fortress Gudrun the good. There was she compelled to remain longer than was the virgin's will. She suffered there great sorrow and hardship.

995. The beautiful Gudrun, before that he went away, the young king left to the training of his mother. The young princesses it distressed very bitterly. Gerlind's teaching, whatever she might do, she would not let be acceptable to herself.

996. Then spoke the she-devil to the beautiful maid, if thou wilt not have joy, thou must have sorrow. Look now on all sides, who may avert it from thee. Thou must heat my room and must thyself stir up the fire.

999. Then spake the noble maiden, I have ability to do that. Whatever you command me, I will do it all, until God from heaven remove my sorrow from me. Yet has the daughter of my mother seldom stirred the fire.

1005. Then were separated from one another the beautiful maidens, so that they must be for a long time unfamiliar to each other. They, who with great honors were princesses, they were compelled to wind yarn. They sat afterwards in unseemly hardships.

1011. Toil, which many despise, (that is very true,) this the ladies followed four years and a half, until Sir Hartmuth out of three campaigns had come home to his country. Still then did these the orphans perform all service.

1024. When he now had taken up his abode, he ordered her to be brought before him. Gerlind the bad had allowed her to wear no good clothes. Whatever the hero might do, the maiden made very little of it. For she was very steadfast in her virtuous honor.

These stanzas, in the order given, make a complete narrative of the departure and return of Hartmuth, and of the privations and toil of Gudrun in the interval. The order 986, 995, 996, 997, 1005, 1011, 1024, (taking the stanzas as the manuscript gives them,) is one that renders perfect connections, but leaves us in doubt how the "bearbeiter" and copyists could become so hopelessly confused. It must, however, be conceded that 995 follows 986 with much more harmony than 986 followed by 987 can, on any interpretation, be made to exhibit. It is also not to be forgotten, that by general agreement, 987 and 988, being stanzas with rhyming cæsuras, are interpolations, so that there is a justification of looking for a closer connection than 986 has with them. A second narrative of these same events, viz: Hartmuth's departure and return, and the occupation of Gudrun in the meantime, and the incidents immediately following his return, is given by Herr Wilmanns in twenty-nine stanzas in the following order: 1000-1003 inclusive, 993, 1019-1023 inclusive, 1013-1017 inclusive, 1025, 1027, 1028, 1032-34 inclusive, 1029-1031 inclusive, 1043, 1048, 1037, 1040, 1036. The arrangement here indicated gives also a flowing narrative.

Some of the stanzas, as for instance 1025, do not have that perfect adaptation, either in the manuscript or in Herr Wilmanns' arrangement, that might be desired. In the case, however, of 1025 there is no reason for doubting its genuineness. In some cases an external occasion for the copyist's sequence is discovered by Herr Wilmanns, as in the resemblance of the final rhymes in 1028 and 1034. After 1028 the copyist may have thought that his last word was the *sêre* ending 1034 instead of 1028 and so wrote 1029 next to 1028, though it clearly belongs after 1034, if we may suppose 1033 and 1034 to be early, and not late, interpolations. The copyist wrote on from 1028, omitting the three now numbered 1032, 1033, 1034, and after transcribing 1031, becoming aware of his error, inserted these three, which will account for their manuscript order.

These two complete narratives in the twentieth adventure of the departure of Hartmuth for war, and his consignment of Gudrun to his mother for training, perhaps first suggested to Herr Wilmanns the theory of at least two early versions of the incidents that compose the Gudrun legend and of the "contamination"* of these two in the poem, as we have it. Certainly a "contamination" of two accounts would seem far more likely than an interpolation, if the latter must diverge from the original recital. In other words, an interpolation would not fly in the face of the facts and order in the poem, and if a second absence of seven years (either as an interpolation or as a part of the original poem) followed one of three years and a half, it would have been mentioned as a second absence. Besides (a point which Herr Wilmanns seems to have overlooked), the combining of these two absences would result in a total absence of ten and one-half years, which period, with an interval of much length, might surpass in duration the stated period of Gudrun's exile. Attention is called to another point which Wilmanns does not notice, viz: that the second interval given, seven years, is just twice as long as the first, and one may well conjecture that the second interval may have been made from two separate accounts of the first, which would involve, at least, three versions, and for three versions Herr Wilmanns finds in other

* The German word "contamination" is in this account of Herr Wilmanns' book left untranslated, as no English word seems better adapted to express the meaning.

parts of the poem good evidence. There is, then, in these two distinct accounts good reason for accepting Herr Wilmanns' mans' theory of a "contamination" of, at least, two *dichtungen*.

But it is not alone in the twentieth adventure, nor chiefly there, that evidences of such a "contamination" are found. Herr Wilmanns shows that the twenty-fifth, which is entitled "How Ortrun and Herwig came to them," that is, to the abducted maidens Gudrun and Hildburg, while washing on the seashore, points, perhaps, still more plainly to such a contamination. In the opening of the adventure Gudrun and Hildburg see the two messengers coming who are to announce that an army is near to rescue them. Gudrun, in her joy, stops washing. Hildburg goes on with her work. Towards night they return, Hildburg with her clean linen, but Gudrun empty-handed. Naturally Gerlind should observe at once that Gudrun has no clothes and inquire of her first about that. But six stanzas, 1274-1279, follow, which describe Gerlind as scolding them for coming home late, and for talking with strange men, and as at last irritated by Gudrun's replies, and threatening punishment. Then comes a stanza, 1280, in which Gerlind asks for the clothes which they were sent out to wash, and accuses Gudrun of idleness. 1274-1279 inclusive follow one another in perfect order. On the other hand, 1280 clearly belongs immediately after 1273. It is the natural order, and such an interruption of the narrative as are 1274-79 would never occur to any interpolator. Besides, these stanzas have no fitting connections in the narrative, either at the beginning or the end. 1279 goes, in its embrace, beyond 1281. 1274 goes back of 1273. It is not a part of the same version, to which 1273 and 1280, the immediately preceding and immediately following verses, belong. 1274-79 cannot be an interpolation, for it is an entirely different presentation of the encounter of the old woman, Gerlind, with her two victims. One presentation, called by Herr Wilmanns *b*, contains no intimation that Gerlind has seen the maidens conversing with Herwig and Ortrun; she observes that Gudrun has no clothes and is angry, and in this presentation some time elapses between the arrival of the messengers and the return of the maidens. In the other (*a*), the old woman has seen them conversing with the strange men and

blames them for that and a tardy return. In this version, the arrival of the messengers was towards evening. In 1224 the "wir müssen scheiden lassen" is taken by Herr Wilmanns to refer to the end of the day, and the fear of the maidens that punishment will follow a late return, so that, in his judgment, 1224, 1273, and 1280 are written from the same stand-point. Gudrun escapes from the threatened punishment by promising at last to favor Hartmuth's suit and to accept him, whereupon there is joy in the castle, and she and her fellow-prisoners are treated, for the first time, with consideration.

It is almost impossible, without considerable knowledge of the poem, for one to understand how much light some of these elucidations throw upon parts of the poem, especially in this twenty-fifth adventure, and how distinctly, under Herr Wilmanns' analysis, the two versions are here and there revealed, and also how clearly the work of the "bearbeiter" is at many points distinguished from the old versions.

At the risk of not being perfectly intelligible to all readers, two or three additional pages of Herr Wilmanns' discussion of the twenty-fifth adventure are here given. After Gudrun has announced her willingness to accept Hartmuth, because the messengers have told her that Herwig's army shall to-morrow rescue her, she prepares for the feast that is now appointed for her. "When Gudrun and her fellow-prisoners have bathed and adorned themselves for the feast, Gerlind and Ortrun come to them to pass the evening in cheerful talk over food and wine. The conversation between Ortrun and Gudrun closes with stanza 1311. In stanza 1315 Gerlind calls on them to part. Between 1311 and 1315 stand now three stanzas, in which Gudrun turns to Hartmuth; he must summon his relatives to court; if his land should then have peace, she will show herself openly by him as queen. The true sense of her words must remain concealed from Hartmuth. He regards her promise as an unreserved declaration, while she makes it dependent on a condition, which she knows can not exist. A third stanza, which gives as a reason for the two preceding that Gudrun wished to weaken the power of Hartmuth by the sending of messengers, hardly belongs to the same composer, but to an improver, who does not refine with the very best taste. All these stanzas take

a remarkable position. That they do not stand in connection, either with the preceding or the following, no one will deny. But the want of a connection is not the only want. For the demand which Gudrun expresses in 1312, the proper place would be where Hartmuth comes first to greet her as his bride. In the conversation between her and Ortrun nothing leads to this demand; indeed, one is not even justified in holding that he (Hartmuth) is present. Still more disturbing is the connection between 1315 and 1316. Gerlind turns to her daughter (Ortrun),

‘dear daughter mine
Now must ye part, but when it is morning
Ye can be with one another again with fitness.’

Then she bowed to Gudrun and asked God to be her protector. Away went then, who should one expect? Ortrun evidently, or Gerlind. No! Away from there went then Hartmuth, says the version. Of Ortrun, to whom stanza 1315 is directed, nothing further is to be seen, and Hartmuth, whom Gudrun did not address, whom she does not appear to have noticed, goes away. “And now,” it is further said, “they appointed a cup-bearer for her and many a seneschal; there was very little need to ask; they ordered feasts for the noble, rich maidens. With drinks and food they cared diligently for the wretched ones”—and yet already in 1305 the maidens have feasted and bravely drunk. The passage does not get explanation from the custom of the after-drink. For, first, it would be here only a continuation of the banquet, whereas the expression, they appointed for her a cup-bearer, points to the beginning, and then not only is there account of drinking, but also of eating.

In the same way as 1312, 1313 point by their contents to an earlier time in the evening, so does 1316. Accordingly, the progress of the narrative is unsatisfactory between 1311 and 1312, between 1313 and 1315, between 1315 and 1316. Stanzas 1312, 1313, 1316 presuppose other relations than 1311 and 1315. How is that explained? Again only by the assumption of a “contamination,” but by that simply and completely. To one version belonged 1311 and 1315; to the other, 1312, 1313, 1316. When Gudrun and Ortrun have finished their conversa-

tion, Gerlind advises them to part. When Hartmuth has been requested to summon his relatives to the wedding, he goes away and sends Gudrun the retinue becoming her rank. To stanza 1316 join then faultlessly 1317, 1318, 1319, 1321, 1322. Supposing now that it has been previously correctly conjectured, from the tone of the representation, that stanza 1320, together with the conclusion of the adventure, are taken from the version *b*, 1312, 1313, 1316, and the following must have belonged to version *a*. To this view the plan of these stanzas corresponds. As Gudrun in stanza 1313 conceals the truth and yet intimates it, just so she proceeds in 1277, where Gerlind calls her to account, because of the talk with the strange men. The character of Gudrun is not conceived alike in both versions. In *a*, clever calculation appears; in *b*, greater depth of nature and a more passionate sensibility. Corresponding to this, the delineation is more elevated, richer in color, more exciting to the imagination and feelings. As she throws away the linen, comes before her tormentor with her hands in her bosom, as she sits in the room with locked door, surrounded by her maidens, and the ugly Gerlind anxiously lurks outside, all these are excellent pictures, for which the version *a* offers no compensation."

From what has been given of the discussions upon the twentieth and twenty-fifth adventures, it will be seen that Herr Wilmanns' argument for the "contamination" of two versions is cumulative, and it will hardly be open to doubt that, however easily the indications from one part of an adventure pointing to a "contamination" might be explained away, when so many passages in different adventures are found, whose inconsistencies, interruptions, and discords vanish on a fair and careful application of this possibility, the possibility rises to a probability.

Herr Wilmanns' acuteness in detecting the interpolations comes out quite happily in the discussion of the part of the poem relating to the abduction of Hilda, Gudrun's mother; for she also was carried off from her home, but, unlike her daughter, was happily, and at last with her father's approbation, married to the abductor. A fair specimen of it may be found in his remarks on stanza 389, which has been much admired. This

stanza gives the impression made by Horant's singing. Horant's singing plays an important part in the abduction of Hilda. The stanza is as follows:

"The beasts in the forest let their food stand untasted. The worms, which there naturally crept in the grass; the fishes, which there naturally swam in the moving water, stopped their course. Yes, he could well use his skill."

Herr Wilmanns remarks: "On this stanza many learned annotations have been made; for instance, as to whether the *würme* of the second verse were caterpillars or other reptiles, but the point close at hand and important has not been made conspicuous, although it can hardly have escaped the notice of the editors, viz: that in this enumeration of different classes of animals, just the birds are omitted whose mention would be first expected. The old poet had not forgotten them; stanza 389 attaches itself to 372, which concludes, 'from this (Horant's singing) the joyful notes of the birds became silent;' then should come, 'the animals in the forest left their food untasted,' and so on; that is the good old connection. All that is related between 372 and 389 not merely does not help the story, but injures it most perceptibly." The order of genuine old verses is claimed to be in the sixth adventure, 372, 389, 391, 395, 396, 401, 402, 403, 404, 407, 409, 430, 431.

Also in this part of the poem Herr Wilmanns believes in the "contamination," and these last stanzas, and also the interesting episode of Wate's fight with Hagen (the father of Hilda and grandfather of Gudrun) are assigned by him to the *dichtung b*, in which the messengers of Hetel sent to bring away Hilda appear not as merchants (which conception belongs to *a*), but as princes, Wate and Horant. Wate, the great warrior of the poem, appears in neither version as merchant. Fruote is the merchant. By a careful analysis, Herr Wilmanns satisfies himself, at least, that *a* is the older version, and that *b* had already been interpolated when united to *a*.

This disentangling, to one who has so fine an appreciation of harmony as has Herr Wilmanns, becomes fascinating as the work goes on, and it will not surprise us to find that another version (*c*) is discovered by our author, and its existence maintained with great warmth. In the twenty-eighth adventure, Gudrun, influenced by appeals from Ortrun, appears on

a tower, and shouting to Herwig, requests him to put an end to the conflict and save Hartmuth from Wate. In spite of the fact that on the previous day Herwig had seen Gudrun on the shore and mutual recognition had taken place, her question implies that she does not know Herwig, and his reply is the plump question, "Now tell me, noble virgin, what is your name?" Any one will see that Herr Wilmanns is right in regarding the character of this interview as entirely inconsistent with a knowledge of the interview of the previous day. It is also to be noted that the appearance of Gudrun on a tower, shouting to Herwig and inducing him to make an effort to terminate the contest, and save the life of him who had robbed his bride and kept her thirteen or fourteen years in miserable exile, is after the manner of the court poetry, that sacrifices much to a woman's whim, and not very probable as an outgrowth of the people's or national poetry. Another touch of this same poetry is where Herwig, in conflict with Ludwig (Hartmuth's father), at first yields, and then observing that Gudrun, his betrothed, sees him, is shamed into a renewal of the contest. The inconsistency between the two interviews, the one on the shore, and the other in the fight, and this court-poetry flavor, apparently gave Herr Wilmanns his first clue to another "dichtung," *c*. It seems clear that there are two versions in the twenty-eighth adventure, and also certain that one of these versions is different from either of the two established versions in the twenty-fifth. The supposition of a third version, *c*, also accounts for some inconsistencies, like the superfluous prophecy of the bird in the twenty-fourth adventure; so for the participation of Ortrun in the fight on the Wülpensand, on the ground that *c* is a more rapid, more compressed narrative. In the view of *c*, the recovery of Gudrun followed more immediately the abduction, and Ortrun, who, in *a* and *b* was a mere child at the time of the fight on the Wülpensand, and had at least thirteen years in which to grow before the expedition of recovery was undertaken, was necessarily old enough to join in the Wülpensand fight, if old enough soon after to join the expedition. According to Wilmanns, *a* represents in scanty fragments the oldest version of the Gudrun-sage, in which all is firm and original, the characters sharply defined, and a fitting role assigned to each. In *b*, on the con-

trary, while much is excellent, as the delineation of Gudrun's movements on learning that rescue is near, and Horant's secret singing to Hilda, and other points, much is insipid and feebly connected. *B* is, in the judgment of Herr Wilmanns, the youngest of the three versions, and *c* the first exposition of the three myths united. That *b* should be younger than *c* is based by our author on the greater deviation of the myths from their assumed early form, and of the wider compass of the parts uniting themselves under *b*.

By no means the least interesting, though not the most satisfactory part of these discussions, is that relating to a supposed "contamination" of two "sagen" or legends. One admits that there are strange features in Herwig's movements in the drama, as we have it. In the first place, he wins the bride by brilliant fighting. When he is robbed of her, he pursues her captors, but does not engage in hand-to-hand conflict with the chief robber, and advises to stop the fight at the close of the first day. In the night Hartmuth and the Normans escape, carrying off Gudrun, and Herwig remains quite passive, and he and his friends desist from further pursuit. After many years, Hilda originates an expedition for rescuing Gudrun, and invites Herwig to join it, which invitation he accepts, and going to Normandy rescues his arch enemy, Hartmuth, from death at the hands of his great warrior, Wata. His part in the movements seems very subordinate for an old legend, when one remembers that he is the chief person wronged. Herr Wilmanns accounts for these strange features by the "contamination" of two "sagen" or legends, which he calls the Herwigsaga and the Gudrunsaga, and which he evolves from a comparison of the main features of our story with those of a ballad, still known, a hundred years ago in the Shetland islands. These are his features of the Gudrunsaga: The king of Hegelingen loses his daughter. He pursues the robber, and, with the greater portion of his people, perishes in a battle fought to regain her. His wife waits with longing for a new race to grow up, in order to rescue the daughter and avenge the father's death. The expedition is successful.

The Herwigsaga is stated somewhat as follows: A sea-king sues for the daughter of a mighty king. He wins her hand.

Before the marriage she is carried off. He pursues the ravisher and kills him in battle. Without doubt these features in both *sagen* being assumed as proven, and a "contamination" of the two legends admitted, we have a very good rationale of the present abnormal features of our story. But the "contamination" theory has by this time got very strong hold of Herr Wilmanns, and although one may not deny that these conjectures and subsequent ones are plausible and even brilliant, one needs to remember that they rest simply on what may be called subjective evidence. For instance, where the ballad from the Shetland islands is compared with our *Herwigsaga*, and a similarity established up to a certain point; but then the widest divergence appears (in the one story the bride waiting thirteen years for deliverance, or, assuming *c* for authority, but a few months, and then being rescued by her fiancé from her abductor and carried home to happy marriage; while in the other she has become reconciled to her abductor, who is slain by her father and her fiancé, and, going home to be married, administers to the guests at the wedding-feast wine tinctured with narcotics, and carrying her father out of the house sets fire to it and burns her lover begging for mercy); it seems rather bold for Herr Wilmanns to claim that the unlikeness of the final *dénouement* proves the identity of the legends. He means, that all depends on the motive, and that in the *Herwigsaga* the original reason for the postponement of the marriage in both cases was in the reluctance of the bride to accept the suitor at first, in her contempt of him as an inferior, which mental attitude may be said to come to the surface in one stanza of our poem. But it certainly is not the difference of development, but the underlying *resemblance*, if it exists, that must prove identity.

In Herr Wilmanns' view, to explain the markedly inconsistent relations of the characters in the *Gudrun* poem requires a "contamination" with the *Hildensaga*, and on the other hand the *Gudrunsaga* has produced a strong impression in our poem on the relations in the *Hildensaga*. For instance, he claims that Fruote is taken out of the *Hildensaga* (where he is an important envoy of Hetel, in the assumed character of a merchant) and carried over into the *Gudrunsaga*, where he

becomes a mere lay figure. Inconsistencies are thus explained, sometimes with surprising aptness, but one cannot forget that the proof is mostly the aptness. It is less safe to attempt to reconstruct an old myth from two or three stories with like characters and to throw aside certain features as deviations from a hypothetical germ, than by linguistic and metrical as well as logical tests to find the early elements of an old poem. The criteria are fewer and the result must be less satisfactory. Herr Wilmanns goes too far in asserting that in the old form of the Gudrun story, Hartmuth fell by the hand of Horant. Can he find any proof for this except a certain poetical justice in the development of his supposed legend?

A passage in the Alexanderlied of the parson Lamprecht is explained by Herr Wilmanns in a new and ingenious way to support the theory of an original independence of each other in these two, the Hilda and Gudrun stories. His interpretation is probably correct, but cannot be counted as a strong argument for all his hypotheses in regard to the myths.

It seems reasonable enough to suppose that these stories were once distinct, and one must admit the possibility of most of Herr Wilmanns' explanations, expressly if one remembers the tendency of copyists, singers, and story-tellers in such an age to enlarge the history, by comparing with it other known legends, and adding some "*haute nouveauté*" at each successive recital. But the logic of a sharp-sighted analyst will do well not to overlook that, if every inconsistency is to be explained away, the liability to mistakes of memory on the part of so many transmitting minds must not be forgotten; and this liability will be found to be an incalculably varying quantity.

To pass by the myth-"contamination," which may be claimed as a sort of necessary substratum to the whole theory of Herr Wilmanns, but which we prefer to regard (as far as it concerns results for our poem) as beyond our ken, no previous explanation of this poem has so much to commend it as the supposed "contamination" of versions. It accounts for inconsistencies which no amount of interpolation could explain. It rescues also the strong points of previous investigators without being obliged to adopt their weak ones. It agrees with Müllenhoff.

in that it keeps a nucleus of old poetry in *a*, a larger nucleus in *c*, and a still more complete form in *b*, and thus sustains, in part at least, the tests of the Lachmann criteria. It deviates from Müllenhoff, in that it does not admit that the earliest version runs through all the adventures of the poem, as we have it, or that the original verses and songs of Müllenhoff are themselves other than compilations. It agrees with Bartsch in admitting that there is a certain sort of unity aimed at by the "bearbeiter" in the version as we have it. It dissents from him in holding that the unity is *not* attained, and that the poem reveals in nearly every one of its characters, and in nearly every division of each adventure, traces of bungling attempts to unite irreconcilables or evidences of want of perception. Under the guidance of Wilmanns we arrive at a point not so far from the marvelous of Ettmüller as was perhaps anticipated. Some of the results, that were modestly stated in the outset, viz: disorder in the stanzas, a "contamination" of *at least two* versions, and an impossibility of the restoration of the exact old poem; these we may accept. But we have something beyond these in the demonstrations of the book. We have three versions; the simple, grand old *a*; the extensive, partly admirable and partly disappointing *b*; and *c* earlier than *b*; the first (our author believes) exposition of the three united stories of Hagen, Hilda, and Gudrun. We have, besides, interpolation within interpolation, making at least five hands whose working our author sees. Ettmüller gave us no more than five, the old author and four interpolations, though he did, what Wilmanns does not attempt, assign every verse in the poem to one of these five poetry-makers. But how much more completely the supposition of a "contamination" of versions unlocks the obscurities of this poem than does Ettmüller's idea of an original poet and four interpolators! Such interpolators will find their parallel in no literature. Whereas if we suppose two or three versions, each one perhaps not without interpolations of its own, and impute to some prince a desire to save all of the Gudrun poetry, that was extant either in memory or in manuscript, and imagine him to have assigned to some bearbeiter and copyist all these versions and parts of versions, we have at least a conceivable hypothesis to account for the present state of the poem.

In so thorough an investigation of the stanzas of this poem Herr Wilmanns must often review the decisions of his teacher, Müllenhoff, and often differ from him. Where Müllenhoff's opinions rest upon purely linguistic grounds, Wilmanns does not venture to oppose them; but where, as for instance, on page 192, he discusses Müllenhoff's decision for one order in the old poem's or version's description of Hartmuth's encounter with Ortrun, and pronounces for another, or, as on page 231, where Müllenhoff's assertion that the old poem ended with stanza 1130 is doubted, the finer sense of harmony seems to belong to the pupil. This discussion is remarkable for that comprehensive sense of order and beauty in which many German scholars are deficient. Inconsistencies in geographical belongings, amplifications in the numbers of warriors, incongruous strokes of character in the same person, the gradual growth of Herwig from a landless, insignificant sea-king in the hands of "bearbeiter" to a great monarch, echoes between different parts of the poem—such features as these, German sagacity has perhaps long since discovered, though never more successfully. But the subordination of all this critical scholarship to a constructive love of letters, and the evolution from this chaos of some light, calls for something of praise. As literary criticism, few books are so rich in results and few more perfectly unpretentious. The characterization of the poem at the end of the book is broad and incisive. The style is simple and clear, without æsthetical exclamations or artificial statements. There is now and then a stroke of quiet humor, but, where noticing the taste of the "bearbeiter" for personal cleanliness and enumerating several comical occasions on which baths were taken, he adds, "the poet knows what is proper," the humor is misplaced. It was the old custom of the German men, as Wackernagel has proved, to bathe frequently.

There is much still to be done for the poem. Its relations to other middle German poetry; the time and place of the origin of the Gudrunsaga, a question which Herr Wilmanns answers possibly correctly, but without real evidence, in assigning it to the beginning of the eleventh century and the Danish supremacy in England; the time of its first arrival and appearance in Ger-

many;* farther, where the poems, which *underlie* its present form, were composed, are among the points for future study which Herr Wilmanns suggests. (Bartsch has no difficulty in assigning the poem, *as we have it*, to some "bearbeiter" in Styria at the close of the twelfth century.) For some of the points suggested no answer may be possible. But a poem that has so much beauty of character and expression, written in the age of fermentation and preparation for modern civilization, a poem in which the notes struck are primitive and awaken echoes in every human heart, and especially so noble a monument of the high German, will not fail of admirers and diligent students. These cannot afford to overlook Herr Wilmanns' labors. The path to an understanding of this poem lies (we think) through the door that he has opened.

* Müllenhoff, in *Haupts Zeitschrift* 12,317, makes the deduction from the occurrence of the name Gudrun in upper Germany in various documents of the eleventh century, that the saga had penetrated thither and was pretty well known there, the last half of that century.

ARTICLE IV.—LANGLAND'S VISION OF PIERS PLOWMAN.*

THOUGH the Early English Text Society has existed but few years, it has already won the respect and gratitude of every man of letters who has been familiar with what it has tried to do, or has actually done. Unlike many of the book-clubs of Great Britain, which are practically nothing but associations for the suppression of knowledge, it has been throughout true to its original aim of making, as far as it could, the treasures of our early literature accessible to all. Its texts have been edited with scrupulous care, and furnished at the cheapest possible rate. With a single exception, every one of them is a monument of the disinterested exertion and earnest enthusiasm which have been, from the first, conspicuously manifest in the operations of the society; but in none of them have the nature and value of its work been more strikingly exhibited than in its editions of the poem, the title of which we have placed at the head of this Article.

For the *Vision of Piers Plowman*, both as regards size and character, is unquestionably far the most important text which has as yet appeared under the auspices of the Society. Some of the other publications may be of equal value to the student of the English language; but no other can be said to have anything like the same value to the student of English literature, or of English history. There is no other which will convey to modern ears so vivid an impression of that peculiar method of alliterative versification which, once universal among our Teutonic forefathers, was swept away by the introduction of rhyme. There is no other which brings into so close and striking juxtaposition high thoughts and homely incidents, which treats, almost in one breath, of the profoundest problems which perplex the heart of man,

* *The Vision of William concerning Piers the Plowman.* By WILLIAM LANGLAND. The "Whitaker" Text, or Text C. Edited by the Rev. Walter W. Skeat. Published for the Early English Text Society. Trübner & Co. London, 1873.

and the most trivial details which vulgarize his life. It is fortunate that a work, in some respects so unique, and in all respects so important, should have fallen into the hands of an editor both willing and competent to give it the attention it deserved. Without disparaging in the least the unselfish and unpaid labor which has been furnished by several scholars to the publications of the Early English Text Society, no single work that has hitherto appeared seems to us to exhibit anything like the amount of conscientious and intelligent care which has been bestowed upon this one, the most valuable of all. The simple bibliographical facts connected with it are impressive of themselves. The work was begun in 1866, and was completed, so far as regards the text, in 1873. About forty manuscripts have been carefully examined. All of any value have been collated, and their variations of reading noted. It is a necessary consequence of work so thoroughly done, that a number of new facts have been brought to light; a number of previous conjectures have been made certainties; a number of false statements have received, for the fiftieth time, their quietus; but doubtless only to come to life again in those perennial fountains of error—school-histories of English literature. One blunder, in particular, which confounds Piers Plowman, the most important character seen in the visions, with the dreamer of the visions themselves, seems likely to live as long as the poem. The last to repeat it is Taine, whose admirable work is sometimes a singular illustration of how well an able man can write about matters of which he knows little or nothing.

In regard to the poet himself, further investigations have added but little to the very little which we already knew. Still it has been made pretty certain that his Christian name was William, and not Robert, as generally given; and, on the whole, it is probable that the traditional surname of Langland is the true one. But in regard to the poem itself our information is now rendered much more full and exact. It had been long known that the work existed in two forms; it was a conjecture, in an appendix to Price's edition of Warton's History of English Poetry, that another, and probably an earlier form, had been once in circulation. This conjecture, it has been Mr. Skeat's

good fortune to prove a fact. It is now made certain that there were three different versions of the poem, and that the additions made to it in the two latter were the work of the author himself. The original text, or text A, taken from the Vernon manuscript, in the Bodleian library at Oxford, appeared, under Mr. Skeat's editorship, in 1867. It had never before been printed, and the date of its composition is assigned, on internal evidence, to the neighborhood of the year 1362. In 1868 the society published the second version, or text B, and in 1873 the third, or text C. The additions made by the poet in these two last were not only great, but of great importance. How numerous they were, may be gathered from the fact, that while text A contains less than twenty-six hundred lines, the B and C texts each contains more than seven thousand. These two later versions differ from one another more in character and arrangement than they do in length, the third having only about two hundred lines more than the second. As the composition of text C seems, from allusions contained in it, to belong pretty clearly to the close of the fourteenth century, there can be little hazard in asserting that the poem must have been looked upon by the author himself as the great work of his life, and that for a series of years it underwent, at his hands, a constant revision, which is of itself sufficient to explain most of the variations of the manuscripts.

Up to a late period the second text, or text B, had been the only one about which much was generally known; and we are inclined to think that a comparison of it with the other two will convince most readers that it is the most perfect form of the poem, though in particular passages it may be inferior. Its composition must have been as late as 1377, for in it there are allusions to Richard II, who ascended the throne that year. It may not have been, and probably was not, as Mr. Skeats almost unqualifiedly asserts, much later than that; though after all, the argument drawn from the fact that the papal schism is not mentioned, can hardly be deemed a strong one, in view of the additional fact that this is not mentioned in text C. The novelty of that event might indeed have worn off to men engaged in secular pursuits; it was too significant and momentous to escape the attention of a Christian poet, even after the lapse of

twenty years, had it entered into his original design to speak of it at all. However that may be, it is this text of the poem which has been most frequently printed. During the great religious revolution of the sixteenth century, the minds of men were naturally directed to the earlier conflict which had taken place in the fourteenth, and a work inveighing with such bitterness, and such minuteness of detail, against the evil practices of the Roman Catholic clergy, was not likely to pass unnoticed. In particular, the famous prophecy in regard to the spoliation of the monasteries—

Ac there shal come a kyng· and confesse you religiouses,
 And bete yow as the bible telleth· for brekyng of yowre reule,
 * * * * *
 And thanne shal the abbot of Abyndoun· and alle his issu for evere
 Have a knokke of a kyng· and incurable the wounde—

which had been so literally fulfilled, seemed to the devout spirits of that time to argue the existence of something more in the writer than mere poetic inspiration. The first printed edition of the poem was published in 1550, by Robert Crowley, and two, or perhaps three, impressions of it appeared that same year. Of one of these, a reprint was made in 1561 by Owen Rogers. During the sixteenth century the work was both well known and popular; but when, in the seventeenth, the Protestant sects had learned to hate one another more than they did the Roman Catholics, the interest in the poem died out, and does not seem to have been revived during the following century. It was not until 1842 that this particular version was again printed, and then under the supervision of Thomas Wright, an antiquary, who has been engaged in doing too many things to do any one of them very well. A second and revised edition of this appeared in 1856, in a cheaper form, in John Russell Smith's *Library of Old English Authors*. The text is excellent, but the notes are meagre, and the glossary very defective and unsatisfactory. Besides these, the third form of the poem was published in 1818 by the Rev. Thomas Dunham Whitaker. It was got up in a very expensive manner, and was printed in black letter. At the bottom of every page was a paraphrase, which sometimes explained the meaning of the text, and sometimes did not. Its size and costliness, added to the mistakes

made by its editor, prevented it from being ever much known save by name; and, indeed, it is perfectly safe to say that all previous texts are entirely superseded by those which have now been published under the supervision of Mr. Skeat.

As a picture of the social and political condition of the times, the work is almost without a rival; and in this point of view it deserves far more attention than it has hitherto received. If about the life of the author little is known, there is no such uncertainty attaching to his character. His personality is prominent on every page of his production. The Puritans, as a sect, were not in existence. But there has never been a period when the Puritan element has not been a conspicuous factor in English character, and a conspicuous agency in English history; and in his seriousness, his earnestness, his lofty conception of personal righteousness, his aversion not simply to sin but to anything which might possibly lead to sin, and not unfrequently in his intolerance, Langland is a Puritan of the Puritans. The very term *sad man*—the serious or grave man—by which, in one or two places, he calls the righteous man, is of itself suggestive. This state of mind, while it sharpened his insight and added bitterness and point to his invective, gave without doubt an unnecessarily gloomy coloring to his views of things; but, fortunately for our knowledge, it had the effect of leading him to strengthen his statements by describing minutely the things themselves. There was no class in the community which was not to a greater or less extent taken in hand by this worker for reform, in whom patriotism in the highest sense of the word was intensified by profound moral convictions and burning zeal for religion, pure and undefiled. It was, to be sure, against the clergy that the fiercest of his denunciations were levelled. The avarice and ambition of the secular priests; the simony which had turned the house of God into a den of thieves; the greed and gluttony of the monks; the idleness and dissoluteness of the mendicant friars: all these were attacked with a violence, the effect of which was not lessened by the fact, made manifest in many places, that the poet still clung to the old faith, or at least had not put himself in opposition to it. But though he devoted his chief denunciation to the clergy, he did not confine himself

to them ; and in reading his invective, it certainly affords some gratification to feel that if there is no good thing that is new, there is no bad thing that is not old. No sharper attack can be found in the whole poem than where Langland arraigns the dishonest practices which prevailed among the tradesmen of the time, the adulteration of liquors, the stretching of cloth so as to make ten or twelve yards amount to thirteen, the use of fraudulent weights and measures ; and, it may be added, there is nothing which he says of the corruptions current about him, whether existing on a grand or a petty scale, in which he is not more than borne out by the accounts which his contemporary, Gower, gives in his *Vox Clamantis*. In these days, when "the fierce light" which the press causes to beat upon every form of fraud often leads us to fear that our own century surpasses all others in evil-doing, it must be confessed that it is somewhat encouraging to find on trustworthy testimony that we are far from having the monopoly of the sin that is going ; that, indeed, in corrupt practices, for which we have been disposed to claim for ourselves the merit of originality in the absence of any other kind of merit, we are nothing but humble imitators of past ages. It is no unreasonable inference that among the lost arts of ancient times may be included many kinds of fraudulent procedure which the rascality of modern times has not yet succeeded in reviving.

Indeed, the *Vision of Piers Plowman* is in its general effect a melancholy book. It is a work such as might have been expected to be produced by a man of great abilities, of lofty ideas of personal integrity and piety, of earnest love to his country, who, however, had so turned his thoughts to the consideration of those forces in society which tended to bring it to ruin, that he had nearly lost sight of the recuperative forces which were in active operation upon the other side. The state of mind caused by such warped views of the social problems which are ever working their own solution about us, is common enough in every age : but in that age, owing to peculiar circumstances, it had become more general than in most. There was a wide-spread feeling that not only was the world wickedder than it had ever been, but that the day of its destruction was at hand. From the point of view of that time the

sentiment was not altogether unwarrantable: for there had been much to sober and sadden men's minds. For a large part of the century the curse of God had fallen upon western Europe in its heaviest form. Long-continued wars had desolated many of its fairest portions, had rendered recuperative industry impossible, had sent to early graves the most vigorous of the population. The frightful license of camps had largely demoralized society. Upon the heels of the desolation and woe thus wrought followed a still heavier calamity. What the sword had spared the plague came to devour. Three times did that terrible pestilence, immortalized by Boccacio, sweep through Europe and slay its tens of thousands, where war had slain its thousands. Under such circumstances it is no wonder, to men keenly sensitive to the evils crowding in on every side, with pictures of woe and death ever before their eyes, that every unusual event should seem the direct warning of the Almighty to a sinful world or a direct judgment upon it; that to them the mystic visions of the Apocalypse should become the most vivid of realities. The opening of the seven seals had been begun, the last age of the Church was drawing nigh. This feeling, which is found in Gower, which is conspicuously manifest in the writings of Wycliffe and his followers, from which Chaucer alone seems to be thoroughly free, shows itself to some extent in Langland; and at the time when the second of his versions appeared, the changes through which England had passed, and the condition in which he saw it, only strengthened the melancholy forebodings to which he had given utterance fifteen years before. The reign of Edward III, which had opened so gloriously, had ended in disaster and gloom. The king, worn out physically and mentally, had lingered along to an old age, in the character of which there was nothing to excite respect, nothing indeed to preserve from the severest censure, save the irresponsibility that springs from irrationality. The Black Prince, the hope and pride of the people, had died in his prime. The government was alternately in the hands of warring factions, whose members may have been actuated by a desire to save their country, but who were certainly determined that it should be saved in their own particular way and by nobody but themselves. At this crisis

a boy of eleven years old mounted the throne. Then it was that Langland, with the words of the wisest of Israel's monarchs in his mouth, "Woe to thee, O land, when thy king is a child," took up again the poem once completed, and drew in detail that picture of the social, political, and religious condition of the times, which in vividness and fullness is surpassed by no other work accessible to the student of English history. The events of war and peace, the rise and fall of parties, the particulars of battles or of treaties, can always be found recorded in chronicles and State papers; but he who wishes to learn how the England of the latter half of the fourteenth century thought and felt, how it lived and moved, can find what he desires to know best, and perhaps only, in the writings of Langland, Gower, and Chaucer.

Yet it must be said that it is only in the first half of the poem that this particular kind of importance attaches to the work. The latter part is to a great extent taken up with religious dissertations and discussions, which doubtless had a living interest to the men of that day. But controversy on theological topics has in modern times so shifted its ground, that much of the long-drawn allegory contained in the poem is apt to grow wearisome to a generation which does not need to be told that holy living is more essential to salvation than a pilgrimage to the Holy Land. True, from the very design of the work, questions connected with religion were given the chief place; but in the former half, the half which was first composed, they are much more largely intermingled with references to the social and political condition of the times. Indeed, one could not easily be discussed without more or less of allusion to the other. The number of manuscripts still existing show conclusively how great must have been the popularity of the poem; and this popularity is of itself a sufficient proof of the extent to which religious questions had become the common subjects of thought and discourse during the latter half of the fourteenth century. In particular, Langland makes perfectly clear a point which the writings of his greater contemporary, Chaucer, often suggest. In that age, the reaction against the Roman Catholic faith in some cases resulted, as it has so often since, not in leading men to have a reformed

faith, but in leading them to have no faith at all. This was especially true among the higher classes. They passed not from Popery to Protestantism, but from Popery to infidelity. No close student of Chaucer can fail to notice the tone of skepticism that pervades his writings; the cautiously-conveyed contempt for ecclesiastical threatenings; the half-drawn inferences from or satirical allusions to dogmas then deeply cherished; the half-hinted avowal of disbelief as to any knowledge of the future state, in such lines as these :

His spiryt chaungede hous, and wente ther,
As I cam nevere, I can nat tellen wher.
Therefore I stynte, I nam no dyvynistre;
Of soules fynde I not in this registre,
Ne mene list thilke opynyouns to telle
Of hem, though that thei written wher they dwelle.

If this be observable in the writings of a man upon whose mind all questions connected with life and destiny rested lightly, much more must it have been true of many who, while not sharing in the doctrines of Wycliffe, shared yet in his disgust at the abuses which were perpetrated and the absurdities which were taught in the name of religion. Naturally, the same dark questions, which have always perplexed the minds of men, were lifted into prominence. Here what can only be inferred from Chaucer is directly stated by Langland. He declares with great bitterness that noble-men, sitting at their tables, discuss religious topics just as if they were clergymen, asking why the serpent was permitted to deceive our first parents, what justice there was in making men now living perish for Adam's sin, and by this sort of talk leading those who listened into disbelief. In another passage he says it was a custom of some to discuss religious topics at meal times, and in particular to speak contemptuously of the doctrine of the Trinity. It does not follow, from such passages, that the reaction in the direction here indicated had been great: it is clear that it amounted to enough to excite the indignation and alarm of men of fervent faith.

It may be thought strange that a work so striking and so invaluable, not merely to the man of letters but to the historian, should have fallen into so much neglect. But after all, the

causes of this are not far to seek. They exist partly in the nature of the poet's views, partly in the nature of the methods by which he gave them utterance. In morbid feeling, no matter how powerfully expressed, there is never any vital element of perpetuity. But besides this, there are in the poem certain defects which impair its value as a work of art. It is not a single vision, but a series of visions, and these, though in some measure bound together by the unity of a common interest, are in most respects entirely independent of one another. Moreover, it is an allegory; and though allegory was a most popular species of composition to our forefathers, it is to modern ears inexpressibly tiresome. Not all the wealth of imagery and sweetness of versification found in the *Fairy Queen* have been able to save Spenser's great work from being so tedious to the large majority of even cultivated men, that few ever succeed in reading it through. And in the *Vision of Piers Plowman* the allegory is not simply the form in which the poem as a whole is cast, but is frequently carried out into particulars, the details of which almost border on the grotesque. A striking illustration of this can be found in Passus xix (Text B; Passus xxii, Text C), in which Grace, or the Holy Spirit, constitutes Piers his plowman, and furnishes him with an outfit, of which the following verses describe a part:

Grace gave Piers a teme · foure gret oxen;
 That on was Luke, a large beste · and a lowe-chered,
 And marke, and mathew the thrydde · myghty bestes bothe,
 And joigned to hem one Johan · most gentil of alle.
 The prys nete of Piers plow · passyng alle other.
 And Grace gave Pieres · of his goodnesse, foure stottis,
 Al that his oxen erylde · they to harwe after.
 On hichte Austyne · and Ambrose another,
 Gregori the grete clerke · and Jerome the gode;
 Thise foure, the felthe to teche · folweth Pieres teme,
 And harwed in an handwhile · al holy scripture,
 With two harwes that thei hadde · and olde and a newe.

Id est, vetus testamentum et novum.

But, after all, the chief hindrance to its popularity, even in the most restricted sense of that word, lies in the language itself. It seems to us that Mr. Skeat underrates the obscurity of the phraseology, and that on this point his own familiarity with the poem has had the tendency to warp his judgment.

Certain it is that the ancient alliterative verse had peculiar difficulties in its very nature. The necessity always existed of finding a number of words beginning with the same letter; it was often an unavoidable consequence that to accomplish this, the writer was obliged to resort to expressions little known. The frequent appearance of terms used only once, twice, or three times in all, is one of the most formidable obstacles to the thorough comprehension of Anglo-Saxon poetry; and we are confident that it will turn out a far harder task to the ordinary student to master Langland's vocabulary than that of his contemporary, Chaucer. Certainly the very prevalent impression, that a far greater number of words of Romanic origin is proportionately employed by the latter is very wide of the truth; though this is an impression for which scholars of some repute are themselves responsible. Mr. Wright, in his introduction to the Harleian manuscript of the *Canterbury Tales*, took occasion to contrast the two poets in this respect, and asserted that Langland, as more particularly representing the feelings of the people, had fewer French words than Chaucer. How any one could have come to such a conclusion after having edited the leading works of both authors, is very strange; that is, if anything which a careless man says or does can be considered strange. The incorrectness of the statement is apparent on even the slightest examination. In fact, Langland introduced or rather employed foreign words with an indifference, not to say recklessness, which must have made life a burden to the purists of that time, if any such there were. Lines like these can be found on almost every page:

And that is the professioun apertly · that appendeth for Knyghtes.

And portatyf and persant · as the poynt of a nedle.

In marchandise is no mede · I may it wel avowe;

It is a permutacioun apertly · a penyworth for an othre.

But not to speak of passages like these, this poet of the common people, as he is called, actually terms a daughter *file*, a cave a *spelonke*, a feast a *maungerie*, and uses many other words which are not only never heard in our period, but have never been common in any period of English speech. When one considers that such conduct as this would now embitter

the lives of many excellent men, and bring grief and discord into many happy homes, one cannot feel too grateful that this poet belonged to the fourteenth century and not to the nineteenth.

A fourth part is still to follow, and in it will be contained the glossary. That it will be as complete and as satisfactory in the explanation of terms as the present state of our knowledge will permit, there need be no fear. But as the remoter primitives and alliances of words are of no particular interest or value in such a vocabulary, let us hope that it will be deformed as little as possible by the adoption of the vagaries of Wedgwood. This is, perhaps, an ungracious thing to say, under the circumstances; but we cannot forget that in the introduction to his most excellent school edition of the Prologue and first seven Passus of this poem, Mr. Skeat has committed himself to the assertion that by far the best work on derivation is Wedgwood's Etymological Dictionary. If this is a view generally entertained in England—which we do not believe—it is certainly confined to that country. Still any error of judgment on a point which in this work is of comparatively trivial importance, ought not to prevent our acknowledging in the fullest and frankest manner the debt of gratitude which every student of our tongue owes to the present editor for the labor, learning, and ability displayed in furnishing for the first time complete and thoroughly satisfactory texts of one of the great classics of our early literature.

ARTICLE V.—ZWINGLI'S THEOLOGY.

ULRIC ZWINGLI (1484–1531) represents the first stage of the Reformed Church in Switzerland. He began what Calvin and others completed. He died in the prime of life, a patriot and martyr, on the battle-field, when his work seemed to be but half done. His importance is historical rather than doctrinal. He was the most clear-headed and liberal among the reformers, but lacked the genius, depth, and vigor of Luther and Calvin. He held opinions on the sacraments, original sin (as a disorder rather than a state of guilt), and on the salvation of all infants (unbaptized as well as baptized) and the nobler heathen, which then appeared radical, dangerous, and profane. He could conceive of a broad and free Christian union, consistent with doctrinal differences and denominational distinctions. He was a patriotic republican, frank, honorable, incorruptible, cheerful, courteous, and affable. He took an active part in all the public affairs of Switzerland, and labored to free it from foreign influence, misgovernment, and immorality. He began at Einsiedeln (1516), and more effectively at Zurich (1519), to preach Christ from the pure fountain of the New Testament, and to set him forth as the only Mediator and all-sufficient Saviour. Then followed his attacks upon the corruptions of Rome, and the Reformation was introduced step by step in Zurich, where he exercised a controlling influence, and in the greater part of German Switzerland, until its progress was suddenly checked by the catastrophe at Cappel, 1531.

ZWINGLI AND LUTHER.

Zwingli was scarcely two months younger than Luther, who survived him fifteen years. Both were educated and ordained in the Roman Church, and became innocently and providentially reformers of that Church. Both were men of strong mind, heroic character, fervent piety, and commanding influence over the people. Both were good scholars, great divines, and fond of poetry and music. Both labored independently for the same

great cause of evangelical Protestantism—the one on a smaller, the other on a larger field. But their endowment, training, and conversion were different. Zwingli had less prejudice, more practical common-sense, clear discrimination, sober judgment, self-control, courtesy, and polish—Luther more productive genius, poetic imagination, overpowering eloquence, mystic depth, fire, and passion; and was in every way a richer and stronger, though rougher and wilder nature. Zwingli's eyes were opened by the reading of the Greek Testament, which he carefully copied with his own hand, and the humanistic learning of his friend Erasmus; while Luther passed through the ascetic struggles of monastic life, till he found peace of conscience in the doctrine of justification by faith alone. Zwingli broke more rapidly and more radically with the Roman Church than Luther. He boldly abolished all doctrines and usages not taught in the Scriptures; Luther piously retained what was not clearly forbidden. He aimed at a reformation of government and discipline as well as theology; Luther confined himself to such changes as were directly connected with doctrine. He was a Swiss and a republican; Luther, a German and a monarchist. He was a statesman as well as a theologian; Luther kept aloof from all political complications, and preached the doctrine of passive obedience to established authority. They met but once in this world, and then as antagonists, at Marburg, two years before Zwingli's death. They could not but respect each other personally, though Luther approached the Swiss with the strongest prejudice, looking upon him as a fanatic and semi-infidel. They came to an agreement on every article of faith except the real presence in the Eucharist. Zwingli proposed, with tears, peace and union, notwithstanding this difference, but Luther refused the hand of Christian fellowship, because he made doctrinal agreement the boundary-line of brotherhood.

THE RULE OF FAITH.

Zwingli's theological system was never fully matured. Nevertheless, it contains in germ the main features of the Reformed Creed, and in several respects it was in advance of the sixteenth century, and anticipated modern opinions. We present it here in its leading features.

1. Zwingli begins with the objective (or formal) principle of Protestantism, namely, the exclusive and absolute authority of the Bible in all matters of Christian faith and practice. The Reformed Confessions do the same; while the Lutheran Confessions start with the subjective (or material) principle of justification by faith alone, and make this "the article of the standing and falling Church." This difference, however, is more a matter of logical order and relative importance. Word and faith are inseparable and proceed from the same Holy Spirit. In both denominations a living faith in Christ is the first and last principle. Without this faith the Bible may be esteemed as the best book, but not as the inspired word of God and rule of faith.

THE DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION.

2. Zwingli teaches the doctrine of unconditional *election* or predestination to salvation (*constitutio de beandis*, as he defines it,) and finds in it the ultimate ground of our justification and salvation; faith being only the organ of appropriation. God is the infinite being of beings, in whom and through whom all other beings exist; the supreme cause, including as dependent organs the finite or middle causes; the infinite and only good (Luke xviii, 18), and every thing else is good (Gen. i, 31) only through and in him. It is a fundamental canon that God by his providence, or perpetual and unchangeable rule and administration, controls and disposes all events, the will and the action; otherwise he would not be omnipotent and omnipresent. There can be no accident. The fall, with its consequences, likewise comes under his foreknowledge and fore-ordination, which can be as little separated as intellect and will. But God's agency in respect to sin is free from sin, since he is not bound by law, and has no bad motive or affection; so the magistrate may take a man's life without committing murder. But only those who hear the Gospel and reject it in unbelief are fore-ordained to eternal punishment. Of those without the reach of Christian doctrine we can not judge, as we know not their relation to election. There may be and are elect persons among the heathen; and the fate of Socrates and Seneca is no doubt better than that of many popes.

Zwingli, however, dwells mainly on the positive aspect of God's providence—the election to salvation. Election, he teaches, is free and independent. It does not follow faith, but precedes it. It embraces also infants. We are elected in order that we may believe in Christ and be holy. Hence it is preposterous to charge the doctrine with a dangerous tendency to carnal security and immorality.

Zwingli preached this doctrine during the Conference with the Lutherans at Marburg in 1529, and elaborated it afterwards, at the request of Landgrave Philip of Hesse, in a tract, *De Providentia*. It was afterwards more fully and clearly developed by the powerful intellect of Calvin, who made it the prominent pillar of his theology, and impressed it upon the majority of the Reformed Confessions, although several of them simply teach a free election to salvation, without saying a word of the decree of reprobation.

On this subject there was no controversy among the early Reformers. They were all Augustinians. Luther heard Zwingli's sermon on Providence in Marburg, and made no objection to it, except that he quoted Greek and Hebrew in the pulpit. He had expressed himself much more strongly on the subject in his famous book against Erasmus (1525). There was, however, this difference, that Luther, like Augustine, from his denial of the freedom of the human will, was driven to the doctrine of absolute predestination, as a logical consequence; while Zwingli, and still more Calvin, started from the absolute sovereignty of God, and inferred from it the dependence of the human will; yet all of them were controlled by their strong sense of sin and free grace much more than by speculative principles. The Lutheran Church afterwards dropped the theological inference in part—namely, the decree of reprobation—and taught instead the universality of the offer of saving grace; but she retained the anthropological premise of total depravity and inability, and also the doctrine of a free election of the saints, or predestination to salvation; and this after all is the chief point in the Calvinistic system, and the only one which is made the subject of popular instruction. In the Lutheran Church, moreover, the election theory is moderated by the sacramental principle of baptismal regeneration (as was

still more the case with Augustine), while in the Reformed Church the doctrine of election controls and modifies the sacramental principle, so that the efficacy of baptism is made to depend upon the preceding election.

THE SACRAMENTS.

3. The most original and prominent doctrine of Zwingli is that of the *sacraments*, and especially of the *Lord's Supper*.

He adopts the general definition that the sacrament is the visible sign of an invisible grace, but draws a sharp distinction between the sacramental sign (*signum*) and the thing signified (*res sacramenti*), and allows no necessary and internal connection between them. The baptism by water may take place without the baptism of the Spirit (as in the case of Ananias and Simon Magus), and the baptism by the Spirit, or regeneration, without the baptism by water (for the apostles received only John's baptism; the penitent thief was not baptized at all, and Cornelius was baptized after regeneration). Communion with Christ is not confined to the Lord's Supper, neither do all who partake of this ordinance really commune with Christ. The Spirit of God is free and independent of all outward ceremonies and observances.

As to the effect of the sacraments, Zwingli rejects the whole scholastic theory of the *opus operatum*, and makes faith the necessary medium of sacramental efficacy. He differs here not only from the Romish, but also from the Lutheran theory. He regards the sacraments only as signs and seals, and not strictly as means or instrumentalities of grace, except in so far as they strengthen it. They do not originate and confer grace, but presuppose it, and set it forth to our senses, and confirm it to our faith. As circumcision sealed the righteousness of the faith of Abraham, which he had before in a state of uncircumcision (Rom. iv, 11), so baptism seals the remission of sin by the cleansing blood of Christ, and our incorporation in Christ by faith, which is produced by the Holy Spirit. In infant baptism (which he strongly defended against the Anabaptists, not indeed as necessary to salvation, but as proper and expedient), we have the divine promise which extends to the offspring, and the profession of the faith of the parents with their pledge to

bring up their children in the same. The Lord's Supper signifies and seals the fact that Christ died for us and shed his blood for our sins, that he is ours and we are his, and that we are partakers of all his benefits. Zwingli compares the sacrament also to a wedding-ring which seals the marriage union.

He fully admits, however, that the sacraments are divinely instituted and necessary for our twofold constitution; that they are significant and efficacious, not empty, signs; that they aid and strengthen our faith ("*auxilium opemque adferunt fidei*"), and so far confer spiritual blessing through the medium of appropriating faith. In this wider sense they may be called means of grace. He also gives them the character of public testimonies, by which we openly profess our faith before God and the world, pledge our obedience to him, and express our gratitude for mercies received. Hence the name *eucharist*, or *gratiarum actio*.

THE LORD'S SUPPER.

Concerning the Lord's Supper, Zwingli teaches, in opposition to the Romish mass, that it is a *commemoration*, not a repetition, of the atoning sacrifice of Christ, who offered himself once for all time, and can not be offered by any other; that bread and wine signify or represent, but are not really, the broken body and shed blood of our Lord; that he is present only according to his divine nature and by his Spirit to the eye of faith (*fidei contemplatione*), but not according to his human nature, which is in heaven at the right hand of God, and can not be present every where or in many places at the same time; that to eat his flesh and to drink his blood is a spiritual manducation, or the same as to believe in him (John vi), and no physical manducation by mouth and teeth, which, even if it were possible, would be useless and unworthy, and would establish two ways of salvation—one by faith, the other by literal eating in the sacrament; finally, that the blessing of the ordinance consists in a renewed application of the benefits of the atonement by the worthy or believing communicants, while the unworthy receive only the outward signs to their own judgment.

He therefore rejects every form of a local or corporeal presence, whether by transubstantiation, impanation, or consubstantiation, as contrary to the Bible, to the nature of faith, and to sound

reason. He supports the figurative interpretation of the words of institution by a large number of passages, where Christ is said to *be* the door, the lamb, the rock, the vine, etc.; also by such passages as Gen. xli, 26, 27 (the seven good kine *are* seven years), Matt. xiii, 31-37 (the field *is* the world; the tares *are* the children of the wicked one; the reapers *are* the angels), and especially Luke xxii, 20; 1 Cor. xi, 25 (the *cup is* the New Testament in my blood). He proves the local absence of Christ's body by the fact of his ascension to heaven, his future visible return to judgment, and by such passages as: "I go to prepare a place for you;" "The poor you have always with you, but me you have not always;" "I go to my Father;" "The heaven must receive him until the times of restitution of all things." He also points out the inconsistency of Luther in maintaining the literal presence of Christ in the sacrament, and yet refusing the adoration; for wherever Christ is he must be adored.

I add his last words on the subject from the Confession sent to King Francis I. shortly before his death: "We believe that Christ is truly present in the Lord's Supper; yea, we believe that there is no communion without the presence of Christ. This is the proof: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them" (Matt. xviii, 20). How much more is he present where the whole congregation is assembled to his honor! But that his body is literally eaten is far from the truth and the nature of faith. It is contrary to the truth, because he himself says: "I am no more in the world" (John xvii, 11), and "The flesh profiteth nothing" (John vi, 63), that is to eat, as the Jews then believed and the Papists still believe. It is contrary to the nature of faith (I mean the holy and true faith), because faith embraces love, fear of God, and reverence, which abhor such carnal and gross eating, as much as any one would shrink from eating his beloved son. . . . We believe that the true body of Christ is eaten in the communion in a sacramental and spiritual manner by the religious, believing, and pious heart (as also St. Chrysostom taught). And this is in brief the substance of what we maintain in this controversy, and what not we, but the truth itself teaches." To this he adds the communion service, which

he introduced in Zurich, that his Majesty may see how devoutly the sacrament is celebrated there in accordance with the institution of Christ. This service is much more liturgical than the later Calvinistic formulas, and includes the "Gloria in Excelsis," the Apostles' Creed, and responses.

Closely connected with the eucharistic controversy are certain Christological differences concerning the ubiquity of Christ's body, and the *communicatio idiomatum*, which we have no room to discuss here.

Zwingli's doctrine of the Eucharist is unquestionably the simplest, clearest, and most intelligible theory. It removes the supernatural mystery from the ordinance, and presents no obstacles to the understanding. Exegetically, it is admissible, and advocated even by some of the ablest Lutheran commentators (as Meyer), who freely concede that the literal interpretation of the words of institution, to which Luther appealed first and last against the arguments of Zwingli, is impossible, or if consistently carried out, must lead to the Romish dogma. Philosophically and dogmatically, it labors under none of the difficulties of transubstantiation and consubstantiation, both of which imply the simultaneous multipresence of a corporeal substance, and a physical manducation of Christ's crucified body and blood—in direct contradiction to the essential properties of a body, and the testimony of four of our senses. It has been adopted by the Arminians, and it extensively prevails at present even among orthodox Protestants of all denominations, especially in England, Scotland, and America.

Zwingli is no doubt right in his protest against every form, however refined and subtle, of the old Capernaitic conception of a carnal presence and carnal appropriation. (John vi, 63.) He is also right in his positive assertion that the holy communion is a commemoration of the all-sufficient sacrifice of Christ on the cross, and a spiritual feeding on Christ by faith. But he falls short of the *whole* truth; he does not do justice to the strong language of our Lord, especially in John vi, 53–58, concerning the eating of the flesh of the Son of Man (whether this be referred directly or indirectly to the Lord's Supper, or not). After all deduction of carnal misconceptions, there remains the mystery of a vital union of the believer with the

whole Christ, including his *humanity*, viewed not, indeed, as material substance, but as a principle of life and power.

This Calvin felt. Hence he endeavored to find a *via media* between Zwingli and Luther, and assumed, besides the admitted real presence of the Divine Lord, a dynamic presence and influence of his glorified and ever-living humanity, and an actual communication of its life-giving power (not the *matter* of the body and blood) by the Holy Ghost to the worthy communicant through the medium of faith—as the sun is in the heavens, and yet with his light and heat everywhere present on earth. This theory passed substantially into the most authoritative confessions of the sixteenth century, and must therefore be regarded as the orthodox doctrine of the Reformed Church.

ORIGINAL SIN.

On three other points—namely, original sin, the salvation of infants, and the salvation of the heathen—Zwingli had peculiar views, which were in advance of his age, and gave great offense to some of his friends as well as to Luther, but were afterwards adopted by the Arminians.

4. The Reformation was born of an intense conviction of the sinfulness of man and the absolute need of a radical regeneration. Zwingli makes no exception, and describes the corruption and slavery of the natural man almost as strongly as Luther, although he never passed through such terrors of conscience as the monk in Erfurt, nor had he such hand-to-hand fights with the devil. He derives sin from the fall of Adam, brought about by the instigation of the devil, and finds its essence in selfishness as opposed to the love of God. He goes beyond the Augustinian infralapsarianism, which seems to condition the eternal counsel of God by the first self-determination of man, and he boldly takes the supralapsarian position that God not only foresaw, but foreordained the fall, together with the redemption, that is, as a means to an end, or as the negative condition for the revelation of the plan of salvation. He fully admits the distinction between original or hereditary sin and actual transgression, but he describes the former as a moral disease, or natural defect, rather than punishable sin and guilt. It is a miserable condition (*conditio misera*). He com-

pare it to the misfortune of one born in slavery. But if not sin in the proper sense of the term, it is an inclination or propensity to sin (*propensio ad peccandum*), and the fruitful germ of sin, which will surely develop itself in actual transgression. Thus the young wolf is a rapacious animal before he actually tears the sheep.

INFANT SALVATION.

5. Zwingli was the first to emancipate the *salvation of children* dying in infancy from the traditional condition of water-baptism, and to extend it beyond the boundaries of the visible Church. This is a matter of very great interest, since the unbaptized children far outnumber the baptized, and constitute nearly one-half of the race.

He teaches repeatedly that all elect children are saved whether baptized or not, whether of Christian or heathen parentage, not on the ground of their innocence (which would be Pelagian), but on the ground of Christ's atonement. He is inclined to the belief that all children dying in infancy belong to the elect; their early death being a token of God's mercy, and hence of their election. A part of the elect are led to salvation by a holy life, another part by an early death. The children of Christian parents belong to the Church, and it would be "impious" to condemn them. But from the parallel between the first and the second Adam, he infers that all children are saved from the ruin of sin, else what Paul says would not be true, that "as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive" (1 Cor. xv, 22). At all events, it is wrong to condemn the children of the heathen, both on account of the restoration of Christ and of the eternal election of God, which precedes faith, and produces faith in due time; hence the absence of faith in children is no ground for their condemnation. As he believed in the salvation of many adult heathen, he had the less difficulty in believing that heathen children are saved; for they have not yet committed actual transgression, and of hereditary sin they have been redeemed by Christ. We have therefore much greater certainty of the salvation of departed infants than of any adults.

This view was a bold step beyond the traditional orthodoxy. The Roman Catholic Church, in keeping with her doctrine of

original sin and guilt, and the necessity of water-baptism for salvation (based upon Mark xvi, 16, and John iii, 5), teaches the salvation of all baptized and the *condemnation* of all *unbaptized* children; assigning the latter to the *limbus infantum* on the border of hell, where they suffer the mildest kind of punishment, namely, the negative penalty of loss (*pœna damni* or *carentia beatificæ visionis*), but not the positive pain of feeling (*pœna sensus*). St. Augustine first clearly introduced this wholesale exclusion of all unbaptized infants from heaven—though Christ expressly says that to children emphatically belongs the kingdom of heaven. He ought consistently to have made the salvation of infants, like that of adults, depend upon their election; but the churchly and sacramental principle checked and moderated his predestination theory, and his Christian heart induced him to reduce the damnation of the millions of unbaptized infants in consequence of Adam's sin to the mildest degree of punishment. Inasmuch as he did not extend election beyond the boundaries of the Catholic Church (although he could not help seeing the significance of such holy outsiders as Melchizedek and Job under the Old dispensation), he secured at least, by his high view of the regenerative efficacy of baptism, the salvation of all baptized infants dying in infancy. To harmonize this view with his system, he must have counted them all among the elect.

The Lutheran Creed retains substantially the Catholic view of baptismal regeneration, and hence limits infant salvation to those who enjoy this means of grace; allowing, however, some exceptions, at least within the sphere of the Christian Church, and making the damnation of unbaptized infants as mild as the case will permit. At present, however, there is scarcely a Lutheran divine of weight who would be willing to confine salvation to *baptized* infants.

The Reformed Church teaches the salvation of all *elect* infants dying in infancy, whether *baptized or not*, and assumes that they are regenerated before their death, which, according to Calvinistic principles, is possible without water-baptism. The second Scotch Confession, of 1580, expressly rejects, among other errors of popery, "the cruel judgment against infants departing without the sacrament." Beyond this the

Confessions do not go, and leave the mysterious subject to private opinion. Some of the older and more rigid Calvinistic divines of the supralapsarian type carried the distinction between the elect and the reprobate into the infant world, though always securing salvation to the offspring of Christian parents, on the ground of inherited Church membership before and independent of the baptismal ratification; while others more wisely and charitably kept silence, or left the non-elect infants—if there are such, which nobody knows—to the uncovenanted mercies of God. But we may still go a step further, within the strict limits of the Reformed Creed, and maintain, as a pious opinion, that all departed infants belong to the number of the elect. Their early removal from a world of sin and temptation may be taken as an indication of God's special favor. From this it would follow that the majority of the human race will be saved. The very doctrine of election, which is unlimitable and free of all ordinary means, at all events widens the possibility and strengthens the probability of general infant salvation; while those Churches which hold to the necessity of baptismal regeneration must either consistently exclude from heaven all unbaptized infants (even those of Christian Baptists and Quakers), or, yielding to the instinct of Christian charity, they must make exceptions so innumerable that these would become, in fact, the rule, and overthrow the principle altogether.

In the seventeenth century the Arminians resumed the position of Zwingli, and with their mild theory of original sin (which they do not regard as responsible and punishable before and independent of actual transgression), they could consistently teach the general salvation of infants. The Methodists and Baptists adopted the same view. Even in the strictly Calvinistic churches it made steady progress, and is now silently or openly held by nearly all Reformed divines.

Whether consistent or not, the doctrine of infant damnation is certainly cruel and revolting to every nobler and better feeling of our nature. It cannot be charged upon the Bible except by logical inference from a few passages (John iii, 5; Mark xvi, 16; Rom. v, 12), which admit of a different interpretation. On the other hand, the general salvation of infants,

though not expressly taught, is far more consistent with the love of God, the genius of Christianity, and the spirit and conduct of him who shed his precious blood for all ages of mankind, who held up little children to his own disciples as models of simplicity and trustfulness, and took them to his bosom, blessing them, and saying (unconditionally and before Christian baptism did exist), "Of such is the kingdom of heaven," and "Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, he shall in no wise enter therein."

SALVATION OF THE HEATHEN.

6. *Salvation of adult heathen.* This is a still darker problem. Before Zwingli it was the universal opinion that there can be no salvation outside of the visible Church (*extra ecclesiam nulla salus*). Dante, the poet of mediæval Catholicism, assigns even Homer, Aristotle, Virgil, to hell, which bears the terrible inscription—

"Let those who enter in dismiss all hope."

But the Swiss Reformer repeatedly expressed his conviction, to which he adhered to the last, that God had his elect among the Gentiles as well as the Jews, and that, together with the saints of the Old Testament from the redeemed Adam down to John the Baptist, we may expect to find in heaven also such sages as Socrates, Plato, Aristides, Pindar, Numa, Cato, Scipio, Seneca; in short, every good and holy man and faithful soul from the beginning of the world to the end.*

* His last and fullest utterance on this subject occurs towards the close of his *Expositio Chr. Fidei*, where, speaking of eternal life, he thus addresses the French king: "Deinde sperandum est tibi visurum esse sanctorum, prudentium, fidelium, canstantium, fortium, virtuosorum omnium, quicunque a condito mundo fuerunt sodalitatem, cœtum et contubernium. Hic duos Adam, redemptum ac Redemptorem: hic Abelum, Enochum, Noam, Abrahamum, Isaacum, Jacobum, Judam, Moysen, Josuam, Gedeonem, Samuelem, Pinhen, Heliam, Heliseum, Isaiam, a deiparam Virginem de qua ille præcinit, Davidem, Ezekiam, Josiam, Baptistam Petrum, Paulum: hic HERCULEM, THESEUM, SOCRATEM, ARISTIDEM, ANTIGONUM, NUMAM, CAMILLUM, CATONES, SCIPIONES: hic Ludovichum pium antecessoresque tuos Ludovicos, Philippos, Pipinnos, et quotquot in fide hinc migrarunt maiores tuos videbis. Et summatim, non fuit vir bonus, non erit mens sancta, non fidelis anima, ab ipso mundi exordio usque ad eius consummationem, quem non istic cum Deo visurus. Quo spectaculo quid lætius, quid amœnius, quid denique honorificentius vel cogitari poterit? Aut quo iustius omnes animi vires intendimus quam ad huiusmodi vitæ lucrum?" Similar passages occur in his *Epistolæ*, *Commentaries*, and tract on Providence.

For this liberality he was severely censured. The great and good Luther was horrified at the idea that even "the godless Numa" (!) should be saved, and thought that it falsified the whole gospel, without which there can be no salvation.*

Zwingli, notwithstanding his abhorrence of heathen idolatry and every relic of paganism in worship, retained, from his classical training in the school of Erasmus, a great admiration for the wisdom and the manly virtues of the ancient Greeks and Romans, and was somewhat unguarded in his mode of expression. But he had no idea of sending any one to heaven without the atonement, although he does not state when and how it was applied to those who died before the incarnation. In his mind the eternal election was inseparably connected with the plan of the Christian redemption. He probably assumed an unconscious Christianity among the better heathen, and a secret work of grace in their hearts, which enabled them to exercise a general faith in God and to strive after good works. (Comp. Rom. ii, 7, 10, 14, 15.) All truth, he says, proceeds from the Spirit of God. He might have appealed to Justin Martyr and other ancient fathers, who traced all that was true and good among the Greek philosophers and poets to the working of the Logos before his incarnation. (John i, 5, 10).†

* "Hoc si verum est, totum evangelium falsum est." Luther denied the possibility of salvation outside of the Christian Church. In his *Catech. Major*, Pars II, Art. III (ed. Rechenb., p. 503, ed. Müller, p. 460), he says: "Quicumque extra Christianitatem (ausser der Christenheit) sunt, sive Gentiles sive Turcæ sive Judæi aut falsi etiam Christiani et hypocritæ, quanquam unum tantum et verum Deum esse credant et invocent (ob sie gleich nur Einen wahrhaftigen Gott gläuben und anbeten,) neque tamen certum habent, quo erga eos animatus sit animo, neque quidquam favoris aut gratiæ de Deo sibi polliceri audent et possunt, quamobrem IN PERPETUA MANENT IRA ET DAMNATIONE (darum sie im ewigen Zorn und Verdammnis bleiben)."

† Dr. Dörner, with his usual fairness and fine discrimination, vindicates Zwingli against misrepresentations (*Gesch. d. Prot. Theol.*, p. 284): "Man hat daraus eine Gleichgültigkeit gegen den historischen Christus und sein Werk erschliessen wollen, dass er [Zwingli] auch von Heiden sagt: sie seien selig geworden; was die Heiden Weisheit nennen, das nennen die Christen Glauben. Allein er sieht in allem Wahren vor Christo mit manchen Kirchenvätern eine Wirkung und Offenbarung des Logos, ohne jedoch so weit zu gehen, mit Justin die Weisen des Alterthums, welche nach dem Logos gelebt haben, Christen zu nennen. Er sagt nur, sie seien nach dem Tode selig geworden, ähnlich wie auch die Kirche dasselbe von den Vätern des Alten Testaments annimmt. Er konnte dabei wohl diese Seligkeit als durch

During the period of rigorous scholastic orthodoxy which followed the Reformation in the Reformed and Lutheran Churches, Zwingli's view could not be appreciated, and appeared as a dangerous heresy. In the seventeenth century the Romanists excluded the Protestants, the Lutherans the Calvinists, the Calvinists the Arminians, from the kingdom of heaven; how much more all those who never heard of Christ? This wholesale damnation of the vast majority of the human race should have stirred up a burning zeal for their conversion; and yet during that whole period of intense confessionalism and exclusive orthodoxy there was not a single Protestant missionary in the field except John Eliot and David Brainerd among the Indians in the wilderness of North America.

But in modern times Zwingli's view has been revived and applauded as a noble testimony of his liberality, especially among evangelical divines in Germany, and partly in connection with a new theory of Hades and the middle state.

Christus gewirkt und erworben denken und hat dieselbe jedenfalls nur als in der Gemeinschaft mit Christus bestehend gedacht. Ist ihm doch durch den ewigen Rathschluss der Versöhnung Christus nicht bloss ewig gewiss, sondern auch gegenwärtig für alle Zeiten. So sind ihm jene Heiden doch selig nur durch Christus. Freilich das sagt er nicht, dass sie erst im Jenseits sich bekehren; auch er schneidet mit dem Diesseits die Bekehrung ab. Er lässt ihre im Diesseits bewährte Treue gegen das ihnen vom Logos anvertraute Pfund wahrer Erkenntnis die Stelle des Glaubens vertreten. Aber es ist wohl kein Zweifel, dass er sie im Jenseits zur Erkenntnis und Gemeinschaft Christi gelangend denkt. Bei den Frommen Alten Testaments fordert auch die Kirche zu ihrem Heil nicht eine bestimmtere Erkenntnis Christi im Diesseits, die sie höchstens den Propheten' zuschreiben könnte." Ebrard (in his *History of the Dogma of the Lord's Supper*, vol. ii, p. 77) fully adopts Zwingli's view: "Jetzt wird ihm wohl Niemand mehr daraus ein Verbrechen machen. Wir wissen, dass Röm. ii, 7: 'Denen, die in Beharrlichkeit des Gutes nach unvergänglichem Wesen TRACHTEN,' ewiges Leben verheissen ist; wir wissen dass nur der positive Unglaube an das angebotene Heil weder hier noch dort vergeben wird, dass nur auf ihn die Strafe des ewigen Todes gesetzt ist; wir wissen, dass auf die erste Auferstehung der in Christo Entschlafenen noch eine zweite der ganzen übrigen Menschheit folgen soll, die alsdann gerichtet werden sollen nach ihren Werken, und dass im neuen Jerusalem selber die Blätter des Lebensbaumes dienen sollen zur Genesung der Heiden (Apok. xxii, 2). Zwingli hat also an der Hand der heiligen Schrift das Heidenthum ebenso wie das Judenthum als zu dem *στοιχείου τοῦ νόμου* gehörig (Gal. iv, 1-3) angesehen, und mit vollem Rechte einen Sokrates neben einen Abraham gestellt. Ihm besteht die Seligkeit darin, dass das ganze Wunderwerk der göttlichen Weltpädagogik in seinen Früchten klar und herrlich vor den Blicken der erstaunten Seligen da liegt."

The future fate of the heathen is wisely involved in mystery, and it is unsafe and useless to speculate without the light of revelation about matters which lie beyond the reach of our observation and experience. But the Bible consigns no one to final damnation except for rejecting Christ in unbelief, and gives us at least a ray of hope by significant examples of uncovenanted faith from Melchizedek and Job down to the wise men from the East, and by a number of passages concerning the working of the Logos among the Gentiles. (John i, 5, 10; Rom. i, 19; ii, 14, 15, 18, 19; Acts xvii, 23, 28; 1 Pet. iii, 19; iv, 6.) We certainly have no right to confine God's election and saving grace to the limits of the visible Church. We are indeed bound to his ordinances and must submit to his terms of salvation; but God himself is free, and can save whomsoever and howsoever he pleases, and he is infinitely more anxious and ready to save than we can conceive.

ARTICLE VI.—BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL.

SOME years since Prof. Creasy, of University College, London, wrote his book on the "*Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*." He does not include the battle of Bunker Hill in that number, though he does place in his list the defeat of Burgoyne, by the Americans, at Saratoga. It is true, he writes in accordance with a certain standard or definition, which he borrows from Hallam. By that rule, a decisive battle "may justly be reckoned among those few battles of which a contrary result would have materially varied the drama of the world in all its subsequent events." The idea of Prof. Creasy's book is an attractive one. The mind finds a pleasure in concentrating so much of human history around these few hours of destiny. But when one stops to meditate carefully upon the subject he finds a certain difficulty in the application of the theory. In periods of civil war or in struggles between opposing nations, where the contest is protracted and is marked by many distinct and successive battles, it is hard, indeed, to tell which one of these should be called decisive, or whether any one of them, separated from the others, can properly be called so. Prof. Creasy does not choose the *closing* battle of our revolutionary struggle to occupy a place in his select list, and if he had taken the *opening* one, it would certainly seem to many readers as fit for the place as the one he chooses.

In truth, it often takes a very long time to tell what is a great and decisive historical event of any kind. The landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth, a small and humble affair in itself, has been steadily growing upon the thought of the world for two hundred and fifty years, and will doubtless enlarge in its proportions as time advances. When the news of the first Bull Run battle, and its disastrous result, went through the North, we all sat down in "sackcloth and ashes." It was, perhaps, the most painful and despairing moment of the war. But, directly and indirectly, that battle stands to-day as one of the important links in the chain of causes ensuring the full

and complete triumph of the Northern army. Looking back over the whole series of events, during the four years' struggle, we could better spare many victories than that defeat. Prof. Creasy would seem, by general consent, to be abundantly justified in placing the battle of Waterloo, as he does, on his illustrious roll. But even in so important and momentous an action as that, we can very easily question whether it reaches the full and exact demands of his definition. Suppose Napoleon had been victorious in that battle, can any one be quite sure that the allied nations would have left him victorious, and would not have defeated him and deprived him of power within a twelvemonth afterwards?

We have reached the centennial year of the opening of the revolutionary struggle, and we do well to go back and dwell amid the heroic men and the heroic thoughts of that day. And it is the suggestion of one who has made our New England history a careful study, that if we would know what our liberties cost our fathers, we should make little of the "glittering generalities" of public parades and make much of our local town histories—bring out the facts as they are embodied in the records of the old New England townships, and come face to face with those stern realities. We have but recently passed through a great struggle, involving armies of such vast numbers as utterly dwarf the armies of the Revolution. But if we will search the histories of towns, we shall find that this recent war made no such demands upon the people as did this great contest for liberty, a hundred years ago. There were but few men then, of military age, who did not serve for longer or shorter periods in the revolutionary army. And the women of that period are not to be overlooked in the reminiscences of that protracted struggle. They stood in their lot, and bore the burdens of those times with more than Roman firmness—with Christian patience and self-denial and fortitude.

The action at Bunker Hill was the first in the revolutionary series that rises into the dignity of a battle. The fight at Lexington and Concord in the preceding April, the still earlier pass at Salem, and the passages at arms at Middle Island and Grape Island, can, none of them, be ranked above skirmishes, of varying importance. And the fight at Bunker Hill lacks

many of the elements of true scientific warfare. In this battle the Americans were, at last, defeated. The English claimed the victory, and our own people, after a sort, conceded that claim. The whole affair, at first, was not reckoned to our glory, or advantage. It was regarded by many as a rash and unfortunate opening of a struggle, that might have been warded off by patience and diplomacy. The chief actors in it were looked upon by multitudes as violent and hot-headed men, who had "sowed the wind and reaped the whirlwind."*

But now, at the end of one hundred years, as we turn our thoughts back to this revolutionary period, no battle in all the series stands out before us in such distinctness as this. Most people probably will find, if they inquire of their own thoughts, that out of all their historical readings, they somehow hold this battle in more living remembrance than any other of that protracted war. Let men, without stopping to refresh their memories, attempt to enumerate the principal battles of the revolutionary struggle, and ask themselves what they remember of their immediate antecedents and consequents, of the numbers engaged on either side, and the varying fortunes of the contending armies, and, if we mistake not, they will find themselves more at home in respect to the battle of Bunker Hill than any other. They have no such distinct impressions even of the battle of Yorktown, which ended the war, as of this, which opened it.

It is quite a noticeable fact that some of the earliest and strongest testimonials to the honor of the American side in that battle came from England. Distance did for the English observer what *time* at length did for us. Mr. Frothingham, in his

* "At first it was regarded with disappointment, and even with indignation; and contemporary accounts of it, whether private or official, are rather in the tone of apology, or of censure, than of exultation. The enterprise, on the whole, was pronounced rash in the conception, and discreditable in the execution; and a severe scrutiny was instituted into the conduct of those who were charged with having contributed, by their backwardness, to the result. No one, for years, came forward to claim the honor of having directed it; no notice was taken of its returning anniversary, and no narrative did justice to the regiments that were engaged, or to the officers who were in command. * * * As time rolled on, its connection with the great movement of the age appeared in its true light. Hence the battle of Bunker Hill now stands out as the grand opening scene in the drama of the American Revolution."—*Frothingham's Siege of Boston*, pp. 154–155.

"Siege of Boston," quotes from a speech of Mr. Johnstone in the House of Commons, Oct. 30th, 1775. "To a mind who loves to contemplate the glorious spirit of freedom, no spectacle can be more affecting than the action at Bunker's Hill. To see an irregular peasantry, commanded by a physician,* inferior in number, opposed by every circumstance of cannon and bombs, that could terrify timid minds, calmly await the attack of the gallant Howe, leading on the best troops in the world, with an excellent train of artillery, and twice repulsing those very troops, who had often chased the chosen battalions of France, and at last retiring for want of ammunition, but in so respectable a manner that they were not even pursued,—who can reflect on such scenes, and not adore the constitution of government which could breed such men." And there were not a few similar testimonials and eulogies from English minds; for whatever faults we may find with the Englishmen of that day or any day, it cannot be denied that they have an hereditary fondness and admiration for pluck and fair play.

For some years before 1775, the British government had been slowly and quietly concentrating a greater military force in and about Boston. Up to the year 1767, there had been a few troops garrisoned in Fort William, as was natural for any town of the size and importance of Boston. This force was not for the overawing, but for the protection of the town, and the people desired its presence. In that year (1767) an addition was made to the customary garrison. In 1768, "a body of seven hundred, covered by the fleet, landed in Boston, and with charged muskets marched to the common, amid the sullen silence of the people." A month later, portions of the 64th and 65th regiments followed. These troops were quartered in the town, but so many collisions occurred between the soldiers and the citizens, followed, at length, by the massacre of March 5th, 1770, that the troops were withdrawn from the town and lodged at the Fort. In 1773 the tea was thrown overboard. On the 13th of May, 1774, General Gage landed in Boston, under his appointment of Captain-General and Governor of Massachusetts. On the 14th of June following came in the 4th regiment—a choice

* Gen. Warren, who was supposed by many to have commanded, but did not.

regiment called the King's Own. The day following came the 43d regiment. On the 4th and 5th of July came in the 5th and 38th regiments. On the 6th of August came the 59th regiment, which was quartered at Salem. The population of Boston at this time was about 17,000, generally patriotic, but with its due proportion of Tories.

In April, 1775, when the fight at Lexington and Concord occurred, the British troops, in and about the town, numbered not far from 4,000. The business of that day cost the Americans 92 men, in killed, wounded and missing, and the British 273. This event was followed by the rapid concentration of troops on both sides, so that by the 17th of June the British forces about Boston numbered about 10,000 men, with several ships of war (six taking part in the battle) and with parks of artillery, the best that age afforded.

From such estimates as were made, the American forces gathered outside the town were not far from 16,000, of which Massachusetts is credited with 11,500, Connecticut with 2,300, New Hampshire with 1,200 and Rhode Island with 1,000. It was but natural that Massachusetts, in whose territories these scenes were transpiring, should have, at this early date, far more than her proportionate number. We have recently listened to an able and spirited paper, read before the Historic and Genealogical Society of Boston, by a gentleman of that city, formerly resident in New Hampshire, in which he claims a larger service for that State, in these opening scenes of the Revolution, than she has generally been credited with, although the open page of history shows New Hampshire to excellent advantage. But this paper claimed, among other things, that the lower tier of towns in New Hampshire, which were, at that time, the most populous portions of the State, poured their men into the Massachusetts regiments, and that there was a large number of New Hampshire men even in Prescott's regiment, which fought so bravely at the redoubt. There were also other important claims which seemed to be very well fortified, but upon which we cannot now dwell. There is no doubt that the men of New Hampshire, many of them the descendants of the Scotch-Irish

that fought about Londonderry, did heroic service at the battle of Bunker Hill, and through the whole course of the war.*

These 16,000 men gathered about Boston were stretched around the city in a large semi-circle. The right wing under Gen. John Thomas was at Roxbury and Dorchester, numbering, perhaps, from 5,000 to 6,000. The center, composed of some 7,500, was at Cambridge under Gen. Artemas Ward, the commander-in-chief, so far as there was any commander-in-chief. Here General Israel Putnam, of Connecticut, reported himself on the 21st of April, two days after the fight at Lexington, and the parole word that night, in the little army, was "Putnam." The left wing, in detachments, occupied Charlestown Neck, Medford, Malden, Chelsea, and other neighboring localities.

But, in a military point of view, this was a broken and feeble organization. It was not yet settled who commanded these forces as a whole. General Ward, at Cambridge, was the central figure of the group, and was really commander-in-chief over the Massachusetts troops. But it was not clear that he had the right to command the troops from Connecticut or Rhode Island. New Hampshire had placed her men under him, so that he had the same essential authority over them as over the men of Massachusetts. But the final and authoritative word to the men of Connecticut and to the men of Rhode Island rested with the States from which they came. It is true, the very exigencies of the case gave a general supervision and right to command to General Ward, and, in the main, he was obeyed by all these forces. But he might be disobeyed, even at some critical moment, under cover of another authority. These 16,000 men, most of them raw and untrained in the arts of war, were guarding a line some ten or fifteen miles in circuit. As we look back upon these scenes, the wonder is that General Gage, with the best troops of England at his command, did not break through at any point, or all points, and scatter to the four winds this miscellaneous and half-organized crowd of

* There is considerable ground for the claim, that among the fighting soldiers in the action—those that stood to their guns and twice repulsed the enemy with great loss—the State of New Hampshire had more than any other State. And the men of New Hampshire, under Stark and Reed, occupied and successfully defended a point towards which the chief attack of the enemy was first directed.

farmers, armed only with such weapons as they could pick up. That he remained quietly cooped up in Boston, during the two months, while these outside forces were gathering, is probably due to the remembrances of that bloody excursion into the country on the 19th of April. A few months before the fight at Lexington, a British officer had written home from Boston : "As to what you hear of their taking arms to resist the force of England, it is mere bullying, and will go no farther than words ; whenever it comes to blows, he that can run the fastest will think himself best off ; believe me, any two regiments here ought to be decimated if they did not beat, in the field, the whole force of the Massachusetts province ; for though they are numerous, they are but a mere mob, without order or discipline, and very awkward at handling their arms." That, very likely, was the common sentiment in the British army stationed at Boston, in January, 1775. But a very material change of sentiment had taken place by the months of May and June of the same year. Before that time, it had been found out that excursions of British soldiers into the country were attended with considerable danger, and General Gage, even with so many tried and veteran troops at his command, did not think it altogether safe to attempt to break through this military line, however contemptible it might seem in a military point of view. But there were loud complaints of his masterly inactivity at home, and he was pushed by public sentiment towards some movement. On the other hand, within the American lines, and throughout the New England towns, there was a feeling of discontent, that so many able-bodied farmers should be compelled to stay about Boston, doing nothing. Planting time had gone by, and the season for haying and harvesting was coming on and nothing was done. On both sides there was a strong pressure for some onward movement, to break up the dead monotony.

It came to the ears of the Americans that a project was on foot, within the British lines, to attack the right wing of our army, under General Thomas, and gain possession of the high lands of Dorchester and Roxbury. This expedition was planned for Sunday night, June 18th. A crisis had at length come. Something must be done, and one of the most important questions to be settled in regard to this whole matter is, who it

was that originated the plan of pre-occupying the British forces, by taking possession of and fortifying the high hills of Charlestown.

There are two writers who have made a specialty of the battle of Bunker Hill. They have sought to find out, from all existing records and evidences, every thing that can be known of it in its inception and progress. Many others have done essentially the same thing. But perhaps there are none who have so thoroughly compassed the field as the two to whom we have referred. Col. Samuel Swett, a native of Newburyport, born in 1782 and dying in Boston, 1866, published the "*History of Bunker Hill Battle*" in 1827, and a vigorous pamphlet, growing out of the subject, in 1850. Richard Frothingham, Jr., born in Charlestown in 1812, and still living there, published a much larger work, "*The Siege of Boston*," in 1849, and supplemented the work with an extended and able pamphlet, in 1850. In matters of fact and detail, these two authors have furnished to the world about all that may be known of this opening battle of the Revolution. But they are in direct antagonism on one important point, and that relates to the question, Who was the military commander in the battle? Colonel Sweet is very stout and earnest in his claim that the chief commander that day was General Putnam, and Mr. Frothingham is set in the opinion that Colonel Prescott was the man.*

A point of great importance in itself, and also as throwing light upon the above question, relates to the very beginnings of this enterprise. Who suggested the idea? Who originated the plan? It is very certain that it did not come from General Ward. He was a very cautious man. His idea, all along, in

* We have examined the long and, in some respects, able article, making the entire June number of the "*Historical Magazine*," for 1868, by its editor, Henry B. Dawson, Esq. This article bristles with learned and historical evidences and shows large labor in the preparation. In this respect, perhaps, no other single contribution on the Bunker Hill battle equals it. But we do not admire the spirit or judgment of the article. It is not above numerous insinuations that General Putnam *might have been* playing the part of a *traitor* in all this enterprise. Such suggestions were made by certain men long ago, and were long ago exploded. It is rather late in the day to give currency to any such ideas. But even in doing so, it is, in a sense, implied that Putnam was the commander of the expedition, for how could he prepare this offering for the British lion if he was not in general command?

those days, was not to provoke the British, but to act strictly on the defensive. When he heard of this project of theirs for June 18th, his philosophy would be to strengthen the right wing, and patiently await the attack. It is very certain that it did not originate with General Warren; for he also thought the expedition a rash one, and so expressed himself; but he was one of those grand and noble souls, who could not bear that other men should be imperilling their lives for liberty and he be counted out; and so, the sound of the guns called him to Bunker Hill, where he out-ranked every officer on the field, and was urged to take the general command, but declined. He fought as a private soldier, and his death that day touched the national heart in its tenderest sensibilities.

Gen. Israel Putnam, born in Massachusetts, but from the age of early manhood living in Connecticut, was a man of a very different style and way of thinking. It took only two days for the fight at Lexington to report itself to him, at his plough, in the quiet fields of Pomfret, and for him to report himself at General Ward's headquarters at Cambridge. He was there on the 21st of April. And he had a speedy following, from all parts of his little State. Colonel Swett says: "Republican Connecticut, the secure asylum of the regicide judges, was behind none of the provinces in determined hostility to Britain, for not only civil, but religious liberty, paramount with her to all earthly considerations, was in danger. In her vocabulary the British were the Philistines, and Putnam, the American Samson, a chosen instrument to defeat the foe; and fortunately she inspired her confidence into all her sister States. With her usual sagacity, however, this province, notwithstanding a confident reliance on supernatural aid, employed all human means to secure it. Her State constitution and establishments were unchanged, her troops the best armed, disciplined, and provisioned, in the army."

General Putnam soon grew weary of the inaction along the American lines. His policy was to pester the British army at every assailable point; to hang around its skirts with daily torments; to harden our men by action; to accustom them, little by little, to the crack of muskets and the roar of artillery. In the month of May, he went with a party of men and

destroyed a British armed vessel near Chelsea. When he returned, wet and covered with mud, he met General Ward and said to him, "I wish we could have something of this kind to do every day. It would teach our men how little danger there is from cannon balls, for though they have sent a great many at us, nobody has been hurt by them." General Ward replied: "As peace and reconciliation is what we seek for, would it not be better to act only on the defensive and give no unnecessary provocation?"

The above anecdote is from the interesting paper* prepared, in 1825, by Col. Daniel Putnam, son of General Putnam. While the delicate feelings of a son towards an honored father might make him to be regarded as a prejudiced witness, yet, other things being equal, it must be confessed that no other person could know the minute facts of this eventful history as well as he. For this Daniel Putnam was driving the team, his father holding the plough, when the news from Lexington and Concord reached Pomfret. He went with his father to Cambridge, and was almost constantly with him for the next four years. He was fifteen years old at the time of Bunker Hill battle, and all the events of that day were deeply impressed upon his memory. He had no doubt that his father set on foot the operations that led to the battle of Bunker Hill, and that he was the chief person in command during that momentous day.

It is very evident from all cotemporary history that General Putnam was one of the chief and guiding spirits at Cambridge during the two months that preceded the battle; that he chafed at the delay and inaction of those months, like a lion confined in his cage. Colonel Putnam relates another interesting anecdote of his father, belonging to a period just a little later, but illustrating his temper, in contrast with the prevailing current of thought and feeling around him. Washington reached Cambridge and took command of the army, July 3d, a fortnight after the Bunker Hill battle. He and General Putnam were much together. As often as once a week they dined

*Published in the first volume of the collections of the Connecticut Historical Society.

together at each other's headquarters. Once, at Washington's table, the Commander-in-chief gave as his toast, "*A speedy and honorable peace.*" At the next dinner, at General Putnam's, the host gave, "*A long and moderate war.*" The son relates the sequel as follows: "It has been truly said of Washington that he seldom smiled and almost never laughed; but the sober and sententious manner in which Putnam delivered his sentiment, and its seeming contradiction to all his practice, came so unexpectedly on Washington, that he did laugh more heartily than I ever remember to have seen him before or after."

But to return. Some one originated the idea of fortifying Charlestown Heights on the night of the 16th of June, and thus giving the British something to do, besides attacking the right wing of the American army at Roxbury. Somebody originated the idea and prevailed upon the Committee of Safety to sanction the plan and allow it to be carried out. Gen. Ward was not the man to think any such thought. Gen. Warren was the chairman of the Committee of Safety and opposed the motion, but when it was carried, he was noble and generous about it, as it was in his nature to be. Col. Putnam relates that his father, in his hours of busy thought and abstraction, had the habit of talking aloud to himself, and between the 10th and 17th of June his mutterings would take such forms as these: "We must go there"—"Think they will come out" * * "We must go in the night"—"We'll carry our tools and have a trench before morning"—"He's a good fellow"—"He wants to go"—"Says he will go if they'll let him"—"Lay still—*lay still I say*, till they come close"—"They won't hurt you"—"I know 'em of old, they fire without aim."

Looking over the men and the events of that day carefully, we cannot discover any man toward whom all the evidence seems to point, as the chief originator of the idea and plan of the battle, so clearly as to Gen. Putnam. In all those scenes Col. Prescott acted so grand and noble a part, that no one can have any wish, in the slightest degree, to detract from his fame. But his rank was that of Colonel, while Putnam had the rank and title of General, conferred upon him the year before by the State of Connecticut. According to all military rule, in such circumstances, Col. Prescott's part would be subordinate.

It may indeed be justly suggested that in this early stage of the war, and in the somewhat confused and uncertain relations of the troops from the several States, strict military laws and usages did not prevail—that there was not, in fact, the same exact regard to rank and titles as ordinarily, but that the battle was a kind of copartnership of limited and separate commands. There is some reason for this conception. It is in evidence, however, that they did not disregard rank and titles on that day; for when Gen. Warren came on to the ground, during the forenoon, Gen. Putnam first met him and as a matter of propriety offered him the command, which Gen. Warren graciously declined. It might very well be asked, if Gen. Putnam did not understand that he was in command, how he could give it into the hands of Gen. Warren. When Warren declined, Putnam advised him to go to the redoubt. It is true, the same thing essentially happened there. Prescott offered Warren the command of the little fortress, which he also declined. But there is no evidence that Prescott included in this idea the general conduct of the battle outside the redoubt. He meant to give him what he had in his own charge, and that was the earth-works which the men, under his direction, had thrown up in the night. A large and important part of the battle was outside these earth-works, but here was Prescott's special charge, and he does not seem to have been absent from this post during the day, on any general oversight, as Putnam most clearly was.

But we have said enough on this point for the present. There will probably be two opinions about it long as the world stands, for the time is past for any perfect historical demonstration. As Mr. Frothingham has very justly said, in all the early years following the battle no one came forward to claim the honor of originating and conducting it; and when time had thrown its halo of glory over this action, so many of the men who participated in it were dead and gone, that the inquiry only ended in a dispute.

The night of the 16th of June was one of the shortest of the year. We have brought with us from our early readings the strong impression that the moon was shining on that night, and have been quite surprised, in all the authorities we have

happened to consult, that nothing is said about the moon. For this would certainly be an element of no little importance to the thousand men who took up their stations on those Charlestown hills that summer evening. They could not make use of artificial lights, for these would instantly reveal their presence and their plan. We have fortunately found an old almanac of 1775, prepared by Nathaniel Low of Ipswich, patriotic enough for the opening year of the Revolution. It has a four-page "address to the inhabitants of Boston," on the political events and signs of the times. It has an awful wood-cut for a frontispiece, entitled, "The virtuous Patriot at the hour of death." It is a dying scene, old and young standing and kneeling around, with rough wood-cut agony in all their faces. The clouds above are in a rolling and tumultuous state, and huge, lusty angels are pressing through with great energy and haste to get at the dying patriot. And underneath the picture we have these two vigorous lines:

"If Prayers and Tears the PATRIOT life could save,
None but usurping Villains Death should have."*

But these are only incidentals. We consulted the almanac for a graver purpose. The moon rose that night at 10 o'clock and 58 minutes—two minutes before 11. It was the waning moon. The moon was full that month, on the 13th, at noon. We have the idea that the moon had much to do in determining the events of those few days. If it be said that the movement on the American side was determined by the news heard from the British camp, this may only remove the fact a step farther back; for it is not unlikely that the night of Sunday, the 18th, was chosen by the British for their attack on the

* And while we are upon this bit of description, we cannot forbear reference to an item of grim humor in the shape of a little story or fable, which we find in the almanac, and which shows that the men of that day were as good at fun as they were at fighting. The fable, in brief, is this. A miser, dying, comes to the river Styx, and inquires of Charon how much it will cost to be ferried over. Aghast at the price named, he plunges in and swims across to save the fee. This was such an atrocious attempt to defraud the infernal revenues, that long consultations ensued as to the punishment to be inflicted upon him. All sorts of horrible devices are suggested, but finally he is brought before Minos, the Judge, who says that all the penalties named are too light for the offence, and he shall sentence him to return to earth and see how his heirs are spending his property.

southern heights because of this very state of the moon. They would have the advantage of darkness, in the earlier hours, to conceal their movements, and the moon would come up between 12 and 1 o'clock to guide and assist them, when they were ready for the onset.

But however all this may be, the thousand men who were to fortify the heights of Charlestown paraded on Cambridge Common at 9 o'clock on Friday night, June 16th, and were commended to the divine care and protection, in an impressive prayer by President Samuel Langdon of Harvard College (made president in the preceding year). They then marched, with their intrenching tools, and rations for twenty-four hours, to the high lands of Charlestown, a distance of some three miles, reaching the place not far from 10 o'clock. Charlestown is a peninsula, about half a mile across in its wider parts, and about a mile in length from the water of the Bay to the Neck, where it connects with the main land. On the north-easterly side of this peninsula is the Mystic River; on the south-westerly side the Charles River, which has been made narrower near the mouth since that day, by fillings in from the Boston and Charlestown sides. The town of Charlestown, at that period, did not, of course, stretch over the peninsula as now, but was nestled near the shore at the south-westerly corner, directly opposite from Boston. The highest land on the peninsula was Bunker Hill, even then well known by that name. This was 110 feet above the water level. As the troops came in from Cambridge over the neck, they would at once begin to ascend this hill. The orders were to fortify Bunker Hill. But when the force came to that height a long parley ensued. The height was good and commanding, but it was too far back from the enemy to suit the purposes of the daring expedition. Breed's Hill, not then commonly known by that name, was a lower elevation, only 62 feet high, but a fifth of a mile nearer to the town of Boston and the bay. In the consultations of that night there were differences of opinion as to the latitude allowed by the instructions given to the intrenching company. As we have said above, the elevation called Breed's Hill was not generally known by that name at that time, and might, not unnaturally, be regarded as a mere swell in the general

slope from Bunker Hill to the bay, and so be taken, by a little stretch of interpretation, as a part of the general mass known as Bunker Hill, and with this interpretation, not outside of the instructions. At any rate, Breed's Hill was chosen for the main redoubt, and lesser defences in the course of the night, or following forenoon, were erected on Bunker Hill, and on Prospect Hill, another neighboring elevation. But in addition to these, and playing a very important part in the battle, was a slighter and more hastily prepared line of defence, in the shape of two rail fences, brought near together and packed between with the new-mown hay, which had just been cut on those grassy slopes. This protecting barrier started near the redoubt and went first diagonally in a north-west direction towards Bunker Hill more than 600 feet, then turning nearly at right angles, it dropped down almost to Mystic River; and when Stark's New Hampshire troops came in from Medford, in the afternoon, on the day of the battle, and were ordered to take their station on this line of defence, close down by the Mystic, they gathered the loose stones along the shore, and completed the line in that shape, to the water's edge. From the angle above named to the shore was a distance of more than 900 feet—the whole fence line about 1,500 feet.

And in the building of this redoubt by night, we have what seems to us an important item of evidence, showing that Gen. Putnam was the directing officer of this expedition, though in the half-organized condition of military affairs, already referred to, he might make the occasion one of conference and consultation rather than of full military authority. It is not claimed that he marched from Cambridge with the thousand men. But there is evidence enough that he was on the ground soon after they were. So far as we understand military affairs, this fact in itself would seem to imply that he was there in a high capacity than Col. Prescott, who led the intrenching party. It accords with what we suppose to be the habits of higher officers in the conduct of military enterprises. They set the movements on foot,—the preliminary steps are taken, and then come upon the scene when their presence is necessary. Let it be remembered, that the honor now in question belongs to Gen. Putnam or Col. Prescott by general consent. In the

divided opinions of that night, as to the best point for entrenching, it was nearly 12 o'clock before ground was broken. Then the men went on vigorously with their work under the light of the moon. The night was calm and clear, and the precursor of a long, hot summer day. The redoubt was so near to Charlestown and the harbor, that the British sentries could be heard through the still night, calling out, from time to time, "all's well," without the remotest suspicion that a thousand men were hard at work two hundred rods away. Daybreak comes early in the middle of June, as every New England farmer's boy knows by painful experience. Almost as soon as the dawn broke, a discovery was made from the ships as to what was going on at Charlestown, and an artillery fire was opened upon the half-completed redoubt from the ships and the forts, and this fire continued at intervals, sometimes with great energy, and sometimes in a more lagging manner, during all the forenoon. At the first noise of the cannon all Boston flocked to the steeples and housetops to know the meaning of the uproar, and citizens, patriotic and tory, British officers and soldiers, marvelled at the almost unparalleled audacity of the men, who had pushed themselves close to the teeth of the British lion, and seemed very much disposed to stay where they were.

We do not propose to give any minute and continuous account of the events of that day. The story, at least in its bold outlines, is familiar to every school-boy. We are more concerned with certain outside and incidental things, not so familiarly known, and which, to the general reader, may help to set the battle in a clearer light, in its personal and historical relations.

And, at this late day, we ought not to be unable or unwilling to give the due meed of honor to our adversaries. They had already learned by sore experience that the Americans would fight, and in taking the position they had that night, it was plain that they meant to proceed to business. But the British were not compelled to adopt the course they did. With their ships of war, they could, in a few days at least, have so harassed the redoubt, and cut off its connection with the main land at Charlestown Neck, that our men would have been

driven to capitulate. But the glove had been thrown down and they would not resort to any safe and skulking way to gain their ends. They thought it more plucky and heroic to administer a prompt and bold punishment. We may well believe that they had no conception of the costly sacrifice to be made in pursuing the course they did. But they accepted the challenge like heroic soldiers, as they were. We may well have an admiration for those battle-lines, that could be moved a second and a third time up those grassy and bloody slopes, into the face of that terrible musketry, which had already thickly strewn the ground with the dead and dying.

The battle proper did not begin till about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The expectation of the early morning evidently was, that a few cannon balls, wisely administered, would put an end to the whole business. But after a time, it became apparent that those men were not to be easily or hastily driven from their position. About noon began the process of taking the British troops across the Charles river to Morton Point, a place covered and protected by rising land, so that it could not be reached from the redoubt, either by musketry or artillery. About 3 o'clock the British battle lines were formed and the upward movement began. Howe led the right wing, and his plan and purpose was to break through that fence arrangement, near the Mystic river. This was the primary idea of the British, in the first and second attacks. If they could break the American line at the fence, they could then sweep round, and encompass the fort on all sides. But the fence line was not broken that day. Both in the first and second attacks, the left wing of the British army, under Gen. Pigot, was held back a little, so that the general advance was in a slanting or diagonal line, in order that Gen. Howe might break through at that part of the defences which appeared very weak, and then, all together, they might close in on the redoubt. But this plan, twice attempted, and resulting in such terrible disasters, was then abandoned. The time between the first and second assaults was short. It was the same body of men, essentially, making the second attack that made the first, only weakened by its losses. The repulse in the second case was as sharp and decisive as in the first. We quote from a note in Frothing-

ham's "*Siege of Boston*" a few words, illustrating the dreadful execution of the American musketry, along the fence, on the front lines of the British right wing. A letter written to England, July 5th, 1775, by one who was probably in the action, says: "Most of our grenadiers and light infantry, the moment of presenting themselves, lost three-fourths, and many nine-tenths, of their men. Some had only eight and nine men a company left; some only three, four, and five." Another letter says: "It was found to be the strongest post that was ever occupied by any set of men."

There was a longer pause between the second and third attacks. Reinforcements were brought over. Gen. Clinton came over. It was hard work to prevail on the men to try that terrible ordeal again, and that they could be made to do so is proof that they were brave and heroic soldiers. But their fears, at this stage, were mostly idle. The ammunition on the hill was almost exhausted. The third attack avoided the fence and was aimed directly at the fort, and about 5 o'clock the redoubt was carried.

Gen. Ward, at Cambridge through all this battle, was a very cautious man; perhaps we ought to add, judicious. He had the theory that the British might take advantage of this movement and rush out from Boston and attack Cambridge. He was not able to see, through all that critical day, that the British had enough to occupy their minds and their hands so long as Putnam and Prescott stayed on Bunker Hill. The danger to Cambridge was in *their* defeat and not in any side and separate movement. The path to Cambridge that day, for the British forces, lay over the Charlestown heights; and indeed Gen. Clinton,—who was late in the action, and without the dreadful experiences of Howe and Pigot,—advised an immediate advance on Cambridge. But Howe had no taste for any further work, that afternoon. Gen Ward did not originally advise or approve of this daring attempt. It was altogether foreign to his genius, and he certainly was not prompt and cordial in his exercise of authority for the help of those heroes in the hour of their deadly struggle. It was not until between two and three o'clock in the afternoon that the New Hampshire men, under Stark and Reed, were brought in from Medford to

take their stations behind the fence. These New Hampshire men, with the Connecticut companies under Knowlton, by whose hands the fence had been mainly built before the coming of the New Hampshire regiments, did the best of service in the battle. Their line did not break or waver for a moment. After the taking of the redoubt, they had to join in the general retreat, but they were not driven from their post.

Many of the men brought in late on the American side, and not hardened at all by the cannonade of the morning, were frightened half to death by the hurly-burly of the scene, and were of very little use. But it was not so with those New Hampshire men under Stark and Reed. The wonder is, that among men recently gathered from farm labors, and with so little experience as soldiers, so many were found to be heroes, and so few cowards. Probably one of the standard topics for dreams with most men, from time to time, is battles and war-like adventures. And we should like to know how many men, who have never been in the army, are courageous in their dreams. We suspect that most of them are industriously looking round for some way out of the scrape, some tree, or fence, or wall behind which to hide. Cannon-balls and bullets and swords are very ugly things, and in the dreams of the night we apprehend that the average man is entirely ready to subscribe to Falstaff's sentiment that "the better part of valor is discretion."

Gen. Putnam was here and there and everywhere, that day, as an officer in general command would naturally be. He was back and forth from Cambridge, across the neck¹ which the British ships were raking with their guns, hurrying up reinforcements, indignant at the slowness and delay, but trying hard to infuse his own life and courage and energy into all officers and soldiers. He had to encounter a good many cowards, as was inevitable, and he sometimes lost all patience with them. But he found, also, a large number of heroes, who stood firm as a rock, so long as it was possible to stand. At the fort, he needed to exercise no particular care. Prescott was there, in whom he had unlimited confidence. That was his post of duty, and no man could fill it better. And as we have already suggested, it may be that in this whole enterprise

there was a kind of understood co-partnership between Prescott and Putnam, and that Prescott's command at the redoubt was of such a kind that Putnam would not interfere with it. He was sure that everything would be done there that could be done. This may be true, and may serve as a kind of explanation of the enigma. But it is quite certain that Prescott gave his chief attention to matters within the redoubt, and was not occupied with the general outside movements.

Hardly anything can be more curious than to look into the cotemporary records of that time, in the shape of letters, newspaper articles, reports and despatches, and note the wide discrepancies in those narratives. If we open, for example, such a volume as "*Force's American Archives*," for the year 1775, in which are gathered the records of passing events, we shall be confronted with such differences of statement, even in simple and non-essential matters, where there could be no motive to pervert the truth, as will altogether astonish us. Letters written immediately after the battle, from the American camp, and from the British camp, so diversify the story, and present it in so many different forms, that one knows not what to believe. From some of the accounts, one might suppose that almost the first thing done by the British on Saturday morning, after the discovery of the redoubt, was to burn the village of Charlestown; whereas this conflagration occurred in the middle of the afternoon, about 3½ o'clock, probably just after the first unsuccessful assault. And the British were not altogether so barbarian in the burning of this village as most of our American histories would make them to be. They did, under the circumstances, what might be justified by the usages of war, rough and cruel usages as they have to be. In the first assault Gen. Pigot found that his extreme left wing was sorely vexed by concealed musketry fired from this village. A nest of sharpshooters was there, protected by the houses, who were picking off his men badly, and the order went forth to burn the village and break up this nest.

Then again, by some of the accounts, it would appear that the British began taking their men across for the assault quite early in the morning, but this movement did not begin till noon. From about 12 until 2 o'clock they were engaged in

transferring the troops to the Charlestown side. Some of the English letters, written at that time, claim that we had, in that action, three times as many men as they, but, in fact, we had not so many as they had. It is a large and liberal estimate of the Americans taking part in the battle to set the number at 3,500, and 1,500 of these, probably, were more in the way than helpers. The British troops and marines engaged in the conflict are believed, on careful estimate, to have been about 5,000, and certainly not less than 4,000. Gen. Gage, in his official report, sent to England, adroitly describes the troops in the action as "a body something above 2,000 men." But as he acknowledges a loss of 1,054, killed, wounded, and missing (the Americans claimed that his loss was about 1,500), he would find it hard to justify himself for such a terrible exposure of 2,000 men, when he had 8,000 troops more near at hand, who might have gone to their help. Gen. Gage's official report of this battle was never criticized on this side of the water with half the severity it met on the other side. But it was well understood at the time, that it did not, by any means, tell the whole truth. On our side, the record made in Gen. Ward's orderly book, immediately after the battle, gives the loss as follows: "Killed, 115; wounded, 305; captured, 30." But he had not all the facts at the time of the entry. A careful counting afterwards made the number of killed and missing 140; wounded, 271; captured, 30; total 461. There is no doubt that this latter account is essentially correct. The men on our side who fell at Bunker Hill were near their own homes, and were sadly missed, and there could be no concealment of facts. And this loss on our side was mostly in a few moments, at the very close of the battle. One writer says, in substance, that the discharge of the British musketry, when the retreat began, and our men were about twenty rods away, almost instantly killed and wounded more men than all before during the day.

But we have hardly begun to mention the discrepancies of these various papers and letters in the American Archives. So glaring and multiform are they that if we reasoned as some of our wise men of this generation do, about the little unimportant discrepancies of the New Testament, we should at once conclude that there had been no battle of Bunker Hill at all. On the other hand, the grand reality of the battle breaks through

all these discrepancies, and stands out upon those pages with a most graphic distinctness, just as the person and acts of Christ do in the stories of the four Evangelists.

It would be interesting to quote from these English letters, especially as it would show, what has before been suggested, that the most complimentary estimates of the American part in the battle, at that day, came from Englishmen. A British officer writing home from Boston, the next day, June 18th, to a gentleman in London, says: "In the prodigious confusion this place is now in, all I can tell is, that the troops behaved with the most unparalleled bravery, and after an engagement of nearly five hours, we forced the Provincials from their posts, redoubts, and intrenchments one by one. This victory has cost us very dear, indeed, as we have lost some of the best officers in the service, and a great number of private men. Nor do I see that we enjoy one solid benefit in return, or are likely to reap from it any one advantage whatever. We have, indeed, learned one melancholy truth, which is, that the *Americans*, if they were equally well commanded, are full as good soldiers as ours, and, as it is, are very little inferior to us, even in discipline and steadiness of countenance." Another letter reports that: "An *Irish* officer humorously said on the occasion that indeed we had *gained* but a *loss*." Still another letter says: "The battle lasted four hours and ended infinitely to our disadvantage. The flower of our army are killed or wounded."

This subject is one that might prolong itself indefinitely. But perhaps enough has been said to bring into view the salient points of the battle itself, and its outward and historical surroundings. It is proper, in drawing to a close, that we should bring a little more distinctly into view a few of the prominent actors in the battle. And here, again, it is but just to all parties to remark, that this great mass of papers to which we have referred, as preserved in the American Archives, seem to be marvelously silent on the question of the chief commander that day. In the reports of ordinary battles, we expect this to be mentioned or suggested as one of the first points. But the circumstances of this battle were very peculiar, and pages after pages, voluminously full, go on, without giving you any sure and certain clue as to who was at the head of it on the American side. In a general, and *very general*, sense

Ward might be called the commander, as he was the man of highest authority in the army. But his relations to the action have been sufficiently pointed out. It is not likely that it was a battle which fought *itself*, without any broad and superintending oversight. If so, such a style might be commended to the consideration of our military authorities.

Certainly the question of headship here ought not to awaken any State rivalries, for Prescott and Putnam were both Massachusetts men by birth and early education. Putnam received his stamp and impress of character before he ever removed to Connecticut. We conceive that the facts of that day point to him as the man in highest command on the field, and we will first speak of him in few words.

Israel Putnam was born at Salem, Mass., on the 7th of January, 1718, and was fifty-seven years old at the time of the battle of Bunker Hill. He removed to Pomfret, Conn., at the very beginning of his married life, in 1739, at the age of twenty-one. He performed important military services in the French and Indian war, and afterwards, from 1755-1764, rising, through various gradations, to the rank of colonel. When the stormy times came on, just before the opening of the revolutionary war, the people of Connecticut took the precaution to appoint him their general, and with that rank and title he went to Cambridge in 1775, and after many heroic acts, and with a daring impetuosity, that exposed him to many dangers, he managed to outlive the war, dying at Brooklyn, Conn., in 1790, at the age of seventy-two. He was a remarkable man from youth to old age. About the same number of people have heard the wolf story as the story of little George Washington and the hatchet. Turning the ear backward, we seem to hear, through the lapse of many years, the sound of the old familiar voices, starting off on the selection for school-reading. "When General Putnam first moved to Pomfret, Conn., the country was new and greatly infested with wolves." In the note below will be found a picture of him, in words more graphic and comprehensive than any man of this generation could give.*

* The following description of General Putnam, taken from Colonel Swett's notes, is from the pen of Judge Dana, formerly U. S. Senator from Maine, and a grandson of General Putnam. It is taken from a letter which was not written for publication, and is all the more valuable from this circumstance.

"In his person, for height, about the middle size; very erect; thick set, muscu—

Col. William Prescott was a native of Groton, Mass., where he was born February 20th, 1726, and was forty-nine years old at the time of the battle. He also had seen service in the army, was at the capture of Cape Breton, as a lieutenant, rose to the rank of captain, was offered a commission in the regular army, but declined. He inherited a large estate at Groton, where he lived, somewhat like a nobleman, upon his ample domains, with a free and generous hospitality. As troubles thickened about Boston, he, in the spring of 1775, raised a regiment from the towns around Groton, not a few of the New Hampshire men, as already suggested, joining it. With this he was on his way to Boston the very day that the battle of Lexington occurred, but did not reach Cambridge until after the British retreat. The whole air was full of the smell of gunpowder the very evening of his arrival, and he was a man ready for bold and adventur-

lar, and firm in every part. His countenance was open, strong, and animated; the features of his face large, well-proportioned to each other, and to his whole frame; his teeth fair and sound till death. His organs and senses were all exactly fitted for a warrior; he heard quickly, saw to an immense distance; and, though he sometimes stammered in conversation, his voice was remarkably heavy, strong, and commanding. Though facetious and dispassionate in private, when animated in the heat of battle, his countenance was fierce and terrible, and his voice like thunder. His whole manner was admirably adapted to inspire his soldiers with courage and confidence, and his enemy with terror. The faculties of his mind were not inferior to those of his body; his penetration was acute, his decision rapid, yet remarkably correct; and the more desperate his situation, the more collected and undaunted. With a courage of a lion, he had a heart that melted at the sight of distress; he could never witness suffering in any human being without becoming a sufferer himself; even the operation of blood-letting has caused him to faint. In viewing the field of battle, his distress was exquisite, until he had afforded friend and foe all the relief in his power. Once after a battle, on examining a bullet-wound through the head of a favorite officer, Captain Whiting, who died on the field, he fainted and was taken up for dead. Martial music roused him to the highest pitch; while solemn, sacred music set him into tears. In his disposition he was open and generous, almost to a fault; he never disguised; and in the social relations of life he was never excelled."

They tell a good story in Greenwich, Conn., the town where General Putnam rode down the stone steps on horseback. That was a long and precipitous descent, with the steps in the steeper part of it. Some years since an English gentleman was shown this place and was told the story connected with it. With an air of complacency, such as Englishmen sometimes have, he replied: "Oh, that is nothing very extraordinary. Our English riders, on a hunt, often go down steeper places than that." "But," said his companion, "your English dragons, in pursuit, didn't follow him."

ous service. He retired from the army for a season in 1777, but entered it again as a volunteer, and was present at the taking of Burgoyne at Saratoga. He was father of the distinguished judge and jurist, William Prescott, LL.D., and grandfather of the celebrated historian, William H. Prescott, LL.D., who has done so much to honor American literature at home and abroad. After the war he returned to his home in Groton, where he lived, and died in 1795, at the age of sixty-nine.*

Gen. Joseph Warren was an eminent physician, born at Roxbury, Mass., in 1741, and was 34 years old at the time of the battle. He had made himself very active in political affairs, in the year immediately preceding the Revolution. In the month of March, before the battle, he had given the oration in the old South Church, commemorative of the massacre of 1770, though the British officers in Boston had threatened the life of any man who should dare to speak in public on that occasion. He was, at the time of his death, president of the Massachusetts Congress, so called, and also chairman of the Committee of Safety. He mingled freely with the common people, though he was a graduate of Harvard College, and a polished scholar. He held familiar intercourse with the patriotic mechanics and laboring classes, and was greatly beloved by them. The circumstances of his death, as we have already said, were such as to cause a very great mourning for him, and his memory is sacredly embalmed

* The following is a picture of Colonel Prescott, from the pen of General Burbeck, and preserved in Colonel Swett's narrative of the battle of Bunker Hill:

"Figure to yourself a man of sixty [mistake], six feet high, and somewhat round-shouldered, sun-burned from exposure, with coarse leather shoes and blue stockings, coarse, home-spun small-clothes, a red waistcoat, and a calico banian, answering to the sack worn at the present day, a three-cornered hat with a red cockade, and a bandoleer or belt, with a sword hung high up under the left arm. You will say that it is a complete caricature; but such was the fact, and such was the dress of the heroes who fought at the battle of Bunker Hill."

The following is from the pen of Colonel Swett himself, and is a graphic description of Colonel Prescott as he appeared and acted immediately after the battle:

"Prescott repaired to Cambridge, furious as a lion driven from his lair, foaming with indignation at the want of support when victory was in his grasp—a victory dearly purchased with the precious blood of his soldiers, family, and friends. He demanded but two fresh regiments of Ward, and pledged his life with them to drive the enemy to their boats. He had not yet done enough to satisfy himself though he had done enough to satisfy his country. He had not, indeed, secured final victory, but he had secured a glorious immortality."

in the hearts of the American people. He had been made a major-general by the Massachusetts Congress only three days before the battle, and might have taken the command on the field, but chose to act in the capacity of a volunteer soldier.

Gen. Seth Pomeroy, a native of Peekskill, N. Y., but then resident at Northampton, Mass., was another hero, who fought that day as a private soldier, though with the rank and title of brigadier-general. He also had seen much military service before. He was made a captain in the army in 1744, was at the taking of Louisburg and in other important actions. He must have been not far from 55 years old at the Bunker Hill battle, and fought heroically in the ranks, encountering imminent dangers, but fortunately escaped alive.

Col. Thomas Knowlton was one who gathered a shining glory about his name on that day. He was born at Boxford, Mass., in 1740, but while he was yet very young, his father's family removed to Ashford, Ct. He was a captain in this action and was put in command of some 200 Connecticut troops, and by them, under his direction, that line of fence was constructed—Stark's men completing what remained unfinished. It was a common saying of Gen. Putnam, that these raw troops would fight well enough if you could only protect their legs. They did not mind about their heads. This fence fortification, made of stones and rails and new-mown grass, might naturally enough have been a thing for sport to those veteran British battalions, but it played a very important part in the battle. Had that fence been broken through, as the British confidently expected, the action would have been short and the victory, for the British, decisive. As it was, that fence was never broken through, and the victory, when it came, had for the British almost the moral disaster of a defeat. Knowlton was made colonel for his brave and brilliant service that day, and was a favorite officer in the revolutionary army.

John Stark, a native of Londonderry, N. H., born in 1728, and at this time 47 years old, had a name which was ever associated with bold adventure and heroic daring. He marched his men in from Medford that afternoon, across the neck, through the British fire from the ships, and would not suffer his soldiers to break their ranks and run across, every man for

himself. He kept them in military order, that they might be fresh and ready for the battle. He shares with Knowlton in the glory of defending the fence, and inflicting the most terrible injury upon Howe's brave grenadiers. Stark's major, Andrew McClary, was a man of splendid form and majestic proportions, being nearly six feet and a half in height, as brave and heroic in action as Stark himself. After the battle he went back to Medford for bandages and materials for the wounded, and on his return was torn to pieces by a cannon-ball from one of the British ships. Some one remarked, on hearing of his sad death, that he was a man of such largeness of body and soul, that nothing less than a cannon-ball was worthy of being the instrument of his death.

Many other names might properly be dwelt upon. But there is one that should be especially noticed, though standing in a somewhat different relation. Col. Richard Gridley, at this time 65 years old, was the engineer who laid out and superintended the construction of this fort on Breed's Hill, and took an active part in the battle that followed, being wounded in the thigh. Upon receiving his wound he was taken into his sulky to be carried from the field, but from some hindrance was taken out again, when almost immediately the horse was killed and the sulky riddled with British balls. Considering in how little time his redoubt was built, it proved to be one of remarkable skill and strength, and it received very handsome compliments from British officers and engineers.

But in writing of any heroic action like this, it is a painful consideration that only a few persons can be mentioned by name, while the great work, after all, is performed by a multitude of unnamed heroes, who stand (in their lot) to execute the trust committed into their hands. Those 2,000 men, more or less, who stood firm on Bunker Hill that day, died, for the most part, without knowing more than a small portion of what they had accomplished. Whether they fell on that field, or died of wounds there received, or lived out the allotted term of life, and died in their homes, most of them passed away before this opening battle of the Revolution had come to be recognized for what it was, or set in its true relations to after history.

ARTICLE VII.—MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND THE
THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

First Principles. By HERBERT SPENCER. Third edition. London, 1870.

Principles of Biology. By HERBERT SPENCER. London, 1864.

Principles of Psychology. By HERBERT SPENCER. Second edition. London, 1870.

THE Empirical, or Experimental Philosophy of the last two or three hundred years is rather a revolution in character than a change of opinions; that is, it has resulted less from the detection of previous errors and the discovery of new truths than from an altered condition or habit of mind leading along new lines into a new domain of thought. It is not so much true that earlier forms of philosophy have been discarded because found to be false, as that they have been forsaken simply because all interest in them has expired. Of course, the change of opinions has been radical and profound, but it rests in large measure upon this profounder change of character involving the substitution of other sympathies and other objects of study for the old ones. Mr. Herbert Spencer, for example, differs from one of the schoolmen or one of the Alexandrian theologians far more in feeling than in ideas. The interest of the one is not the interest of the other, the domain of the one not the domain of the other; and the separateness here is very much wider than between the mere intellectual conclusions which they have severally reached.

There are two sides to every object in nature, the known and the unknown; the former by which it reaches the consciousness through the senses, the latter insensible to us and therefore not directly represented in consciousness. Both are alike in this, that we are equally convinced of the existence of both; not more of the sensible properties themselves than of the inscrutable something which underlies them. What is true of one phenomenon is true of all. The universe as a whole has its

obverse and reverse sides; the one turned towards us, which we know because we are conscious of it, the other turned away from us towards the dark, of which we only know that it is there. Strangely enough, as it would seem, it is this reverse and dark side of nature which first excited the curiosity and the reflective faculties of man. Philosophic thought does not begin with the obvious phenomenon but with the occult essence; not with the perceptible effect but with the hidden cause beyond. The reason, no doubt, is that during the era of infancy, whether in the individual or the race, the mind had become habituated to the forms of the universe in advance of the awakening of the intellect; the phenomena had entered into possession gradually and silently without causing any surprise or raising any questions. Familiarity bred indifference. What we now call the glory and wonder of the universe, the external forms which make it impressive to the reason and imagination, were nearly inoperative in the unsophisticated consciousness of primitive men. They were not startled by the fact of their own being or by the environment in which they found themselves, but accepted the world, as childhood does still, without astonishment or inquisitiveness, making use of it for the various purposes of life, but otherwise not interested in it at all. Thought arose with the detection of the interior mystery of being, the world behind the veil whose existence is certain but whose nature is unmanifested. What in their innermost essence are all things? how have they arisen? whence do they come and whither do they tend? What they are on the outward side of them, the fluctuating and fleeting phenomena which touch the senses, is no very great matter and is well enough known already. But their origin, their essence, and their destiny are not known, and these therefore became the first serious inquiries of the mind. The results are to be found, not alone in the innumerable systems of metaphysics and ontology of the last 2,500 years, but more abundant and impressive still in the religions of the great races, African, Arabian, and Aryan; and in their arts, their literatures, and their social order. The whole multiform civilization which has passed, or is passing away, with all its immense activities and productiveness, is characterized by these two things: the fir-

a passionate interest in, and a persistent study of, the essential nature and first cause of all being, reaching its highest development in the idealism of Plato and the monotheism of Jesus; the second, an indifference to mere phenomena, reaching its extremes in the scepticism of philosophy and the asceticism of the church. Throughout this era, wherever we take it, what is most accessible and obtrusive in nature, namely the sensible forms she wears, is absent from the higher life of man, whether mental, moral, or spiritual; his inspiration is derived from the immensity and eternity which lie behind in the dark, and on that is spent the whole wealth of his power. Not the attribute or property but the substance, not the body but the soul, not the effect but the cause, not the creation but the creator.

Now what has happened in Modern Philosophy is, on the one hand, not so much the disclosure of the fallacy of earlier thought as the exhaustion of the earlier enthusiasm. The existence of some substantial entity beneath every phenomenon and of some efficient cause before every effect, is as distinctly recognized and affirmed to-day as it ever was, and if these mysteries still retained their ancient hold upon the imagination and heart of man, the disproof of one ontological theory would have merely led to further thought and the formulation of another. But, strictly speaking, modern philosophy maintains no controversy with any of the dogmas of the past, and offers no substitutes of its own. It has simply taken itself out of the lists, evacuated the whole region altogether. The logical plea for this is that the essence and origin of things are not only unknown but unknowable; that all possible theories have been tried and have broken down one after another; and therefore that farther speculation is mere beating of the air and winnowing of chaff; but the real motive of the withdrawal is the profounder, moral one of weariness and indifference. The search has been abandoned because the problem has ceased to be attractive. The solemn trance of the Egyptian, the strenuous thought and bright imaginations of the Greek, the consecration of the Hebrew, the rapture of the early Christian, are states of mind which have passed away, not by reason of the detected fallacy, but by reason of the vanished charm. On the other hand, along with this abandonment of the domain of past

inquiry has gone the appropriation of that other domain which the past neglected. Up to a certain epoch in time, the reason and the heart of man are pre-occupied with the interior nature, the efficient and final causes of phenomena. That preoccupation failing, what remains for inquiry? The phenomena remain; and henceforth philosophy concerns itself with these alone; irresolutely and incoherently at first, because the disturbing ancient traditions still linger among its processes, but exclusively and consistently at last, when it reaches the distinct conviction of its proper motives and aims.

Now it is evident that in themselves these two systems of thought are not antagonistic but supplemental and successive; that the substitution of the one for the other, or at least the association of the one with the other, is an inevitable step in the natural development of mind. It is within our right to dispute any given inference or dogma of Experimental Philosophy which seems to us to be mistaken; but its *raison d'être* and right of succession are indisputable. The field it occupies, the material it uses, the ends it proposes, are all of immense and immediate importance. The welfare of any individual or of any community is determined first of all and most imperatively by its relations to those surrounding existences of which we are conscious, and there can be no question that the careless construction and rude adjustment of those relations has been the fatal vice of the antecedent civilization. Indeed, it may be argued that philosophy should have begun where it is leaving off to-day; instead of precipitating out of their natural order, and in advance of the maturity of the intellect, a host of remote and difficult problems, it should have taken up patiently the realities which are accessible at once and the momentous questions which press by a thousand urgencies for solution on the spot. The whimsical perplexity of Socrates between conflicting abstractions, the contemplative absorption into deity of the Indian, the ecstatic reveries over heaven of the mediæval saint, the fierce hair-splitting of Homoöusian and Homoiousian, Nominalist, and Realist, are premature at least, and the indifference or hatred for the material life which they involve, absurd and injurious. It may be said, therefore, that modern philosophy only is not sure of the validity of its title

but of the priority of its claim. Moreover, it has already vindicated its principle by the astonishing success of its method. Released from the burden and entanglement of antecedent speculation, dealing directly and exclusively with the accessible verities of the world, it has not only rectified the thinking of men with regard to those verities but in a measure readjusted their relations to them and mightily increased their power over them; and in doing all this has cleared the ground and laid the foundations for the highest problems of life and mind.

The materials of the modern philosophy, then, are given to it in the actual experiences of every man. They are the contents of consciousness; the impressions made upon it at every successive instant of time by the surrounding universe in all its co-existing phases; the memory of past impressions of the same kind; the accompanying feelings, thoughts, and volitions; and such other experiences, if there be such, as are underived from, or independent of, impressions from without.

Furthermore: not only does conscious experience supply to philosophy its materials, but in a primitive form its processes as well. The data, and the distribution of the data which is the business of the philosopher, are already rudely associated in the natural life of the man. The thronging phenomena which emerge into consciousness, whether through the senses, or out of the memory, or out of the interior depths of consciousness itself, come in an order of their own, not an incoherent multitude but an organized array. They obviously resemble one another and differ from one another, falling into rank of their own accord as they arrive, like clinging to like and parting from unlike. The stars assemble themselves together apart from the earth, the seas from the lands, plants from the soil, animals from plants, motion, sound, heat, light, and lightning from one another, matter from mind, the conscious self from things not itself. The immutable outlines of all classification are given us with sensation, revived along with every memory, and maintained among all the associated or resulting affections of the mind. The whole process of human thought in its last analysis consists, on the one hand, in the reception and more careful observation of this automatic distribution of phenomena; and, on the other, in the reference of

any newly observed fact to the group of facts previously observed to which it belongs.

In this distribution there are two general relations to be distinguished. The first are relations of co-existence in space, the simultaneous impressions of resembling and differing phenomena registered in consciousness at any given instant of time. If the universe were stationary, persisting though all experience without motion or change, these would be the only relations involved; thought would consist in the discrimination of a given number of fixed forms according to their superficial resemblances and differences; and the classification of any form once affected would hold good forever. But the universe is incessantly changing; nowhere is it at this instant precisely what it was the instant before or will be the instant after. Therefore, in addition to the simpler relations of things as they lie side by side together—the relations of co-existence in space, there are the more numerous and complex relations of things as they follow one another—relations of sequence in time; and classification is to be made according to likeness or unlikeness in both. Any fact whatsoever is explained, so far as explanation is possible for us, when we have found the group of facts whose forms in the present and whose antecedents in the past are like its own. That group again is explained when we have merged it along with others in a larger group having like forms and like antecedents; and so on step by step until we reach a point beyond which we can generalize no farther; or a point where all the converging lines of generalization meet in some one comprehensive antecedent. A body thrown into the air falls to the ground. In what does our explanation of the phenomenon consist? First of all, in the observation of the fact that other bodies thrown into the air fall to the ground; an observation which we make more precise by the farther observation that in all cases the velocity of the falling body has a fixed relation to the distance traversed in the fall. Secondly, by ascertaining the common antecedent of all these similar actions, namely the attractive force of the earth. By a more extended observation we are able to add other groups of phenomena to this, that is, are able to explain them; until at last we reach the general law that all particles or aggregates of matter attract each other with a

force varying inversely as the square of the distance between them. Or again, a body thrown into the air does not fall to the ground. Here, too, our explanation is as before; the observation that there are other bodies which behave in the same way, and the discovery of the antecedent common to them all, the resistance of the air. Such is the substance and the form of human thought. The first step by which intelligence rises above the passive reception of impressions is the recognition of the inherent likenesses and differences of things; and the whole process by which it disposes of any fact is a process of segregation from things unlike it and of classification with things which it resembles.

Science itself cannot supersede or transcend this process. Its business is simply to give to the thinking of all men and of every-day life a finer precision and a wider range. It corrects the rude classification of things which it finds ready made and carries them farther; altering the distribution of certain phenomena, as when the rising and setting of the sun are referred to the rotation of the earth instead of the revolution of the heavens; or including phenomena never classified before, as when the condition of the stellar universe is referred to nebular condensation: but in all this bringing no denial of principle, only correction and enlargement of method. In its highest and widest generalizations "science is but trained and organized common sense."*

The same thing is true of philosophy, which, in the only meaning that can now be given to the word, is but the highest form of this universal process. As the classifications of science are wider than those of ordinary thinking, so are the classifications of philosophy the widest of all. They concern the character, or characters, the relations of co-existence and sequence which all beings known to us, throughout the whole of their history, have in common.† All these processes of intel-

* Prof. Huxley.

† "Through persistently conscious of a Power manifested to us, we have abandoned as futile the attempt to learn anything respecting the nature of that Power; and so have shut out philosophy from much of the domain supposed to belong to it. The domain left is that occupied by science. Science concerns itself with the co-existences and sequences among phenomena; grouping these at first into gen-

lection, the popular, the scientific, and the philosophical, are essentially identical. The materials are the same, namely, the facts of conscious experience; and the method is one, namely, the explanation of facts by classification according to resemblances and differences.

Here we are brought face to face with the question upon our answer to which depends our estimate, not alone of any particular form of science or philosophy, but of the value of all human thought whatsoever. Let it be conceded that the essential nature and the first cause of all being are unknown and unknowable, because we have never had any conscious experience of them and never can have any; that they are not only out of consciousness but out of the reach of consciousness, and therefore not the proper objects of our thinking. What remains, then, for knowledge and thought are the perceptible phenomena and the relations among them. But evidently enough, our experience in the outermost range of it does not cover the whole area of the phenomenal and relative. There are vast realms of the sensible universe which transcend the experience of any man, or of all men together, as certainly as the essential and absolute transcend them. By what right do we claim a knowledge of *these* transcendent verities which we disclaim of the other? Why, if we refuse to philosophize about the first cause because out of consciousness, do we not also refuse to philosophize about the next transit of Venus because out of consciousness? Yet knowledge of this sort is continually claimed, and must be claimed if we continue to think at all. The humblest reasoning of the most untutored intellect is a perpetual incursion into the region of unexperienced truths, while the higher generalizations of science and the universal synthesis of the philosopher are in large measure

eralization of a simple or low order, and rising gradually to higher and more extended generalization. But if so, where remains any subject-matter for philosophy? The reply is—philosophy may still be the title retained for knowledge of the highest generality. . . . As each widest generalization of science comprehends and consolidates the narrower generalizations of its own division; so the generalizations of philosophy comprehend and consolidate the widest generalizations of science. . . . To bring the definition to its simplest and clearest forms. Knowledge of the lowest kind is *un-unified* knowledge; science is *partially unified* knowledge; philosophy is *completely unified* knowledge."—*First Principles*, Part II, ch i, "Philosophy Defined."

concerned with such truths alone. How are we to indicate this daring venture and immense appropriation? There is only one answer possible to the question. If we have a knowledge transcending all experience, it must be a knowledge which experience never gave, but given in the constitution of consciousness itself; not a reflection from the world outside, but an inherent light of its own. We *know*, not by virtue of having experienced, but by what the greatest living representative of the scholastic philosophy has called the original infallibility of the mind itself.

For consider: Strictly speaking, our experience is limited to the actual, present contents of consciousness; the impressions, memories, desires, thoughts, resolves, of this very moment we call *now*. How are we to get beyond these limits? What reason, for example, have we for affirming the existence of a surrounding universe? No reason at all except that such is the authoritative declaration of consciousness, which cannot be gainsaid. Or, if it be attempted to resolve this primal cognition into simpler elements, if it be affirmed that having these impressions of a real objective universe we must attribute them to some cause of which they are the effects; then the question arises, why must we attribute effects to causes? and the answer is as before, because it is an authoritative declaration of consciousness not to be gainsaid. Or, if it be said that the declaration is not authoritative and final, but must be taken as possibly false until actually verified by experience; then the question is, what is the nature of such verification? and the answer is, it is nothing but a repetition of the original declaration—the same thing is inevitably assumed in the proof that was affirmed at first; namely, that there is an objective universe.

But waiving this point and admitting the outer universe as a real portion of our experience, still it is evident that no such enlargement of experience supplies either the necessary materials or the necessary conditions for thought. The experiences of the present instant, however vast and vivid they may be, are in themselves of no avail simply because no time is given in the instant to avail of them. Before they can be thought about they must be remembered, and in remembering them they must be distinguished from others of the same kind which went

before. Thought is impossible until to the experience of the present we have added the experiences of the past, of ourselves, and of the universe as we have known them hitherto. What authority have we for doing this? These things are not experience. They *were* experience, if memory can be trusted, but what ground is there for trusting memory? No ground except that its declarations are among the authoritative declarations of consciousness which cannot be gainsaid. I am incapable of the simplest process of thought or the simplest effort toward thinking until I recall out of the past my experiences in it; this recall I am incapable of making without assuming the veracity of memory; and the veracity of memory I know only because my consciousness affirms it. No other source of certitude can be assigned for the knowledge I seem to have. Hence, again, it may be said, that certitude does not accompany memory; that for aught we know it is a false witness whose testimony can only be accepted as trustworthy after it has been verified. We take it for granted when given and act accordingly, but we do not know it to be true until we have actually put it to the test; that is, when what seems to have been our experience in the past is confirmed by what is our experience in the present. But how is such test to be applied and such confirmation to be obtained? Only, again, by trusting the affirmation of memory; for in the very act of testing past experience by present, the present experience is itself become a part of the past and is available only as a memory. Practically we go through life testing our recollections by our perceptions and never reaching any deeper ground of certitude than this, that memory, like perception, is a primal cognition of the mind which authenticates itself or is not authenticated at all.

But waiving this point again, and admitting the disclosures of memory along with those of perception as portions of our actual experience, still we have in the sum total but small store of material for knowledge and thinking. What is all this to the illimitable universe about which we go on reasoning every day of our lives? How far does perception, aided though it be by all the instruments of science, carry us outward into the boundless regions of space or downward into the interior constitution of things? How far does memory, supplemented by all the history of the race, carry us into the past of the uni-

verse? And into its future neither carries us one single step at all. Widen and fill it as we may, the whole of our experience is but a drop out of the ocean, a sand from the shore. Yet we do not hesitate to push beyond the drop or the sand-grain, out of the scanty material in hand, to build our histories and prophecies, from the infinitesimal fraction to construct our theory of the whole. What is our warrant for all this? That things have happened *in* our experience so and so is in itself no reason for affirming that they happen after the same fashion *out* of it. That the sun has risen daily for fifty years has nothing to do with its punctuality an age ago or to-morrow morning, any more than ninety-nine throws of the dice have to do with the hundredth. Our warrant for claiming a knowledge transcending the bounds of experience is simply in the declaration of consciousness that like causes produce like effects and must do so, that like consequences of necessity follow like antecedents at all times and in all parts of the universe; that therefore if we are in possession of the one we can infer the other: a declaration whose sole authority is in the constitution of consciousness itself; which experience may suggest and within its own limits may verify; but which we do not hesitate to accept as true even when experience affirms, or seems to affirm, the contrary. To this intuitive certitude are to be added all other intuitions, the axioms of mathematics and the whole body of mathematical truths derived from them, the elements of logic, and the essential principles of morality. We know that things equal to the same things are equal to each other, that the angles of a triangle together equal two right angles, that two bodies cannot occupy the same space or one body different spaces at the same time; that cruelty is base and fidelity is honorable; not because they have always fallen out so in our experience, for in point of fact multitudes of them have never occurred in our experience or even in the whole of human experience, at all: but because they *must* be so everywhere and forever, and it is not at the option of Omnipotence itself to make them other than they are.

To the interpretation of the universe, therefore, the mind of man brings not alone its experiences but also a body of intuitions transcending experiences; and without the latter the former are unavailable. It remains to add, what has been implied

already, that the wider the range of our thought the more entire and obvious is our dependence upon this transcendental knowledge. In ordinary thinking, the rough-and-ready logic of every-day life, we do not need to go very far beyond the concerns of the moment, what happened yesterday, or is happening to-day, or to happen to-morrow, and it matters little what theory we hold as to the validity of our reasoning. The barometer is falling to-day—there will be wind or rain to-morrow. That is an inference we can draw without troubling ourselves about the nature of it. But the moment we venture upon any of the wider generalizations of science, the draft upon *a priori* truths is enormous and the distinct recognition of their authority is essential to the worth of our conclusions. Light, heat, and the actinic rays of the sun are undulatory motions. There must, therefore, be an undulating æther pervading all luminous space. Why? No mortal eye ever saw this æther. In the experience of all mankind it is simply *nil*. Yet it *must* be there, for there can be no undulations without an undulating medium.

Finally : the recognition of the absolute authority of *a priori* truths is indispensable to and binding upon the philosopher beyond all others ; that is, upon the thinker, who, transcending the conceptions of science as they transcend the conceptions of ordinary thought, undertakes to provide us with a theory of the universe. It is any man's right to do that—if he can ; and there are only two conditions which anybody else has a right to impose upon him. The first is that his theory shall actually include all the phenomena involved—shall be an interpretation of the whole and not of a part only. The second is that it shall be consistent with itself ; either that it shall make no use of *a priori* truths as such, but relying exclusively upon experience, frankly confess that its interpretation of things beyond experience is conjecture and not knowledge ; or, making use of them, shall recognize their independent origin and self-authenticating force.

II.

The Theory of Evolution is a theory of the universe ; not of the infinite and absolute reality which lies behind it, for that has been dismissed from consideration as unknowable ; but of phenomena and their relations. Its materials are those of

ordinary thinking, or of science, only it deals with the whole, whereas each of these deals with a smaller or larger part. Its process is that of ordinary thinking, or of science, namely, the classification of phenomena according to their community of character. Given all the relations of co-existence, the universe as it stands to-day, and all the relations of sequence, the universe throughout the past and throughout the future; then what is the character, or what are the characters, common to the whole?

Briefly stated, the answer of the theory to the question is this: The phenomena of the universe, whether mental or material, at rest or in motion, through all space and all time, however different in any other respects, are alike and at one in that they are all manifestations of Force. Matter, considered in itself apart from the changes it undergoes, is known to us simply as a something that offers resistance, the impressions it makes upon the senses consisting in various modes of reaction upon resistance; and this resistance is what we recognize as Force. The changes which it undergoes are all modes of Motion, and Motion, even more distinctly than Matter, is known to us only as a manifestation of Force. As with Matter and the changes of Matter, so with Mind and the changes of Mind. The states of our consciousness at any given time, and the successive modifications wrought among them, are all in their last analysis reducible to this, that they are manifestations of Force. Beginning where we will, with a feeling, a thought, a volition, or a series of such, with any material object, or assemblage, or series of objects, we run down at once to this ultimate reality of Force, of which these inner and outer worlds are the manifestations. We can go no further in this direction, for beyond lies the impenetrable region of the Unknowable, with which we have nothing to do. The manifestations are accessible to us, but what this manifested force is in itself or whence it comes we do not know.

This, however, we do know, that Force is a constant quantity. It can neither be increased nor diminished. For, if we suppose new force to have been added to the force which already was, such addition must have been made from nothing, and it is inconceivable that nothing should originate force. Or,

if we suppose that some force has been subtracted from the whole, such subtracted force has been converted into nothing; which is equally inconceivable. Force cannot be conceived as created or annihilated; therefore it cannot be conceived as increased or diminished. There is exactly as much force at work to-day as there was yesterday, or will be to-morrow, and no more. From eternity to eternity the force manifested by the universe is an absolutely constant quantity.

What is true of Force is likewise true of Matter, which is one manifestation of Force. We cannot conceive that it has ever been added to or subtracted from, such increase or diminution being inconceivable both in itself and because it involves the creation or annihilation of Force. The Matter of the universe is an absolutely constant quantity. Lastly, what is true of Matter is for the same reasons true of Motion, which is another manifestation of Force. Motion cannot be conceived as either beginning or ending, as coming into existence, or ceasing to be; therefore it cannot be conceived as increasing or diminishing. The Motion of the universe is an absolutely constant quantity.*

What are we to say of the phenomena of Mind? They are manifestations of Force as Matter is, or as Motion is, but are they a separate manifestation, inconvertible into either of the others? If they are, then at some point or other there must have been an addition to the previous force of the universe; for we know with certainty that Mind has actually begun to be, since in the earlier stages of nebular and terrestrial condensation the conditions for its existence were wanting. There is more mind in the universe than there formerly was, and if Mind is a separate entity then is there more force than there formerly was, and Force is not a constant quantity; which is inconceivable. There is nothing left for us therefore but to merge the phenomena of Mind along with those of some other manifestation of Force. It is certainly not Matter; it must therefore be an affection of Matter; that is to say, it must be a mode of Motion.

We are left then with these great constants—Force, Matter, and Motion, whereof the first is known to us, not in itself, but only through the other two; and the business of the Theory of

* See, however, p. 360 below.

Evolution is simply to give an account of the mutual relations of the two great manifestations of Force. We have Matter, indestructible, but forever shifting its forms; here a solid, there a liquid, there a gas; here an ultimate atom, there a molecule, there an aggregate: and Motion, continuous, but undergoing parallel transformations; here molar, there molecular; sensible, as in the flight of an arrow, the fall of a body, the revolution of a planet; or insensible, as in the undulations of light and heat, the transmission of nerve-force, or the actions of the mind. Is there any constant and necessary relation between these two parallel sets of transformations? Are the changes of form in the fixed quantity of Matter and the corresponding changes of mode in the fixed quantity of Motion independent of each other, or are they reciprocally determined? Both are undergoing simultaneous redistributions everywhere and forever. If these redistributions have a law, that law is the law of the Evolution of the Universe.

One great order of the transformation of Matter is made up of the changes from a solid to a liquid state, or again from a liquid to a gaseous or æriform state; in other words, from a greater or less degree of condensation to a greater or less degree of dispersion. Water passes into vapor and is diffused through the atmosphere. The various chemical compounds found at the earth's surface are all resolvable into their constituent elements. Of organic bodies, plants are continually giving off oxygen and annuals carbonic acid, and after death both are decomposed and their component particles dispersed. No doubt if the necessary conditions were supplied, the solid matter of the entire universe would be disintegrated and dispersed. In all these transformations the principal agent at work is heat, which we know to be a mode of Motion, and the relation we sought for is obvious. The greater the amount of motion communicated to any aggregate of matter, the greater is the diffusion.

More important than these are the remaining, converse transformations, those, namely, from a state of diffusion to a state of condensation. We have reason to believe that out of a primordial condition of nebulous matter uniformly diffused through space has arisen the stellar universe of to-day, the solar system, the earth, and all bodies organic and inorganic known to us.

As the former series of changes was accounted for by the communication of motion, so is this series accounted for by the abstraction of motion; and from both together we derive the great law of Evolution and its complement Dissolution, which is stated thus: Evolution is the integration of Matter and the concomitant dissipation of Motion; Dissolution is the absorption of Motion and the concomitant dissipation of Matter.

This, however, is Evolution in simple outline. All evolving things have reached their present state by an integration of matter and a dissipation of motion; but it remains to inquire what has happened to the matter in the course of integration and what to the motion in the course of dissipation. The answer is, both have undergone simultaneous redistributions. The matter which at the beginning was homogeneous, incoherent, and indefinite, as in the nebulous substance diffused through space, or in the elements of which an organic body is composed, has become heterogeneous, coherent, and definite, before perfect integration; and the motion, which at the beginning was uniform, has been redistributed in a similar way, before its complete escape. The whole law restated stands thus: *Evolution is an integration of Matter and concomitant dissipation of Motion; during which the Matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity into a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which retained Motion undergoes a parallel transformation.** Ilias in nuce. In this curt formula is written the history of the universe.

Let us begin with the earliest condition of things of which any traces are left; when matter was uniformly diffused through space, somewhat as the vapor of water is diffused through the atmosphere; what we may call an evaporated universe, a thin mist, or haze, of the ultimate particles of matter, showing no signs as yet of condensation at any point, but homogeneous, incoherent, and indefinitely extended. How the universe got into this condition is not known; indeed, it is not certainly known that it ever was there; but supposing that it was, then we know very certainly that it could not have staid there, for within this cloud of matter lies the whole energy of force. Only as Matter so far is homogeneous, so is Force so far uniform. We have

* *First Principles*, Pt. II, ch. 19.

as yet nothing but the attraction of gravitation, by which each particle draws all the others and is drawn by them with a power inversely proportioned to the distances they are apart. From the resultant of these tractions necessarily arises a movement of the whole towards its centre; but a movement deflected from a right line to one side or other of the centre of gravity by the resistance of the medium through which it takes place, giving sooner or later a nebulous sphere revolving in one direction around its axis. A little later, by mere dint of revolving, the sphere becomes an oblate spheroid, and as it revolves faster at the circumference than anywhere nearer the centre, a ring, or rim, of nebulous matter is left behind by the continuing concentration of the spheroid within. This ring, like the nebulous substance of the universe at the beginning, is in a state of unstable equilibrium; accordingly, it collapses upon itself and becomes a body revolving on its axis and around the centre of gravity, the first of all the stars, or, it may be, the first stellar system. All this, however, implies an arrest of the original motion towards the centre of gravity. What has become of this arrested motion? It cannot have been annihilated, for motion is continuous; in fact it reappears in new forms, and what was before a sensible motion of translation through space is now the insensible motion we call heat and light. So the process goes on, nebula after nebula, system after system, star after star detaching itself and bursting into heat and flame, until we have the heavens as they stand to-day; the primordial homogeneous matter integrated into suns and constellations of suns; the primordial uniform motion converted into multiform motions of rotation, revolution, heat, light, and many more.

The subsequent history of these new worlds is beyond our ken, but what has happened in our own we know very well. At first we have a rotating and revolving spheroid distended and incandescent by the retained heat resulting from arrested motion. As the heat gradually escapes by radiation into space the spheroid condenses; in other words, as the repulsions of molecular motion diminish, the particles of matter approach each other more and more closely on their way towards their common centre of gravity. Here the earliest chemical combinations take place, increasing in complexity as the falling temperature

permits freer unions of the atoms of matter. Cohering aggregates appear, lands, seas, and an atmosphere are differentiated, until in time the earth's crust is sufficiently consolidated to prevent farther radiation from within; at which point terrestrial evolution, properly speaking, comes to an end. Its fires gone out, or pent up at the centre, nothing remains but darkened rotation and revolution in space. Fortunately, as the interior forces are cut off, the beneficent sun, still radiating heat and light, steps in, and a new and nobler evolution begins. The fierce heats of the earlier age give place, not to the more than arctic cold which was their natural conclusion, but to a wonderful, variegated climate, wherein the more complex chemical compounds are stirred to higher activities and helped into wider relationships. Some of them take up the carbon and hydrogen from the soil and air around and grow apace; others, yet more complex, feed upon the former, and both together acquire the curious capability of reproducing themselves; reproduction brings competition; competition, "natural selection," or survival of the fittest; selection, divergence of character, improvement of type, an ever increasing range and variety of life up to the multiform societies and civilizations of man.

In this long development there has been nothing at work from first to last but an integration of matter and a concomitant dissipation of motion. Integrating matter has passed from its original incoherent and indefinite homogeneity into stars and systems of stars; on the earth's surface into a heterogeneity yet more coherent and definite of lands, oceans, and an atmosphere of chemical compounds, cohering aggregates, and organized bodies with their varied species and societies; while the escaping motion has passed from its original uniformity into the complicated revolutions of the spheres, the undulations of radiant force, the varied motions shown in electricity, magnetism, and chemical affinity, in the phenomena of vitality, animal or vegetal, and in the phenomena of mind.

What is to be the end of Evolution? Its tendency of course is towards the complete integration of all matter and the complete dissipation of all motion, with a stable equilibrium between the two; a solidified universe over against radiated motion. Whether this will happen or not depends upon a

very curious condition. All motions are convertible into one another, and as a matter of fact mechanical motion is everywhere lapsing into radiant motion and radiant motion stealing away into space. If, now, the æthereal medium is of infinite extent and the universe is not, an irreparable loss of motion is slowly going on which will in time bring about complete equilibration. If both the æther and the universe are limited, then all waste is prevented; the fugitive undulations, outward bound, are arrested at the frontiers, turned back and set to work again. In this case, since Force persists, there will be a continual increase of motion, in other words, a continual rise of temperature, which in time must bring about complete dissolution. If, again, the æther is limited and the universe unlimited, the same result will follow within the æther; but in this case it may happen that by reason of the vast translations set up through space by gravitation, the diffused contents of the æther will be expelled and replaced from time to time by successive inroads of Matter lying beyond. Lastly, if both universe and æther are unlimited, all speculation fails: the end may be complete equilibration; or complete dissipation; or neither, that is, a cycle of Evolutions and Dissolutions succeeding each other forever.*

III.

The Theory of Evolution must be accepted if it satisfies the two requirements that we are entitled to make of any theory, namely, (I) that it explain all the phenomena; and (II) that it be consistent with itself.

* Mr. Spencer regards this condition, upon which the ultimate issue of Evolution depends, as indeterminable. It is worth pointing out, however, that the theory requires its determination, at least approximately. Thus, if a boundless æther has been draining off the motion of a limited universe through infinite past time, equilibration must have resulted long ago.

Prof. Balfour Stewart (*Conservation of Energy*, p. 163) and Mr. J. J. Murphy (*Habit and Intelligence*, vol. i, p. 55) have concluded that the present condition of things requires us to assign both a definite beginning and a definite end—the universe cannot possibly have existed through an eternal past nor can it exist through an eternal future. We are not concerned with criticism here, but considerations of this kind already indicate the extreme artificiality of the theory as an universal explanation.

I. Evolution depends upon the three postulates of the Persistence of Force, the Indestructibility of Matter, and the Continuity of Motion, with their several corollaries. If they are granted, then it is claimed that all the phenomena are covered by the formula of Redistribution of Matter and Motion. It is apparent that two questions are involved here: the first as to the validity of the postulates; the second as to the sufficiency of the formula. In conducting the examination we cannot do better, perhaps, than to begin with each postulate in turn, and following downward in the track of Evolution, note whether anything happens at any stage of the process over and above the redistribution of previous matter and motion: or, more specifically, whether there are any energies of Force, any forms of Matter, or any modes of Motion left unaccounted for.

FORCE.—As the particles of homogeneously-diffused matter moving towards the centre of gravity approach each other, it is found that in addition to their reciprocal attractions they manifest reciprocal repulsions, and that the latter energy exactly balances the former; in scientific language, action and reaction are equal and opposite throughout the universe. Now attraction cannot be converted into repulsion, nor repulsion into attraction. Nor can we conceive of any one force giving us co-existing equal attraction and repulsion. Whether, says Mr. Spencer, everything is explicable on the hypothesis of universal pressure from which tension is a differential result; or on the hypothesis of universal tension from which pressure is a differential result; or whether pressure and tension everywhere co-exist; are questions which it is impossible to settle. Each of the suppositions postulates an inconceivability. "Nevertheless, the last belief is the one which we are compelled to entertain. Matter cannot be conceived except as manifesting forces of attraction and repulsion."* Half of the phenomena involved, therefore, are due to the workings of a force which cannot be derived from the force which produces the other half; and there is no third force known to us as the origin of both. In other words, instead of Persistent Force we have from the beginning two persistent forces. They are dismissed by Mr. Spencer, in a paragraph, as the "incomprehensible dual-

* *First Principles*, Part II, ch ix.

ity" in the action of the "absolute cause of changes;" which is assuredly an unsafe disposition of the mystery. If there is duality in the action of the absolute cause, why not plurality? If a force of repulsion which is not derived from a force of attraction, or from any known antecedent common to both, why not a chemical force, or a vital force? At any rate, the motion whose redistributions we are to trace, if not the joint product of two separate forces, is the resultant of an inexplicable dual force. This force being universal and persistent is never converted into any other, but in obedience to it the particles and aggregates of matter are transferred through space, and this motion of transfer or translation is subsequently converted into other motions, and into what, by an unfortunate nomenclature, have been called the various forms of Force. There is only one force, but many redistributions of the motion it causes.

Of these redistributions the earlier ones are all intelligible, and sufficiently accounted for by the theory. The general *movement towards the centre of gravity* is gradually differentiated by action and reaction into the special motions of revolution and rotation, which increase in heterogeneity as matter progresses towards integration; and sensible motion into insensible motions of radiant force. We reach without embarrassment the rough cast of the coming stellar universe—an assemblage of rotating and revolving spheroids of nebulous matter emitting light and heat. Here we meet our first difficulty. As the incandescent star cools it condenses, that is, with the escape of repelling molecular motion its particles approach each other more and more closely; and when near enough together they manifest the energies of chemical affinity. The peculiarities of these energies as compared with gravitation, which preceded them and persists along with them, are two: while gravitation is a weak force acting at sensible distances, chemical affinity is an intense force acting at insensible distances; and while gravitation is indiscriminating, each particle attracting all the others, chemical affinity is elective, each particle attracting certain others but neglecting the rest. Now if, according to the old construction of the phenomena, these two energies are two separate forces, the relation between them is

very simple. One of them supplies the condition which enables the other to act; the proximity brought about by the attraction which all particles have for each other permits their special affinities to come into play. But this is a denial of Evolution, which requires us to believe that of the whole quantity of escaping motion in the spheroid certain portions are distributed into the several forms of chemical energy. Instead of disappearing at once into space in the shape of radiant undulations of the interstellar medium, they are detained within the star, where they are converted into vibrations of the particles of matter, and according as the rhythms of the vibrations are synchronous or discordant, or otherwise adjusted to each other, the particles manifest what we call chemical affinity, or do not. What is the instrumentality which brings about these redistributions of motion? The theory restricts us to one, namely, the redistribution of matter. Exactly as the integration of nebulous substance has converted the uniform motion falling upon it into multiform motions, so has a farther and finer integration of portions of the substance of a star converted portions of its retained motion into the motions of chemical affinity. What we call the simple elements of chemistry are in fact compound bodies made up of the ultimate units of matter, and the properties displayed by them are not original endowments but the result of the making up, or combination. In other words, the mere mechanical juxtaposition of inconceivably minute atoms, all alike in character, converts previous motion into the indissoluble unions, the tremendous energies, and fine discriminations of chemical affinity. We will not affirm that mere molecular arrangement is incapable of effecting this astounding metamorphosis, although in the present state of science it certainly passes all understanding. But what has brought about molecular re-arrangement; and in particular, what has brought about the special arrangements which are the only ones known to us? The possible combinations of atoms approaching each other are inconceivably numerous, yet the actual combinations are very few and each of them is constant. All matter when decomposed is found in the shape of 60 or 70 substances which show chemical energy, and the persistence of these shapes is such that we, at least, are ignorant of

any others.* What has determined the selection of these particular multiples of units and the perpetual exclusion of the infinite number of other possible ones?

A like interpretation must be put upon the phenomena of cohesion, capillary attraction, electricity,† magnetism, etc., which accompany the gradual cooling and condensation of the star. None of these energies are separate, inconvertible forces; all alike are redistributions of retained motion consequent upon special integrations of matter.

Up to this point it cannot be said that the theory has been inadequate to the strain put upon it. It has met every successive puzzle with a distinct and intelligible explanation which we do not know to be inconsistent with the facts and which may ultimately be found in entire congruity with them. But with the appearance of life on the globe a new factor is introduced, which instantly alters the direction and character of evolution, and for which the theory so far is confessedly unable to offer any real explanation at all. This factor is the law of Heredity.

Hitherto there has been no pause in the concurrent redistribution of matter and motion. Each of its phases has been a lapse out of the one before into the one after; homogeneous matter integrating into the nebulae or the stars, and at the surface of a cooling star into chemical compounds and cohering aggregates; uniform motion subdividing into myriad multi-form motions: but down to the appearance of the first living beings, and including these it may be, there has been no stage of the process which has maintained and perpetuated itself among the surrounding changes; the most stable equilibria instituted having no permanence beyond a temporary balance of forces, ready to yield at any moment to sufficient disturbance,

* Thus, the solar spectra show that these juxtapositions resist the fierce heats at the sun's surface.

† Mr. Spencer's *Essay on Electricity* (Essays, 3rd Series, London, 1874), published since the above passage was written, will give an idea of the manner in which he proposes to explain the so-called physical forces as redistributions of motion. Another exposition of the same sort will be found in the chapter on the *Actions of Forces on Organic Matter*. Part I, *Prin. Biol.* It is no doubt to some such generalization that Prof. Tyndall has referred as the great approaching discovery of physical science.

and to resume the lapse towards farther integration of matter and dissipation of motion ; like a river, arrested here and there in eddies or lakes, but on the whole perpetually flowing towards the sea. But the first instance of reproduction among living beings is a pause which is something other than an equilibrium ; an arrest of lapse and dissipation ; a conservation leading to an accumulation of forces ; the initiation of a movement the reverse of all the movements in the midst of which it arises. As each stage of inorganic evolution, mechanically speaking, is a descent from one level to a lower one, so is each stage of organic evolution an ascent from one level to a higher.

Now what is specially to be noted here is the fact that every attempt which has yet been made to construe the history of life upon our globe as a phase of Universal Evolution has only served to enlarge the scope and heighten the importance of the new factor by which this deviation or reversal of movement has been affected. Under the theory of creation, the law of Heredity is called upon to account for nothing but the transmission of the ancestral form of each species with such variations as arise from time to time within specific limits ; but in Mr. Darwin's theory of Natural Selection, accepted by Mr. Spencer with certain reservations, it is the power by which, under the regulative action of the conditions of life, all things are accomplished ; every living being having descended by ordinary generation from the primordial living form or forms. From first to last the whole world of life reposes upon this one fundamental fact of inheritance. Moreover, as we shall see farther on, Mr. Spencer's philosophy itself has no other basis, the psychological data upon which its generalizations depend having been all provided, directly or indirectly, by the inherited effects of ancestral experience through past ages. These things being so, it is above all things incumbent on Mr. Spencer to account for Heredity as a redistribution of **Matter** and **Motion**. In other words, if the indestructibility of **Matter** and the continuity of **Motion** are granted, inorganic Evolution may be taken as accounted for ; if the indestructibility of **Matter**, the continuity of **Motion**, and the law of Heredity are granted, organic Evolution may be taken as accounted for ; but the organic Evolution cannot be affiliated upon inorganic Evolution until the law of Heredity has been deduced from the Persistence of Force.

Mr. Spencer's provision for this supreme exigency is the now famous hypothesis of physiological units and physiological polarity. It is known that a fragment of broken crystal exposed to a solution of its constituent elements reproduces the original outlines of the crystal; and that by some parallel process of assimilation and repair organisms restore their lost or injured parts. We have no clue whatsoever to these processes beyond the facts that they occur and that they resemble each other; all we can say is, that the constituent units of the crystal or the organism have a power of moulding assimilable material into units of their own type, the type varying according to the specific character of the individual. Taking the analogy as it stands, however, and carrying it a single step farther, we are enabled to include the phenomena of growth in the same generalization with the phenomena of repair, as equally due to polarities of the physiological limits. But growth and repair are processes which terminate within the limits of the organism. They cease when equilibrium has been reached between its several parts and between the whole and the environment. Now a fertilized germ is a physiological unit, or assemblage of such units, which has escaped beyond the range of this equilibrium. Detached from the individual from which its polarities were derived, and by which also they were restricted, it passes into a new environment, where it develops into a second individual, reproducing the characters of the first and adding new characters of its own. Hence Heredity, Variation, Survival of the Fittest, and the whole process of organic evolution.

Of this hypothesis must be said what was said in a previous article of Mr. Darwin's hypothesis of pangenesis, that it leaves the mystery as impenetrable as it was before. To throw the processes of crystallization and of organic growth, repair and reproduction into a single category, as actions alike due to "polarity," is simply to give a convenient name to a very striking analogy. It is an ingenious enumeration of the facts, but not at all an explanation of the process. How came the physiological or the physiological units by this marvelous and manifold polarity? The old theory replies, by ordinance of God and the act of creation. But this, says Mr. Spencer, is to escape from one mystery into another deeper and darker, to explain certain

perplexing but unquestionable facts by assigning an inconceivable, that is, an impossible cause. Whatever the special agency at work may be, it is necessarily some form of universal, persistent force; and to say that we do not understand it is simply saying that we do not understand those particular redistributions of matter and motion which endow certain "units" with certain "polarities." Reduced to its simplest terms, therefore, the hypothesis amounts to an affirmation, *first*, that no factors can have been concerned in the genesis of fertilized germs beyond certain redistributions of matter and motion in the parent organism; which is a transparent begging of the whole question: and *second*, that fertilized germs thus originating have the power of reproducing parental and ancestral forms; which is a barren truism. Accordingly, it will be found that Mr. Spencer himself offers the hypothesis rather as a statement than a solution of the problem; or more accurately, perhaps, as an indication of the direction in which a solution is to be sought; and in all the editions of the *First Principles* the phenomena of specific and generic development are distinctly referred to the "unexplained principle of hereditary transmission."*

Far more significant, however, than the acknowledged inadequacy of this theory of the fundamental facts of vitality are the hesitation and reserve with which Mr. Spencer approaches the last and the highest of his problems, the origin and nature of Mind. As we have seen, if Evolution means anything at all, then it is certain that all mental phenomena are modes of motion, differing from other modes in that they are more

**First Prin.*, Pt. II, ch. 19. This meagre outline does no justice to the admirable ability with which Mr. Spencer has generalized the phenomena of growth, repair, genesis, heredity, and variation; a generalization which entitles the *Second Part* of the *Principles of Biology* to rank along with the *Origin of Species* as the high-water mark of biological speculation. It serves, however, to show the incomparable superiority of the hypothesis of physiological units to the hypothesis of pangenesis; a superiority due, perhaps, to the fact that the phenomena of heredity lay beyond the range of Mr. Darwin's special theory, while they fall at the very centre of Mr. Spencer's universal theory. Certain primordial forms and the law of heredity are previous conditions to Natural Selection, which, therefore, cannot be called upon to account for them; but they are only links in the chain of Evolution at large and so must be explained in terms of the Persistence of Force. Thus what was a mere afterthought of Mr. Darwin's, was a supreme necessity for Mr. Spencer from the first.

involved and obscure, but otherwise not differing at all. The falling of a wave of light upon the eye, or a wave of sound upon the ear, and the resulting changes of consciousness, are all motions whose differences have been determined by the differing conditions of the nervous and muscular tissues through which they have passed. Nothing has happened throughout the circuit except a redistribution of motion consequent upon special integrations of matter. This is a mere truism, if we hold that Force persists. Yet Mr. Spencer has nowhere said in so many words that Mind is identical with Motion; has everywhere so carefully abstained from saying it, that when we reach the apologia which concludes his discussion of objective psychology, we are not surprised to find that he distinctly rejects the identification as an inadequate account of the phenomena. No doubt all changes of consciousness occur as terms in a series of mechanical and molecular motions, any one of which is convertible into its equivalent of any of the others. Yet Mr. Spencer singles out these changes to confer upon them characters which are utterly inexplicable by the mere fact that they are motions or the products of motion; characters which it would be absurd to ascribe to any other term of the series, and whose derivation, therefore, from any or all of the preceding terms is inconceivable. They stand apart over against the rest of the universe, so separate, so antithetical, yet so mysteriously related that—"we can only think of Matter in terms of Mind. We can only think of Mind in terms of Matter. When we have pushed our explorations of the first to the utmost limits, we are referred to the second for a final answer; and when we have got the final answer of the second, we are referred back to the first for an interpretation of it. We find the value of x in terms of y ; then we find the value of y in terms of x ; and so on we may continue forever, without coming nearer to a solution. The antithesis of subject and object, never to be transcended while consciousness lasts, renders impossible all knowledge of that ultimate reality in which subject and object are united." * Such is Mr. Spencer's famous escape between the Scylla of Idealism and the Charybdis of Materialism; of which

* *Principles of Psychology*, Part V, ch. 10.

we will only say here that it involves the paradox of affirming that self-consciousness may be expressed in terms of unconsciousness, and *vice versa*. But setting that aside, imagine the language we have quoted applied to any of the motions antecedent to a change in consciousness, to molecular motions of the nervous system, or to the incident forces of the universe which initiate them, or to any possible combination of such motions. Here again, as before, it is manifest that the direction and character of Evolution have been altered by a new factor for which the theory has no explanation and—this time—no hope of any. “Carried to whatever extent, the inquiries of the psychologist do not reveal the ultimate nature of Mind; any more than do the inquiries of the chemist the ultimate nature of Matter, or those of the physicist the ultimate nature of Motion.” There are, therefore, three separate manifestations of the Ultimate Reality, neither of which can be explained as a special form of either of the other two; each of which covers a mystery of its own. No adversary of Mr. Spencer’s is likely to object to this. It is a brilliant change of front at the very crisis of the battle; but what has become of our all-embracing formula of the Redistribution of Matter and Motion? We have seen that it left in the rear the law of Heredity for later reduction; but *Consciousness* it gives up as a mystery irreducible forever; and to raise the siege here, as we shall presently see, is to abandon the campaign. The truth is, that the inexpugnable conviction of the separateness and personality of the Mind which underlies all human life, increasing in power and positiveness as life deepens and strengthens, has had no more impressive testimony in recent times than the bewildering pause of Mr. Spencer’s philosophy on the brink of Materialism.

MATTER.—The Indestructibility of Matter is the second of the postulates of the theory. Any increase or diminution of it being inconceivable, it must have existed, shifting its forms but constant in quantity, forever. It is, however, known to us only as a specially conditioned manifestation of Force. By this must be understood one of two things: either that it is a separate entity, through which Force is exerted; or else that it is itself a portion of Force. In the former case its origin is unaccounted for in the terms of Evolution, for eternal self-ex-

istence is no more a scientific explanation than creation, and we have left on hand another "incomprehensible duality" in the action of the absolute cause of changes, concerning which we are entitled to ask as before, if duality is admitted why not plurality? If there be Force and Matter, neither of which can be derived from the other, nor from any known antecedent common to both, then why not Force, Matter, and Mind? In the latter case, Matter is Force under special conditions; but being indestructible, it never changes into anything other than itself; that is, it is an inconvertible force. What then becomes of the transformation and equivalence of forces on which Evolution depends, or rather of which it is the universal synthesis? The only answer that can be given is that the persistence of this special form of force is due to the "special conditions" spoken of above; but these conditions must be themselves a perpetual, determining force, so that we are left again with two separate forces, one of them "specially conditioning" the action of the other.

Accepting, however, the existence and indestructibility of Matter, we come to the question whether it has any forms which are more than the integration of previous forms; a question involved in the one already considered, whether there are energies which are more than integrations of previous modes of motion. If, for example, the various energies of chemical affinity should turn out to be separate and inconvertible forces, then the so-called chemical elements are separate inconvertible substances. But apart from this, there is a form, or a quasi-form of Matter, which sustains a part of such transcending importance in all evolution that some account of its origin and functions is imperatively demanded in the terms of evolution. We have seen that the original movement of homogeneous matter towards the common centre of gravity is deflected from a right line and converted into a motion of rotation around the centre by the resistance of the medium in which it takes place; and that this rotation is subsequently differentiated into the complicated revolutions of the heavenly bodies. By the continuing resistance of the medium, these multiform motions are themselves gradually retarded and ultimately overcome, when the planet, or star, or system of stars is precipitated

into the body around which it revolves, to be dissipated by the concussion and to begin a process of evolution anew. Not only so; to this same resistance is due the redistribution of all modes of mechanical motion into the several modes of undulatory or radiant motion. Let us suppose that two masses of matter, say two stars, moving in opposite directions, collide and that the effect of collision is dissipation of the substance of the stars: that is, that the arrested mechanical motion of the masses is distributed among their particles, which are thrown thereby into rhythmical vibrations that drive them asunder—mechanical or molar motion reappearing as insensible or molecular motion. What becomes of these innumerable molecular motions? They are gradually retarded and ultimately overcome by the æthereal medium, which suppresses, only more promptly, the minute rhythms of an atom as it suppresses the vast revolutions of a planet—by resistance. But suppression is not annihilation; it is only abstraction, a theft, we may say, instead of murder; the vibratory motions of the molecule vanish into space as undulatory motions of the medium. As before, mechanical motion reappeared in the shape of molecular motion, or absorbed heat, so now molecular motion reappears as æthereal motion, or radiated heat and light. Thus, on the one hand, by its silent, perpetual check, or *brake* as it were, on the precipitate, rectilinear motions of masses, the æther has determined the whole mechanical structure and functions of the universe. On the other, by stifling the pulsations, or rhythmical beatings, of atoms, it has lighted up the heavens with the splendor of incandescent suns, and folded round the earth an attempered atmosphere that has prompted and protected the entire development of organic life. Briefly, the whole of evolution, the whole of dissolution, and the secular alternations of the two which flow eternally from the persistence of Force are determined throughout by the resistance of the æthereal medium—and are absolutely dependent upon it. But this is not all; beneath these deeps there lies a lower deep. Force itself, from which flows all motions and all redistributions of motion—all evolution and all dissolution, is paralyzed in the absence of an appropriate medium. That Force should act through a vacuum, says Mr. Spencer, that two bodies should

attract or repel each other across an empty space, is as inconceivable as that undulations of heat or light should traverse empty space. As we must assume a medium for the transmission of motion, so must we assume a medium for the transmission of force.

Now, as the old formula has it, *entia non multiplicanda sunt præter necessitatem*. It is intolerable that every lame theory should be helped over the style by the invention of a new æther. We are obliged to suppose that the several media which resist molar and molecular motion, radiate undulatory motions, and transmit forces, are one and the same. Philosophy has never dreamt of anything in heaven or earth more marvellous than the properties which science ascribes, and is *compelled* to ascribe, to this æther. That it may take up the pulsations of thrilling atoms at the surface of the sun, it must have a tenuity more delicate than any gossamer or any gas; that it may send them flashing through space, it must have a continuity more perfect than that of adamant; that it may bear the enormous strains of gravity it must have an elasticity beyond that of india rubber and a rigidity beyond that of steel. The inscrutable delegate and go-between of all energies of Force, all forms of Matter, and all modes of Motion, it transacts the open business of the universe beyond the range of the keenest senses or the finest scientific tests. With every concession to the exigencies of a needful hypothesis,* it is surely not hypercritical to suggest that a substance of this astonishing character, assumed to explain so much, stands in sore need of explanation itself; a necessity which may not accompany the partial

* Mr. James Martineau recently published a very eloquent but rather hasty criticism on some features of the doctrine of Evolution; upon which the *Saturday Review*—whose philosophers are of the most straitest sect of the Empiricists—remarked with characteristic urbanity that his objections were mostly trivial and common-place and betrayed a deplorable ignorance of the real intent of a scientific hypothesis. Now this is valuable admonition for everybody. But, on the other hand, it is to be remembered that Mr. Spencer's "System of Synthetic Philosophy," however rich in hypothetical details, in its fundamental principles and main outlines is not offered as hypothesis at all, but as necessary and absolute truth; and the whole body of mental intuitions is invoked to establish the claim. In this particular case, if the system is true the hypothesis is true; but if the hypothesis is true, the formula does not cover the facts; a dead lock and dilemma from which there seems no possibility of extricating the theory.

generalizations of science, but which is absolutely binding upon the philosopher whose generalizations purport to be universal. Prof. Tyndall may make what use of the æther he pleases, but *Mr. Spencer has no right to help himself out of trouble by postulating any substance which he cannot include in his universal formula of the Redistribution of Matter and Motion.* Now, marvelous as the æther is by reason of the attributes with which science is obliged to invest it, it is more marvelous still by reason of the *one* attribute which science is obliged to deny it. Firmer than any solid, the æther is imponderable. It *is*, for it *must* be. For to say that it has weight is to say that it gravitates; if it gravitates it must integrate; and if it integrates it must leave vacua behind. But in a vacuum there can be no resistance to motion, no propagation of radiant motion, and no transmission of any kind of force. To maintain the continuous action of the machinery of the universe there must be no solution of continuity in the ætheral medium. Persistent Force presupposes a persistent æther; and all the redistributions of motion flowing from Force presupposes a persistent æther. In other words, Evolution is possible only upon the previous condition of a stable æther which does *not* evolve; and the formula fails to cover the facts. Here, then, to sum up, is a substance which we can only classify as material, for it occupies space, it offers resistance, it transmits motion and force; yet it is subject to no redistribution, since, if it were, all other redistributions would be impossible. It plays the rôle of Heredity in the development of life; that is, it is a fact which Evolution, so far from accounting for, is obliged to assume as the prerequisite of its own efficiency. In effect it is a fourth postulate tacitly introduced into the theory, without any claim to rank as an ultimate reality along with the other three.

MOTION.—To the difficulties we have found in reconciling the “incomprehensible duality” of Force and the indestructibility of Matter with the fundamental postulate of the Persistence of Force, must now be added the difficulty of reconciling the continuity of Motion with the same postulate. If motion once initiated goes on without diminution forever, changing its forms but never converted into anything else or ceasing to be, then for the very reason that Force persists, Motion must go on

accumulating forever; a conclusion not only inconsistent with the theory which supposes the amount of Motion a constant quantity, but inconsistent with the facts; for the accumulation of Motion through infinite past time must have brought about final dissolution long ago. We can only infer, therefore, that there is a flaw in the argument somewhere; that although the beginning or the cessation of motion is as inconceivable as the creation or annihilation of matter, yet in point of fact motion must both begin and cease to be; that is, that there are actual modes of existence which are yet totally inconceivable to us. The truth is that motion, strictly speaking, is discontinuous, i.e., any given motion may be expended, not only in initiating subsequent motions, but in merely setting up the *conditions* by which subsequent motions are ensured. E.g., let us in imagination allow the universe to vanish and in its place let there be two of the ultimate atoms of matter at a given distance, say a yard, from each other: then under reciprocal attraction (neglecting the resistance of the æther) they will move towards each other until they meet midway; and as action and reaction are exactly opposite, they will be carried back by the recoil to their first positions, where under the persistent force of gravity they will again begin to move towards each other; and so on forever. Now in any one of these recoils motion is not converted into other motions but expended in overcoming the tractive force of gravity, and so restoring the atoms to their first places, or using Prof. Balfour Stewart's phrase, in bringing about *energy of position*. If on resuming their original positions we could imagine the atoms to be divested of force (say by the sudden disappearance of the medium for transmitting force), as they have been of motion, absolute rest would ensue. In all these changes what is really persistent is not force alone, for at the instant of collision the traction of gravity is zero; nor motion alone, for at the starting-point *vis viva* is zero; but the *energy* common to both and distributed in varying proportions between the two. The constant quantity is the sum of all the *vires vivæ* of motion plus all the tractions of gravity at any given moment, which is equal to their sum at any other moment. Thus it is seen that the relations of Matter and the relations of Motion to the Force of which they are both said to be manifesta-

tions, are utterly dissimilar. Matter, whatever it may be, a separate entity, or a separate form of force, is never anything other than Matter, never rises out of or lapses into any other form of Force; but Motion, meaning thereby the change of place produced by the action of Force on portions of Matter, comes and goes; the energy of *vis viva* now arising from, now lapsing into, the energy of gravity. These distinctions are so evident on the face of the phenomena that it must be supposed that Mr. Spencer had them in mind in his chapters on Matter, Motion, and Force. Yet throughout these chapters, if we except a few obscure passages, Motion is spoken of as necessarily continuous under some one or other of its own forms; and still more explicitly as being indestructible in the same sense that Matter is and for the same reason, viz: that its beginning or cessation is inconceivable.* Now it is an abuse of language, of which Mr. Spencer is hardly capable, to call energy of position a form of Motion. It might with far more propriety be called a form of gravity, for in this energy the *vires vivæ* are at zero and the tractions at their maximum. But if it be not such form Motion cannot be continuous, and still more cannot be indestructible in the sense in which Matter is.

It follows from all this that the question whether there are any modes of Motion which are more than redistributions of previous modes is only another form of the question already considered, whether the special forces of chemical affinity, cohesion, capillarity, electricity, magnetism, polarity, vitality, mind, etc., are more than redistributions of the uniform motion of translation set up by universal, persistent Force. Here, however, we may with advantage change our point of view for the moment, and assuming that all the actions of the universe of whatever sorts are equally motions, repeat the inquiry whether any of them refuse to be accounted for as redistributions of previous motion.

* "This law [that a moving body, unresisted, will go on in a straight line with a uniform velocity] is in our day being merged in the more general one that Motion, like Matter, is indestructible; and that whatever is lost by any one portion of Matter is transferred to other portions," so that "the motion apparently lost continues under new forms, through forms not directly perceptible." (*First Principles*, Part II, chapter v, p. 183.) However, compare the concluding paragraph of the chapter.

The earliest redistributions are the changes of uniform molar motion into molecular vibrations or absorbed heat, and of these into undulations of the luminiferous æther or radiant heat and light. In due time, with the progressing integration of matter there come farther subdivisions and differentiations into the varied actions of chemical elements and cohering aggregates. In general, sensible motion of whatever kinds is redistributed throughout the universe into the several kinds of insensible motion. Now between all these differing modes of motion the only relations provided for by the theory are quantitative relations. They are like or unlike because they are equal or unequal in their amounts, or in their intensities, or in both. Differences other than these cannot be accounted for by redistribution. With reference to the amounts involved, it is always true that so much molar motion is equal to, or more or less than, so much molecular, or so much radiant motion, the general equation standing thus: the whole amount of uniform motion produced by persistent Force = the sum of the amounts of the several forms into which it is ultimately subdivided. Each form differs from the others in being more or less; while the total of all the consequents at any given time exactly equals the total of all the antecedents. With reference to the intensities, the relations are likewise quantitative. Since action and reaction are equal, all motion is rhythmical, and the rhythms of different motions differ only in the periods in which they are accomplished. The rhythms of sensible motion, as in the gyrations of the celestial bodies, are slow and few; of insensible motion, as in the vibrations of molecules, inconceivably swift and numerous; but all are of the same kind, and if our senses could distinguish them they might be measured and a mathematical statement given of their relative proportions. When a unit of friction, let us say, is converted into its equivalent of heat, what happens is the transformation of a relatively slow into a relatively swift rhythm, a difference purely mechanical and quantitative. So of concussion converted into heat or sound, or of any mode of sensible motion into any mode of insensible motion.

These things being so, it follows that all motions ought to be known to us as differing quantitatively, and in other respects as

not differing at all. What they are in themselves, that ought they to be in our consciousness of them; nothing less, nothing more, nothing other. If there is nothing but redistribution and if redistribution can produce only varying amounts or varying intensities, then, what consciousness recognizes should be only varying amounts and intensities. Light ought to be known as so many nervous pulses or thrills per second or infinitesimal of a second; heat as so many more or less; red as so many, blue as so many, sound, odor, flavor, as so many; each ought to be felt as a certain fraction or multiple of any of the others; more or less than something else of the same kind. Yet what are the facts? The differences which are absent from consciousness are precisely quantitative differences, and what we actually find there are the inconvertible sensations of brightness, color, noise, odor, flavor, pressure; *qualitative* differences between which, or between any of them, and motion an equation can by no possibility be established. If nervous excitations are all of the nature of molecular motions initiated by incident motions of the surrounding universe, then we can compare, for instance, the tremors that traverse the optic nerve when excited by a wave of light with the tremors of the auditory nerve excited by a wave of sound, and, if our tests are fine enough, ascertain the relative quantities and intensities of the two. Up to the very threshold of consciousness the theory carries us triumphantly, exhausting the facts as it goes with its formula of the redistribution of matter and motion; but within consciousness it is helpless. The phenomena on one side are only quantitatively different; the resulting phenomena on the other are qualitatively different; and the formula which accounts for the former is of no avail among the latter. Along a thousand thrilling chords, myriads of motions differing only as their speed, their rhythm, or their volume differs, are pouring into the common receptacle of the brain, where the only recognition they receive—or accept—is a recognition for what they are not and not for what they are. Motion themselves, and under the eternal necessity of continuing motion—for Force persists and Motion is continuous—they are invested with self-consciousness, the *self* being a something which is *other* than self.

Most travellers in Europe are familiar with the remarkable line of railway which runs from Berne to Geneva by Fribourg and Lausanne. It happened to the writer some years ago, crossing the continent for the first time, to take the morning train from Berne on one of those depressing days when the damp sirocco, or föhn, blowing from the heated Mediterranean over the snowfields of the higher Alps, covers and fills all Switzerland with cloud. Throughout the morning there was nothing to be seen but the gray landscape of rolling meadows, dimmed and blurred by trailing vapors and completely effaced a mile away. Out of this fog-bank the train plunged into the long tunnel beyond Chêxbres and issued on the other side into—perfect day; the Lake of Geneva outspread far below, the Dent du Midi and the Savoy Alps beyond, high noon in a cloudless sky overhead. Something like this sharp transition and surprise is the *coup-de-théâtre* which Mr. Spencer has prepared for readers of his philosophy. We follow obscure waves of molecular change along converging nerves that discharge into the great ganglia of the brain, where they vanish into an utter darkness that not even Mr. Spencer's reflectors have illuminated; to reappear beyond, the vivid phantasmagoria of sensation and perception. How has this astounding transformation been wrought, and on which side of it does the truth lie? Which is the reality and which the illusion? The blurred landscape, the low-lying canopy, and the straitened horizon—or the overflowing splendors of the open sky? Are these elements of consciousness out of which all thought, all emotion, all character are built, and from which all conduct flows, what they declare themselves to be? Or are they the mere *spectra* of rhythmical agitations of cephalic ganglia beating in unison with an agitated universe beyond? If we degrade and discredit consciousness by saying that they are, then we are confronted by three several difficulties, our only key of interpretation being the redistribution of motion consequent on the integration of matter. In the first place, how can any redistribution of motion account for motion becoming conscious of itself? In the second place, how can redistribution account for motion becoming conscious of itself as anything *other* than motion? In the third place, how can redistribution account

for motion becoming conscious of *antecedent* motions as anything other than motion? If consciousness is but the product of previous modes of motion, it must be in accord with the producing factors; or, to borrow Mr. Spencer's definition which sums up his systems of Biology and Psychology, "Life, including consciousness and intelligence, is the progressive adjustment of interior to exterior relations." Now this adjustment may well be incomplete, but it can never be false, for force persists, and after the long ages during which it has gone on under the law of inheritance, it must now be approaching the full measure of the truth. Yet so far are we from this consummation, that consciousness to-day is as far astray, as completely in discord with the reality, as ever. Nay, the case is worse than this, for in every advance of the mind towards deeper and clearer self-consciousness, with increasing pertinacity does it recognize things as they are not and refuse to recognize them as they are. Progressive adjustment turns out progressive alienation and incongruity.

However, we have nothing to do here with the fatal conclusions flowing from Mr. Spencer's construction of the facts—that is a question which will come up farther on. We are dealing now with the facts themselves, and the question is, how can consciousness and the double delusion it rests under be accounted for as a redistribution of antecedent motion? There is no escape from the answer. The phenomena of consciousness are inexplicable in terms of the theory of Evolution. Now what are these phenomena? They are the very phenomena which the theory set out to explain. As was said in the beginning, "the materials of all thought, popular, scientific and philosophical, are the contents of consciousness, the impressions made upon it by the universe in all its co-existing and succeeding phases;" and now it appears that these impressions are unaccountable on the one hand and false on the other. Mr. Spencer, to be sure, comes to our relief in this predicament with the consoling doctrine of transfigured realism, which assures us that although sensation and perception give no true account of the world beyond consciousness, yet some sort of a world must be there; in the very act of misrepresenting the reality the existence of a reality is guaranteed, for were there

no reality there could be no misrepresentation; but the only result of this comforting demonstration, so far as the purposes of *explanation* are concerned, is that we have left on hand the double embarrassment of *two* correlated sets of phenomena neither of which throws any light on the other.

Has any other of the great systems of philosophy, from the days of Thales and Democritus to our own, ever landed in an anticlimax more surprising than this? We began by dismissing from consideration, as unknown and unknowable, the object of all earlier speculation, the essential nature and efficient cause of being. The infinite and absolute reality, we said, is not only out of consciousness but out of the reach of consciousness. From that inner world behind the veil it can bring only a conflicting multitude of empty conceptions. What then remains for consideration, we asked, if the ultimate reality of phenomena be abandoned? and the answer was the phenomena remain. For the pseud-ideas of a first cause, infinite, absolute, omnipotent, conscious, personal, loving, which have burdened and perturbed the mind of man so long, we substitute our universal generalization of persistent force. And what do we gain by the substitution? Unity among the causes instead of multitude? Congruity among the effects instead of discord? Our persistent force turns up on our hands an "incomprehensible duality;" unavailing at that until we have added to it indestructible matter, a non-evolving æther, and if not the laws of vitality and heredity, at any rate the irreducible mystery of sensation and self-consciousness; no one of which can be affiliated upon persistent force. And now, lastly, suppose that we have accepted and made the uttermost of our universal synthesis of phenomena; what then, if anything, remains for farther inquiry? Really, it would seem that our answer must be as before when we set aside the absolute reality—the phenomena remain; for the contents of consciousness are inexplicable as the mere redistribution of previous motions, and the universe beyond is inexplicable until the trustworthiness of consciousness is ascertained and accounted for.

As an orderly array of all the far-spreading analogies of nature, as a summary and unification of the latest results in all departments of science, Mr. Spencer's philosophy is the greatest

intellectual feat of the century ; and this criticism fails in one of its purposes if it has questioned the certainty of such eminence. But by an inevitable necessity the theory of Evolution is stranded upon the reefs which beset any explanation of things that applies the methods of positive science to the problems of Life and Mind. The facts of the universe are too multitudinous and too divergent to be packed into a portable formula or to be derived from a single source. In spite of himself, Mr. Spencer has excluded, if not the phenomena, yet the more important aspects of the phenomena, those, namely, which they wear within the circuit of consciousness; and he has admitted, however unavowedly or under protest, the ontological question of essence, origin, and cause; the very omission and admission of all antecedent speculations. On the whole, there is reason to suspect that our philosophy of the Knowable is after all what its predecessors were, a philosophy of the Unknowable ; a new metaphysic as vicious as the old one—and as futile.

(To be completed by a review of Mr. Spencer's Principles of Psychology, touching the question (II) whether the theory of Evolution is consistent with itself; that is, whether the mere inheritance in nervous structures of the effects of ancestral experiences justifies its wholesome use of *a priori* truths.)

ARTICLE VIII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND RELIGIOUS.

AIDS TO THE STUDY OF GERMAN THEOLOGY.*—Since English thinking is empirical and German thinking supersensuous, the views of a German author cannot be unveiled by the mere translation of German words into the English vocabulary. For this reason the author of this anonymous little book proposes to aid English readers in attaining a knowledge of German theological thought by furnishing "a key to thought-translation," or a "transmutation of German ideas into the garb of English thought." He confines himself to theology as distinguished from philosophy, and aims not to controvert or criticise, but only to interpret. He begins with a glance at the downward progress of Rationalism from Leibnitz to Semler, as the result of which "the empire of reason had extended itself alike to heaven and earth, had reduced all revelation to the realm of nature, and all morality to the one virtue of worldly prudence." He then proceeds concisely, but with great clearness, to present his interpretation of the course of theological thought in Germany from Kant to the present time. The course of thought treated is so extensive and profound, any outline of the interpretation possible in this notice would be unprofitable. Those who are beginning the study of the subject will read the book with interest and find it a stimulus and a help to further investigation.

The author, while recognizing Kant as "a great reconstructor" in philosophy, regards him only as a destroyer in theology, not only uprooting Rationalism but establishing a system which "resulted in the negation of all theology." But Kant himself attempted to "re-establish the demonstration of God's existence on a new and higher basis—that of our moral nature." This "was an utter, egregious failure." We think the author fails to estimate aright the theological position of Kant. If he "closed the ancient gates" through which thought had been wont to enter

* *Aids to the Study of German Theology.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1874. Crown 8vo, pp. vii, and 184. New York: Scribner, Welford, & Armstrong. Price \$2.00.

into the knowledge of God, and attempted to open a "side-door" in our moral nature, it was at least an open door, and the one through which, in fact, human thought does enter into the knowledge of God. And even in the Critique of the Pure Reason we cannot regard his results so destructive of theism as our author represents them. I. H. Fichte, in his recent work on The Theistic View of the Universe, says: "Kant, far from denying the ontological argument, reestablished it in its real power by his demonstration of the *a priori* origin of the idea of the Infinite." He demonstrated that the idea of God is necessary to the human reason; that without it reason cannot answer its necessary questions, nor solve its inevitable problems, but breaks down in hopeless contradiction. Thus he not only proved that it is a rational idea, that there is "room for it;" but also that there is a necessity for it to the completeness of human rationality; that the human reason demands it. This certainly is not destroying the intellectual or rational basis of the belief in a God.

Our author teaches that, consequent on the fact that "Kant left everything in a state of negation," two tendencies simultaneously appear; so that Kant was "the father of two schools." The first was the tendency to substitute for the limitations of the intellect the authority of faith. He presents Schleiermacher as the representative of this school, which is characterized by "the identification of religious belief with religious feeling." In saying that the transition to this school was through Jacobi, the author forgets that Jacobi, in an essay intended as a general introduction to his philosophical works, explicitly declares that what he called the faith faculty in former treatises, is the reason.

The other tendency arising from Kant's negations was to absolute unbelief. This is traced through J. G. Fichte to Schelling and Hegel. The author regards Hegel as the reconstructor of theology from the skepticism derived from Kant. Evidently with a loving sympathy, he points out the principles of Hegel's philosophy which sustain a true theism; and his chapters on this subject are very interesting. Yet he admits that it was the left wing, representing another side of the philosophy, which prevailed and was practically the principal representative of the system.

While the author generally adheres to his purpose to interpret without criticizing, yet in developing the mythical theory of Strauss and the theology of the school of Tübingen, he points out objections of great force. The mythical theory "contained within

itself the seeds of inevitable decay; and that decay has come through its own inherent weakness more than as the result of those strokes inflicted on it by its adversaries. Nay, strange to say, the finishing blow has been given by its own hand. Not Schenkel, not Renan, not Ewald, not the revival of Rationalism nor the reaction of orthodoxy, has put the last touch on the demolition of the system; it has come from Strauss himself—from the hand of him who gave it birth, and who has latterly been its almost exclusive representative. The mythical theory has ended its days by suicide, and has given up in despair those conclusions and standpoints which at one time it regarded as the very elements of truth."

VOICES OF THE PROPHETS.*—The Warburton Foundation provides for lectures "to prove the truth of revealed religion from the completion of the prophecies in the Old and New Testament, which relate to the Christian Church, especially to the apostasy of Papal Rome." These lectures make no reference to this "Apostasy." The argument of the lectures is intended to draw out some of the internal evidences of Revelation, by comparing the personal character, times, and circumstances of the prophets with the nature of the special truths revealed to them. In the two first lectures the author meets the common objections against the possibility of the miraculous intervention implied in prophecy. In the third he gives a rapid sketch of the rise and progress of Hebrew prophecy, showing how it was from the earliest times intertwined with the national life and influential on it. In the fourth, he distinguishes true prophecy, which is the fruit of a living union between the Divine Spirit and the spirit of man, from unconscious prophecy, like that of Caiaphas. In the fifth and sixth, he argues that prophecy, so far as it involves a preparation to receive revelation from God both in the prophet and the people, is a natural outgrowth of germs already existing in the primitive religion of the patriarchs and preserved in the first chapters of Genesis. In the remaining six lectures he traces

* *Voices of the Prophets*. Twelve lectures preached in the chapel of Lincoln's Inn in the years 1870-1874, on the Foundation of Bishop Warburton. By EDWIN HAMILTON GIFFORD, D.D., formerly Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, and Head Master of King Edward's School, Birmingham; Rector of Walgrave, Honorary Canon of Worcester, Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of London. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1874. Crown 8vo, pp. xxiv, and 264. New York: Scribner, Welford, & Armstrong. Price \$2.50.

the growth of Messianic prophecy from the promise in God's Covenant with Abraham onward to its more complete expression by Isaiah.

The lectures are reverent in spirit and evangelical in sentiment; they mark out an interesting and important course of thought; but there is little vigor in the treatment of the subjects, and the thought is deficient in freshness, suggestiveness, and power of quickening.

OEHLER'S THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. Vol. I.*—Prof. Oehler, in his *Prolegomena* to the Theology of the Old Testament, published many years before his death, announced his intention to publish a Manual of Old Testament Theology. He did not accomplish his purpose, although detached portions of the theology were published, mainly in Herzog's *Realencyklopädie*. The work before us is posthumous, prepared by his son, Hermann Oehler, librarian to the Evangelical Seminary at Tübingen. The basis of the work is the course of lectures delivered and revised from 1839 to 1871, which had gained during that long time a thoroughness and depth making it worthy of publication. In these lectures the text of the principal paragraphs was fully written. The further elucidation of these, which the professor was accustomed to make extemporaneously, has been obtained from his own notes, from note-books of his students, and from his published articles; so that the work exhibits few of the defects of a posthumous publication, and appears to be a complete and trustworthy presentation of the professor's course of thought. In this volume, after an elaborate introductory essay on biblical theology in general and the theology of the Old Testament in particular, the subject of MOSAISM is discussed. The first section treats of the history of revelation from the Creation to the settlement of the Covenant people in the Holy Land. The second section treats of the doctrines and observances of Mosaism. Here the author presents, first, the Mosaic doctrine of God and his relation to the world; secondly, the doctrine of man; and, thirdly, the Covenant of God with Israel, and the Theocracy. The work has the characteristics of the best German scholarship, and will be

* *Theology of the Old Testament*. By Dr. GUST. R. OEHLER, late Professor Ordinarius of Theology in Tübingen. Volume I. Translated by ELLEN D. SMITH. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1874. New York: Scribner, Welford, & Armstrong. 8vo, pp. xii and 428. Price \$3.00.

of great value to all thorough students of the Old Testament. The first volume in the original contains the entire discussion of Mosaism. In the translation about one-fourth part of the Theology of Mosaism is reserved for the second volume. The translation, with some stiffness and occasional infelicities, is on the whole very readable.

CHRIST AND OTHER MASTERS.*—This work is designed to show the true position of Christianity in relation to other religions. This it does, not by loose talk about the fine sentiments in other religions, but by a careful investigation of those religions in a rigorously historical method. The religions considered are the following: that under the Old Testament; the Religions of India, including Vedaism, Brahmanism, and schools of philosophy, including Buddhism; the Religions of China, Confucianism, Taoism, and Fo-ism or Chinese Buddhism; the Religions of the American aborigines; the Religions of Oceanica; the Religion of Egypt; and the Religions of the Medo-Persians. He also traces the alleged coincidences of these religions with revealed religion and their contrasts with the same. The work has attained an established reputation for thoroughness in plan and execution, and for scholarly excellence. We are glad to see it in its third edition. Prefixed is a brief biographical notice of its accomplished author, whose untimely death, occasioned by a fall in the Pyrenees at the age of thirty-eight, was a loss to Christian scholarship greatly lamented.

THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT.†—The author proposes to treat the subject not *dogmatically*, but *inductively*;

* *Christ and other Masters*; an historical inquiry into some of the chief parallelisms and contrasts between Christianity and the religious systems of the ancient world, with special reference to prevailing difficulties and objections. By CHARLES HARDWICK, M.A., late Archdeacon of Ely, and Christian Advocate of the University of Cambridge. Third edition, edited by Francis Proctor, Vicar of Witton, &c. "Are not Abana and Pharpar, rivers of Damascus, better than all the waters of Israel? May I not wash in them and be clean? So he turned and went away in a rage." 2 Kings, v, 12. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874. Crown 8vo, pp. xviii, and 592.

The Doctrine of Holy Scripture respecting the Atonement. By THOMAS J. CRAWFORD, D.D., F.R.S.E., Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh; author of "*The Fatherhood of God*," "*The Mysteries of Christianity*," &c. Second edition. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. Scribner, Welford, & Armstrong, New York. 1875. 8vo, pp. x, and 538. Price \$4.50.

deferring all theories and assumptions, he begins with an examination and comparison of the representations of the work of Christ in the Scriptures, and from these collects the elements of the doctrine. In Part I (pp. 3-202) he examines the doctrine of the New Testament. As the result of this examination he reaches the following conclusions: Christ is the divinely-appointed Saviour and Mediator; his sufferings were an expiatory sacrifice for sinful men; they were vicarious; by his obedience unto death he has secured our reconciliation to God; he is the Redeemer of his people, his blood being the ransom by which their deliverance is secured; his sufferings and death are a satisfaction for sin, or a satisfaction to divine justice (although this has no affinity to the "satisfaction" which a vindictive man may demand for an injury or indignity); our sins were imputed to Christ, in the sense that he was made liable to endure their penalties, without any transference to Him of their moral turpitude or culpability; his sufferings were penal in their character, that is, were judicially inflicted in the execution of a law which denounced punishment on the sins of men; the atonement originated in God's love, and is the consequence, not the cause of God's willingness to save sinners; the mediatorial work and sufferings of Christ were intended not only to obtain for us redemption from the guilt and penal consequences of sin, but also to secure our personal sanctification; the Scriptures teach the efficacy and completeness of the mediatorial work, not merely as removing obstacles or affording facilities in the way of our being saved, or as making salvation attainable on certain conditions, but also as providing that these conditions shall be fulfilled, securing not only a possible salvation, but an actual salvation "to all those for whom Christ hath purchased redemption;" the Saviour and the benefits of his atonement are freely offered to all sinners, so that the atonement is sufficient for all, suitable for all, and pressed on the acceptance of all.

In Part II (pp. 203-284) he examines the Old Testament and finds its teachings on the subject corroborative of the teachings of the New Testament.

In Part III (pp. 285-401) he examines thirteen different theories of Christ's work, varying more or less from his own; among which are the Governmental theory, and the peculiar views of Maurice, Alford, Campbell, Robertson, Young, and Bushnell.

Of these theories he remarks that almost all of them contain a portion of truth; that the portion of truth which they express has

been unhappily neglected or overlooked by defenders of the Catholic doctrine; that whatever truth they contain is not in the least degree inconsistent with the Catholic doctrine, but may be maintained in the fullest extent along with it; and that whatever truth they contain is incapable of being maintained, either on reasonable or scriptural grounds, apart from the Catholic doctrine of the atonement.

Part IV (pp. 403-489) is devoted to answers to objections.

The remainder (pp. 443-530) is an appendix containing excursus on various related questions. There are also a full table of contents, an index of subjects and authors, and an index of texts.

The work is not written in the spirit of a partizan or controversialist, but is kindly and candid in tone. Whatever exceptions may be taken to particular points in the author's conclusions, the work as a whole must be valued for the ability and thoroughness of the investigation, and for the fulness of the presentation of the subject.

THE KINGDOM OF CHRIST ON EARTH.*—This is a noble argument that grows as it goes, expanding, like an abounding river, into broader and broader stretches of thought. It was evidently inspired by the spirituality, grandeur, and unlimited comprehensiveness of the theme. The Kingdom of Christ—how great a theme for the contemplation of a pure and philosophic mind! The idea of Christ's kingdom on earth, in itself and in its history, is shown to be from God. It is ever in essential antagonism with the kingdom of evil. The nature of Christian virtue, comprehending but rising above the idea of duty in its free spirit; the divine agency in redemption, and the spiritual, organic outgrowth of the Church; the human agency involved in the advancing of Christ's kingdom; the correlated qualities of Christ's sacrifice and the Christian law of self-sacrifice; the progress of Christ's kingdom in its relation to civilization; the scriptural doctrine of the triumph of Christ's kingdom as distinguished from Millenarianism; the relations of Christ to the spirit of the present age,—these great topics are treated with patient thought, a wide

* *The Kingdom of Christ on Earth*: Twelve lectures delivered before the students of the Theological Seminary, Andover. By SAMUEL HARRIS, Dwight Professor of Systematic Theology in Yale College. Published by request of the students. Andover: published by Warren F. Draper, Main street. 1874.

compass of illustrative knowledge, great purity and spirituality of aim, and often with original force and brilliant, striking eloquence. We make but a single quotation, commending the reader to the lectures themselves as a most valuable contribution to our religious and theological literature.

The following passage—as coming from an experienced teacher—points out a real danger in the study of theological science :

“ While, then, it is necessary to man, as a rational being, to define and interpret the gospel to the intellect and translate it into systematic theology, there is inherent in so doing the danger of falling into a rationalistic habit, and regarding Christianity as a philosophy. Especially should there be caution against this danger in theological seminaries, in which the student is necessarily occupied in defining, interpreting, vindicating, and systemizing the gospel to the intellect. There is danger that he come to be interested in the more intellectual investigation of truth, rather than in Christianity as the power of life to sinners; that a *dilettanteism* of interest in philosophy and literature displace the earnestness of Christian interest in men and Christian zeal to bring sinners to Christ; or, in a different direction, that the spirit of controversy and the eagerness of theological discussion displace Christian love to men and interest in the appropriate work of saving men from sin. There is danger, also, that the student be entangled and held powerless in his own speculations; so many are the questions suggested in defining, interpreting, and systemizing the facts of Christianity, and so severe and protracted the intellectual effort in the process, that they become associated in the student's mind with the facts of the gospel; and the life-giving truths come to his mind not in the freshness, simplicity, and power of the gospel, but as the nucleus of questions and difficulties, of metaphysical distinctions and nice adjustments of thought; and he is entangled and held fast in the bristling *cheveux-de-frise* which his thinking has constructed around every truth of the gospel. There is danger that he be rationalistic, regarding Christianity only as a process of thought, and finding its whole significance in the definition of truth to the intellect. So, also, the history of Christianity must be studied as a history of doctrine. But there is danger, in so studying it, that the student come to regard the determination of doctrine as the great work which Christianity has accomplished in the past, as the entire significance of its history. In one age it determined the doctrine of the Trinity; in others, successively, the doctrines of sin, of atonement, of justification by faith, until, as an eminent living divine has said, there remains nothing to be determined but the Christian doctrine of the Church itself. But the history of the Church is not found merely in the history of doctrine, but also in ideals which in Christ have become powers in the world, in confessions and martyrdoms, in missions and charities, in self-denial and heroism, in Christian experience of penitence, faith, and love, in triumphs over death, in the progress of justice, and of Christian customs, laws, and institutions, in reformations and the growth of Christian civilization.

Accordingly, the gospel does not address itself merely to the intellect, and especially not to the observing, analyzing, and classifying faculties, which positive science exclusively addresses. It addresses itself to the faith, to the moral nature, to the spiritual necessities, aspirations, and intuitions. This Paul recog-

nizes in his preaching: 'Commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God.' Jesus recognizes it: 'If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine.' And the intimations of the moral and spiritual nature are as trustworthy as those of our observing and comparing faculties; for they are of the very core of our being; and if they are false, the whole being is vitiated with falsehood. There is, then, a philosophical basis for the answer of an unlettered candidate for the ministry, who, when asked at his examination for ordination: 'What proof have you that Christ is divine?' answered, with tears: 'Why, bless you, he has saved my soul.' And if the keen definition and proof of truth by and to the intellect is separated from the knowledge and evidence of spiritual experience, and we are obliged to choose which of the two is the safer preparation for preaching the gospel, I should not hesitate to choose the latter: 'Blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed.'"

YALE LECTURES ON PREACHING.*—Of the three remarkable courses of lectures delivered by Mr. Beecher at the Yale Theological School, the first series was the most uniformly sustained and perhaps the most useful; but the last rivals it in these qualities, and it contains more detached eloquent thoughts, more soul-moving passages. It enters into the essence of the matter and substance of preaching. It deals with the Word of God—the true method of presenting God—the manifestation of God through Christ—Christ's own preaching and ministry—the sense of sin—the formation of Christian manhood—life and immortality. These topics take the reader into the inmost heart of truth. They concern themselves with the very subjects, motives, affections, inner springs, and powers of that with which the preacher has to do—"the Word of God, not as a dead record, but as interpreted by vital souls, with such auxiliaries as they can reach: namely, the development of the natural world, the disclosures of Divine Providence, the experiences of good men, and the illuminating of the Holy Ghost." But Mr. Beecher does not lose his hold of the practical, and his footing is still on the solid ground of fact, nature, and experience. His shrewdness and cheery humor flash out as conspicuously as ever. Yet deeper thoughts seem to absorb him. The last lecture of this series closes with these affecting words, which certainly cannot be forgotten by the young men to whom they were addressed. "And let me tell you,

* *Yale Lectures on Preaching.* By HENRY WARD BEECHER. Delivered before the Theological Department of Yale College, New Haven, Conn., in the regular course of the "Lyman Beecher Lectureship on Preaching." From phonographic reports by T. J. Killinwood. Third Series. New York: J. B. Ford and Company. 1874.

fly up! Do not stay down here where troubles dwell. Go above the dust that rises from the ground, and above the thunder of earthly noises. Betake yourselves to the realm of eternal peace, to the refuge of God's heart, to the love of Christ's bosom, to the apartment of God's house which the Saviour went before to prepare for you. Escape from your troubles to your eternal home. Do not whine. Do not complain. Do not even think complaint. For, by sorrow and troubles God is preparing you for power and influence. And many of you with feeble tongue will have an abler administration hereafter than you have here. Many of you with feeble hands will hold a sceptre that you cannot now hold.

Live for the other life. Endure as seeing Him who is invisible; work by faith; work by hope; work by love; work by courage; work by trust; work by the sweet side of your mind; and so, be like Christ, until you dwell with him."

Mr. Beecher sets forth strongly the barrenness of abstract preaching, and contends that man's moral nature is to be met, that he is to be apprehended in his true personal life, that even sin should not be preached in an abstract and philosophical light, but in the light of men's actual sinful experience, and of Christ's redemption, dwelling on the elements of recovery, of the new life secured by a divine power. Christ as the lover of sinners is to be preached. "Your whole ministry will derive its chief consequence and power from whatever of Christ is in you, and in you not by thought, but by disposition and life." We should not go back to old Jerusalem. "Christ proved is not Christ realized." The missionary after he has been long in the field thinks less of his theology and more of his Bible.

There are some passages in Mr. Beecher's best style; bits of prose-poetry, lyrics not to be sung but read, as the leaf of his personal experiences, on p. 107; and the description of the sympathy of Christ to all, on p. 174; and Christ's love to little children, on p. 181.

He has a shade of irreverence towards Father Abraham, who was called the "Friend of God," that seems to be, to say the least, unnecessary. While giving praise to some of John Calvin's great qualities, he calls him "a man without bowels, and intensely in sympathy with the monarchic idea." He makes, in our estimate, too much even of the Apostle Paul, by bringing him too close in comparison to the all-perfect Master. He gives shrewd advice to young preachers, not to preach to the top but rather

the bottom of the audience, which is like putting a jack-screw not under the roof, but under the sills of the house, to raise up everything that is above them. But poetry, satire, fun, pathos, vitality, audacity, sweetness, sublimity, thought on fire, pregnant counsel, original, inspiring, awakening address, suggestive when wrong, soul-stirring and mighty when right,—all the qualities so characteristic of the author, are found abundantly in this brief course of lectures.

SIDGWICK'S *METHODS OF ETHICS** is a unique and valuable contribution to the already plethoric abundance of ethical treatises in the English language. It is unique in that the author proposes to himself only a critical examination of the methods of reasoning pursued on the different systems of Ethics. He limits himself to methods alone, leaving unconsidered, as of comparatively little consequence, all biographical and historical details. He does not concern himself with the names even of the leading writers who have expounded or defended the systems which he criticizes. It is with the several systems in their characteristic principles, and the facts and reasonings by which they are defended, and with these alone, with which he occupies himself. What is still more unique, his own position is scarcely indicated, much less is it positively affirmed or defended. His attitude is that of an unbiased and almost an uninterested critic and judge, so impassive are all his procedures of statement and criticism. His method is analytic and tentative. As he takes each system in hand, he feels his way with respect to its distinctive features, trying to assure himself, to begin with, that he states them correctly, and then testing them by every variety of criteria which may suggest themselves. He assumes so far as he may the air and method of a novice, who seeks first to be informed what is held and then to disown what is true, and like a novice, he gropes his way hither and thither, apparently not anticipating where he shall land.

This method has many disadvantages. To a reader not acquainted with the subject matter, and in a certain sense master of the field of inquiry, the discussions are blind and almost unintelligible. To a reader who is familiar with the several points, the progress of the discussion is slow and the hesitations and delays of the writer seem unnecessary.

* *The Methods of Ethics*. By HENRY SIDGWICK, M.A., Lecturer and late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

But the method has some advantages. It disciplines the reader to fairness and comprehensiveness, and teaches him that each of the several systems which pass in review has reason upon its side, and perhaps leads him to the conclusion, that they are all consistent with one another, being all but different aspects of some one fundamental theory, which may reconcile them all. If the method is not fitted to make men partizans, it is adapted to train them to be philosophers. Unfortunately, in regard to no subject are the temptations to partizanship so strong and often so irresistible as in respect to moral science. The leading theories are so intimately associated in the minds of most men with some relation of origin, as derived from this or that philosophical school, or with some application in politics or theology, that a scientific discussion of their merits seems to be almost impracticable.

Possibly it was in view of the unsettled condition of moral science proper, that Mr. Sidgwick was led to adopt the somewhat novel method of treating it, which he has ably and consistently applied in this volume. When we speak of the volume as able, we do not mean that it is not open to somewhat serious criticism. The delay and tedium incident to the method of the author seem to us to be unnecessarily aggravated. The diction is far from being what it might and should have been. The repetitions and diffusenesses of argument and language are scarcely pardonable, even in view of the great and peculiar excellencies of the treatise. But we cannot be mistaken when we recommend the book as one of the most important contributions to scientific ethics which has been made in the present century by any English writer.

DR. HICKOK'S LOGIC OF REASON* is an attempt to state the principles of a logic which is higher than the ordinary formal logic—higher even than the Transcendental Logic as exemplified in the speculative systems of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel—or the Logic of Force as taught by Herbert Spencer. The logic of these systems is limited to abstractions and can give no explanation of those ultimate relations which condition the possibility of the concrete and the individual. A logic which proposes this higher problem is styled by Dr. Hickok the Logic of Reason. It is the logic of concrete universality. It treats of three classes of conditions. 1. The conditions without which the experience cannot be.

* *The Logic of Reason, Universal and Eternal.* By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., LL.D. Boston: Lee & Shepard. New York: Lee, Shepard, & Dillingham. 1875.

2. The conditions with which such experience must be. 3. The conditions so eventuating as evincive of a proposed end. Experience again furnishes us with three descriptions of object or subject matter. 1. Experience with pure physical and inorganic matter. 2. Experience with organic being. 3. Absolute being, as above finite being.

The treatise is brief: it is clear to a reader who is experienced in metaphysical symbols, and has had some acquaintance with Dr. Hickok's peculiar style. It is in every respect worthy the careful attention and close study which it requires.

*SERMONS AND SONGS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.**—The alliterative title of this new volume from Dr. Sears—containing nineteen sermons, and twenty-three hymns on related subjects interspersed—reminds us that Watts and Doddridge often combined the two, with this difference, however, that in their practice the hymn was really born of the sermon, or of the same train of thought, and was meant to be sung, whereas these poems are of different dates, most of them having appeared before in other collections, and seem to be intended chiefly for reading. The connection is no doubt pleasant and edifying. By the way, when the author says in the preface, "In our church service the sermon consummated in the hymn," we question not the sentiment but the intransitive use of the verb, usage requiring the sermon to be consummated or the hymn to consummate. As to the quality of the sermons, our readers will come to them with high expectations, remembering the author's previous works, "The Fourth Gospel the Heart of Christ," "Regeneration," and "Foregleams of Immortality." Nor will they be disappointed. The same devout spirit, evangelic doctrine, rich and delicate sentiment, and winning style, characterize these discourses. The author's theological position is not less singular—not less anomalous, some would say—than before, and it is one that indicates the "diversities of operations" in our times. His denominational association we suppose still to be with Unitarians, and this volume is inscribed to the "three Christian Societies" to whom he has ministered in "pastoral relations;" yet the orthodox have claimed him and will claim him still, and certainly on some most important questions not without reason. On other questions, however, he must be classed with the followers

* *Sermons and Songs of the Christian Life.* By EDMUND H. SEARS. Boston: Noyes, Holmes, & Co. 1875. 12mo, pp. 334.

of Swedenborg rather than with Trinitarians. Like that teacher, in regard to our Lord's person, he is as far removed as possible from Socinians. With the same class, too, he denies the proper personality of the Holy Spirit (as on p. 329), while not content with the "feeble" word "influence;" and in the first of these sermons the only angels he recognizes are departed human spirits. In his former works he adopts with some modification the same teacher's doctrine regarding our Lord's risen body and the "spiritual bodies" of his followers. But still more obvious is his antagonism to the "free religion" of the day, and his sympathy with the great body of believers regarding the supernatural facts of Christianity; and the evangelical elements of his faith are set forth in this as in foregoing works with a glow and charm that cannot fail to attract devout readers generally. We must add that in the preface, in characterizing these discourses, he defines a sermon on "the fundamental facts of the gospel history" with a discrimination which we heartily recommend to the attention of those orthodox ministers who are forever taken up in the pulpit with proving instead of proclaiming their authorized message. "I do not regard it," he says, "as the province of the sermon to go behind the facts themselves, or try to prove them. That belongs to works of another kind. The sermon assumes them as premises acknowledged by the congregation, and prophecies from them, but in such wise and with such application to the wants of the human heart as to complement the historical evidence with the clearest spiritual vision and the most assured experience of Christian believers. This in itself is evidence, and without it the historical facts are of little avail, and finally lose their hold even upon the intellect, notwithstanding the completeness of the historic demonstration."

BROWN'S DISCOURSES AND SAYINGS OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST.

—The expository writings of Dr. John Brown of Edinburgh (a ministerial and gifted family) have long held a high place in theological literature. His work on the "First Epistle of Peter" has had a warm reception in this country as well as abroad. The preface to the first edition of this series on our Lord bears the date of 1850, and the advertisement to the second, two years later.

* *Discourses and Sayings of our Lord Jesus Christ*. Expositions. By JOHN BROWN, D.D. Two vols. Carter & Brothers. 1875.

stands in no need of description or commendation here. As our Lord's teachings offer the most important theme, and one especially prominent at this day, so the writer's learning, care, large experience and sound judgment qualified him for its worthy treatment. We call attention to it just now because it comes before us in a new and cheap edition, the two volumes being included in one, and that in all respects well executed, comprising no less than 1245 pages, at the price of only \$3.50. The first preface exhibits happily the central place of the subject in Christianity. The dedication to "James Douglas, of Cavers," is a fit tribute to an admirable man, and a model in that kind of composition.

MUSINGS AND MEMORIES.*—The contents of this volume are arranged in sixteen chapters under their several general titles, such as Kindness, Individual Influence, Riches, War, Children, Providential Deliverances, Influence of the Holy Spirit, Ministry, and others; each being divided into smaller sections with appropriate headings. Usually some narrative or suggestive fact is handled as a text for devout meditation or counsel, with modest good sense, in a kindly spirit, with profound reverence for the Divine Word and the human conscience, and scrupulous delicacy of thought and language. With more than Quaker reticence, nothing is told us of the author, and the imprint of the "Association of Friends" is not needed to indicate the school from which it issues. The quietness, benignity, sober conviction, and wakeful discretion, that pervade all its pages, as well as the absence of whatever is sensational or pretentious, bring us into the very atmosphere of the brotherhood. Their writings abound more than those of any other sect in memoirs, narratives, and the devout use of anecdote. We think some of our best readers will find this volume a pleasant addition to the store of wholesome thoughts which they resort to at intervals, a chapter at a time, for some helpful ministry. We recommend to "outsiders" the chapters on "Providential Deliverance" and the "Influence of the Holy Spirit," and especially to the more restless, bustling Christian people, that section of the latter which treats of "Silent Worship."

* *Musings and Memories*. Being chiefly a collection of anecdotes and reflections, of a religious character, on various subjects. Philadelphia; published by the Tract Association of Friends. 1875. 12mo, pp. 367.

MARTINEAU'S RELIGION AS AFFECTED BY MODERN MATERIALISM.*—This "is an address delivered," as the title-page informs us, "in Manchester New College, London, at the opening of its eighty-ninth session," last October. It is an able protest and argument against the materialism that bases itself on modern science. Of course, it will have the more weight with a class of cultivated readers from the theological position of the author. Moreover, he urges his conclusions with a really fine eloquence. As might be expected, he concedes more to unbelief than any orthodox theologian can do,—“the consecrated cosmogony” and “the system” of “the churches,”—admitting that “in the whole history of the Genesis of things Religion must unconditionally surrender to the Sciences.” His stand is for *mind*—the human mind and the Supreme Mind—against the sufficiency of *matter*. He claims for religion the province of the question, “*Whence*, of all phenomena,” and relegates science to the “*How*.” For a specimen of ingenious and indeed conclusive argument, most happily put, within a small compass, we refer the reader to the whole passage beginning at the foot of p. 26, and ending near the top of p. 40, and particularly to his crushing grasp of Prof. Tyndall's admission that “we must radically change our notions of Matter,” p. 30. Dr. Bellows may well be pardoned for calling attention with evident satisfaction to the fact, which moreover the champions of orthodoxy not only acknowledge but welcome, that “among the stoutest defenders of the essential postulates of religious faith” are some whom he calls “disowned leaders in theological reform,” p. 8. Nor is this fact new. Christianity has always found able defenders in its outer as well as inner courts. One of the choicest sermons we ever heard in behalf of prayer, as against mere naturalism, was from Dr. Bellows.

THE RENT VEIL.†—Among those who would explain the symbolism of the Mosaic economy, some may be said to allow it the *minimum* of evangelical meaning, if any at all, while others would extort from it the *maximum*. Of the two classes, if we must be confined to either, we prefer the latter for edification, and to this class, we hardly need say, Dr. H. Bonar belongs. The

* *Religion as affected by Modern Materialism*. By JAMES MARTINEAU, LL.D. With an Introduction by the Rev. HENRY W. BELLOWS, D.D. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1875. pp. 68.

† *The Rent Veil*. By HORATIO BONAR, D.D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1875. pp. 184.

neat volume before us is occupied with the doctrine of the need and efficacy of Christ's sacrifice as set forth under the symbol of the veil. We cannot say that we are aided or attracted by the style of his interpretation and comment, yet many readers find it adapted to themselves. His hymns, if not our favorites, are still more largely acceptable and useful.

MR. TIFFANY'S PRICE LECTURE.*—Endowed lectureships sometimes call out a traditional and perfunctory, rather than a fresh and original treatment, of the themes to which they relate. Such is not at all the case, however, with Mr. Tiffany's Discourse, delivered on the ancient Price foundation, in Boston. It is a condensed, yet clear and perspicuous, discussion of Modern Atheism; a discussion terse and definite, yet temperate in its tone, and discriminating, urgent, and conclusive in its reasonings. His appropriate text is the opening sentence of the Bible, the "root of all the religion contained in it."

The character of the lofty conception of God in the Bible is thus described :

The thought of God is not, either in Judaism or Christianity, merged in or entangled with the existence of the universe. He is distinct in essence, though in Him all things consist. For "in the beginning God created." He not only was, but He was acting, and the universe is the fruit of His act. It does not exist as His necessary organization, eternal as Himself, and as essentially Divine, according to the Pantheism of Spinoza. It does not constitute His essential opposite, without which He could not come to the consciousness of Himself, according to the earlier philosophy of Schelling and the later logic of Hegel. He is in Himself complete—the I am, above all.

"He sits on no precarious throne,
Nor borrows leave to be."

The necessity in Him to create was the moral necessity of love, not the natural necessity of self-completion. The universe appears by the fiat of His will. He commanded, and it stood fast. Strauss, in his latest book, "*The Old Faith and the New*," says that from the Old Testament we inherit the Lord God; from the New Testament, the God-Father; from the Greek philosophy, the Absolute. But the idea of the Absolute is involved in the clear cut statement of the text. He who wrote it may not have had it fully developed in his thought, but all the elements of the thought are there. The earliest product of literature which we possess is an acknowledgment of the Supreme Being the Alpha and the Omega, the origin and end of all that exists. He who in the beginning of all things already is, and who creates all that doth appear, is of necessity the sole, self-existent, independent, unlimited One. The ultimate substance is Spirit; the ultimate Being is God.

* *Modern Atheism*. A Price Lecture, delivered in King's Chapel, Boston, in Lent, 1874. By Rev. C. C. TIFFANY, Rector of the Church of the Atonement, New York. New York: J. Whittaker, 2 Bible House.

The position of Atheism stands in essential antagonism to the Bible doctrine :

Atheism is the blank denial of this fundamental postulate of the Bible. It either denies that the ultimate substance is spirit, or that, being spirit, it is conscious, personal, and creative. It may take many forms. It may appear as the positive denial of materialism, or the negative affirmation of the sensational philosophy. It may say with Vogt, "We admit of no creation, either in the beginning or in the course of the world's history, and regard the idea of a self-conscious, extra-mundane creator as ridiculous." Or it may say with John Stuart Mill, "that we can never know whether there be a God;" or with Spencer, "that He must ever be the Unknown." But whether men affirm with Virchow, that "all besides physical properties are transcendental, and the transcendental is the chimerical;" or with Dr. Maudsley, "that mind is an abstract idea, which has no existence outside of the mind, i. e., out of the idea;" or with Shopenhauer, "that idealism and materialism are all one, that it is just as true that the percipient is the product of matter, as that matter is the conception of the percipient, and that the Unconscious is the basis of all;" or with Strauss, "that the Cosmos itself is the one thing, beyond which we cannot go in search of an author;" still, in ever varying form, Atheism is the denial of a God above Nature, of a self-existent and independent absolute spirit, of a creative will.

After pointing out the *animus* of Atheism in its successive forms, in a fine historical passage, Mr. Tiffany proceeds to limit the proper function of science :

Theists, of all others, have thus an interest in the world wherein they live, and in the science which explains it. Is, then, their most cherished and sacred belief at the sport and mercy of those from whom their knowledge must be chiefly derived? Is the belief in God, as the world's author, threatened or disproved by the incoming of the knowledge which reveals the method of His progressive creation? To state the problem thus, seems to be to answer it; and yet I claim that the statement is just. Science is not engaged, when in its rightful province, with the origin of things, but only with their existence. Its problem is to investigate the properties, the methods, the relations, the genesis, so far as it is appreciable by scientific investigation of matter and force already existent in the world about us. But it cannot go beyond. It is engaged with the things which are seen, not with the things which are unseen. Whatever be the earth's structure, or the method and process of its formation, when we come to consider the great fact of its origin, whether the Cosmos itself be eternal and self-existent, or whether it finds its origin in a cause outside itself, we decide by another faculty than the logical understanding as engaged with visible phenomena. In this relation, it is indubitably true that "the natural man knoweth not the things of God." Science, in deciphering the unfolding scroll of the universe, can show us its properties, can teach us what the nature of God must be, if He be its author. But science, from the nature of its tests, finds its task is complete when it brings us face to face with the ultimate forms of the visible creation. We turn inward, not to dream, but to question the soul and the facts of its life, when the problem of the source of life is to be known. We must ask the Spirit concerning the Spirit. And it is not to

escape from reality, but to grasp it, to apply for the answer to the question, "What does all this mean?" to that intelligence which alone gives meaning to anything, without which science itself were impossible, and by which we test the validity both of its methods and results.

Of the bearing of the doctrine of Evolution on Theism, Mr. Tiffany speaks as follows:

But it seems to me, that if all that its most enthusiastic disciples may claim be granted, it leaves that question untouched. We ought to remember that Mr. Darwin, whose theory of the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest has given coherence and cogency to the hypothesis of evolution, does not himself make any such extensive claim. He, whose profound study and observation has created the new school, merely indicates that all forms of animal or vegetable life may have come from four or five original species, whose origin he does not attempt to account for. Of course, the creation of these original types would require precisely the same creative power as the creation of any number indefinitely multiplied. On the one theory, there would be more numerous creative acts; but, on the other, there would be the need for precisely the same kind of power, to produce the one germ, or type, as to produce the one thousand.

The question, as Mr. Darwin leaves it, is one of method, not one of ultimate origination. But, leaving the modest originator to his less ambitious claims, and forgetting for a while the gaps in the theory, when it is claimed by some of his enthusiastic disciples as the complete explanation of all the phenomena of Nature; passing over the fact that the origin of life is not shown by it; that the passage, not only from the inorganic to the organic, but from one kind of life to another—from the vegetable to the animal, for instance—is not indicated, and granting for the moment that the theory is not a working hypothesis, but an established fact, buttressed up on all sides by irrefutable phenomena, and capable in every particular of complete demonstration; and following the enthusiastic disciples to the incandescent or candescent hydrogen of the pale stars which the spectroscope reveals as the ultimate matter, out of which the materialists deduce everything in the universe, animate and inanimate; and the question still comes, with the same imperative urgency as ever, with that undisguised frankness which proclaims it thoroughly at home in the gazing soul, "Whence comes the hydrogen?" Is this gaseous tissue, unconscious, inchoate, as yet indiscriminate, containing yet within it the marvelous possibility of the Cosmos,—is this ultimate matter the Eternal Being? Or do the laws of our mind compel us, who can ask the question which it cannot hear, who can think the thoughts it cannot receive, who can classify and arrange all the marvelous products, of which it gives no trace as yet,—does this mind, or does it not, compel us to attribute a substance so marvelously endowed to the product of a Being endowed at least with qualities equal to what is produced? Let our minds travel to the farthest star, and we meet at last the old question, which rises and will not be put down, Does the greater come from the less, or the less from the greater? Does the unconscious germ get to be of itself, or is it formed by that intelligence which is equal, nay, superior to all the possibilities it contains? Does it commend itself to the only inhabitant of the world, which can trace its wonders, that the origin of the wonder is less endowed than he at its starting? Can thought ever deem it reasonable that it is not the product of a

thinker? Nay, as we stand before the veiled universe, and ask what it cannot answer, we are assured that, as the fountain cannot rise higher than its source, our word is the echo of the Eternal Word, which spake and it was done. For, as Martineau has so well said, "Nothing can be evolved that was not involved," and if thought, and speech, and reason be evolved, we are sure that what involved them was the equal of the evolution.

Thus, if evolution be carried to its farthest limit, and it be granted that life and thought were bubbling in the burning cauldron of the gassy flame, still life and thought will ever ask, Who cast them in? And the soul will find the competent answer, not in the flame, but in Him who maketh the flame of fire His ministers;

"Who builds on liquid air, and forms
His palace chambers in the skies,
The clouds whose chariots are, and storms
The swift-winged steeds with which he flies."

And the adoration and worship of the being who can worship and adore, will be not to the burning hydrogen, but to Him who is seated on the burning throne of God.

The inability of evolution to disprove or exclude Design is thus set forth :

No theory of evolution can explain away the presence of the tendency to variation on which evolution depends, or the persistence which seeks perpetuation, or the fact that the survival of the fittest involves a fittest to survive; that on this theory, "whatever is better, is stronger, too;" and a universe in which this rule holds, says Martineau rightly, already indicates its divine constitution, and is pervaded by an ideal power unapproached by the forces of necessity. "Thus the law of natural selection, instead of dispensing with anterior causation, and enabling the animal races to be their own providence, distinctly testifies to a constitution of the world pre-arranged for progress, externally spread with large choice of conditions, and with internal provisions for seizing and holding the best. What can look more like the field of a directing will intent upon good?" If we may quote the illustrations of this eloquent and subtly intelligent author, they must impress us as they impress him, with the truth that evolution and propection are inseparable conceptions. He remarks: "The term Evolution is taken from the history of the seed or embryo of living natures. And what is the seed but a casket of pre-arranged futurities, with its whole contents prospective, settled to be what they are by reference to ends still in the distance. If a grain of wheat be folded in a mummy cloth and put into a catacomb, its germ for growing and its albumen for feeding sleep side by side and never find each other out. But no sooner does it drop, thousands of years after, on the warm and moistened field, than their mutual play begins, and the plumule rises and lives upon its store till it is able to win its own maintenance from the ground. Not only are its two parts therefore relative to each other, but both are relative to conditions lying in another department of the world, the clouds, the atmosphere, the soil, in the absence of which they remain barren and functionless; and this from a cause that has no sense of relation! The human ear, moulded in the silent matrix of Nature, is formed with a nerve susceptible to one influence alone, and that an absent one, the undulations of a medium into which it is not yet born; and, in anticipation of the whole mu-

sical scale of its harmonies, furnishes itself with a microscopic grand piano of three thousand stretched strings, each ready to respond to a different and definite number of aerial vibrations; and this from a cause that never meant to bring together the inner organ and the outer medium, now hidden from each other. The eye, shaped in the dark, selects an exclusive sensibility to movements propagated from distant skies; and so weaves its tissues and disposes its contents, hangs its curtains and adjusts its range of motion as to meet every exigency of refraction and dispersion of the untried light, and be ready to paint in its interior the whole perspective of the undreamed world without; and this from a cause incapable of having an end in view! The deduction which he makes is true, that to "take away the ideal basis of Nature, yet construe it by the analogy of organic growth, will be ever felt as a contradiction."

Turning to the psychological side of the question, Mr. Tiffany impressively shows the untenable character of the sensational philosophy, and of the Spencerism positivism. We extract the following passage from this portion of the Discourse:

The only way to meet this doctrine of nescience, and assertion of the relativity of all knowledge, is to resist it at the outset. We must affirm that consciousness and perception are not at all what these philosophers have pictured them to be. Consciousness of self is not consciousness of a thought or a sensation, but the intuitive knowledge of myself thinking or feeling. The thought or sensation is not so prominent in consciousness as the self, which thinks and feels, though the two are inextricably intertwined. Mr. Greene, of Cambridge, has well said what answers to the consciousness of every one, that "consciousness is the immediate knowledge that the ego has of itself as a perceiving agent." The personality is the subject which consciousness unfolds, and nothing can be more certain or more sure to me than this knowledge of myself. If I cannot trust this, I cannot trust the evidence of my senses, for they are not more sure to me than I myself am. The *cogito ergo sum* of Des Cartes is best rendered, "I, thinking, know I am," for my being is not a deduction from my thought, but a consciousness revealed in the fact of my thinking. With this consciousness of the ego or personality, is the consciousness of myself as affected and as affecting, in other words, as power, and so as cause. There is the immediate consciousness of will, and the intuition of the moral faculty; so that, not merely as forms of thought, according to Kant, to which we may not attribute objective validity, but as constituent elements in the ego or self, I have the intuition of existence or substance, and cause and effect. These are not merely modes of my thinking, but modes of my being, of which I am immediately conscious. And in regard to perception, indissolubly joined to the perception of the appearance, is the intuition of something appearing. I see not merely green, but something green; I touch not hardness, but something hard. The quality reveals a substance in its quality, and the substance is known so far as the quality perceived can reveal it. There may be more to it which other qualities may reveal. The blind man can perceive the ball as hard only; the man of vision can perceive it hard and red. The child sees and feels it hard and red; the man, by knowledge, perceives it hard, red, and of ivory. But every quality revealed the substance, and the substance was involved in every perception of its quality, not as unknown, but as known, so far as the quality could reveal it. A

great deal has been said since the time of Kant about the *thing in itself* which underlies all qualities, the ultimate something in which qualities inhere, but which are not it. But qualities do not veil, they unvail and make known. I see a leaf; I intuitively recognize not merely a shape, a color, a size, but something of such shape, size, and color. So far, I know it. It may have an internal structure, which I do not yet know, because it is not yet perceived; but when perceived, I shall know not merely a new manifestation, but the substance newly manifested. When its chemical properties are perceived I shall know it more perfectly, but all the time I know it, just as I know the man I meet for the first time, though I know him more perfectly the more I perceive of him.

On the force and veracity of our moral intuitions, and on the fallacy of the sensational theory as to their origin, Mr. Tiffany's observations are as pointed as they are timely. We quote here a few lines :

Our moral intuitions are equally clear, and even more convincing as applied to the Theistic argument. Those who deny their validity, adduce as a proof, that conscience varies in its decisions, and is formed by circumstances. True, the judgment which applies the moral faculty grows in clearness by experience and by practical obedience to that faculty. So men and nations grow into a clearer comprehension of just what the right may be. But the original distinction between right and wrong, intuitively felt, is the starting-point of all such culture. I can cultivate my taste, but that is not creating it. I must have the æsthetic faculty before I can improve it. While, then, the distinction between right and wrong is an intuition, the judgment as to what course in special circumstances is accordant with right and wrong, grows in clearness and soundness as the mind grows in intelligence, and the moral nature strengthens by its proper exercise. For when we look into the nature of moral distinctions, we find that they do not consist in the advices of prudence, but in the commands of duty.

The annexed passage on the validity of conscience, and of the inferences deduced from it, is equally well put :

It is under the guidance of this moral nature, and in the acknowledgment of its supreme authority, as centred in the authority of God, that man has come to his best estate, and shown in himself the vindication of His method. If anything is known by its fruits, the validity of conscience is assured. The test of the moral nature is the ultimate criterion of man's judgment of worth or worthlessness. We cannot escape it. "It hath beset us behind and before, and laid its hand upon us." Nations and individuals are alike subject to its judgment, and in obedience to it all that most dignifies man and gives him supremacy in the hearts and over the lives of men, comes to flower in character. Nothing stands so perpetual under the wearing influence of time. Nothing is so deathless, under whatever accumulation of misfortune or obloquy. It always justifies itself, and carries with it an atmosphere of immortal youth and vigor. And in the critical cases of its decision, nothing is more unlike it than the reference to prudence, or deference to utility. Its decision is the issue of the moral necessity of always clinging to right, in defiance of utility and in the face of prudence. And this, which is the elevating and enduring quality in man, which wins for him the universal suffrage

of his fellow-men in respect and honor, is just that which finds its necessary completion in God. It lies at the basis of all prayer for forgiveness when the soul has sinned; it is the root out of which spring the blossoms of praise and adoration, when its monitions have been followed to the freedom of the soul. Those who have followed it most faithfully and attained its supreme heights; who stand to the rest of us as inspirations, and lift our souls by the magnetism of their holiness into a nearer communion with God, are yet just those who are the least self-assuming in their perfection, who are the most conscious that the life has come forth from God.

In confutation of Materialism, Mr. Tiffany's reasoning is clear and decisive:

The argument of the Materialists is, that as the brain is the organ of thought; that as the healthful thought depends on the healthful brain; as an injury to the one is the injury to the other; therefore, in substance, they are identical. They illustrate this by the production of music from physical causes, an effect, they say, as different from the strings of a violin and the pipes of an organ as thought is from the tissues of the brain. But, we answer, sound is merely an aerial vibration, and there is no difficulty in tracing it to its material origin. But when we speak of music, we get to something beyond mere sound. We get to that orderly arrangement and combination of aerial vibrations which is not the product of matter, but of mind, which conceives the thought and uses the material to express it. The organ which produces the music of the church service is indeed a chest of wood, inclosing pipes of metal, which is the physical cause of all the sounds we hear, and which, by their effect upon our minds, aids our worship and stimulates a spiritual act. But the harmony and progression of sound is possible to the organ only as the thought of the composer, who of sound made music, is conveyed through its pipes by the action of the organist, whose muscles are acted on by the nerves, while the nerves are acted on by the will, which will is guided by the intelligent perception of an intelligent musical idea. Music has its spiritual origin as well as its spiritual appeal. It is the mind using aerial vibration to convey emotion, as words are the mind using aerial vibration to express thought. The fallacy of the Materialist is that of a man who, standing amid the ceaseless shuttles of one of our factories, and beholding the orderly progression of the movement, and seeing the cotton cloth coming forth, should assert that the machine furnished the cotton; because, forsooth, if the machine is injured, the cloth is uneven, and if the machine is broken down, no cloth at all is manufactured. That is, overlooking the immense difference between the product and the organ it uses, they confound the one with the other.

Says Professor Tyndall, "The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. They appear together, but we do not know why. Let the consciousness of love, for example, be associated with the right-handed spiral motion of the molecules of the brain, and the consciousness of hate with the left-handed spiral motion; we should then know, when we love, that the motion is in one direction, and that, when we hate, the motion is in the other—but the why would still remain unanswered. The Materialist, granting the correlation of thought with the physics of the brain, is not entitled to say that his molecular grouping and motion explain anything; in fact, they explain nothing."

If we know anything at all—if we can trust the impressions made upon our senses as we dissect the brain, we can trust still more the intuitive consciousness that we are not the body we act in; or, to reduce it to a concrete example, that an anxious mind is not merely a bad headache, or a perturbed conscience a nervous irritation. And should the Materialists be able hereafter to prove—as their boast is that they will—that vital force is the mere correlation of other forces; that there is in it nothing essentially distinctive from heat or electricity; they would only move on one step farther in the physical explanation of the physical organ. They would not then have touched the spiritual power. That is, not the vitality which dwells in the tree or in the body, but something which uses the lower force for its higher purpose. Said Schleiermacher long ago of the efforts of the Rationalists to explain away spiritual truths by their materialistic interpretations: "The clearing out of a subject is not its clearing up."

Still the heart and the mind cry out for God, for the Living God; and so those who deny God, must satisfy the craving for religion. Comte, with his Positive Philosophy, professes the worship of humanity, and decrees a hierarchy and an ecclesiasticism which shall find in the devout commemoration of the world's heroes the satisfaction of its craving. Mill derides this, but confesses that, after his wife's death, her memory was a religion to him, and Strauss, who is so jubilant in his assertion that science has destroyed religion by first revealing an infinite Cosmos, which deprives God of a special habitation above the firmament; next by depriving Him of His special retinue of attendant angels (for, as Büchner remarks, the telescope does not reach or discover any region where angels dwell); and lastly, by excluding His personality, since personality is but a phantom of the brain; Strauss himself, after disparaging the longing for immortality as a childish cry, and asserting that we exhaust our being here, tries to find, in the cultivation of poetry and music, the true satisfaction for the so-called religious nature. His ritual is the true order of progression in musical authors at quartette concerts, where, and in what proportion, Haydn, and Mozart, and Beethoven should come in; and Lessing's Poem of "*Nathan the Wise*" stands to him, he says, as their scriptures do to Christians, Mohammedans, and Buddhists.

We have made large extracts from this admirable discourse, but have had more trouble in deciding what to leave out, so condensed and satisfactory is the entire discussion.

GRACE FOR GRACE.*—We predict for this book, what indeed it has already begun to receive, a hearty welcome among devout and cultivated readers. As much might be expected by the many admirers of Mr. James, as one of the most fascinating preachers of his time. He died in 1868, at the age of seventy-one. Though a pastor for a few years in Rochester, N. Y., he spent most of his life in preaching here or there, as occasion offered, and always acceptably to intelligent hearers, and doing good otherwise with his ample means. While having time to elaborate most effective

* *Grace for Grace.* Letters of Rev. WILLIAM JAMES. New York: Dodd & Mead, Publishers. 12mo, pp. 341.

sermons—of which others, we hope, may yet be published, besides the two printed with a “memorial,” soon after his death—he was more industriously occupied than could be then generally understood in religious correspondence, indulging ardent devotion to his friends and an impassioned desire for their spiritual advancement. Hence this compilation, or rather, as we suppose, selection from his letters. No dates, nor names of correspondents, are given, as we could wish. An index, too, might have been added with advantage. The brief, appropriate preface we take to be from the pen of one of his most estimable friends, though signed only by the writer’s initials. The last eleven pages are filled with extracts from the “view of Mr. James’ character and life,” by Rev. Henry Neill,—an affectionate and eloquent tribute to his personal and Christian endowments. The matter of the letters may be characterized by the titles given to the three sections under which they are distributed:—“the Gift of Grace,” or “free justification and full salvation for the soul through Christ the Redeemer;” “Growth in Grace, promoted in the soul through the ministry of trial;” and “Fruits of Grace,” or “the response of the soul in voluntary self-sacrifice.” The key-note of the whole is God’s love in Christ, and the sinner’s justification, and his sanctification too, by faith; or more distinctly, the prime office of faith in Christ’s work, or of the reception of him as God’s free gift, in order as well to deliverance from sin as to the forgiveness of sin. The view adopted and eloquently urged, especially in connection with the author’s own experience, goes far, some will say to an extreme, in the direction of passivity. A peculiarity and charm of the book is in the combination of what is technically called orthodoxy with catholicity toward other theological views. His warm sympathies are not only with Edwards and Goulburn, but with Faber and Manning (before his perversion) and Robertson, and both *Eccs Homo* and *Eccs Deus*. In magnifying faith as related to sanctification, he goes as far as the “Higher Life” school, yet qualifies his approval of their writings, especially as to the suddenness and completeness of the results they describe. The reader cannot but be attracted by his fervor, candor, high aspirations, and most profound and tender sense of the grace of the gospel. We cordially commend the book to the many who are now seeking higher attainments in the Christian life.

MANNING'S HELPS TO A LIFE OF PRAYER.*—The ranks of unbelief might congratulate themselves on the formidableness of the "prayer gauge" proposed under Tyndall's auspices, when at once it drew so much of the enemy's fire. Indeed, we have felt ashamed to see the anxious attention bestowed on that challenge, especially from the pulpit, when nine-tenths of the hearers knew little and cared less about the cavils of scientists, whether old or newly vamped. In at least one instance a pastor, in a noted watering place, was sensibly relieved to find that a brother engaged to preach for him was not going to hammer on the objections to prayer, as they had been the theme of so many foregoing discourses, and particularly of one from an eminent clergyman, who had made the objections seem more telling than his answers. There have been defences that sound more like the cry of vexation or alarm than the shout of faith. The same difficulty does not lie so much against arguments in print, which may be passed over by those who feel no need of them and who can turn to more suitable food, yet in this form, too, their frequency and apologetic tone have sometimes done more to suggest and spread than to counteract unbelief. There is not the less need, however, of good essays and sermons on the subject of prayer—not to call up and argue against all possible objections to its validity, but to animate and guide all classes of minds in this great department of spiritual life. And such is the little treatise before us by Dr. Manning, appropriately entitled "Helps." A guaranty for its quality may be found in the brief preface, which tells us that his own study of this subject, "some of the results of which are here gathered up," has brought to him "a fuller experience of the nearness and love of God" than he "once had." The successive chapters treat of the "Nature of Prayer," its "Forms," "Objects," "Fruits," "Power," and the "Hour of Prayer." The course of thought shows a devout spirit, careful discrimination, and acquaintance with the experience and needs of the soul in relation to communion with God. Without ignoring the controversies of the day, the author does not exaggerate their merits or influence, nor suffer himself to be warped by them from the practical helpfulness which he proposes to individual minds. The brief extracts from the book which have already found their way into religious papers may have prepared our readers to appreciate the value of its sug-

* *Helps to a Life of Prayer.* By Rev. J. M. MANNING, D.D., Pastor of the Old South Church, Boston. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 12mo, pp. 159.

gestions. It occurs to us that as in most treatises on devotional themes, there may be here something of the tendency, which in a greater degree was pointed out as impairing the usefulness of Prof. Phelps' popular work, "The Quiet Hour," to make prayer seem a more formal or formidable if not mysterious business than it should be considered, or than the author would intend to have it; but we lay no stress on the suggestion. The work cannot fail to be largely acceptable and useful. Moreover, by its elegance in every point of mechanical execution it may adorn the parlor as well as befit the closet.—The omission, by misprint, of the word *are* on p. 22, 10th line from the foot, leaves the word "*like*" to be hastily construed as a verb.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

ALZOG'S CHURCH HISTORY.*—Dr. Alzog, the author of the work of which we have here the first volume in a translation, belongs to a school of learned German Catholics, who, while loyal to their own church, are familiar with the researches of Protestant scholars, and bring to the study of ecclesiastical history a good degree of thoroughness and impartiality. The work, as to size, is intermediate between the dimensions of an ordinary manual and of a copious history like that of Neander. The translation appears to be free, yet to represent correctly the sense of the original. The work is a valuable one to Protestant students, as presenting the views of history entertained by an enlightened adversary.

THE MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.—The fourth volume of this work covers the period of Mr. Adams's service as Secretary of State during the first term of Monroe. The steady advance of Mr. Adams from one political station to another, until he finally reached the presidential office, is a noteworthy fact in our history. The narrative becomes more and more important from an historical point of view, although it is less interesting than it would be if the diary contained a larger infusion of gossip. As we approach more recent times, interesting characters with whose names the present generation is familiar—Webster, Clay, Jackson, Calhoun, &c.—come upon the stage.

* *Manual of Universal Church History.* By the Rev. Dr. JOHN ALZOG, Professor of Theology at the University of Freiburg. Translated by F. J. PALISCH, Doctor of Theology, etc., and Rev. THOMAS S. BYRNE. Volume I. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1874.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.*—This is another of the admirable synopses of special "Epochs in History" which Messrs. Scribner, Armstrong & Co. are now publishing. It embraces the period from 1789 to the "hundred days" and Waterloo in June, 1815. A valuable feature of this volume is a map, which shows the boundaries of the different States of Europe in 1789; and another which shows their boundaries in 1812, when the line of the Empire extended on the northeast to Hamburg, and on the south far into Italy. The special attraction of the volume, however, is a bibliographical appendix, with comments on the books which relate to the subject, by President A. D. White, whose own special study of this period of history gives to it more than usual interest.

PROF. CHARLTON T. LEWIS'S HISTORY OF GERMANY † presents the history of the German people from the earliest times to the present, in a very readable volume of 799 pages. He does not profess to have made any original researches; but, founding his work on the best German compends, he has rewritten the whole with special reference to the wants of Americans. The work is admirably done. We do not mean that there are absolutely no minute errors. We have fallen on a few which a more careful revision will undoubtedly eliminate in another edition, but the book is very superior to the heavy and clumsy and often obscure translations of German works upon which English readers have had to depend hitherto. The last third of the book is particularly valuable. The relation of Germany to the first Napoleon is very clearly and succinctly stated. The chapter on the German Confederation, from 1815 to 1865, is an excellent one. Chapter xxxiii gives an account of the war of 1866 and the North German Bund. Chapter xxxiv takes up the war with France, which it carries on to the surrender of Sedan. Chapter xxxv continues the story to the Peace of Frankfort; while the last chapter is devoted to the new German Empire, and the contest which is now going on with the Roman Catholic Church.

* *The French Revolution and First Empire: An Historical Sketch.* By WILLIAM O'CONNOR MORRIS, sometime scholar of Oriel College, Oxford; with an Appendix upon the Bibliography of the Subject and a course of study by Hon. ANDREW D. WHITE, LL.D., President of Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. Scribner, Armstrong & Co., New York. 16mo, pp. 306.

† *A History of Germany from the earliest times.* Founded on Dr. David Müller's "History of the German people." By CHARLTON T. LEWIS. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1874. 12mo, pp. 799.

PEAKE'S HISTORY OF THE GERMAN EMPERORS AND THEIR CONTEMPORARIES* makes an excellent companion volume for Professor Lewis's "History of Germany." Each of the works by itself will be found to repay careful reading or study, yet neither interferes with the value of the other. This last volume is in reality a succession of biographies of the different German emperors from the time of Charlemagne. Around each one are grouped the great events which occurred in his time; together with an account of the more celebrated among his contemporaries. There is a practical advantage in this method of presenting history. The leading characters are made to stand out prominently, and acquire in the mind of the reader or student an individuality which they do not usually have in a continuous narrative. There is, unfortunately, a fatal facility with which a continuous history is read, which, unless special pains are taken, leaves an indistinct impression of the individual personages who figure in the story. Any device which breaks up the stream, and fixes the attention on individuals is valuable. The author's account of the manner in which the plan of the book was first suggested is interesting. She was standing in the celebrated banqueting room of the Roemer, in Frankfort-on-the-Main, in which the German emperors were formerly waited on at table by kings and princes, and was looking at their portraits, as they are represented in the order of their succession on its walls. The thought struck her, she says, that it would be a good plan to begin with Charlemagne, the earliest of them, and come down to the present time, taking their individual lives as a clue through the intricacies of German history. A valuable feature of the volume is the portrait of each emperor, which accompanies his biography, copied from the paintings in the Kaisersaal just spoken of. Under each portrait, also, is given the motto which he adopted at his coronation. The sketches of the lives of "contemporaries" are excellent, and they add to the value and interest of the work. The book closes with the life of the present Emperor, William I, and the wars of 1866 and 1870.

MISS LARNED'S "HISTORY OF WINDHAM COUNTY, CONNECTICUT,"† is a valuable contribution to an important class of works

* *History of the German Emperors and their Contemporaries*. Translated from the German and compiled from authentic sources. By ELIZABETH PEAKE. Illustrated. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1874. 8vo, pp. 587.

† *History of Windham County, Connecticut*. By ELLLEN D. LARNED. Vol. I, 1600-1760. 8vo, pp. 583.

—the local histories of the country. Such books, from their nature, must always be supposed to be labors of love with their authors; but this one shows the results of the unwearied labor of many years. The first volume alone is as yet given to the public, and the story, which is brought down only to 1780, is of course that of the early colonization of the County. The amount of material collected is unusually large; but the value of the book does not consist in this: it consists in the method in which the material is presented, which quite raises it above the average character of local histories. Windham County is an inland county, and lies neither on "the Sound" nor on "the River." Down to 1760, it was a purely agricultural district, with no such points of interest as are gathered around New Haven and Hartford, Norwich, and New London. Yet Miss Larned has succeeded in grouping her facts in such a way as not only to show how an agricultural community grew up in what was deemed a very retired district, but to throw a charm around the whole narrative. The novelists and the poets of the present century have taught us how much of interest can be thrown around very homely subjects—and the same thing may be true in the domain of history. Miss Larned carries her readers back to the days of pioneer life in the seventeenth century; shows what were the real dangers and difficulties with which our ancestors had to contend in the wilds of the "Quinebaug" and the "Wabbaquasset" country; explains the disputes that arose about "boundary lines;" describes the way in which the land was divided among the emigrants; gives an account of their troubles with the Indians; tells the story of the building of the "meeting-house," and the settlement of the minister, and of all the ministerial troubles which ensued; in a word, gives the details of home life as it was in the fifty years from 1676 to 1726. We have not space to mention even the different topics which are discussed in the book. They are generally treated so exhaustively, that we have been somewhat surprised that the account is not more full of the "Windham Frogs;" and of "Putnam's Wolf-den." We close with a single quotation from the story of the "uneasiness" which was felt about the very worthy man who was the first minister of New Roxbury (Woodstock). "With good abilities, and education, and much energy of character, he was eccentric, and erratic, rash in temper and speech, and somewhat willful and overbearing. His sermons, though sound and vigorous, abounded in odd con-

ceits and ludicrous comparisons. 'A single grain of grace in the heart was worth more than the best load of hay ever carried from Roxbury to Boston.' 'If unconverted men ever get to heaven, they would feel as uneasy as a shad up the crotch of a white oak.' These eccentricities of the minister greatly annoyed his ministerial associates, and once, it is said, induced several to join in an admonitory visit to the offender. The minister received their reproofs with great meekness, frankly acknowledged his faults and promised amendment; but in prayer at parting, after returning thanks for the brotherly visit and admonition, hoped 'that they might so hitch their horses together on earth that they should never kick in the stables of everlasting salvation.'

BENEDICT MEMORIAL.—This is a sketch by the Rev. Joseph Anderson of the life of the late Hon. Aaron Benedict, one of the most prominent manufacturers of Waterbury, Connecticut. He is known as the father of what has become one of the great industries of the country,—the brass business. The story of his early efforts, and the development of his plans, forms a valuable chapter in the history of American manufactures. But though widely known in his business relations, he was no less conspicuous for the "unalloyed goodness of his heart," and for all those qualities of character which make up a Christian citizen in the strict New England sense of the term.

THE EVANGELIST.*—No name is more familiar or honored in the Baptist churches of eastern Connecticut, and of Chenango and Madison Associations in the State of New York, than "Elder Swan." Though at times a pastor, as he is even now when almost an octogenarian in New London, his work has been chiefly that of an evangelist and "revivalist," and in this he has wrought most effectively. Like so many of the celebrities in his denomination, his early education was limited, with only a brief theological training at the Baptist Institution in Hamilton, N. Y. Seeing what he has done in spite of this hindrance, we shall not say, as is so often said in the case of more eminent men in Church and State who have been only "self-educated," such as Bunyan, Clay, and Greeley, "What might education have made him;" for possi-

* *The Evangelist*: or Life and Labors of Rev. JABEZ S. SWAN. Edited by Rev. F. DENISON, A. M. Published by William L. Peckham, Waterford, Connecticut. 12mo, pp. 466.

bly formal discipline might have trammelled the freedom and tamed the impulse of such men, so as to impair their power. In this instance, as it appears from the memoir, and all who know the subject acknowledge, a native vivacity of imagination, quickness of thought, and depth of sensibility and sympathy, amounting to genius, in connection with fervent piety, qualified him, as no education alone could do, for effective preaching. He has been sometimes noted for eccentricities or extravagances, as well as power, yet is acknowledged in the main to have done eminent service in awakening and reforming men, especially where faith and courage were most tested. This volume—a solid book in fair type—is largely, and in the best part of it, autobiographical. The editor supplies what is wanted in the narrative, in general acceptably, but sometimes perhaps seeming unduly to magnify his theme. A life-like portrait precedes the memoir, and an index is added, while several engravings represent churches associated with the subject. From beyond the pale of his denomination we greet the veteran evangelist: “*Servus in ocelum redeas.*”

MISCELLANEOUS.

THE ANCIENT CITY.*—This book is an attempt to explain the civil and political institutions of antiquity as an outgrowth from the earliest religion of the Aryan race, which the writer supposes to have been a worship of dead ancestors and of fire. After describing in the first part this religious belief, the writer applies its ideas to the institution of the family, explaining by them the marriage rite, the nature of kinship and succession, the idea of property, the paternal power, and the *gens* or enlarged family. The third part does the same for the city, explaining its religious acts, the authority of the king, the quality of citizenship, and the character of the laws by reference to this primitive religion. The fourth and fifth parts treat of the successive revolutions by which these old ideas were overthrown and succeeded by, first, the later municipal system, and afterwards the empire. This brief outline shows how interesting and important are the topics discussed, and the writer has certainly succeeded in making an interesting book upon them. But the work has not been done in so critical a spirit as to command full confidence and justify its tak-

* *The Ancient City.* A Study on the Religion, Laws, and Institutions of Greece and Rome. By FUSTEL DE COULANGES. Translated from the latest French edition, by Willard Small. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1874.

ing rank as an authority on these topics. The author makes hardly a single reference to modern writers who have gone over the same ground, but claims to support his statements by numerous passages in ancient literature. This gives the book an appearance both of originality and of authority. But if a question arises in any reader's mind as to the justness of the use of these quotations, and he is led to refresh his memory by looking them up, he will find in many cases that a wide statement is based upon a very narrow foundation. Special cases are taken as evidence of general usages; the custom of one country is inferred from that of another; every slightest hint is forced into the service of the theory, so that nothing shall be left unexplained. It can hardly be supposed that the whole life of antiquity was thus built up on one principle and is thus reducible to so simple a system. The book is interesting and suggestive, but ought not to be used without careful examination of its authorities and comparison of the views of other writers.

CASTELAR'S "OLD ROME AND NEW ITALY."*—The charm of this book consists in the fact that it gives the impressions which "old Rome and new Italy" made upon such a man as Castelar, the late President of the Spanish Republic. We have had our fill of accounts written by English and American travelers, from the time of Addison and before. But it is something less common and really refreshing to accompany the member of one Latin race as he visits for the first time the historic cities of another kindred Latin race. The style of Castelar is imaginative and poetical in the extreme. Such wealth of language and such descriptive power can only be found among those whose blood has been warmed by a southern sun. It was almost with a feeling of happy relief that, after following him in his rhapsody on Venice for some pages, without exactly knowing whether we understood him or not, and not much caring, we came to these words: "It is not possible to describe Venice. Our language has not words enough to paint so rich a picture. At least I cannot attempt it. One must see and feel and admire, and steep the eyes in these colors, and absorb that beauty in all the pores, and then be silent." The titles of the

**Old Rome and New Italy.* Recuerdos de Italia. By EMILIO CASTELAR, author of "The Republican Movement in Europe," now publishing in "Harper's Magazine." Translated by Mrs. Arthur Arnold. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1874. 12mo, pp. 301.

different chapters are: Arrival in Rome; the great ruin; the Coliseum; the Roman catacombs; the Sistine Chapel; the Campo Santo of Pisa; Venice; on the Lagues; the God of the Vatican; the Ghetto; the great city; Parthenope.

SOCIAL PRESSURE: SIR ARTHUR HELPS' LAST WORK.*—Another of that admirable series of "Conversations," carried on by the interlocutors first introduced in "Friends in Council," is republished in this country by Messrs. Roberts Brothers, just as the tidings come to us of the death of their accomplished author. This volume seems richer and more genial than any of its predecessors. The Essays which become the themes of discussion among the "Friends" are: Towns may be too large; Intrusiveness; The art of leaving off; Overpublicity; Ridicule; Choice of men for offices; and Looking back upon life. This last chapter fitly closes the series, and would seem to have been written with almost a presentiment of the sad event which was so soon to follow. It will be read with a melancholy interest by a large number of the author's admirers in this country.

THE GREAT CONVERSERS.†—A collection of twenty essays, many of them before published under other forms, on rhetorical or literary topics, such as "Great Conversers," which gives name to the volume, "Literary Clubs," "Epigrams," "Pulpit Oratory" "Originality in Literature," &c.; the last, however, is an account of the "Battle of Waterloo," with a map. The style is easy and lively. Anecdotes and quotations abound, bringing together really a great deal of literary information, and keeping up a gossip interest throughout. Without claiming to be critical or profound, the author only professes to entertain the general reader, yet for this purpose has drawn on a singularly tenacious memory or turned to good account a full "*Index Rerum*," and shows "the art of putting things." He has more than fulfilled the aim which he modestly avows, "to cheat a few hours of their *ennui* or weariness," furnishing an agreeable and comely volume that must be acceptable on any table, and may not only amuse but incidentally

**Social Pressure*. By Sir ARTHUR HELPS, K.C.B. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1875. 12mo, pp. 412.

† *The Great Conversers, and other Essays*. By WILLIAM MATTHEWS, LL.D., Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature in the University of Chicago. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 1874. pp. 304.

instruct all classes of readers. It has the merit also of an index, which is wanting in so many books that need it. The mechanical quality does credit to the Chicago publishers.

THE GLADSTONE CONTROVERSY.*—Dr. Schaff has connected with Mr. Gladstone's Letter a brief history of the Vatican Council, together with the Latin and English text of the Vatican Decrees, and the Papal Syllabus which preceded them. This is a timely and useful publication. It is an extract from Dr. Schaff's forthcoming work on the Creeds of Christendom, which cannot fail to prove extremely valuable to ministers and theological students. The remarks of the editor upon the history of the late council are judicious, learned, and instructive. Mr. Gladstone's Letter is a powerful arraignment of the modern Papal system in its relations to the State and to the obligation of Civil Obedience. Its wide circulation in England, and the number of replies which it has called forth, are an indication of its influence. Of these replies, by far the most interesting is that of Dr. Newman, whose unsurpassed felicity of style renders everything attractive which comes from his pen. The rejoinder of Manning is adroit and vigorous, but far less rich and suggestive than the pamphlet of Newman. Occasionally, in a minor point, Gladstone is corrected by his adversaries, as he himself frankly allows in his Rejoinder, entitled *Vaticanism*, in which he defends his main positions by cogent arguments. The whole controversy is a wholesome one, especially in England, where the tendency, as Mr. Gladstone points out, is to neglect questions which seem abstract and remote from some immediate practical exigency. Apart from the theological bearing of this discussion, the political state of Europe and the possible future contest between the Papal power and the Italian people and government, render it in the highest degree important that the English nation should have its eyes open to these momentous interests. The tone of both Newman and Manning is cautious and moderate, and in good contrast

* *The Vatican Decrees*, with a History of the Vatican Council, etc. By PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D. Harper & Brothers. 1875.

A Letter to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk, on occasion of Mr. Gladstone's Recent Expostulation. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, D.D. New York: The Catholic Publishing Society. 1875.

The Vatican Decrees in their bearing on Civil Allegiance. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. New York: Catholic Pub. Society. 1875.

with the spirit of Monsignor Capel's pamphlet, in which Mr. Gladstone is assailed for having inflicted a wanton insult upon the Roman Catholics of Great Britain.

THE NEW EDITION OF APPLETON'S CYCLOPEDIA.—The new issue of the American Cyclopaedia, by the publishing house of D. Appleton & Co., has reached the tenth volume. It is prepared under the supervision of the editors of the original work, Mr. Ripley and Mr. Dana. Among the contributors to this edition are many able scholars and scientific men. The value of the work has been greatly enhanced. The illustrations, especially the maps, are a peculiar and a highly valuable feature of this edition. The typography is excellent. As compared with all foreign Cyclopedias, this series is distinguished by the full information which it gives respecting Americans and American affairs. As far as we have observed, there is a studious endeavor to avoid everything polemical and partisan, and to present under each article the best results of impartial research. The wide and varied scholarship of the senior editor, Mr. Ripley, as well as his appreciative, catholic spirit, qualify him, in an eminent degree, for the superintendence of a work of this character. We are sure that nothing which could do injustice to any person or party would secure his approval, or find its way, save by accident, into volumes which must pass under his critical eye.

THE WOMEN OF THE ARABS.*—This book has lain longer on our table unnoticed than we intended. By his seventeen years of missionary life in Syria, Dr. Jessup is admirably qualified for a full and effective treatment of this very interesting subject. His work supplies a demand for information among the friends of Christian missions, and indeed a natural curiosity among all intelligent readers. It will be of timely service in the organized efforts now on foot among American women in behalf of their sex in heathen and Mohammedan countries. We have been particularly interested in "the children's chapter." The volume ought to be in our Sunday School libraries, and will furnish some of the best reading for the family circle.

* *Women of the Arabs.* With a chapter for Children. By Rev. HENRY HARRIS JESSUP, D.D. New York: Dodd and Mead. pp. 372.

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ARTICLE I.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONTAIGNE.

As the personal character of a man will greatly influence his philosophy, we must look at Montaigne's character before proceeding to our theme. The stories of his careful education, of his learning Latin from a German tutor as he would his mother tongue, without labor or study, of his being awakened by the sound of music, are well known; but they deserve mention on account of their influence on his character. If a boy is lazy, Montaigne's substitute for an alarm-clock will be sure to make him more so; if he lacks ambition, such a purely literary education will make him more averse to entering the struggles of an active life. So we find, as might have been expected, that Montaigne's mental cast was preëminently passive. This is seen not only in his indolence and timidity, but in those nobler qualities which distinguish the judge from the advocate, the man of thought from the man of action. A man of action must be enthusiastic—Montaigne was calm; he must be decided in his opinions—Montaigne was often in doubt; he must have strong emotions—Montaigne's pulse rarely quickened its regular beat: he must be objective in his thoughts, occupied with men

and things about him—Montaigne was subjective, self-examining. Although of a kind heart and capable of the strongest friendship, as in the case of La Boétie, he was deficient in love. Even ambition was powerless to strengthen his energy, and we can imagine his comfortable satisfaction in saying that he preferred the second or third place at Perigueux to the first at Paris. He was thus cut out for a philosopher, while his pleasant humor, quick to discern incongruities and pointed analogies, gave him great power as a critic.

The sincerity of Montaigne, which has been called in question, cannot be judged of by one who is unable to appreciate his peculiar frame of mind. Inconsistency is not a sign of insincerity. It may be the surest sign of honesty, to be willing to change an opinion on the strength of new evidence or maturer thought, and to brave the charge of inconsistency for the sake of conviction. Neither does disagreement between word and action argue, in all cases, duplicity. The man who takes as his device a pair of balanced scales, acknowledges that, if his equilibrium ever is disturbed, it is only by a very little ; but, if an opinion is based on such inconsiderable grounds, we cannot expect its author to live up to it, as he would to a firm conviction. No one will suffer martyrdom for what he thinks may, after all, not be true ; and convenience or custom may easily outweigh, in a crisis, the mite of evidence which caused the needle to waver towards the opposite side. Thus many of Montaigne's opinions are incompatible with Christianity ; yet, when he came to die, why should he force his misgivings upon the attention of the world and grieve his friends ? So he took the sacrament and died a good Catholic.

Sainte-Beuve thinks that Montaigne was perfidious, that his pious and elevated sentiments only serve to conceal the venom underneath ; and to prove this, says that he *betrays* himself in certain passages. But why should we attribute such a deep scheme to one who had no object to accomplish, and wrote to pass away the time ? Does his known vacillation and changeableness of mood need the help of deliberate deception to account for his contradictions ? It is true that he does not throw himself into a ferment of despair, when contemplating in the abstract the failings of the race ; but this want of sympathy

should not brand as counterfeit all his noble and reverent thoughts. Warmth of feeling is not necessary to a true appreciation of the grandeur of the universe and of all the wonderful powers of nature, which fill our hearts with awe and fear. Nor should this coldness be unjustly exaggerated and made to appear odious. We cannot see the "rire amer" on Montaigne's face any more than we can on Thackeray's. Such a comfortable, good-natured epicurean philosopher can smile without feeling a "malin plaisir," and laugh without "rubbing his hands" for sheer wickedness.

As Montaigne's virtues were mostly of a quiet, unobtrusive kind, so his faults were mostly weaknesses. The most prominent of these is his selfishness, which takes the form of vanity and irritability, but especially, what the word implies, regard for self and disregard for the rest of the world. He is always occupied with himself and has little interest in any one else. But he had nothing of the intense selfishness of Goethe, who made all events of his life contribute to his own development, who absorbed in himself all the good that he found in others, without making any return. Montaigne occupied himself little with the rest of mankind, whether to give or receive, and, although he sometimes visited the court, and traveled in Italy, and was Mayor of Bordeaux four years, yet even at these times he seems to have mingled little with other people, and generally to have chosen his society from among the books on the shelves of his library. It is natural then that he should always be talking about himself and his favorite authors.

If "philosophy is the generalization of research,"* the philosophy of any individual will be the generalization of his own experience and observation, or his views on topics of universal interest. These topics are mostly included under nature, morals, and religion. Only the last two will need to be spoken of here, for Montaigne was no naturalist. In fact, he had little faith in science, and regarded nature as a "veiled painting," of which our knowledge is so imperfect as not to be trusted at all. This is not wonderful, if we remember that most of his scientific knowledge came from Ovid and Plutarch. We will begin then with his morals.

* G. H. Lewes.

Here he appears as an Epicurean. Pleasure he considered the aim of philosophy, and ease and repose the chief requisites of pleasure; he did not care for wealth, except as it banished anxiety, and glory and fame were not worth to him the labor of acquiring them or the additional care which they entail upon their possessor. In order to secure peace, he took no sides in the wars of his time, and is said to have opened the gates of his chateau to each party in turn. For the sake of peace he believed in following custom and usage, as far as possible; accordingly he submitted to all the forms of his church, though he can hardly have felt much faith in them. But, when Montaigne makes pleasure and repose the aim of life, it is neither slothful indifference nor sensuality that he has in view, but the pleasure that can come only through virtue, and the repose that attends a quiet conscience. The pleasures of the appetites and senses he does not consider worth the name, as they by their very nature contain their limitation within themselves, and, if indulged to excess, change their character and become painful. One of the first virtues then that he recommends is temperance. This includes not only the curbing of the appetites, but moderation in all things. Montaigne showed the practical side of his philosophy in this, for, after all, *ne quid nimis* is a maxim applicable to our good intentions as well as to our bad ones. There are times when the world seems to be taken by storm by the confident enthusiasm of one man, when heroic deeds are to be done, and great sacrifices to be made. But most of us lead a prosaic life, in which coolness and deliberation come out ahead in the long run. They who are always on fire are not always the most useful members of the community, and they whose restlessness finds vent in trying to benefit the world and bring about the millenium by means of a favorite idea, do a great deal of mischief. Montaigne, then, in acting as the pendulum of society, performed a very useful if not heroic function, and we can only wish that France had bred more men of that stamp, who might have given her development a little more steadiness and regularity. But, because Montaigne advocated moderation, we must not think that he discouraged the nobler impulses. There are many passages in his works which show that he fully appreciated courage, devotion, and the heroic

qualities; only he saw that they do not find their place in every-day life, and that, as a rule, moderation is our best guide.

Humility and deference to received usages held a high place in his estimation. He had no patience with insolence and self-conceit, and distrusted all who wanted to make innovations on the old customs. Grant that they were bad; he thought it absurd for men to be so self-reliant as to try to break down, by their own private opinions, what had grown up with the experience of centuries. But, in addition to these rather negative virtues, Montaigne had a moral rectitude which is quite remarkable. By moral rectitude is to be understood an adherence to principles for their own sake, without regard to the approbation of mankind. It is hard to act when unseen just as we would in public; but Montaigne said: "*Les actions de la vertu, elles sont trop nobles d'elles memes pour rechercher aultre loyer que de leur propre valeur et notamment pour la chercher en la vanité des jugements humains.*"* This sounds almost like Cicero, and implies a moral sense of the highest kind. This high standard of conduct is also seen in his repudiation of belief as an excuse for moral delinquencies. "*Ruineuse instruction à toute police, et bien plus dommageable qu'ingenieuse et subtile, qui persuade aux peuples la religieuse creance suffire seule, et sans les moeurs, à contenter la divine justice.*"† He tolerates no such cowardly subterfuge in his system, but brings us face to face with our actions to take the consequences, without regard to our opinions on religious subjects.

But, if Montaigne's morals were as unobjectionable as they have been described, why have they been called, and justly called, *pagan*? As far as his code is concerned, there is nothing repugnant to Christianity; it is in the sanctions, in the reasons that lie back of the rules, that the discrepancy occurs. Montaigne bases his ethics on intelligent self-benevolence; it is for our own good that we are to be temperate; it is for our own

* Virtuous acts are too noble to seek any other reward than that which comes of their own worth, and especially to seek it in the vanity of human judgments.

† Instruction ruinous to all order, and much more harmful than ingenious and cunning, which persuades people that religious belief is of itself and without morals sufficient to satisfy divine justice.

happiness that we are to live virtuously. There is not a word either of divine command or of future reward or punishment. And this is just what constitutes the difference between his ethics and the ethics of Christianity. For there is truth in the blunt remark of Mr. Stephens, "Hell is an essential part of the whole Christian scheme." That Montaigne did not believe in a future life, is seen in his essay on the fear of death, where among all the arguments and considerations that he brings up to allay that fear, he leaves out the very one which of all is the most forcible, namely, the existence of a future life. For what we fear is death, and if we can be persuaded that what we call death is but a change in our life, and perhaps a change for the better, there is, of course, no cause for fear. But Montaigne did not believe in this future, and therefore his philosophy, without holding out any hope that death is not the end of life, aimed at so accustoming us to think of death, that we should take it as a matter of course, as one of nature's ordinances, viewing its approach calmly, without hope and without fear.

Ohne Kummer schlaf' ich ein
Ohne Hoffnung aufzusteh'n.*

Montaigne's view of death stands in strong contrast with the ideas contained in Hamlet's soliloquy. As he did not believe in a future life, but thought that death was but a "leap from bad existence to non-existence," this leap itself and not its consequences was what he dreaded. In Shakespeare's more Christian philosophy, the dying is but a bagatelle; it is "the dread of something after death, the undiscover'd country from whose bourn no traveller returns," that "puzzles the will." Yet it may, we think, be questioned as a matter of fact, whether the impediments to suicide lie more in the fear of some well-defined punishment, or in that strong instinct, common to man and the brutes, which makes us strain every nerve to maintain life and hence shrink from its voluntary destruction.

But Montaigne disbelieved not only in a future life, but also in any direct command of God. His morals belonged to our earthly life, and he did not attempt, indeed he considered it

* I fall asleep without care,
Without hope of rising again. (Rückert.)

supremely presumptuous, to sound the divine will, to pretend to a knowledge of God's commands. He considered the ways of God to be infinitely beyond the apprehension of man, an unknown quantity, not to be used in human calculations. Thus he not only offered no reward or punishment in his system of morals, but took away from his rules the prestige of a superhuman origin. It may seem to many that this was a weak system (if we can give it so formal a name), unpractical, a lantern without a light. Yet, from one point of view, it is the germ,—or better, perhaps, the undeveloped ancestor—of the modern utilitarian theory, which, whether true or not, has certainly shown itself worth fighting about. The chief distinction may be briefly said to be this: Montaigne made the greatest happiness of the individual the rule of conduct; J. S. Mill makes the greatest happiness of the community to be that rule. Montaigne thus approached a doctrine which has been favorably viewed by some of the foremost thinkers of the nineteenth century.

We now come to Montaigne's religion, or his views on God. His creed is short and can be given in few words; and we cannot better express what we hold to be his conception of the Deity than by quoting a sentence in which he does not, it is true, avow his belief, but nevertheless describes it pretty accurately. He says: "*De toutes les opinions humaines et anciennes touchant la religion, celle là me semble avoir eu plus de vraysemblance et plus d' excuse, qui recognoissoit Dieu comme une puissance incomprehensible, origine et conservatrice de toutes choses, toute bonté, toute perfection, recevant et prenant en bonne part l'honneur et la reverence que les humains lui rendoient.*"* This is the idea that runs through and colors all his speculations on the great First Cause, but it needs a little explanation, to show distinctly what he meant by the words he uses. We leave out any question as to his atheism, because we think there can be no doubt that he believed in God: the only question is, what kind of a God he believed in,

* Of all ancient human opinions concerning religion, that one seems to me to have had the most probability and justification which regarded God as an incomprehensible power, the originator and preserver of all things, all goodness, all perfection, receiving and accepting kindly the honor and reverence that men gave him.

what representation he made to his mind of the Deity. The "puissance incomprehensible" expresses literally his view. God was to him so infinitely above all our thoughts that he was incomprehensible, unknowable. God was, it is true, the cause, the creator of the universe, and infinite in all his attributes of goodness, but the very fact of his infinity placed him beyond our powers of understanding. We can speak of infinity and we can speak of the First Cause, but as to forming any definite idea in our minds of the full meaning of these words, it is impossible. Montaigne never seems to warm up to the contest, to show a little fire in his argument, more than when he speaks of those whose presumption leads them to attempt a solution of insoluble problems. He never speaks with more sarcasm than when exposing the folly of those who try to raise themselves to the skies and make man the chief personage in the world. It was this absurd self-conceit that Montaigne combatted most fiercely, under whatever form it appeared, but especially, when it pretended to a knowledge of the wishes of the Deity, when it assumed to know exactly what was his law, what his attributes, and to be as familiar with God as with a next-door neighbor. What! can we creatures of a day, we feeble mortals speak with him whose name is Eternal? Can we, who do not know the smallest part of the universe about us, to whom the every-day phenomena of nature are hidden mysteries, aspire to know the Infinite? Can we, who are always exposed to error, whose best endeavors may be thwarted by unknown causes, lay down with infallible certainty the will of the all-wise, all-seeing Creator? That man must, indeed, be presumptuous, childishly self-confident, who can do aught but keep silence before God. But vastly more presumptuous, blasphemously arrogant, must he be who denies God, and makes his miserable judgment, not the interpreter, but the rival, of the divine will.

" Wer darf ihn nennen?
 Und wer bekennen:
 Ich glaub' ihn?
 Wer empfinden
 Und sich unterwinden,
 Zu sagen: Ich glaub' ihn nicht?" *

* Who can name him and who acknowledge: I believe him?
 Who that feels will dare to say: I believe him not?—GOTTHE.

Montaigne thus silences all speculation as to the attributes or the will of God. He holds that he can be known only through the heart, the feelings. Therefore, he pays him all the reverence, all the humble homage and respectful service of one who feels his own impotence and unworthiness; but, like the Athenians of St. Paul's time, he worships at the altar inscribed "To the Unknown God."

The difference between Pascal and Montaigne is seen very distinctly on this question. They both start from the same premises, they both entertain identical opinions at the outset, yet their final goals are very distant. Pascal brings out quite as strongly as Montaigne the limitation of human knowledge, our great liability to err, the impossibility of comprehending the infinite. He, too, surrenders his reason unconditionally, and says that he cannot prove God, that he only knows him through faith. But, though his reasoning is in form essentially similar to that of Montaigne, as far as they go together, it has, nevertheless, a difference in emphasis which completely changes its character. While Montaigne throws the strongest light upon the inadequacy of our knowledge, Pascal brings into prominence the necessity of our faith. And thus the two arguments stand side by side like two precisely similar statues, one lighted from above, the other from below. Hence Pascal is not satisfied to state his belief, but goes further and insists upon it, and with the aid of the doctrine of chances proves in a mathematical argument that every one ought to believe in God. He shows all the zeal of one who is thoroughly convinced, all the earnestness of one who feels the dignity of the topic.

Montaigne, then, was not a Christian. We believe that the name of Christ occurs but twice in his writings, and, if it were not for an occasional Bible quotation, we might think that he had never heard of the Messiah. He occupies just as neutral a position with regard to the gospel teachings as if he had lived under Cæsar at Rome. Neither did he believe in revelation, or else all his arguments about our ignorance of the Creator would be null; all his magnificent reasoning in the *Apologie de Raimond Sebond* is only valid on the supposition that any such thing as direct inspiration never has taken place.

But not only in these specific points of belief, but in the general spirit of his religion, Montaigne was unchristian, especially in the absence of love. Love is really the main-spring of Christianity, not only because it is emphasized so strongly in the Bible, but because it has actually been the motive power in all the great enterprises which form the glory of Christianity, and its peculiarity as distinguished from other religions. It is love that sends missionaries to the distant corners of the earth, it is love that animates all our great charities, it is love that prompts all the less noisy but not less noble acts of devotion and self-sacrifice which are constantly occurring before our eyes, if we but notice them. Now the prevailing idea with Montaigne was reverence rather than love, a distant, cold, and passive submission to the will of God, rather than an active, ardent devotion to his service.

We naturally enquire, how it could happen that a man living in a Christian country and at a time when the Church, far from being regarded with indifference, was torn by dissensions, could be so little affected by the Gospel. One reason is that, though in a Christian country, he was in a pagan world. A man's world is made up of the minds he comes most frequently in contact with. In Montaigne's case these were the writers of Greece and Rome; he lived with the classics; from them he derived his thoughts and his facts; in their company he found the greatest pleasure; and he looked upon the struggles going on about him as one, sitting comfortably in a warm room, watches the bustling wayfarers of the street below, on a stormy day—with a certain interest, yet with no desire to mingle in the jostling crowd. It is because of this exclusion from the world and intimacy with antiquity that he is so slightly imbued with the spirit of his own time. His God was not the God of Christianity, nor of any other particular religion, but a kind of a generalized idea common to them all. Hence we find such strange combinations as quotations from St. Augustin, Tacitus, and Plato, put together to illustrate one point of conduct towards God. As if these three had the same Divinity in mind. But another reason why Montaigne was so little affected by Christianity is found in its demonstrative character. It is preëminently a religion of logic and evidence. It has in th—

Bible the testimony of the truth of certain facts. These facts being given, men go on to reason from them, to deduce rules and principles and formulæ, to build up an elaborate system, each part of which finds its sanction in the Bible. The fact that there are a great many different sects does not impair the truth of this statement, for any facts are liable to be interpreted in different ways; yet each holds that his own conclusion alone is right, each thinks that he alone is strictly logical throughout. Now any such system was contrary to the cast of Montaigne's mind, as will now be explained. It may seem odd that in speaking of Montaigne we should have gone so far without mentioning his skepticism, that we should have spoken of his morals and his religion as if he actually had a well defined system, and expressed it in clear language. Such has not been our meaning. We have tried to discover what beliefs he really did hold in morals and religion, because we think that everyone has some firm ideas, however skeptical he may appear ordinarily. Having, then, given the positive side of Montaigne's philosophy, we come to the negative side, the doubts, the caution, the non-committal deliberation, which give the *timbre*, the individuality to Montaigne and makes him indeed the ideal skeptic. Although this skepticism is one of the most noticeable features of Montaigne, we will pass it over briefly, because it has been so much enlarged upon by others. We will simply define it without giving it any extended illustration. Pascal and Sainte-Beuve think Montaigne is "pur Pyrrhonien," but this, we think, is putting it too strongly. He certainly does appear in one place to question everything systematically, and he advocates a suspension of judgment, a state of indifference, as the true aim of philosophy. But in this case he is arguing with an object in view, he is trying to "secouer un peu plus rudement" those who call the arguments of Sebond weak, and he uses an artifice which he acknowledges to be but a feint. He says: "This is a desperate trick, in which you must throw down your own arms in order to disarm your adversary, and a secret trick which must be used rarely and with reserve." Such an admission shows him to be hardly more than a dilettante Pyrrhonist. His skepticism was of a more general and common kind; his doubts

are such as have arisen at some time in almost every careful thinker; they came from a strong sense of the liability of the human understanding to err. He did not doubt everything, but he saw how many mistakes are constantly made; he saw what a host of false appearances we are exposed to, how easily we may be deceived, and he saw above all how hard it is by reasoning to reach any general abstract ideas which will be reliable. This was made evident to him by the discrepancies in the different philosophies. Each school had its own ideas, its own definitions, which had been arrived at by *a priori* reasoning, and each considered itself alone in the right. Among such a confusion of claims who was to decide? What rule of certainty was there which could be followed out with success in every case?

Now, in one sense, Montaigne is growing every day less skeptical; the doubts which he expressed as to many philosophies are year after year found to be more valid, and are gradually being replaced by a scientific method of certainty. This method, however, Montaigne did not have, and these doubts as to the value of *a priori* reasoning led him to general distrust of all kinds of reasoning; he burst the old chains of superstition and subserviency to dogmatism, but he did not know how to use his newly-acquired liberty. It was the logical character of Christianity that put it, in his mind, on a par with philosophy in general, and he had no more faith in its chain of deductions than in any other. For it must be observed that the questions on which we have attributed to him convictions rested not on any argument, but on the feelings. He says that God can only be known through the influence of the Divine Spirit, and not proved, and his moral views were based, not on any elaborate argumentation, but on an experience that had become incorporate with his feelings; he knew virtue to be its own reward, because he had always found it so to be, and felt that it could not be otherwise. But Christianity, because it is proved by evidence and is not to be found in the feelings, until so proved, did not appear to him to have any better claim to absolute truth than any other religion. It was this peculiarity of Christianity, taken in connection with the atmosphere of classicism which Montaigne breathed, that made him so

indifferent to it. W. R. Greg, after speaking of the discrepancies of different creeds, says: "But they all agree in affirming that their faith came to them by more or less direct revelation from on high, admits of no questions and contains no flaw. In this they all lie (all except one at least every one admits)." To this thought, without the clause in parenthesis, Montaigne could heartily subscribe, and hence he did not really belong to any church, but believed in what is common to all, that is God.

In closing this analysis we will mention one or two characteristics of Montaigne's philosophy which are especially indicative of true genius. It has been mentioned that he breathed the air of the classics. Nevertheless, we shall find many points in which he was ahead of his times, and not behind them. He used the classics as his mental food, it is true, but the assimilation of that food belonged to him; and thus he was able, secluded from the world and given up to his own thoughts, to distance his contemporaries by a couple of centuries or more in many of his ideas; to arrive at thoughts which the rest of the world has comprehended but slowly if at all. It is in this faculty of anticipating the future that we find his genius.

Montaigne went beyond his time, first, in his religious toleration. Though he lived at the time of the St. Bartholomew, and though he disapproved of heresy on the ground of its presumption and its liability to lapse into atheism, still he believed in freedom of conscience and opinion, in non-interference on the part of the government with religious worship. This idea is realized in the United States, but we all know how recent and imperfect is its introduction in most European States.

In his opposition to dogmatism Montaigne anticipated, we think, the spirit of modern science. He fought principally against religious dogmatism, it is true, and that is no longer so formidable an obstacle to progress as in his day. But his arguments apply to dogmatism of all kinds, and it is in respect to these other kinds of dogmatism that he is most useful to us now. "*La verité ne se juge point par auctorité et temoignage d'altruy*"*—this was the rule that he followed. Now there is no lack of opposition at the present time to religious restraint,

* Truth cannot be determined by the authority and testimony of another.

but are we free from political dogmatism? There are still many people who will hold to the ideas of their party, as if they were eternal; who will quote the words of an old leader, as if he were inspired; who regard his theory of government or his policy as something received from heaven, something which needs no change to suit it to the times, or modification to adapt it to different nations. Again, there is danger of scientific dogmatism—danger that people but half-informed will accept the dicta of scientific investigators as absolute; will give more faith to an hypothesis than he who first invented it; will thus violate the true spirit of science in their zeal for its cause. It is in cases like these that Montaigne's freedom of judgment or skepticism, if that be a better name, is of true value; not to lead us into universal doubt, but to make us satisfy ourselves of the truth of what we hear, suspending our judgment if the facts are beyond our comprehension; forming an independent opinion, if they come within the range of our knowledge.

ARTICLE II.—THE METAPHYSICS OF EVOLUTION.

Principles of Psychology. By HERBERT SPENCER. London, 1872.

I.

THE analysis conducted in a previous Article disclosed, or seemed to disclose, two facts: *First*, that the universal generalizations of the Theory of Evolution have omitted, if not the phenomena themselves, at least the more important aspects of the phenomena, those namely which they wear within the circuit of consciousness. The phantasmagoria which fill the theatre of the brain are, for us, the phenomena, and nothing is explained if *they* are not; in the midst of them we live and move and have our being; nay, the whole development of mankind has gone on in the midst of them, and they are left behind by the formula of the Redistribution of Matter and Motion. *Second*, that the generalizations, guilty of this vast omission, themselves fall asunder in irreconcilable contradiction upon any attempt to translate them into definite thought. So far as appears here, they must follow the Absolute Reality into the exile of the Unknowable, and for the same reason, because they transcend the faculties of our intelligence.

We come now to the ultimate question of all, independent of the foregoing although distinctly foreshadowed by it—the consistency of the Philosophy of Evolution with itself. Whether its generalizations are reconcilable with each other and with the phenomena or not, no longer matters here. The question now is, what right has the evolutionist to generalize at all? If there is only one process of derivation for all things, then Mind itself is only one product of this derivation; and if so, how can it philosophize about anything beyond itself?

At the outset the evolutionist is in no worse case than any other theorizer. All philosophy must begin with the contents of consciousness and must consist in the interpretation it puts upon them. Taking them as they stand, as the sole source and the sole criteria of knowledge, it may legitimately reason

beyond them, for consciousness itself affirms the existence of an objective universe past, present, and to come, and of certain eternal necessities according to which it is constituted. In this case the business of the philosopher is simply to ascertain the exact deliverances of consciousness and to apply them to the facts of being. We accept the universe as here now, because consciousness affirms that it perceives it; as having been in our previous experience, because consciousness affirms that it remembers it; its orderly persistence through the past, present, and the future, because consciousness affirms the uniformity of causation. But if the philosopher refuses to accept consciousness as the one original and fundamental fact for him, if he insists on deriving it from something other and earlier than itself, then it ceases to be either a source or a criterion of knowledge; any authority it may have is derivative and second-hand, and the true sources and criteria are to be sought for in that anterior existence from which it issues. We have seen that Mr. Spencer has approached the very brink of explicit self-contradiction to evade the necessity of identifying Mind with Motion, but in the all-involving chaos we are now approaching, this evasion is of no avail. The transcendent mystery and incommunicable characters with which he has invested consciousness count for nothing here, for if not itself motion it is avowedly the product and equivalent of motion, issuing exclusively from, and disappearing without any remainder in, motion; and therefore so far as its utterances are concerned it must be treated as motion, for if we treat it as anything else we restore to it its character as an underived mode of being; which is a denial of evolution. We have nothing at all to go upon but the sensations which are the subjective sides of molecular motions of the nervous centres supposed to be induced by the incident motions of a surrounding universe. To anticipate Mr. Spencer's illustration, there is an ultimate unit of feeling which appears as a term, or link, in a series of nervous and muscular changes, and out of such units are built up, somewhat as a chemical compound is built up out of the ultimate units of matter, all our sensations and all the relations among them. Of the intrinsic possibility or impossibility of such a constitution of consciousness we have now nothing whatever to say.

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Our question is as to the possibility or impossibility under such conditions of a *philosophy*. If Mr. Spencer's mind was evolved after this fashion, how came he by this all-embracing knowledge of the illimitable and everlasting universe? No other thinker, we may say, has ever swept the breadths of being with generalizations so vast as these: what is their value if intelligence is a redistribution, or the product of a redistribution, of motion consequent upon an integration of matter? Our affirmation is, that in construing the phenomena of consciousness as an outcome of universal evolution Mr. Spencer has dug a pit-fall for his own philosophy. Either a consciousness so derived and constituted cannot know with certainty anything beyond itself; or, if consciousness certainly knows anything beyond itself, it cannot have been so derived and constituted.

It is scarcely necessary to say that Mr. Spencer himself is perfectly aware of the gravity of this question. On the one hand, he has appropriated the whole body of subjective intuitions and objective *à priori* truths, the positive utterances of perception, memory, and reason, concerning the universe inner and outer, present and absent, with a freedom nearly unparalleled in the history of thought; while upon the other, he has applied them to establish a theory which abstracts, or seems to abstract, its certitude from every intuition and its necessity from every *à priori* truth. If these dicta of consciousness are not absolutely true, then Evolution is not true; and if they are not *known* to be true Evolution is not known to be true; but conversely, if Evolution is true, then the dicta, whether true or false, can never be known to be true. It would appear that the gunner is overthrown by the recoil of his own guns; for the accumulation of proofs that the Persistence of Force is the universal postulate and Evolution the universal law of being is cumulative proof that *no* proof is conclusive; the increasing certainty of the theory involves the decreasing certitude of the intuitions on which it rests; the lever lengthens at the expense of the fulcrum, and, startling as the result may be, the most elaborate system of Realism which the world has ever seen appears to land in inevitable Idealism or Scepticism. From this fatal plunge it is to be withheld, as no one knows better than Mr. Spencer, only in one way, namely, by showing

that the paradox in question is not a contradiction; that the special redistributions of motion involved in the construction of the individual consciousness can give authentic intelligence of the entire redistribution of motion and matter; that a single product of Evolution carries with it a certain knowledge of all other products and of the process itself; that is, that a limited experience supplies to a limited consciousness a fund of sure intuitions sufficient to interpret the whole universe beyond consciousness. This is the formidable task to which Mr. Spencer addresses himself in the General Analysis which concludes his explanation of General Psychology, and thither we must resort for the formal and final justification of his entire philosophy.

Before, however, we can appreciate either the strength or the weakness of this justification, we must clearly understand the thing which is to be justified. The intuitions which Mr. Spencer has applied so confidently and on so vast a scale are ultimate combinations of the states of consciousness, and the states themselves are products of previous modes of motion. Clearly, the authority of the intuitions is determined by the process of their derivation, and we must comprehend the latter in order to estimate the vindication of the former. In other words, we have to ascertain Mr. Spencer's theory of the nature of mind before attempting to judge his theory of the nature of knowledge. As there are no breaks in the process to be studied, we have no alternative but to begin with the beginning.*

II.

The immediate effect of Evolution is an integration of diffused homogeneous matter; a more or less consolidated mass having a certain separateness and individuality of its own.

* Mr. Spencer's distribution of his subject, especially in the *Principles of Psychology*, is very perplexing. His order is neither the logical nor the chronological, the scientific nor the popular, but an indescribable compound of all four, to the confusion, not only of the student but of most of the critics. If the resulting obscurity has been of some incidental service to the Philosophy by masking the *petitio principii*, which, as we shall see, it appears to involve, it has also been a disservice by lessening the force of the analogies between Mind and Motion upon which the Philosophy depends; analogies never before worked out as they have been by Mr. Spencer. The statement that follows is as nearly as possible chronological, and is mainly drawn from the First, Fourth, and Fifth Parts of the *Principles of Psychology*.

Such aggregates are the primitive nebulous sphere, or spheroid, revolving on its axis, the several portions into which it subdivides, the solar system arising from one of such portions, the earth a constituent member of the solar system, and any integrated mass of matter at the surface of the earth. Each of these individuals is made up of separate parts interdependent and acting upon one another, while the whole is exposed to, and responds to, the actions of the environing universe. As the constituent parts become more heterogeneous, more distinctly differentiated, and more dependent upon one another, and as the whole responds to wider and higher actions of the environment, it rises in the scale of being. The solar system, for example, with its complicated structure and harmonious functions, its prolonged rhythms within and its extensive relations without, is of a distinctly higher type than the incoherent nebula out of which it came; or the earth with its differentiated surfaces and contrasted climates than the incandescent spheroid which it was ages ago. But vast as are the resulting disparities, the fundamental similitude is maintained; one formula covers all the phenomena. Each evolving aggregate is made up of its constituent parts and is reacting perpetually upon the forces of the universe; and when we have ascertained its structure and functions, and its place in the environing whole, there is nothing more to be known about it. Be it a nebula, a stellar system, a separate star, a chemical compound, a cohering mass, or an organism, its Life involves these three things; the relations among the parts of the individual, the relations among the parts of the environment, and the correspondence between the two. It may be a low kind of life or a high kind, simple or complex, but in any case it is never anything more or less or other than this—the adjustment of internal relations to external relations in Space and in Time.

A mass of protoplasm fitted for the earliest manifestations of animal life is an aggregate of matter like any other; but in point of time it is the latest, and in point of character the highest, product of the redistribution of matter and motion. By the exceeding heterogeneity, definiteness, and coherence of its parts, and by its exceeding sensitiveness to incident forces—the

complexity of the internal relations, and the complexity of the external relations to which they respond—it is the record of an incalculable evolution in the past, and the prophecy of a yet more incalculable evolution to come: the goal or fruit of the one, the starting-point or germ of the other. Yet at first sight nothing could be more unpromising than the character of the four elementary substances of which it is chiefly composed.* Three of them, Oxygen, Hydrogen, and Nitrogen, when uncombined, are gases which refuse to liquefy, that is, to surrender their contained molecular motion, under any available pressures; they are especially inapt, therefore, for that dissipation of motion which is one concomitant of evolution. Three of them again, Hydrogen, Nitrogen, and Carbon, have a very low chemical energy and stability—are, so far, specially inapt for that integration of matter which is the other concomitant of Evolution. Hydrogen and Nitrogen of course combine both inaptitudes. Carbon, however, is known only as a solid which resists volatilization at any available temperature, and oxygen, although a gas, has a chemical energy exceeding that of any other substance. Remembering now that the properties of a body are the *resultants* of the properties of its components, resultants in which antagonistic forces are balanced but not destroyed or lost, we may expect to find in the higher compounds of these four substances a capability of evolution wanting in the substances themselves; a mean between the extreme molecular mobility which results in dispersion or dissipation, and the extreme stability which results in complete equilibration. Of these compounds, protoplasm itself is the highest. It is made up of relatively immense molecules, retaining all the energies their elements had, but whose very massiveness implies a decrease of molecular mobility and of self-sustaining power—an inertia which promises persistence, a sensitiveness to incident forces which promises change, and a latent power which promises work; in other words, the conditions of those incessant but orderly and efficient transformations which constitute the evolution of organic life.† On closer study, it is found that

* *Principles of Biology*, Part I, ch. i.

† An organism is no more alive than an inorganic aggregate—a crystal or the solar system; it is only alive in a more complex and noble manner; that is, the correspondence is of a higher kind.

this plasticity and power of organic matter combines four conspicuous characters. In the first place, it is an absorbent; by an action analogous to those of capillarity and osmose, shown by certain other forms of matter. In the second place, its constituent molecules ("physiological units," as Mr. Spencer calls them) have a power of moulding assimilable particles of absorbed material into their own form, and of impressing upon them their own "polarities;" a mysterious action, whose only known analogue is the process by which a broken crystal exposed to an appropriate solution restores its original outlines. In the third place, its sensitiveness to incident forces leads to changes of two different kinds: either its molecules are thrown by disturbance out of one order of arrangement, or state of aggregation, into another, possessing different properties from the first, a tendency which in other compound bodies is known as isomerism, or polymerism; or the arrangement is completely overthrown, and decomposition ensues. From the union of these four characters or modes of action, absorption, polarity, isomerism, and decomposition, flow all the structural and functional phenomena of animal life.

These characters of animal matter are necessarily manifested, as are those of any other evolving aggregate, under two contrasted aspects, according (1) as it is subject to the actions of the surrounding universe on the one hand, or (2) as it reacts upon the universe on the other. (1.) Its complex and massive molecules—colloids, as they have been termed—are permeated in the conditions in which they are always found by solutions of their crystalloids, molecules made up of the same constituents, but less complex and massive, and therefore having greater molecular mobility. By polarity the units of the absorbed crystalloids are moulded into colloidal units and integrated with the organism. From this simple function of absorption and assimilation, or nutrition, as we name it in organisms, aided by isomerism, arise the complicated functions of growth, repair, genesis, and heredity, together with the several structures by which they are carried on.* Furthermore, the protoplasmic mass, thus fed and stimulated within, is ever receiving at its surface impressions from surrounding things,

* *Principles of Biology*, Part II.

the pressures of gravity, the impacts of molar and molecular motion. Under these experiences, and out of the fundamental process of nutrition, there arise by a series of adaptive modifications, in which polarity and isomerism are involved over again, the several senses and sense-organs by which intercourse with the outer world is maintained.* Widely diverse as are these two great classes of phenomena, they have a common origin and a common character. Each is developed out of the primitive function of nutrition, and each constitutes an increment of organic force. In assimilation the molecular motion locked up in food is indirectly transferred to the organism; in receiving impressions the mechanical motions of neighboring objects or the undulations of the air and the ethereal medium are directly transferred. Both are subtractions from the matter or motion, or both, of the environment, and additions to the matter or motion of the organism. It is evident that this increase must have a term. After a certain limit has been reached, when the reservoir is full, the inflow must be balanced by the overflow, the accumulation of matter and force by the expenditure of matter and force. (2.) Accordingly, it is found that the massive and inert colloids are in a state of ceaseless flux and transition. Shaken by the disturbances of incident forces from without, they fall asunder and are decomposed. Fed by the more mobile and active crystalloids, they are at the same time dissolved by them and diffused away. Thus what is built up by one hand is torn down by another, renovation is accompanied by disintegration, waste and repair go on together. From this action arise the various functions and structures of excretion and exhalation. The surplus force may be disposed of by simple transmission to surrounding objects with which the organic mass is in contact; the molecular motion disengaged from the colloids within escaping at the surface, the sensible or insensible motion entering at one side overflowing at the other. But as we have already seen that, by reason of its polarity and isomerism, the structure of the mass is differentiated by the entering motion, so we may expect to find a corresponding differentiation effected by the escaping motion—the specialized

* *Principles of Biology*, Pt. V, ch. vii. The differentiation of the sense-organs from the outer or surface-tissues, and of their functions from the common function of nutrition, is given in detail.

structures through which the universe acts on the organism associated with another set through which the organism reacts upon the universe. Now of the many isomeric changes of form set up among the colloids of a protoplasmic mass some will be accompanied by a change of bulk; the colloid will pass into an isomeric state, in which it occupies less space than before, i. e., it will *contract*. From contractility arise by successive adaptations the various forms of muscular tissue and the actions they perform.* Instead of homogeneous waves of escaping motion, we have the highly specialized motions, by which developed organisms act on the surrounding universe.

These, then, are the two fundamental processes of life by which the correspondence between every individual and the environment is maintained; and the primordial forms with which the evolution of the animal world began could have manifested no other. A structureless mass of protoplasm exposed to nearly uniform conditions does nothing but absorb nutritious matter and receive incident motions, while it excretes waste matter and surrenders surplus motion. Action and reaction are of a simple kind, and the one is almost directly affiliated upon the other. Between the two great processes, the accumulation of matter and force, and the expenditure of matter and force, there are no intermediate steps, or very few. But when by successive redistributions the actions of the universe on the organism have developed the several senses, and the reactions of the organism on the universe have developed the several organs of motion and locomotion, there will arise the necessity of some intermediation between the two. Multitudinous communications from without are responded to by multitudinous actions, and the response cannot be coherent and definite unless there is intervening co-ordination and adjustment. Hence, by inevitable redistributions of matter and motion *within* the organism, there arises a third group of specialized structures whose function is the orderly transfer of matter, and force from those which accumulate to those which expend.†

* *Prim. Biol.*, Pt. V, ch. viii. To complete the statement, it should be added that contraction is immediately reversed by the tendency of the colloids to resume their previous isomeric state and bulk, muscular action consisting of alternate contractions and dilatations.

† *Prim. Biol.*, Pt. V, ch. viii.

We have the vascular system, by which nutriment is distributed to all parts of the body in action; the osseous system, by which inner and outer strains are antagonized; and, lastly, the consummation of the whole and the superlative achievement of Universal Evolution, we have the Nervous System, by which the innumerable impressions received through the senses are co-ordinated at the interior, and thence discharged to the muscular apparatus which effects the movements of the body. In this centre of reception, co-ordination and discharge are the birthplace and seat of Consciousness. What we call its functions are but another aspect of the functions of the nervous centre; and the same redistribution of matter and motion accounts for the genesis of both.

Let us suppose* that a structureless aggregate of protoplasm which has been exposed on all sides to uniform, or uniformly changing conditions, as when floating free in the ocean, becomes attached to some fixed support, so that a particular portion of its surface is more exposed to contact with moving objects around it than the rest. Any such contact—a touch, or blow, or an agitation of the medium it inhabits—will cause an addition of motion to the colloidal particles at the point affected. Part of this added motion will be expended in setting up those isomeric changes which produce contraction, with perhaps other changes of allied or different kinds; but a certain surplus, we may suppose, will be left over, which will of necessity extend to adjacent particles, according to the law that motion follows the line of least resistance. This line will be determined by the greater or less stability of the several particles. Such of them as are isomerically transformed under disturbance more easily than their neighbors, and especially such as give out motion during transformation instead of taking it up, will offer a pathway to the entering wave; we shall have action along an obscurely defined channel instead of uniform diffusion through the mass. Furthermore, according to the general principle of polarity, some of the particles having once been isometrically transformed, will mould other particles in their vicinity into the same new type, whereby the obscure channel

* *Principles of Psychology*, Pt. V, chs. ii, iii.

already traversed will be more distinctly differentiated and prepared in advance for the passage of a second wave, which again will facilitate the passage of a third; and so on indefinitely. Thus in time the more exposed portion of the mass is differentiated from the others as a definite seat of successive impressions and resulting contractions, with a channel leading inwards along which surplus motion is drafted off with ever-increasing directness and facility. To all intents and purposes a channel of this kind is an incipient nerve.

Where is this incipient nerve or line of ever-lessening resistance likely to terminate? In that point of the mass where there happens to be the least resistance of all. If the circumstances of the evolving organism have so changed that *two* portions of its surface are more exposed to contacts from without than the rest, then it will almost certainly happen that while a touch, or blow, or vibration, is adding motion at one of them, a contraction is expending motion at the other; there will be pressure at the former and tension at the latter, and our incipient nerve will be converted into a connecting line of least resistance, ever restoring the disturbed equilibrium between the two. This restoration of equilibrium is not itself a true nervous action, but it tends to become such. The actions of the two more exposed portions, at first separate and independent, will in time become associated and reciprocal; an addition of motion at one of them will produce an expenditure at the other, so that finally we shall have a simple series of sensible impressions, nervous discharges, and muscular contractions—an organism definitely adjusted by direct action and reaction to a single order of relations in the environment.

No creature, however, is likely to be subject to conditions so little involved as these. Instead of exposure at one or two points, there is sure to be exposure at three or four or more; while an impression is adding motion at one of them, contractions will be expending motion at several of the others, and the entering wave, initiated by the supposed impression, will reach some point in the interior where it is perplexed between the competing tensions of these several places of contraction.* In the long course of Evolution hitherto nothing has happened

* *Prin. Psych.*, Pt. V, ch. iii, p. 5 to 7.

comparable in the grandeur of its consequences with this molecular distraction at the "parting of the ways." Drawn towards different quarters by conflicting tensions, the wave must break up into diverging portions, and in this act of breaking up and diverging the intervening particles of colloidal matter will be thrown into confusion; caught at the point of parting between the outgoing waves or wavelets, some will fall in one direction and some in another; instead of that symmetrical adjustment of particle to particle in linear order which constitutes a nerve-fibre and which promptly transmits nerve-motion, there will arise an amorphous mass of particles which arrest and absorb motion, decomposing and giving out their own stores of contained motion as they do so. Such an amorphous mass is an incipient ganglion, or nerve centre. Any subsequent motion arriving by the incipient nerve from the incipient sense-organ at the surface will be detained among the entangled and unstable molecules of the new ganglion, whence it will be discharged in augmented volume to the several points of contraction. This detention, simple as it seems, is the condition of that interior co-ordination by which the various reactions of the organism are definitely adjusted to the various actions of the environment; while consciousness, as we saw, is the accompaniment of this co-ordination and adjustment.

Here, then, is the elementary form, or ideal type, of all nervous structures; a massive centre of re-arrangement receiving the motions sent through *afferent* nerves as they are stimulated by impressions made upon the several senses; and discharging stimuli along *efferent* nerves to the various portions of muscular tissue. It is only necessary to add, what however is of the last consequence, that the resulting contractions of muscular tissues constitute an active intercourse with the outer world, from which a new order of impressions is telegraphed back to the centre, to mingle there with the other order of passive impressions simultaneously received.

It is evident that the amorphous mass of colloidal matter forming the original nervous centre cannot remain unaffected in the midst of these incessant actions and reactions. As the motions communicated from the environment develop the special organs of the several senses, and as the motions restored

to the environment develop the special organs of muscular action, so, according to the same laws of redistribution, the motions received through the afferent nerves and discharged through the efferent nerves must differentiate and organize the nervous centre itself. Perpetuated from generation to generation by the law of Heredity, continually enlarged and improved under the laws of Variation and Survival of the Fittest, it is ever evolving along with the rest of the organism into a higher and wider correspondence with the surrounding universe. The latest product of this evolution, the descendant of the entire series of nervous systems and the inheritor of all their growths and improvements, is the assemblage of cephalic ganglia in Man; a veritable microcosm, whose interdependent particles repeat, so to say, letter for letter, word for word, volume for volume, the interdependent parts of the environment; the minute structure of the limited universe within duplicating the immense structure of the illimitable universe without. But structure determines function at any given instant, precisely as in the long course of evolution function has thus determined structure; the two proceeding *pari passu* together. If the organization of the nervous centre corresponds to the organization of the outer universe, then, in the perpetual intercourse going on between the two, the motions set up in the centre must equally correspond to the motions taking place in the universe. As determinate structure answers to structure so must definite change answer to change, definite action to action.

No enumeration can sum up the multitudes of agitations which fill the sensitive ganglia of the brain as they reply to the motions of the universe without; while at every successive instant a new host rises upon the ranks of its predecessor. What becomes of this countless succession of countless multitudes? How are they withheld from the whirl and conflict of utter chaos? By the rigorous restraints of structure which, as we have just said, determines the order of all function. Any simplest disturbance of the molecules of the brain, as, for example, the sharp shock among them which follows a blow or touch given or received at the surface of the body, is not an isolated change among the myriads of others; it has been preceded by a similar shock following a similar blow, and that

by a long series of other similar ones. A specific structure has undergone a succession of definite changes which cohere together in linear order as resembling one another. So too with the single interior change which follows the breaking of a single wave of sound upon the ear. A swift succession of such shocks blends into what we call a tone, and the simple shock or the compound tone falls into order as one of a long series of previous changes like itself set up in the same specific portion of the brain. So once more with the indefinitely more delicate disturbance produced by a wave, or as we may say by a merest ripple, of the luminiferous æther breaking upon the retina of the eye. Minute beyond all imagination, it coalesces with its immediate predecessors into an appreciable agitation, the last in a long series of similar ones that have gone before.

Thus in the midst of bewildering multitude we have precision, simplicity, and order. What we may call the unit of the actions of the nervous centre is a molecular disturbance of some constituent portion of its substance. All such disturbances are alike in that they are all equally modes of motion, but as the histological, or minute, structure of one portion differs from that of an adjacent one, so the rhythm of its vibrations differs. Belonging to a whole family of like rhythms set up in the same portion of nervous substance, it enters into combination with others of the family, or of kindred families, giving multiples and compound multiples of higher and higher complexity, each of which again is identifiable as the last in a long series of such.* If now these regulated throngs of motions that come and go within the theatre of the brain are invested with consciousness, the problem of all the ages is solved; for the organization of nervous actions is determined by the structure of the nervous centre, and both again by the structure and functions of the evolving universe around. Self-consciousness must carry with it the consciousness of the Not-self.

Now we understand Mr. Spencer's theory of the nature of Mind. Consciousness is the correlative of organic action of the nervous centre. Successive multitudes of changes that are molecular motions on one side of them are sensations upon the

* *Prin. Psych.*, Part I, chs. i-v.

other. The unit of consciousness is that simple, undecomposable feeling which arises, twin-born, along with the simple shock among molecules of the brain when disturbed and decomposed by a touch or blow at the surface of the body, by a wave of sound or of light breaking upon the ear or the eye. As these units of nervous change are all alike modes of motion differing only as their rhythms differ, so the units of feeling differ quantitatively, but otherwise not at all; as the units of nervous change combine into more and more complex multiples of motions, so the equivalent units of consciousness combine into more and more complex multiples of feelings—there arise the several sensations of Touch, Taste, Odor, Sound, Heat, Light, with the yet more complex feelings which we distinguish as Emotions and Desires, Pleasures and Pains; lastly, as any motion or multiple of motions falls into line as the last in a series of similar motions that have gone before, so each feeling falls into line with its predecessors of the same kind. Unit for unit, multiple for multiple, order for order, the feelings of consciousness answer to the motions of the nervous centre, and the organization of one host answers to that of the other.* *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius sit in sensu*; there is nothing in the mind which is not simultaneously, or was not the instant before, in the brain, and no law of mental action which is not the counterpart of some law of cerebral action.†

It so happens that consciousness having been profoundly studied ever since the dawn of philosophy, its changes have

* *Prin. Psych.*, Pt. II, chs. i, ii.

† Throughout this Article we have conceded, for the sake of the argument, that consciousness may be thus derived. Here it must be noted, in passing, that no such derivation is possible. If the elements of consciousness are numerically equal to the elements of cerebral change, and if the order of their composition is the counterpart and equivalent of the order of composition among cerebral changes, then the former cannot have arisen by any *redistribution* of the latter. To put the case in its simplest form: the ultimate constituent of conscious changes is an undecomposable unit, and the ultimate constituent of cerebral changes is an undecomposable unit. We must choose between two alternatives: either these units are one and the same unit, or, if they are several and two, one of them cannot be produced by a redistribution of the other. We must identify Mind with Motion or Mind is not covered by the formula of Redistribution; and equally in both cases Mr. Spencer's Theory comes to grief. Nor will it avail to say that a sensation is the subjective side of a molecular motion, for a unit which has two sides that cannot be assimilated is not an undecomposable unit.

been methodically classified as acts of Sensation, Perception, Memory, Reason, Desire, Will, and so on; but all these actions are equally feelings or combinations of feelings which on the outer or objective side are molecular disturbances of the cephalic ganglia. To illustrate their interdependence and community of character let us follow some conspicuous and vivid series of changes through the whole circuit from the first impression upon the senses to the resulting actions of the body. From a cloud, we will say, which has suddenly darkened the summer sky, there issue in the same moment a flash of lightning and a report of thunder, with gusts of wind and down-pour of rain; simultaneous motions of the æther, the atmosphere, and the following rain-drops throw into agitation the sensitive molecules exposed at the surface of the body, whence waves of molecular motion take their way inward along the afferent nerves. A portion of this motion is instantly transmitted to the muscular tissues, producing automatic reflex action, that is, an instinctive start and tremor of the body; another portion, however, is intercepted by the nervous centres which give out a definite amount of their own contained motion, as when an electric spark explodes a powder mine, and with this liberation of motion in the brain a concomitant sensation arises in consciousness. Now what follows?* This vivid sensation is no alien and stranger in consciousness. It represents a definite action of a specific structure which has often acted in a similar way before—is instantly classified with preceding sensations like itself. But this act of classification, in one aspect, is nothing other than an act of Memory; for to recognize this sensation of a thunder-storm as like previous sensations is to remember previous thunder-storms. So too in another of its aspects this same classification is obviously an act of Perception; for to say I perceive a thunder-storm, is only saying, I have sensations which, when they occurred before, were sensations of a thunder-storm. In yet another aspect of it, the classification is an act of Reasoning, for to reason about a thing is to compare the sensation we have of it with others of the same kind already experienced. Memory, Perception, and Reason are all different sides of the same sensation, whose presence in consciousness is

* *Prim. Psych.*, Pt. III, chs. iv-ix.

due to the obstructive action of the nervous centre. But what becomes of the sensation itself? It accompanies the motion liberated in the nervous centre, which of course tends to discharge itself along lines of least resistance, that is, along the efferent nerves to the organs of contraction. This tendency on the subjective side is nothing other than an Impulse or Desire; and if the discharge take place, if the tendency of cerebral action to motor action is really consummated, then we have what on the subjective side is nothing other than an act of Will. The motion liberated in the brain by impressions made upon the senses by the thunder-storm brings with it Sensation, Perception, Memory, Reason, Desire, Resolve, Action—we put up our umbrella or run into the house.

We may sum up the whole matter, then, by defining Consciousness, in the individual and in the race, as the necessary consequence of the obstructive action of the nervous centres. It remains to notice that according to the inexorable laws of the redistribution of matter and motion, this obstructiveness ever tends to diminish and disappear. As the unequal stabilities of the constituent particles of structureless protoplasm traversed by successive waves of motion gave rise at first to definite and continuous lines of nervous action, so the unequal stabilities of the constituent particles of the nervous centre itself must give rise to a similar redistribution. The motions entering by afferent nerves and leaving by efferent nerves open continuous pathways for themselves through the amorphous masses of the brain, somewhat as the labyrinth of a great railway junction is traversed by through lines to accommodate the growing traffic between distant cities. As such connections are multiplied and improved, obstruction lessens, smaller quantities of motion are liberated, fainter sensations arise. In fact, nervous action is ever passing into automatic reflex action, simple or compound; and if evolution goes far enough to adjust the brain to all possible actions of the outer universe, obstruction, sensation, and consciousness will expire together. Mr. Spencer has accustomed us to all sorts of surprises in the course of his philosophy, but here is a catastrophe which we may be pardoned for contemplating with some amazement; not that it is so appalling but that it is so bizarre. With the

crude Materialism which infers the mortality of the soul from that of the body, we were familiar before; but who could have predicted this Transfigured Realism which derives Consciousness and all its wonders, in men or in Man, from obstructed action of the afferent nerves and extinguishes it at last in perfect organization of the ganglia of the brain?*

III.

Having ascertained Mr. Spencer's theory of the origin and nature of Mind, we are prepared to examine his theory of the Nature of Knowledge. Consciousness is a complex assem-

*To take a striking illustration, those vivid emotions which belong to early life, the "heaven that lies about us in our infancy," the splendors which clothe the soul when

We do come

From God who is our home,

are the subjective sides of those strong and voluminous motions given out by the relatively unorganized hemispheres of the brain in childhood. As organization progresses with growth these become more and more permeable, less motion is intercepted and less given out, until finally our primitive sensations entirely subside; or to put it in the foolish hyperbole of the poet,

Shades of the prison-house begin to close

Upon the growing Boy;

But he beholds the light, and whence it flows,

He sees it in his joy;

The Youth who daily farther from the East

Must travel, still is Nature's Priest,

And by the vision splendid

Is on his way attended;

At length the Man perceives it die away

And fade into the light of common day.

If Wordsworth had been an Evolutionist he could never have maintained his gravity to the end of the Ode on the Intimations of Immortality in Childhood. Indeed, all the raptures of the poets and prophets involve a "pathetic fallacy" of a rather ridiculous kind. The highest types of Art and Literature, the great religions, are expressions of Modes of Emotion, and emotion is due to amorphous masses of "grey tissue" getting in the way of afferent nerves, which, *pace* Mr. Spencer, who has sung a Dithyramb, or Enthusiastic Ode, upon the Intimations of Spirituality in Matter and Motion—*Prin. Psych.*, Pt. V, ch. x, p. 617—is in no wise a holy or poetic thing but most essentially prosaic and profane. One may even say that there is a touch of the preposterous about the Synthetic Philosophy itself: the philosopher of the millennium with his automatic brain will be as far beyond the 19th century philosophers as the Theory of Evolution is beyond the Dialogues of Plato or the Apocalypse of St. John.

blage of feelings which are the exact equivalent of a complex assemblage of motions due to organic action of the nervous centres. Among these feelings we find the constant, explicit, and positive affirmations of an objective present universe as perceived, a past universe as remembered, and certain necessary modes of being which determine its orderly persistence through the past, the present, and the future. The question is, how can these affirmations of realities beyond the feelings be verified by any tests or guarantees supplied by the feelings themselves? Let us suppose that they have endured for years or for ages, that they have been distributed and redistributed into all possible combinations, so that the laws of their transformation and composition are exactly known; that mere sentience and self-recognition have developed into a full and scientific consciousness of self; still, how is it possible that the fatal circuit of conscious change can be passed; that any merest suspicion, much more that any certitude, of a world beyond should rise among the movements of the world within? The sensations making up this inner world are exclusively products of previous motions; how can the recognition of themselves carry with it recognition of the producing factors—how can consciousness, confined to *effects*, involve a sure knowledge of *causes*? The question is complicated by a startling fact. The sensations to which self-recognition attaches are directly caused by certain motions of the brain acting as it is stimulated by the afferent nerves, which again are stimulated by the actions of external things; our consciousness of the external world, therefore, ought to be distant and indirect by as many steps as have been interpolated between an impression at the surface and a sensation at the centre. But these interpolations have all vanished from consciousness; indeed, there is no reason to suppose that they ever were found there. What we directly feel is not the explosion among the molecules of the brain close at hand, nor the flight of motions along efferent nerves, but the uproar of the storm or the splendor of the heavens: the external things themselves. How have these intermediate links been dropped out of the chain, the consciousness of the proximate causes merged and lost in that of the remote causes? Mr. Spencer would no doubt reply, by that redistribution of

matter and motion which is always converting conscious nervous action into automatic reflex action; an explanation which answers for the instantaneous transmission of molecular motion through the afferent nerves, but not for its detention among the masses of the brain. If we are conscious of any of the causes of sensation, we ought to be conscious above all others of those cerebral disturbances with which it is most closely associated. Setting aside, however, the complication, let us confine ourselves to the question in its simplest form—how can the self-recognition which accompanies sensations give authentic intelligence of the external realities which cause them?

Turning now to the Seventh Part of the *Principles of Psychology*, we find that Mr. Spencer has been taken in front and rear between two fires, and that the defence opens with an attempt to turn the arms of one assailant against the other. To the Idealist, who affirms that consciousness is confined to the sensations and can never transcend them, that the perceptions and memories we seem to have of an objective universe are internal feelings which it is impossible to verify, Mr. Spencer replies by bringing into action the whole body of our mental intuitions. You acknowledge, he says, for you must, that consciousness *does* affirm the existence of external realities and the uniformity of causation among them; and how do you propose to invalidate these affirmations. Necessarily, by opposing to them certain other affirmations of this same consciousness, for by the terms of your own theory you are restricted in the choice of your weapons to the arsenal of consciousness. In a word, you oppose to the affirmations of Perception and Memory the counter-affirmations of Reason; and the simple question to be settled is, which is the more trustworthy, everybody's perceptions and memories, or your reasonings? Now—*il y a quelqu'un qui a plus d'esprit que Voltaire, c'est tout le monde*; here is a body of declarations made unanimously by the consciousness of all men—yours included; which has the incontestable superiority of being earlier than all others, more persistent and uniform, more distinct and simple than all others, and to it you oppose the obscure, involved, and round-about reasonings of a few metaphysicians. This is not the worst of it; these reasonings themselves involve at every suc-

cessive step, in spite of the reasoner, the very things he seeks to be rid of; for it is only by making use of Perception and Memory that Perception and Memory can be confuted, and an objective universe must be assumed before its existence can be disproved. The materials of all reasoning are supplied to it from the very sources it undertakes to discredit; and the act of appropriation is a full concession of trustworthiness.

This is unquestionably conclusive argument. The Idealist, conceding, by the very use he makes of them, the authority of certain deliverances of consciousness, is forthwith outflanked by simply bringing up the remainder, quite as good as they; leaving to him the option of accepting them all, which is Realism, or of rejecting them all, which is Scepticism. It is with the spoils of this preliminary skirmish that Mr. Spencer has constructed his philosophy, which asserts absolutely, not only the existence of external phenomena, but, the universal and necessary laws which govern them; and not only the Phenomenal and Relative, but back of them an Absolute Cause of all changes of which they are the manifestations. It is true that this Non-relative Reality is labelled "unknowable" and excluded from the range of philosophical inquiry, but for all that Mr. Spencer does not hesitate to declare, not only that it exists and beyond all other things must exist, but even that it is an inexpugnable element of consciousness; and if he denies to it Personality, intelligence, and will, it is to credit it with other attributes inconceivably transcending these.* In fact, the very plea by which the exclusion of the Unknowable is justified involves an amount of positive definition that throws the whole Philosophy of Evolution into the very front rank of *a priori* Ontological speculations.

The immediate effect of this victory over the Idealists is of course to draw the whole fire of the Intuitionists. Mr. Spencer has successfully maintained the authority of the deliverances of consciousness against a reasoning which necessarily involves them all, but he has not thereby vindicated his title to make any use of them himself; for if the Idealist discredits one of such utterances by quoting some other one, Mr. Spencer appears to discredit them all together by the process he pro-

* *First Principles*, Pt. I, ch. v, and Pt. II, ch. xxiv.

vides for their derivation. We are brought back at once to the previous question. If consciousness is confined to sensations which a moment ago, or on the outer side of them, were mere motions of a nervous centre, how can it yield this positive and immense knowledge of things beyond itself? How can self-recognition among a certain limited group of effects carry with it authentic intelligence of all other effects and of all causes; the antecedents and consequents of the entire universe? The question itself indicates the nature of the answer which must be obtained. Before the sensations which compose consciousness can recognize themselves as the effects of previous causes, and before they can ascend from this special recognition to the generalized conception of universal causation, the relation of cause and effect must already exist among themselves; there must be some of them which directly determine, *and are known* to determine, the succession of certain of the others.

I. Throwing aside all hypotheses as to their origin, and excluding as far as possible the habitual implications of external objects which accompany them, Mr. Spencer finds that our sensations separate of themselves into two contrasted groups, or series, which he describes according to their most conspicuous characters as respectively the Vivid and the Faint Series.* The vivid series consists of those feelings which we name Touch, Odor, Sound, Brightness, and so on. Their peculiarities are, *first*, that their ultimate antecedents, if they have any, are beyond consciousness; *second*, that they are original sensations, preceding all others in point of time; *third*, that whether they appear in simultaneous order, or one after another in successive order, their arrival, their persistence, and their departure are beyond the control of consciousness. This independent origin and superiority to control already invite the belief that they are representatives and symbols within consciousness of some Power, or Mode of Action, beyond it.

Among these vivid feelings flows the stream of the faint series, feelings which we name Memories and Ideas. Their peculiarities are: *first*, that they are copies and so successors in time of the vivid feelings, that is, they are the vivid feelings over again in weaker form; their antecedents there-

* *First Prin.*, Pt. II, ch. ii. *Prin. Psych.*, Pt VII, ch. xvi.

fore are all within the circuit of consciousness; *second*, that they are largely under the control of consciousness; although it can never entirely exclude them, it can call them up at pleasure, it can throw them into many different combinations, and it can dismiss some of them by putting others into their place—it has a mastery over the order of their arrival, their persistence, and their departure. Here then appears to be the relation sought, furnishing within consciousness a platform and materials for our conceptions of Subject and Object, of Self and Not-self. Certain interior changes of a given order are consequent upon certain interior antecedents which we recognize as determining causes, and out of this whole recognition arises in time our sense of Personality, or of Ourselves. But interior changes of the other order are, in themselves, precisely like the first; both are equally feelings, and each order is a duplicate of the other, the only difference being that while the copies are faint the originals are vivid. If the faint order has its determining antecedents, the vivid order must have such antecedents too; they are not within the limits of consciousness; they must therefore be outside of it. That is, beyond the vivid feelings which come and go within the theatre of the mind after an order and law of their own, there must be an external world of some kind from which they flow.

Granting for the moment that this analysis of our feelings is accurate and exhaustive, the argument founded upon it may be conveniently stated thus: Certain mental phenomena, which we will call phenomena of the class B, are known as effects of certain antecedent phenomena A; phenomena D are known as like in general character to phenomena B; they must therefore be the effects of some antecedents C; resembling B in all other particulars, they must also resemble them in this, that they are effects of causes. What is the warrant for this inference? Because B and D are alike in 9 or in 99 particulars, why are we authorized to affirm that they are therefore alike in the tenth or the hundredth? We do not know that D has causes; we only know that it is like B, which has. Obviously the inference is a deduction like the one expressed in the familiar syllogism, All men are mortal; Socrates is a man, and, therefore, mortal; resembling men in other characters, he

must resemble them in this one of mortality. Why? Only because like causes produce like effects and like effects imply like causes. But in the case in question this is the very thing we are seeking to ascertain. Our warrant for the conclusion is the conclusion itself. We have assumed at the outset of the argument the thing to be proved, namely, the uniformity of causation.

But is the analysis accurate and exhaustive? Is this relation between cause and effect, from which we have ascended by analogy to certitude that our sensations of the vivid order are manifestations of an objective universe, and from that to the certitude of the uniformity of causation, a relation actually within consciousness or not? If it is, then our conceptions of Subject and Object may have arisen in the manner alleged; but to know whether it is or is not we must revert to the hypothesis of the origin of our sensations which we began by excluding. We say that by an act of the will we can call up the faint copies of our vivid feelings which we name memories and ideas, or imaginations, can re-arrange them in various combinations and substitute others in their place. Granting that this mere determination of order is a veritable causation, the question is as to the manner in which the determination is effected. By the hypothesis a volition is a sensation which arises in consciousness along with a specific motion arising in the brain. This is the character which it has in common with all other sensations. A Desire is the sensation accompanying a motion which tends to discharge from one portion of the brain to another when it arouses memories and ideas, or from the brain through the efferent nerves to the organs of muscular action; a Volition is the sensation accompanying this motion at the instant of discharge. Is the sensation of will the cause of the motion, or the effect of the motion? We say that it is the equivalent of the motion, or the subjective side of the motion, or simply that it accompanies the motion. But in what character? If it is the cause of the motion, then where is its own cause? Necessarily some other motion of the brain on the point of discharge, which is absurd. If it is the effect of the motion, then it cannot be the cause of the discharge into that other portion of the brain which arouses memories

and ideas. In this case *cadit questio*; a volition is not the cause which determines the order of our memories and ideas; and, the foundation failing, the whole superstructure of our knowledge comes to the ground. It is precisely here that the application of the Theory of Evolution to mental phenomena is involved in irretrievable disaster. Either the sensations composing consciousness are *motions* interpolated in the general series of nervous actions—effects of those which went before and causes of those which come after, a conclusion explicitly rejected by Mr. Spencer;* or they are only *accompaniments* of motions liberated in the brain, a conclusion whose logical issue is the theory of Prof. Huxley,† that all our actions are automatic reflex actions like the movements of a decapitated frog, consciousness sitting apart a mere reflection and spectator of the life which it seems to control, like the compound register of a steam engine which records its condition but is powerless to affect its action. This has been pronounced a wild speculation,‡ but it is the necessary outcome of the Theory of Evolution. Consciousness has no control over its own states, for it has none over the bodily changes out of which they arise. No relation of cause and effect, therefore, can exist within it, and our conceptions of Subject and Object are left unaccounted for. In any case it is clear that the relation we are in search of is not within but beyond consciousness, for what a volition causes, if anything at all, is a motion in some portion of the brain which, discharging along a line of nervous communication, arouses motion in some second portion, and with it a memory or an imagination. To affirm the existence of a causal relation between the two termini of this circuit—the resolve and the memory—is to affirm the existence of the intermediate changes, all of which are exterior to consciousness: in other words, to begin the argument, as before, by assuming the very thing to be proved, namely, the existence of an objective reality.

But on following the analysis a step farther we discover that this distribution of our feelings into those of the vivid and

* *Prin. Psych.*, Pt. V, ch. x, etc.

† *Fortnightly Review*, November, 1874.

‡ *Spectator*, Nov. 7, 1874, and subsequent numbers. Prof. Huxley's theory of Automata is claimed by Mr. Douglas A. Spalding.

those of the faint order is an insufficient foundation for that developed conception of Subject and Object which we actually possess.* A volition and a series of memories and ideas consequent upon it are, so far, only sensations whose equivalents are certain modes of motion, and the utmost that we are entitled to infer is that the external antecedents of consciousness are modes of motion. That there are motions outside may be taken as proved, but not that there is a world of matter which moves, and a world of force which compels it to move. Yet this is what we are conscious of; this is the elemental form of that antithesis of Subject and Object transcending all others—a Power within, controlling our faint feelings, which we call *Ourself*; an opposing Power without, controlling our vivid feelings, which we call the external universe. We have gained little, therefore, until we have accounted for our sense of Force, for that it is which is the true cause, giving to the will within and to the resisting world without their determining power. “The impression we call resistance,” says Mr. Spencer, “is the primordial, the universal, the ever-present constituent of consciousness;” which becomes, therefore, “the mother-tongue of thought, in which all the first cognitions are registered and into which all symbols afterwards learned are interpretable.” In other words, the impression of resistance is the typical form of those ultimate units of feeling out of which the complex sensations composing consciousness are built. “Hence, along with the segregation of our states of consciousness into vivid and faint, the consciousness of something which resists comes to be the general symbol for that independent series implied by the vivid aggregate.” Here, then, at last we have hunted the eternal and omnipresent mystery to its last covert. Consciousness we have decided to be the product, or the equivalent, or the accompaniment, of an interior redistribution of Matter and Motion; Matter and Motion to be the manifestations of Persistent Force; and Resistance to be the universal symbol of Force. If now we can find *resistance*, pure and simple, among the constituents of consciousness, we have the key which fits every ward of the whole mystery. It is with some pardonable excitement that we come, after long travail over

* *Prin. Psych.*, Pt. VII, ch. xviii.

Mr. Spencer's philosophy, to the analysis which is to lay bare the last secret. What is the genesis and character of this omnipotent unit of consciousness? To our mortification, we discover at once that it is not the simple thing we had hoped to find. However indecomposable in itself, the impression of resistance is a sensation like any other, and according to the hypothesis the concomitant of a molecular motion in the brain. What is the origin of this motion? A stimulant sent along the afferent nerves from the surface of the body. What has excited the afferent nerves? Impressions of the outer universe upon the senses; these impressions are consequent on certain actions of the body; the actions are muscular movements excited by stimuli sent through the *efferent* nerves which have drafted off a molecular motion in the brain; and the concomitant of this motion is a sensation known as a volition. We are back in consciousness again, but not through the portal or on the side from which we issued. Our construction of the pure contents of consciousness has involved a wide flight beyond it, and once more, this time more flagrantly than before, we have begun our argument by assuming the very thing to be proved, the existence of the body, of the world beyond the body, and of the forces by which they act and react on one another.

The truth is very manifest. Mr. Spencer having divested our volitions of all self-determining power by construing them into the mere spectra of certain modes of motion absolutely determined by certain other modes, has reinstated them in their old rank and prerogatives to explain our conceptions of Force, Subject, and Object. Free Will, we may say, cashiered before the action as an impudent pretender, has been suddenly re-commissioned under fire to save the whole line of battle from collapse. The line of battle is saved no doubt; but at what a cost! Our certitude of an objective universe and of the Force it manifests is sufficiently vindicated, but only by conceding the self-determining power of the will and the self-authentication of the faculties of our intelligence. We may sum up the whole by saying that Mr. Spencer has overthrown the Idealists, and afterwards escaped through the lines of the Intuitionists under their own countersign and uniform. But the escape is an evacuation.

II. The reader will already have anticipated the criticism next in order. As remarked in a previous Article, our impressions of the external universe at any given instant, however vast and vivid they may be, are in themselves of no avail for the simple reason that in the instant no time is given to avail of them. Before they can be attended to they must be remembered; and before they can be recognized they must be assimilated with others which have been received before. When we say that we perceive a sunset, or a landscape, we mean that we recognize an assemblage of phenomena as resembling previous assemblages which constituted what we call sunsets or landscapes. Perception, with all the reasonings and knowledge founded upon it, implies Memory, and the worth of the perceptions depends upon the truthfulness of Memory. If Memory falsifies the past, Perception cannot tell the truth about the present; and the truth would be useless if it could, for in the next instant the thing perceived is a thing remembered. We have to inquire, therefore, what ground the Theory of Evolution leaves us for putting faith in the disclosures of Memory.

Reverting to our old illustration, we will suppose that a thunder-storm has delivered several simultaneous impressions to the different senses, which, acting through the afferent nerves, liberate a definite amount of molecular motion in the nervous centres, along with which an equivalent sensation arises in consciousness. This sensation, as we said, is no alien and stranger, but represents a specific action of a determinate structure which has often acted in like manner before. Pausing in consciousness for the moment, it instantly classes itself with other co-existent resembling sensations. It is this pause of the vivid feeling which we call an impression, and this classification with faint feelings which we call memories, that we have to examine.

First, it is to be noted that by a pause we mean persistence during an appreciable time. The vivid impression endures as such, say for a second or fraction of a second, at any rate for an interval considerable enough to admit of division into smaller parts, which may be measured, objectively, by the successive vibrations of the molecules of the brain involved. That infinitesimal of the sensation which answers to the first

vibration in the brain is already, relatively speaking, a thing far in the past by the time that the sensation closes with the last vibration. But a vivid sensation belonging to the past, whether near or remote, can be represented in consciousness only by a memory. What then is a memory? A faint copy following a vivid original, and therefore on the objective side a weaker vibration following a strong one. It results that while the specific portion of the brain which responds to the impressions made by the thunder-storm is violently vibrating in the present instant, it is at the same time thrilling with the faint successors of preceding vibrations; and the subjective equivalent of the whole is a compound sensation, one part of which is a perception and all the other parts memories. Setting aside all other implications, we have to ask if the histological structure of nervous masses, so unsymmetrically arranged that they obstruct the passage of motions arising through the afferent nerves, can be capable of precision and delicacy of action so perfect as this. This, however, is nothing to what follows, for the vivid impression thus pausing in consciousness an integrated whole is now to be classified with faint copies of preceding impressions. The thunder-storm, as it passes with its shafts of lightning and uproar of thunder, rouses the memory of another which happened long ago with many special accompaniments of its own, as a fall of hail, an uprooting of trees, and the burning of a building struck by the lightning. As the present group of vivid sensations represents the action of a specific portion of the brain, so the other group when it arose represented the action of another such portion, the two portions having much in common, since both were excited by thunder-storms, but each involving molecules of the brain not involved with the other, since the storms differ in their details. Now when I say that this present group of vivid impressions brings up *faint copies* of the past group of vivid impressions, I must mean one of two things: (1.) In the first place, I may mean that the violent vibrations excited, say fifty years ago, by the phenomena of the first storm have persisted ever since, growing fainter and fainter but never quite dying away; and that the latest of these faint vibrations, and the violent vibrations excited to-day, co-exist in the brain so that their equiva-

lents in consciousness, the perception of the present and the memory of the past storm, are at once compared together as like and unlike. If we accept this as the true statement of what has happened, then we must accept the following implications. Here is a compound action of innumerable combined molecules which has persisted fifty years; each of these molecules in the meanwhile must have entered at every successive instant into other combinations, for to say otherwise is to suppose that each change in the universe has its corresponding molecule; it is therefore thrilling at any instant with all these accumulating vibrations, and the whole brain is alive at this moment with the incalculable successors of all past vibrations; in the midst of which arise the violent vibrations excited by the storm of to-day. Supposing such persistence to be possible, how can a consciousness that is more than a blurred sentience arise out of this entanglement and conflict of molecular vibrations? Given the vivid impressions of the present instant, by what law of the redistribution of matter and motion do they single out from this chaos the faint impressions resembling themselves? It is obvious that the physical and physiological difficulties in the way of this interpretation are insuperable; we are thrown back, therefore, on the other. (2.) According to this hypothesis, the vibrations aroused by the thunder-storm years ago have not persisted in the brain but have disappeared like any other motions, passing to adjacent molecules, or vanishing through the efferent nerves. What *has* persisted is the *combination* of the molecules effected by combined impressions of the storm and the *tendency* to repeat under appropriate stimulus its first vibrations. This stimulus may be provided by motion disengaged in any portion of the brain, but of course is most likely to come from portions nearest at hand, i. e., in psychological language, almost any sensation may arouse the group of faint sensations representing the forgotten thunder-storm, while the sensations of the storm to-day are almost certain to do so. This is the physiological basis of the doctrine of Association of Ideas. Two or more phenomena occurring together in the environment excite to simultaneous action two or more corpuscles of the brain; by a known law of motion, these having acted in concert once, are

likely to do so again under any disturbance, but especially under a disturbance closely like the first. At first sight this is a far simpler interpretation than the other; but remembering that there is strong reason to believe that our memories are imperishable, and that out of the multitudes known to survive no one is exactly like any other, what have we gained after all? Instead of innumerable vibrations blending or clashing together in the brain at once, we have innumerable structures *ready* to vibrate; a physiological difficulty not much more tractable than the other. There remains to be noted a difficulty common to both these hypotheses. Whether the memory with which we assimilate a perception represents the last in a persistent series of vibrations, or an occasional vibration of a persistent structure, it must *co-exist* in consciousness with the perception or the two cannot be compared together. Both then being equally present, by what specific differences do we distinguish one of them as referring to the past? The only order of sensations directly known to us is the simultaneous order; how do we rise to the consciousness of the serial order? from the recognition of the relations of co-existence whose abstract is Space to the recognition of those of Sequence whose abstract is Time? This is one of the obscurest portions of the *Principles of Psychology*, and for a full elucidation the reader must go to Mr. Spencer himself. Here we can only say that he accounts for the distinction between our perceptions of Space and Time by the fact that while the terms of a relation of co-existence can be thought of in any order with equal vividness and ease, those of a relation of sequence cannot; or to quote exactly: "It is perpetually found that while certain states of consciousness follow each other with as much facility and clearness in one direction as in the opposite (A, B—B, A), others do not; and hence results a differentiation of the relations of co-existence from those of sequence," or of Space from Time.* "It is perpetually found;" but how is it found? Only by experience, that is, only by trusting Memory. That the states of my consciousness have ever occurred in any order at all other than the order which I find in this instant is known

* *Prin. Psych.*, Pt. V. ch. xxii.

to me only by remembering them—I cannot establish the relation of sequence until I assume it as established already. Once more, for the fourth time, the entire argument has been founded upon the very thing to be proved, the faithfulness of Memory; and this was evident enough before, for that the sensation we call a memory is the equivalent of a vibration in the brain, induced, no matter how, by an impression in the past, can be known only by recalling the past.

III. When a vivid sensation emerges in consciousness it falls into rank as like or unlike those faint sensations which it finds or arouses on arrival. This ranking or classification we call an act of Perception, or of Memory, or of Reasoning, according to the side upon which we look at it. In Reasoning, those almost automatic comparisons which constitute perceiving or remembering are made deliberately and carried farther. No new faculty is involved, the same thing being done in the one case that was done in the others, but the process is corrected and extended. We may say that Perception or Memory is a swift, unconscious Reasoning; Reasoning a careful, conscious Memory or Perception. This community of character will be more apparent when we reflect that as the organization of the nervous centres improves and its obstructive action diminishes, all three tend to pass into instinctive or automatic reflex action together. As for our convenience we distinguish Reason from Perception and Memory, so we distinguish certain processes of reasoning from each other. We talk of Perfect and Imperfect, Quantitative or Qualitative, Reasoning, and so on; but all are only forms of the same deliberate and methodical comparison of our feelings with one another. Those which are like in character we classify together as sensations of touch, taste, smell, hearing, or vision; while all again are classified according to the order in which they come and go. Sensations appearing in the reversible order we distinguish as the representatives in consciousness of objective things co-existing in space; those appearing in the serial order as representing things which succeed in time. Furthermore, when we find two or more phenomena co-existing, or succeeding occasionally, we infer that the relation between them is a fortuitous one that may or may not appear again. When the co-existence or sequence is

habitual, we infer that its reappearance is probable. If always, without any exception, we find the phenomena occurring together, or in sequence, we infer that they always have done so, always will do so, and universally *must* do so—we recognize their relation as determined by some constraining necessity or inexorable law. Thus the organization of consciousness corresponds with that of the universe; what is occasional, or habitual, or uniform in the order of the one, representing what is possible, or probable, or necessary in the order of the other; and the mere comparison of our sensations brings with it the recognition of contingent and necessary truths—the axioms of morality, mathematics, and logic, the laws of Matter and Motion, the fundamental postulate of the Persistence of Force.

What is our warrant for the inferences thus drawn from our sensations and the order observed among them? All the questions of philosophy are summed up in the demand for this warrant. What right have we to affirm, on the strength of our conscious experience, that there is an external universe? or, granting the external universe, what right to affirm beyond the range of our experience of it the existence of necessary universal laws?

Mr. Mill replies, and insists that Mr. Spencer ought to reply, that we have no warrant at all except the experience itself. I never saw, for example, two bodies occupying the same space at the same time, and I have good reason for thinking that no other man ever saw them. If such a thing had ever happened it ought to have been observed by this time; it has not been observed, therefore the presumption is that it has never happened, and therefore our only wise course is to act as if it never could happen. Yet I do not certainly know. Perhaps in some outlying portion of the universe, or in some remote age, two bodies sometimes, or often, or always, *do* occupy the same space at the same time. What I call a Law of Nature is not an absolute necessity—a thing which cannot but be, but only an order of occurrence which has been uniformly maintained within my experience. In that transcendental region, for what I know, cruelty is beautiful, fire freezes, the triangles are all multilateral, things equal to the same thing are very unequal to each other, motion is discontinuous, matter destruc-

tible, and force intermittent. In a word, I am not authorized to say that there are any necessary truths, but only regularly or irregularly recurring phenomena. All I know of things I have learned from experience, and experience, which has much to say of their order, is silent as to their necessities. This may do very well for Mr. Mill, but of course it will not answer at all for Mr. Spencer, for if the intuitions of the mind are not absolutely known to be true, that is, as correspondent with the facts, then Evolution is not known to be true. If Motion is not continuous, Matter indestructible, and Force persistent everywhere and forever, and if it is not impossible that they should be otherwise, then nothing is explained, and our theory of the Universe collapses. As Mr. Spencer, therefore, has maintained our intuitive certitude of an objective universe against the Idealists, so he maintains our intuitive certitude of the necessary uniformity of causation against the Empiricists. In both cases—that is, for the use throughout his philosophy of the entire body of *a priori* truths—he offers the same justification. “There is,” he says, “a ‘universal postulate’ which guarantees the truthfulness of all our intuitions.* This postulate may be best described in Mr. Spencer’s own words: “To ascertain whether along with a certain subject a certain predicate invariably exists, we have no other way than to seek for a case in which the subject exists without it;” in other words, we try “to conceive the negation of the proposition, . . . and *our failure to conceive the negation* is the discovery that along with the subject *there invariably exists* the predicate. Hence the inconceivableness of its negation is that which shows a cognition to possess the highest rank—is the criterion by which its unsurpassable validity is known.” Put into concrete form, the statement amounts to this: We know that there is an external universe, not because we perceive it or remember it, but because the negation of the universe, or a no-universe, is inconceivable; we know that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, not because we see that it is, but because the negation is inconceivable; we know that trilaterals are triangular because it is inconceivable that they should be polygonal; we know that force persists because it is inconceivable that it should begin or cease to be; in general, we know that Evolution is the law of

* *Prin. Psych.*, Pt. VII, ch. xi.

all changes, not because it must be so, but because the negation is inconceivable. Mr. Spencer is so convinced of the sufficiency of this universal postulate that he offers it as a reconciliation between the Empiricist and the Intuitionist. The pacification of all philosophic feuds is proposed on the broad ground, not that the proposition expressing an intuition is true, but that the negation of the proposition is inconceivable.

At first sight it would seem that this conciliatory postulate proves quite too much. We accept a given proposition as certainly true because we are obliged to reject the proposition expressing its negation; and we are obliged to reject the negation because it is inconceivable. If inconceivableness compels the rejection of a negative proposition, it must also compel the rejection of any other expressing an inconceivable relation. Thus, the proposition "space is infinite," expressing an inconceivable relation, must be rejected. But to reject it is to accept the alternative proposition that "space is finite," this, indeed, being the affirmative proposition of which the other is the inconceivable negation. That space is finite, therefore, is a cognition of "unsurpassable validity." But—any limitation of space is as inconceivable as no limitation. So of the finite or infinite duration of time, the finite or infinite divisibility of matter, or any other of such antinomies of thought. The implication in all these cases is that there are two inconceivable things, one of which must be true, so that the universal postulate is good for nothing. This application of the Law of Excluded Middle, as it is called, Mr. Spencer dismisses in two pages with some contempt, on the ground that it involves an excursion beyond the range of the phenomenal into the domain of the Unknowable, where philosophy has no concern. Any propositions we form respecting noumena are words without ideas belonging to them, and our conclusions are merely verbal. "That Space must be finite or infinite are alternates of which we are not obliged to regard one as necessary, seeing we have no states of consciousness answering to either of these words as applied to the totality of Space, and therefore no exclusion of antagonist states by one another." It is to be inferred, then, that this excursion beyond the phenomenal is one upon which Mr. Spencer has never ventured. But the Theory of Evolution rests upon the postulates

of persistent matter, motion, and force, that is, upon the assertion as necessarily true that they have never begun and will never cease to be; which involves the assertion of infinite time; which is inconceivable. Back of these persistences again lies the Absolute Reality, whose existence Mr. Spencer declares the most certain of all truths, all other existences being phenomenal. But to say of anything that it is Absolute is to say that of all things it is the most inconceivable. So of that hyper-personality and hyper-consciousness which Mr. Spencer substitutes for the theological attributes of the First Cause. We may say that no thinker, not excepting Prof. Tyndall before the British Association, has gone farther afield into the wastes of the Unknowable, or made more surprising discoveries there than Mr. Spencer; in other words, no other thinker has made a more abundant use of propositions expressing inconceivable relations.

But now what is it that gives to the universal postulate its infallible efficiency? How have we come into possession of a criterion which enables us to distinguish at once between contingent and necessary truths? for here as elsewhere the derivation determines the character. As the matter stands, it looks very much as if we had made our own impotence the source of all certitude and the measure of the Power manifested in the universe; for our inability to conceive is the test by which our surest conceptions are verified, while outwardly it marks the limit beyond which Persistent Force cannot act. What is this noble infirmity of the mind? It is, Mr. Spencer explains, merely an observed law of mental action, a fixed order among our sensations from which they cannot be deflected. When I affirm that two bodies *must* occupy two spaces in the same time, it is simply because the states of consciousness answering to the two bodies refuse to cohere in the relation answering to simultaneous occupancy of the same space. So of the negation of any other necessary truth; the internal relations answering to the alleged external relations cannot be coaxed or forced out of consciousness. If now we inquire the cause of this resistance and persistence of our sensations, we find it in the structure of the nervous centres. The relations among changes in consciousness are determined by the organization of the

brain, which we know has been determined by the course of Evolution. We inherit at birth a nervous system which has been slowly built up by successive redistributions of its constituent particles into definite adjustment to relations among external things, and to establish relations in thought reversing or contradicting relations in fact involves nothing less than disintegration of the brain. From the first living forms down the line of successive generations the universe has gone on moulding the brain into conformity with itself, and it is as possible for the earth to roll backward on its axis as for consciousness to conceive the negation of an invariable objective relation. We *must* believe that two bodies occupy two spaces in the same time because we cannot conceive the contrary; we cannot conceive the contrary because we cannot undo the adjustment of the nervous centres to the outer universe.

The value of the universal postulate, then, is due to the fact that it represents the inherited result of all ancestral experiences. To the direct disclosures of the Senses and the Intellect consciousness adds a fund of necessary truths derived from the pre-established structure of the brain—that is, from the registered results of Sentiency and Intelligence in our progenitors back to the primordial forms. This is an immense addition, no doubt, and it explains at once the superiority of Mr. Spencer's system to the cruder forms of empiricism which it is fast supplanting. His base line is as much longer than theirs as the experience of the race exceeds that of the individual; and it is not surprising that he should have come upon the battle field to mediate between the contending hosts. It is really one of the most notable events, and Mr. Spencer one of the most picturesque and affecting figures in the history of Philosophy; for the Theory of Evolution is the draft of a treaty of perpetual alliance and peace, not only between the Empiricist and the Intuitionist, but between Science and Religion. Yet after all, to vary our figure, it is certain that this gift-bearing Greek would bring into the very citadel of Ilium the most formidable of her foes. Mr. Spencer offers to make over the whole body of *à priori* truths, revised and enlarged, and to found all philosophy upon them. But in what sense are they *à priori*? As underived and self-authenticated intuitions of the mind? Not at all;

they are derivations from experience, only the experience is much vaster than it was supposed to be. The truths are *à priori* to the individual but *à posteriori* to the race; each of us is obliged to believe what his forefathers have learned of the relation of things. That some of them have been unvarying, so far, he knows, but that any of them are necessary he does not know. Our warrant for claiming a knowledge of being beyond the range of experience is precisely what it was before the discovery of the universal postulate, the experience itself; and all the old questions come trooping back as clamorous as ever. What right have we to say that Force persists and that Evolution is the law of all being forever? of the unknowable Absolute that we *know* it exists?

Here, indeed, we reach that sweeping *petitio principii* which includes all the others noted hitherto, and which sums up Mr. Spencer's philosophy from the provisional assumption of the indispensable postulates of thought at the beginning of the *First Principles*, to the assignment of an infallible criterion, or Universal Postulate, which closes the *Principles of Psychology*; a circular argument whose diameter is so vast that the inexorable curve of the circumference, its fatal return into itself, is imperceptible at any one point. By the organization of our consciousness we affirm, and must affirm, the present existence of an objective universe; its necessary evolution out of preceding forms according to the laws of Matter and Motion; the laws of Matter and Motion as determined by Persistent Force. Returning from persistent force we must affirm the Indestructibility of Matter and the Continuity of Motion; their concurrent redistribution through all time; and, finally, the necessary evolution of Consciousness out of them. First we assume the necessities of Consciousness in explaining the Universe; then the necessities of the Universe in explaining Consciousness; or, shortening the diameter so as to bring the extreme terms together, we say that because Consciousness is thus constituted we know that Force persists; because Force persists, we know that Consciousness is thus constituted. Against this double *petitio principii* it is submitted that one or other of the alternative propositions with which we began has been made good; either, a consciousness so derived and con-

stituted cannot know with certainty anything beyond itself; or, if consciousness certainly knows anything beyond itself, it cannot have been so derived and constituted.

The truth is that our knowledge is founded not upon impotence but upon power. Consciousness comes into its cognitions through the direct use of its faculties; not through the roundabout application of any criterion, however sure, or any postulate, however universal. We know that the universe exists because we see it, and hear it, and feel it, and remember it; we know that much of the order of its co-existences and sequences is invariable because we know that it must be so; and it is precisely because it must be so that negations are inconceivable. The warrant for all these truths is the simple fact that consciousness affirms them, and consciousness affirms them because it knows them to be truth. With these self-authenticated dicta of the mind, all reasoning must begin, and upon them any explanation of things, scientific or philosophical, must be founded. The indispensable first step towards a coherent and sufficient theory of the outer universe is to withdraw consciousness from the theory, for to include it is to impeach the character of the sole witness we have; to leave the fabric of our conclusions in the air, a superstructure without a foundation.

We began our examination of Mr. Spencer's Theory of Evolution by noting what seem to be the salient points of contrast between the earlier, or intuitionist, and the recent, or empirical, systems of thought. Down to a period not very remote the mind of man was preoccupied with the essential nature, the efficient and final causes of phenomena; that preoccupation failing, there remained for study the phenomena themselves, which necessarily and rightfully became the subject-matter of succeeding speculation. Our whole conclusion here is that the Theory of Evolution, which we have examined, or any other of like kind, is not that philosophy of phenomena which is the legitimate and final successor of antecedent philosophies. In the first place, it omits the phenomena no less than they, since it leaves the only forms in which they appear to us uninterpreted; in the second place, its universal syntheses are quite as contradictory and incoherent as their ideal abstrac-

tions; in the third place, it invalidates such explanations does give by impeaching the trustworthiness of consciousness upon which all knowledge depends. We may infer the final philosophy of the future must be some eclectic tem which combines the recognition of the Absolute Re characterizing the past, with the recognition of Phenoi characterizing the present; the whole founded upon the of the authentic utterances of consciousness as they stand

ARTICLE III.—THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

THE subject of the person of Christ has enlisted the attention, and engaged the profoundest thought, of the wisest and best men in the Christian Church in every age, since the days of the Apostles. It has been regarded as the great mystery of Christianity, and more difficult of apprehension, in some of its aspects, than even the doctrine of the Trinity itself. One of the last desires expressed by the dying Melancthon was, that he might in eternity understand this subject as he had never done on earth. In his last hours he thus addressed himself, "Thou shalt enter into light! Thou shalt see God! Thou shalt learn of what kind is the union of the two natures in Christ."

The following facts are almost universally admitted by Trinitarians, viz: that Christ had an existence as the divine Word, the second person of the Trinity, before His birth into this world; and that after His birth He appeared as a man, and, sin excepted, had all the experiences of a man, so that He may be properly designated as the God-man. While these facts are very generally admitted, different theories for explaining and harmonizing them have been adopted. The theory most commonly held is as follows: that the Divine Second Person, in becoming incarnate, took into personal union with Himself a true body and a reasonable soul; that this created human soul or human nature had all the attributes of a perfect humanity, but was impersonal; that Christ had but one personality, which was divine and eternal, and that this personality held and acted the two natures, the divine and the human; that these two natures, however, were not commingled, but remained entire and distinct, each possessing and exercising the qualities and attributes peculiar to itself.

"Whatever is true of either nature, in Christ, may be predicated," it is claimed, "of His person." Thus we may, with equal truth, affirm that Christ was conscious of knowing all things and of growing in wisdom, of infinite blessedness and human sorrow, of divine omnipotence and human weakness; in a

word, that He was in the conscious exercise of all the attributes of divinity, and, at the same time, was subject, like other men, to all the conscious experiences of humanity. This theory maintains that the created human soul or human nature in Christ was possessed of intelligence and will; that it formed judgments, increased in knowledge, rejoiced and grieved, and yet, that in Christ there was but one *ego*, but one personality, that of the eternal Word, possessing and exercising all divine attributes, the same as before incarnation. That this theory has its difficulties, and difficulties so great as to render it well-nigh inconceivable by the human mind, is admitted by some of its ablest defenders. Says Prof. Tayler Lewis, in an able Article upon a kindred topic in the *Biblical Repository*: "The doctrine of the God-man, of the Divine, not simply superadded to, or in connection with, either as a temporary or abiding indwelling, but as forming one person with the human, yet remaining Divine,—this baffles Reason. Here she utterly loses her way. Her highest light is but thick darkness." "This mystery of the two natures in one person is not escaped even by those who reject the doctrine of the Trinity." "On the lowest hypothesis of pre-existency, we have the real difficulty for the reason, although it may not be of so startling a kind as is presented by the doctrine of the absolute Godhead. We have still that most mysterious fact at which reason staggers—a prior and a posterior existence forming one personality."

In this discussion it is of the first importance to regard strictly the distinction between a nature and a person, "a distinction which is of as great consequence," says Professor Shedd, "in Christology as in Trinitarianism." It is difficult here to give exact definitions, but not difficult to understand the distinction. By nature, in this connection, is meant, not the unknown substance or essence on which properties depend; but rather, the properties themselves, those essential qualities or attributes of a thing which constitute it what it is. By a *mental* nature is meant the faculties, attributes, or capabilities of the mind. Thus, there is the capacity for thought, for feeling, and volition. A *nature*, however, never thinks, nor feels, nor wills, but a *person*. It can be conscious of nothing, it can experience nothing, for all conscious experience is by a person. Attributes pertain

to the nature, but the conscious exercise of attributes or faculties is by the personality. Perhaps no clearer definition of personality can be found than that given by Professor Lewis, in the Article already referred to. "Whatever can say of itself, I, and to which can be addressed the word *Thou*, and of which can be said, He or Him—that is a person."

It is universally admitted that Christ had a genuinely human self-consciousness. He, as truly as other men, could say, "I am weak and dependent; I sorrow; I increase in knowledge." How satisfactorily to account for Christ's *genuinely human experiences*, consistently with the recognized fact that in Him there was but *one personality*, and *that* divine and eternal, is the problem before us. The advocates of the common theory are compelled to take one of two positions; either, that Christ's impersonal humanity was self-conscious and had human experiences; or, that His divine person had, at the same time, experiences both human and divine. No middle ground is, for *them*, possible. Many, therefore, boldly assume that "in Christ there were two self-conscious intelligences, two self-determined free-agents, constituting one person;" but they attempt no philosophical explanation of the fact. Thus to endow the human nature of Christ with conscious intelligence and will; to insist that it thought, reasoned, formed judgments; in a word, had all the conscious experiences common to our humanity (sin excepted), and yet insist, in the same breath, that this human nature was destitute of all proper personality, is to obliterate all distinction between a nature and a person. To accord to the human nature or human soul of Christ self-consciousness, is to accord to it a true subsistence or personality. The one necessarily implies the other, and there is no escape from the conclusion that in Christ there were two personalities, one human and the other divine. This is denied, but the denial is illogical and cannot be sustained by any process of sound reasoning. Other prominent advocates prefer to take the second position named above. Admitting the force of these objections, they take the ground that the one divine and eternal person in Christ, in the full possession and conscious exercise of all divine attributes, received, also, into His divine consciousness all the operations and movements of His human

nature. In His single personality met all divine and human experiences.

We fail, however, to see how this mode of reasoning helps the matter. To affirm of the person Christ Jesus that He was, at the same moment, conscious of omniscience and of growth in wisdom, of infinite blessedness and of sorrow, of omnipotence and of weakness, is to affirm positive contradictions. Such contradictory experiences are absolutely exclusive of each other, and cannot, by any possibility, co-exist in the same person. The attempt is made, however, to harmonize these contradictory experiences by the assertion, that Christ's single personality existed and operated in *two different spheres*. Liddon, in his Bampton lectures before the University of Oxford, uses this language: "If, as He knelt in Gethsemane, He was in one sphere of existence all-blessed, and in another 'sore amazed, very heavy, sorrowful even unto death,' might he not, with equal truth, be in the one omniscient, and in the other subject to limitations of knowledge? The difficulty is common to all the contrasts of the Divine Incarnation." "His single personality has two spheres of existence; in the one, it is all-blessed, undying, and omniscient; in the other, it meets with pain of mind and body, with actual death, and with a corresponding liability to a limitation of knowledge."

This extract shows to what desperate straits the defenders of the theory on this last ground are driven. "Unity is a condition of personality." Personality is simple and indivisible, and "unity of consciousness is involved in unity of person." To ascribe to one and the same person both a divine and a human self-consciousness is most effectually to destroy this unity. Two spheres of self-conscious activity for one and the same person, is an idea impossible of conception. According to this mode of reasoning, we have in Jesus a divine I and a human I, and these two I's constituting but one I—one personality, which is a contradiction in terms.

The attempt thus to crowd, at the same time, all human and divine experiences, mutually exclusive as many of them are, into the same personality, is utterly futile. The defenders of the common theory, we repeat, are thus driven to one of these two positions; they must either ascribe to the impersonal human-

ity or human soul of Christ what belongs and can belong only to a person, or they must ascribe to His incarnate personality contemporaneous and contradictory experiences.

Those occupying the first position fail to make the proper and necessary distinction between a nature and a person. They give to us in Christ a created human soul, which prays, agonizes, suffers, and dies; and, for aught that we can see, nothing is really left us but a simply human sacrifice for sin. Those occupying the second position do, indeed, preserve the proper distinction between a nature and a person, but, in preserving it, they, in turn, impose impossible conditions upon Christ's personality, and effectually destroy its unity.

Pressed by these difficulties, many able thinkers in Germany, and a few in this country, adopt a theory which, they think, harmonizes more satisfactorily the admitted facts. According to this theory, the Divine Second Person in the Godhead became incarnate by uniting to Himself a human body, but not a created human soul. In this body we include, of course, the mysterious principle of life with all its vital forces. There was in Christ but *one mental principle*, uncreated and eternal. The Divine Second Person, in becoming incarnate, subjected Himself, truly and literally, to human limitations and conditions. The distinction between a nature and a person, so important in Christology, is in this theory strictly preserved. Although it insists that the *Divine person* in Christ was thus subjected to human limitations, it *as rigidly* insists that the *divine nature* of Christ, which was identically the same with that of the Father and the Holy Ghost, was *not* thus subjected. So far as the divine nature was concerned, God did not become man, but the Divine Second Person in Christ did become a human person.

Dr. Hodge, in his published theology, clearly recognizes this distinction between nature and person. In vol. II, p. 395, he says: "Although the divine nature is immutable and impassible, and therefore, neither the obedience nor the suffering of Christ was the obedience or suffering of the divine nature, yet they were none the less the obedience and suffering of a Divine Person."

Now obedience and suffering necessarily imply *limitation*. If the Divine Word, in becoming incarnate, was to *this extent*

subjected to the conditions of humanity, we surely need have no hesitation in concluding that He was subjected to *all* its conditions.

The Scriptures declare that "He made Himself of no reputation," or, as in the original, "He emptied Himself." There is a direct reference here, not to His *nature*, but to His *person*. By this expression is meant, not that He laid aside the actual possession of any divine attribute, but that He emptied His divine consciousness of divine experiences, bringing it down to the level of the human. Now, *consciousness* is *not* a *faculty* of the mind, but the light, so to speak, in which the mind sees the workings of its faculties; or, in other words, the field in which appears to itself its own movements and operations.

In reducing, therefore, the consciousness of the Divine Word to the human level, we touch not a single attribute or faculty belonging to Him as God—the divine nature of Christ is preserved in all its integrity. But Christ had also a perfect *human* nature. In order to this, must He have had a created human soul? Let us not too hastily conclude that this was necessary.

A few suggestions here, in regard to the nature of the soul, may serve to throw light upon the subject.

According to the development theory, man is not only physically but mentally a development from the brute creation, and the mental principle within him is the same as that of the animal, with a few higher faculties, only, added. The Scriptures, on the contrary, represent this mental principle as kindred in its nature with the divine.

We hold that, in the very nature of things, *all rational intelligences* are, in the *radical elements* of their mental nature, *alike*. We include the Divine Mind itself. Man was made, and as for that matter, angels too, in the image of God. If an angel should become truly incarnate, the soul of the angel, developing through a human body and brain, would take on those peculiarities which constitute human nature. For example, the radical element in all souls, the capability for feeling, would, in an angelic soul incarnate, be exercised in the direction of all the bodily passions. We call them bodily passions, but they are mental feelings, occasioned by the *union* of the soul with a fleshly body. So when *we* drop the *body*, we drop those pecu-

liarities wherein *human* nature differs from *angelic* nature, and "we become like unto the angels." In like manner, the Son of God took upon Him *our* nature. By becoming *truly incarnate*, He acquired those peculiarities which constitute a true humanity. The Divine Mind or nature operated but *humanly* during the incarnation, through its Second Person, in the self-consciousness of Christ, whilst the Divine Mind operated *divinely* at the *same* time, through its First and Third Persons, in the self-consciousness of the Father and the Holy Ghost. In other words, the incarnation affected, not the *Divine* nature itself, but only the *manifestations* of the Divine nature in *one* of the persons of the Godhead. These manifestations, coming through a human organism, took on a *human type*, became *truly human*,—just like the manifestations of a created human soul (sin excepted). The intelligence, the love, the sympathy of Christ, although *truly human*, were nevertheless, *not* the intelligence, the love, the sympathy of a *created* human soul within Him, but of the divine and eternal Second Person of the Godhead.

"The Word was made flesh"—became man—by which is meant, *not* that He became a *created human soul*, for, this would be to lose His *personal identity*; but that the divine Second Person took upon Him all the conscious experiences of a perfect humanity. The thoughts, feelings and actions of the man Christ Jesus, genuinely human as they were, yet were, *truly* and *literally*, the thoughts, feelings, and actions of the Second Person in the Trinity. According to this theory of Christ's person, He did not, during the incarnation, *consciously* exercise divine attributes. Take, for example, the attribute of omnipotence. The miracles of Christ were wrought by the omnipotence of the divine nature. There is but one divine nature common to the three persons of the Trinity. We may, therefore, say that Christ wrought miracles by the omnipotence of *His own* divine nature, but the *efficient will* which called it into operation was that of the First and Third Persons, and *never* that of the Second Person of the Godhead.

So we may say that Christ was possessed of infinite knowledge, but this infinite knowledge did not appear in His incarnate consciousness. He acquired knowledge and grew in wisdom like other men, but *back* of *His immediate consciousness* lay,

in His *divine nature*, an *infinite* store-house of knowledge. From out of this infinite store-house the *Holy Ghost* brought into His incarnate consciousness all the knowledge it was necessary for Him to *use* in His mediatorial work. A few analogous facts will aid us in gaining a conception of this point. The Saviour promised to His apostles the Holy Spirit, who should, in like manner, bring all things to their remembrance, whatsoever He had said unto them. They had the knowledge of these things stored away in their *mental natures*, but needed the Holy Ghost to bring it up again into their consciousness. Cases have occurred of persons falling into a deep trance, who, upon coming out of it, have found all their knowledge of letters gone from them, and who were obliged to learn over again their A, B, C's. That they still possessed this knowledge stored away in their mental natures, was proved by the fact that it all came back to them again after a season.

All are familiar with the fact that men of the greatest intellect and most profound knowledge, frequently, in extreme old age, pass into a state of second childhood. None but a materialist would claim that there was here any positive *destruction* of *mind*, or any *actual loss* of knowledge. The mind itself remains the same, but through physical changes in the brain, its powers are rendered useless. All the knowledge ever possessed is still retained in the *mental nature*, but does not appear in the *consciousness*. It is not the *mind*, but its *manifestations*—not the *mental nature*, but the *personality*—which has undergone a change. Could the spirit of a Sir Isaac Newton or a Humboldt be brought back to earth and made to occupy an infant body and brain, it would, unquestionably, develop as an infant, manifesting only infantile powers. Thus sensitive is the soul in its personality to changes of condition. The higher and more delicate the mental organization, the more sensitive is it to these changes, and the more readily responsive to those mysterious and wonderful laws which regulate the union of soul and body.

These are but feeble illustrations of the point under consideration, yet they serve to throw light upon this most difficult subject. In all our reasonings, great care must be taken lest we separate too much Christ's divine person from the other persons of the Trinity. In His mortal body, although not confined to

it, dwelt, nevertheless, the fullness of the Godhead. The entire Deity was there, yet subjected to the law of incarnation as to only *one* of Its persons.

If the Incarnate Word retained the conscious exercise of unlimited power, why are we everywhere in the Scriptures assured that it was by the Father and the Holy Ghost that His wonderful works were performed? Why pass outside of and beyond our Lord's immediate personality for the exercise of power, when that power was already present? That this was done, surely no one can deny in the face of the plain testimony of Christ Himself. This is His language: "The Father that dwelleth in me, He doeth the works." "If I cast out devils by the Spirit of God, then the kingdom of God is come unto you."

Besides the direct testimony of Christ, given on various occasions, we are plainly taught by the sacred writers that the Holy Ghost was given Him without measure. It was by the Holy Ghost that He gave commandments unto His apostles, performed all His miracles, and accomplished His entire mediatorial work. In Him were hid—that is, in His infinite nature—all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, an exhaustless resource; yet these treasures, in their fullness, could be brought forth and made available only by the Holy Ghost. It was thus that Christ was prepared to instruct men in regard to the deep things of God, as no man or even angel could do. This profound knowledge came to Him *not* by *revelation*, but by the power of the Holy Ghost, from the *depths* of *His own infinite nature*.

We need not hesitate to admit the subjection of the Divine person of our Lord to human limitations. Practically, His control of the attributes of Deity was as perfect, for all the purposes of His mediatorial work, as if He had been immediately and personally conscious of their exercise. He had but to will, and it was done. The resources of Omnipotence were at His command, yet really, in His own personal experience, He knew what human weakness and dependence meant. Although a son, yea, the eternal Son of the Highest, "yet learned He obedience by the things which He suffered."

It is hard for us to come to the conclusion, that an eternal Person could thus humble Himself to the condition of a creature; and we make it still harder by separating Him in our conceptions from the other Persons of the Godhead. We must not forget that there is but one God—one Supreme Being—existing in three persons; and that this Supreme Being, although humbled to man's condition in his Second Person, yet remained, in His First and Third Persons, in unchanged power and glory. Thus Deity is consciously and truly man in Christ, and God in the Father and the Holy Ghost, while Christ is *God* in His nature and attributes, and *man* in His consciousness and person. By thus distinctly grasping the conception that Christ and God are not *two*, but only one Infinite Being, we are enabled satisfactorily to explain and harmonize the otherwise irreconcilable contradictions of the Incarnation. Experiences which could by no possibility co-exist in *one person*, may nevertheless be possible in *one Being*, existing in *three Persons*. One of these Persons only, the Divine Word, became subject to the law of incarnation, and the consequent human experiences, whilst the other Persons of the Godhead held and acted His divine attributes during the period of this subjection. Their infinite activities were properly His, however, although not appearing in His incarnate consciousness; so that He could truly say, although subjected in His person to human limitations, "What things soever He" (the Father) "doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise." If, giving to Christ a created human soul, we may say that the actions and sufferings of this human soul were those of a Divine Person, because taken into personal union with Himself, surely it is proper for us to say that the infinite activities of His own Divine nature were His, although not appearing in His incarnate consciousness. The inconsistency of the former supposition is this, that the created human soul in Christ, having no human personality, is incapable of human experiences. They cannot co-exist with divine experiences in His Divine Person; or, if allowing for the sake of argument that they can, the question then becomes pertinent, what need is there of a created human soul? According to the latter supposition, however, His Divine nature, although

not called into action by the incarnate Second Person, yet ceased not its superhuman and divine activities. Indissolubly united with it and competent to call into action all these activities were the First and Third Persons of the Godhead, the Father and the Holy Ghost. His *mental nature*, therefore, did act, at the same time, in *two different spheres*, the particular sphere depending upon the condition of the personality calling forth the action. Thus what was not true, and could not be, of His *Personality*, was true of His *mental nature*.

The advantages of this theory over the one commonly held are manifold. It greatly simplifies our conception of the person of Christ, giving us but one mental principle—but one self-conscious, intelligent, voluntary agent. The attempt to conceive of Him as possessed of two intellects, one human and the other divine, and each having its separate and distinct set of attributes, in full conscious operation, at the same time, is extremely confusing as well as unsatisfactory. This theory necessitates the doctrine of the Trinity. A Unitarian could not possibly accept it, for if the Deity consists of but one person, and that person should be subjected to human limitations, it is plain enough to be seen that no Divine Person would be left upon the throne, to wield by His efficient will the infinite attributes of the Divine nature. This theory gives us a truly infinite sacrifice for sin. It was a Divine Person that humbled Himself and became obedient unto death, and *not* a created human soul. With this accords the Scripture declaration, "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but made Himself of no reputation, and took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of man; and being found in fashion as a man, He humbled himself, and became obedient unto death." "For ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that, though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might be rich." There was here, evidently, self-sacrifice on the part of Deity, for man. Now where was the self-sacrifice if we are to suppose in Christ the presence of a created human soul, which endured all the suffering, while the Divine Second Person was present and united to it, we care not how closely, only to give dignity and value

to the suffering. It was the Second Person of the Trinity, He that was in the form of God, of whom it is affirmed that being found in fashion as a man He humbled Himself and became obedient unto death. "Who was it," we would ask in the words of another, "that humbled Himself? Not the lowly son of the lowly Virgin. No earth-born creature could have humbled himself by an everlasting alliance with his own kindred, indwelling God, to be consummated with a seat at the right hand of the Highest!" This Eternal Person in His original condition could not, indeed, make an atonement for sin. In order to this, His condition must be changed; He must take His place as a man among men. All this, the Scriptures do most explicitly declare was done. They tell us that *He* was made a *little lower* than the angels *for the suffering of death*, that He might taste death for every man; and that there may be no mistake in regard to what this condition was, it is added, "Wherefore in all things it behooved Him to be made like unto His brethren." He that poured out His soul unto death was the Incarnate Word, the Second Person in the Trinity, and no created human soul. Again, this theory gives us not a mere *earth-born, created man*, but a truly *Divine man*, possessed of infinite *capabilities*.

The Bible teaches that the Divine Word became man. This fact, it is strongly argued, proves that He must have taken into personal union with Himself a created human soul as well as body. It proves *just the reverse*. An essential quality of a perfect manhood is personality—a genuine *human* personality. This is denied in express terms, by the common theory, to the human soul of Christ. By striking out this essential quality, the perfection of His manhood is fatally marred. If the Divine Word, when He became incarnate, remained unchanged as to His person, and in the conscious exercise of all divine attributes as before, we fail to see how He made the *slightest approach* towards becoming man. If, however, when He became incarnate, He laid aside His divine experiences, subjected Himself to the laws of human development, and thereby became just like other men (sin excepted) in all His conscious experiences; in a word, if, as the Scriptures declare, He became in all things like unto His brethren, *then* may we affirm, in a sense which

has real meaning in it, that He did indeed become man. *Such* a man, possessed of an *infinite* nature with *infinite capabilities*, we have no difficulty in conceiving of, as appointed to be the "Judge of quick and dead," as having committed to Him *all power* in heaven and in earth, and as being exalted *even* to the *throne* of the universe.

But the chief advantage of this theory is that it is in accordance with the teachings of the Scriptures. They nowhere directly affirm that Christ had a created human soul. That He had, is only an inference drawn from the fact that He is described as having the experiences of such a soul, and is often spoken of as a man. Now notice how the words of Scripture, taken in their literal and obvious meaning, confirm this view of our Lord's person. "For it is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins: wherefore, when He cometh into the world, He saith—Sacrifice and offering Thou wouldst not, but a *body* hast Thou prepared me." There is no reference here to a human *soul*, but only to a human *body*. "Awake, O sword! against my shepherd, and against the man that is my fellow, saith the Lord of Hosts." The man Christ Jesus is here called the "fellow," the equal of the Lord of Hosts. "The first man is of the earth, earthy" (has a created soul); "the second man is" (it does not say, personally united to, but *is*) "the Lord from Heaven." "I am the root and the offspring of David" (not united to the offspring). "Father, glorify Thou me with Thine own self, with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was." Who offered this prayer? Evidently the *eternal, pre-existent spirit* in Christ; and *prayer* implies *dependence*. And when in Gethsemane He prayed, saying, "O, my Father! if it be possible, let this cup pass from me," and an angel was sent to strengthen Him—is it not evident that it was the *very same* pre-existent spirit that here also offered the prayer and endured the sorrow? Will it be said that He suffered in His human soul? Such language is not only unscriptural but unmeaning. There is no escape from the force of the simple and direct teaching of the Scriptures that *He* suffered, and *He* was God. The *one and only* and *indivisible* personality in Christ Jesus, the *pre-existent* and *eternal* Word, *prayed* unto the Father, was *strengthened* by the angel,

and *endured* the sorrow. The conclusion follows, direct and irresistible, that the Divine Word could not have been in the conscious exercise of His divine attributes, and that He must of necessity have been subjected, in His person, to human limitations and conditions.

But we have no space to pursue further the Scripture argument. The more thoroughly the teachings of Inspiration upon this most important subject are studied, free from all preconceived theories, the more thorough, we believe, will be the conviction that they sustain the view of Christ's person here advanced. Why should it be thought a thing incredible or impossible that Divinity should, in one of Its persons, manifest Itself humanly in Christ, without the intervention of a created human soul as Its instrument? It ill becomes us to assert, dogmatically, that this would be impossible for an infinite, incomprehensible, *triune* God!

ARTICLE IV.—THE TROUBLE WITH THE CAUCUS.

THAT there is some trouble with the caucus is plain enough. The nominations of both parties are in many cases not fit to be made. The men nominated are either unknown or known unfavorably, and yet the nomination of a regular caucus is, in the case of the party in power, almost a guarantee of election. And so the corruption of our government, State and municipal, is continually growing with the increasing knavery and imbecility of the representatives of our caucuses.

Now we often hear it said that if the "good men" would go to the caucuses the result would be different. Their abilities and character would command respect, and secure the nomination of respectable candidates. Before an election most of the better class of newspapers preach editorial sermons on this text, discourses that have a curious likeness to those computations one sometimes hears of the number of heathen that might be converted with the money spent for tobacco, or the number of miles of railroad that we might have instead of our whiskey. Somehow the good seed does not seem to fall on the right sort of ground, and the use of tobacco and whiskey and the corruption of the caucus go on increasing. The "if" in either case is too large; the conclusion might follow if the premises were established; but the "good men" won't go to the caucuses.

Some advisers say, in despair of other means of reform, "Disregard the caucus nomination, vote against all bad men that are nominated, and thus compel the nomination of good men." But then the difficulty arises, that the candidates of both parties are equally objectionable or equally unknown, and there being no mode of union adopted among the "good men," it may follow that a disgusted Republican will vote for the Democratic nominee and a discontented Democrat for the Republican; or both may decline to vote altogether. This result, those evil spirits, the politicians, who preside as tutelary divinities over caucuses, contemplate with grim complacency. Indeed, it has been observed that some of these astute managers join in the

newspaper cry, doubtless from unholy motives, and pleasantly invite good citizens to come to the caucus and nominate better men, if they are not satisfied with those who are actually nominated. The good man thus sees himself reproached on all sides; some accuse him of indifference, others of stupidity, but the most exasperating charge is that of the caucus managers. They try to do as well as they can, they say, and nominate worthy men, as they suppose; while the good men stand coldly aloof, decline to give their assistance, and then try to undo at the polls the work that owes its unsatisfactory nature to their refusal to participate in it. Under these circumstances it is not surprising if the good man is puzzled to know just what he ought to do.

It is undoubtedly true that as a rule our best citizens are not regular attendants of the caucus. So far the popular complaint is correct. But when the newspapers proceed to say that if such men would attend, the character of the nominations would be settled by them, we are led along from facts to inferences, and the validity of these inferences must be examined if we are to get any further than reproaches and lamentations over our plight.

Suppose we venture the statement that it would make little difference if the better class of citizens, that now stays away, should attend the caucuses? We should be careful how we throw blame on an estimable class of men unless we are certain that they deserve it. Indeed, if the deplorable state of our government is really caused by the indifference of good citizens, they hardly deserve the name of good. If they can remedy matters, and neglect to do so from mere supineness, they are guilty of real treachery to the State.

There are several things to be noticed about the class of citizens in question. One is, that men who are alive to the demands of duty in their family, social, and business relations are likely to answer its calls in other directions. The disposition to do our duty is a general trait, and is not particularly under the control of our desires. If we have a real sense of obligation, we cannot confine it to those things that we want to do. It compels us to do those things that we don't want to do. That is its peculiarity, and the reason why we attach

great importance to it. Of course, we often see individuals that are generally prompt at the call of duty, singularly forgetful of its claims in particular cases. But when we observe the class of men that is distinguished as possessing this moral sense in an unusual degree—when we see these men declining with some unanimity to discharge what we suppose to be their duty, we have a good opportunity to consider whether our opinion or theirs as to their duty is more to be trusted. In short, we have some reason to suppose that many good men do not feel it to be, on the whole, their duty to attend caucuses.

Another thing to be noticed is that the better class of our people are not indifferent to their duties as citizens. On the contrary, they take a very keen interest in them. It is not so very long since the war that the patriotism of this class can be forgotten. There was, before the attack on Sumter, some talk of this indifference, but the outburst of devotion to the Union that followed that attack silenced all such language. It cannot be that that class which gave so freely of its substance, and left its dead on so many battle-fields, has forgotten its sacrifices, and lost all interest in the welfare of that country whose danger so recently roused it to enthusiasm. Do we find that politics is avoided among our acquaintance as a topic of conversation? Do we not find that even those who pretend indifference and disgust, yet secretly follow the movements of politics with a keen eye? And when the state of affairs is such that they can make their influence felt, they are not slow to improve the opportunity.

One other point remains to be noticed, and it is one that has often been observed as a marked American peculiarity. Most of us doubtless have at one time or another come into conflict with a hotel-clerk or 'railroad-officer, when the right in the matter was plainly on our side. What did we do? We pocketed the impertinence and made the best we could of the situation. We did not break forth into fury as an Englishman might, because we knew that our fellow-citizens would laugh at us, knowing, as we ourselves knew, that we were helpless. He who has seen his own trunk fall from the top of a pile of baggage with the calmness of a disinterested spectator, has proved himself an American citizen. Strong language is of

no use, for the baggage-master is himself an American, and has cultivated a *sang-froid* as well as a faculty of powerful expression that, added to his advantages of situation, renders him invincible. If we were to seek for an explanation of this stoicism in the fashionable philosophy of the day, we should perhaps lay it to the influence of the environment. The same subtle forces that caused the Aborigines to submit without complaint to the tortures of their enemies, or the hardships of cold and hunger, have possibly affected their successors on this continent with a similar apathy before the inevitable. But the principle of heredity must not be disregarded. Some such trait must exist among the Anglo-Saxons, for did not Charles Lamb, when his play was hopelessly damned, join vigorously in the hissing? But however it be explained, the fact remains. The ordinary American citizen will not make any demonstration unless he thinks it will have some effect. And so we may suppose it comes to pass that a man who has a sense of duty and who is not indifferent to politics, declines to attend caucuses and to a certain extent elections, because he believes that his presence will not affect the result, and he does not choose to put himself to gratuitous trouble.

We have then good citizens, mindful of their duty and interested in politics; but their influence is lost because there is no satisfactory way for them to exert it. The caucus does not answer its purpose. Why it does not, we shall see if we go to one ourselves. It is not necessary to take so bad an example as a ward caucus in a large city is apt to be. A country town in Massachusetts may be selected as offering a fairer illustration, and the personal observation of the writer may be allowed to bear witness to the faithfulness of the account. The town is four or five miles square, with an agricultural and manufacturing population of 6,000 or 7,000. There are also several institutions of learning of large size existing in the town, so that there is a small class of citizens of more than average culture. For the convenience of the laboring classes the caucus is held in the evening. In consequence of this, the farmers, who live away from the village and are obliged to be up early in the morning, do not attend. The workmen in the factories, who are in or near the village, and generally spend more or less of their even-

ings in the stores or on the sidewalks, attend in greater or less numbers, according to the emergency. The representatives of learning generally do not appear, unless from curiosity or in a time of great interest, such as General Butler sometimes occasions. One who is acquainted with the villagers may pick out a few faces that he sometimes sees in attendance on the fire-engine. For the nomination of town officers the attendance is small, for that of delegates to the State-senatorial, congressional, or State conventions, larger, but not often more than one hundred. The smaller meetings are quiet, the larger sometimes turbulent, though there is no physical violence. A member of the town committee calls the meeting to order, some person nominates a moderator, who is chosen, and appoints a committee to nominate delegates or officers. They are elected and the meeting adjourns. Everything is "cut and dried." These nominees for town-officers are elected at the town-meeting, for who else is there to vote for? The delegates to conventions of course require nothing more than the caucus nomination. The machinery works well; everything is apparently fair; but a little observation shows that the whole affair is in the hands of half-a-dozen men. They may not be bad masters, but they are masters. They make no display of their power, but it is real power. And they do not belong to the class of "good men," in the sense of being eminent for their abilities or virtues. They are members of the "firemen's ring," hotel-keepers, stable-owners, small tradesmen, and lawyers. They are the "men about town" of the New England village, and any one acquainted with such villages will find no difficulty in recognizing them.

Sometimes citizens of the better class grow a little restless and attend the caucus. They are welcome. They give an air of respectability to the proceedings. But as soon as their numbers grow formidable the managers draw on their reserves. Large numbers come in from the street-corners and other places of resort, and the original programme is quietly carried through. Only in times of unusual excitement does the better class carry the day. But these exceptions are rare. And it is plain they must be rare, for the "good men" are widely scattered, their evenings are not always at their command, and they have no

organization. On the other hand, the party managers have their friends immediately around them in the village, the rank and file willingly devote their evenings to caucuses, and their chieftains have them in excellent discipline. The "good men" see suspicious delegates chosen without the power to prevent it, these delegates meet in convention and nominate unknown men, and all the names being on one ticket, all are elected together. It is safe to say that generally the good citizen does not know the name of the State-senator whom he has helped to elect, and knows generally nothing but the name of his representative

Such is the town-caucus viewed under rather favorable circumstances, for where there are liquor-shops, the saloon-keeper becomes a political chief. Hence the ward-caucus of the city must be painted in darker colors; but the essential features are the same. The lesson to be drawn from this picture is not an acceptable one, but it is unavoidable. The government of the country is no longer under the control of the better classes, but is in the grasp of the class of men above described. And more than this is true. Under our present system the control of the government will pass more and more into their grasp. The earlier State legislatures were of a higher grade than those we now have. State senators were once distinguished men. Until recently the Senate of the United States preserved its former high character. Now it too has yielded to the ascending influence of the primary meeting. And even the Supreme Court was recently saved as by fire from the suspicion of this taint. In times of great peril, when the necessity of good men is felt even by the bad, this tendency may be temporarily arrested. But we must not allow ourselves to hope that it will not reappear when the emergency is past.

What is the remedy for this state of affairs? Can we admit that our republic is already in its decadence? If all our acquaintance with the morals of the people were gained from the newspapers, we might be inclined to take a gloomy view. But if we look at our individual experience we see that honorable men and virtuous women are not growing scarce. On the contrary, there are probably, with the advance of civilization, more now than ever before. Their influence is felt in most

departments of society ; in business, in law, and in education, ability and integrity are the foundations of success. Why is there an exception in the case of politics ? Is it in any way possible for the higher classes to exert on the government an influence proportioned at least to their numbers, if not, as in other departments of society, proportioned to their superiority ?

It will assist us in our answer to these questions if we correct a possible misapprehension as to that class of citizens that we speak of in general terms as the people. They, too, receive a large share of abuse. If the better classes are the negative cause of our evil state, the people are the positive cause. They wilfully nominate and elect bad men, regardless of the warnings of those whom they know to be competent to judge. But we must not suppose that the people really desire a corrupt government. If we turn aside our thoughts from that vague general term, the people, and look at the individuals that compose the bulk of our population, we shall find that they are, after all, not such very bad fellows. Anyone who has had occasion to employ labor, and has taken pains to make the acquaintance of his workmen, has found them, if he has treated them well, to be not without the ordinary virtues. They are not insensible to kindness nor incapable of gratitude. They are often faithful to their duties, even to the extent of heroism. Take even the lowest class of day laborers, such as live in tenement houses in the cities, where, to say the least, there is little encouragement to be good, and it is sometimes affecting to see how virtues, like delicate exotic plants, manage to exist in that foul atmosphere.

Their behavior at the caucus is, therefore, not to be explained by their total depravity ; there is something in the caucus that calls out evil passions that elsewhere slumber. In a word, the caucus shows the people its numerical advantage, and the spirit of democratic envy drives them to make use of it. The laborer does not look on the government as the cause of his evils, which it too often is, but as a power which he may bring into use for his own support in his struggle for existence. In this struggle he cannot resist the conviction that he is somehow overreached by the wealthy classes. The toil which barely furnishes his family with food, swells the already excessive wealth of his

employer. As he returns in the evening to his miserable abode and squalid family, bearing on his weary shoulders the implements of his labor, he sees his master rolling along in an elegant carriage, his wife and his children finely dressed and beaming with health and the enjoyment of their drive. As he painfully trudges along in the dust which the passing carriage has left behind it, his reflections are bitter. That luxury is purchased with his labor, but he himself will never share it. All there is before him is a life of continuous toil, and an old age of pain and want. And what his life is, will also be the life of his children. And yet he is far from being a communist. He would not (at least at present) resort to violence to bring about a fairer division of the blessings of this life. But a certain degree of envy is only human. There must always be "Ins," and there must always be "Outs." And what seems the natural state of affairs to the Ins will excite the discontent of the Outs. They stay poor, or grow poorer, while their lucky brethren are fattening on their misfortunes.

Now the ordinary constitution of society does not allow this feeling to show itself. But with universal suffrage the opportunity is too tempting to be resisted. The laborer sees at the caucus the members of the upper classes trying to secure certain measures. But here, at last, all the advantages that elsewhere enable them to carry out their views, are of no avail. The contest is here decided by numbers, not by wealth or education, and the laborer rejoices in his only chance to let the rich man know that in this country the vote of one man is worth no more than that of another. He cannot answer the arguments that prove to him that the interests of all classes are the same. But he feels them to be fallacious. He thinks that by keeping the higher class out of the government, he will be sure that the advantages will come to him instead of to them, and though he is continually disappointed in this expectation, his disappointment embitters him without teaching him wisdom. He struggles against a law of nature, thinking it is only a law of man; and the fact that the men he elects do frequently give him employment on public works, perpetuates his delusion. Besides, the men who urge him to disregard the influence of the higher classes are men who are

little, if at all, above him. They drink with him and talk with him familiarly. They sympathize with him in his hard lot, and assure him that they will do their best to improve it. Although he may not feel confident that these are the best men to have in office, he cannot resist the temptation to humiliate his superiors. The popularity of Butler with the populace of Massachusetts was measured by the fear and hatred felt towards him by the upper classes.

It is clearly evident from this, that any combination to control government based upon any class distinction, such as wealth or education, has no possible chance of success. The moment its constitution was clearly understood it would be overwhelmed by popular indignation. The remedy for our disorders must be sought in some other direction.

Nor can we look for relief from education. The process is too slow, and, as De Tocqueville points out, has natural limits beyond which it cannot pass. "It is impossible, after the most strenuous exertions, to raise the intelligence of the people above a certain level. Whatever may be the facilities of acquiring information, whatever may be the profusion of easy methods and cheap science, the human mind can never be instructed and developed without devoting considerable time to these objects. The greater or the less possibility of subsisting without labor is, therefore, the necessary boundary of intellectual improvement. This boundary is more remote in some countries and more restricted in others; but it must exist somewhere, so long as the people are constrained to work in order to procure the means of subsistence, that is to say, so long as they continue to be the people. It is therefore quite as difficult to imagine a State in which all the citizens should be very well informed, as a State in which they should all be wealthy; these two difficulties are correlative."

The struggle between capital and labor, which is but another form of the conflict of the people with the upper classes, furnishes us with valuable lessons, and, as will be argued, with the suggestion of a remedy for our political troubles. The conditions are in great part the same, except that while the people are aware that the strikes, with which they punish their employers, cause suffering to themselves, they do not see that

their action in politics is followed by the same results to their own interests, as well as to those against whom their envy is directed. If, then, we examine the nature of the expedients which have been resorted to with success in allaying the jealousy of the laboring class, we may reasonably expect to find some elements that are essential to the removal of the same feeling, when displayed in politics. The general principle of all these expedients has been to array self-interest against class-envy. Just so soon as it has been possible to make the working class understand where their true interests lie, the influence of reason has steadily calmed down their bitter hatred of their employers. The process is a slow one, and yet in its beginnings, but the direction is right. The methods by which this change is wrought are embraced under the head of Co-operation, which may be defined as any mode of doing business whereby the wages of the laborers employed vary according to the success of the business. But for the purpose of illustration a particular form of organization of labor has peculiar advantages. When contracts are made for constructing the road-bed of a railway in England, the large contractor divides his share into sections of small size, and sublets these to other contractors. So far the process is the same in this country. But in England (in some cases) the sub-contractor, instead of hiring his men by the day and putting them directly on to the job, *divides his section again into portions of such size, that the laborer can judge for himself how much time it will take to accomplish them.* The men themselves become contractors for these smallest divisions. They organize themselves into bodies of ten or fifteen members, called "Butty-gangs," selecting their gang in such a way that the members may be, so far as possible, of equal efficiency, and choosing a head. The English "navvy" is about as near a savage as any civilized man, but by this device of piece-work he has unquestionably forwarded civilization. This system is a hard blow to strikes and trades-unions. If the workman thinks he can do more work at eight hours a day than ten, he is at liberty to try it. If he wants a holiday he can take it, if he gets his contract done in time. If he finds that others who do less than himself receive equal pay, he can join a gang where he finds his equals.

But the instructive point for us is, that the work is subdivided until the ordinary man can see just where his interests lie. Let us suppose that instead of this complex organization of contractors and sub-contractors, the whole job were to be regulated at a gathering of all the parties concerned, where the voice of the capitalist should have no more authority than that of the laborer. What sort of management would result? Precisely the management that we see in our unwieldy caucuses. The remedy, then, which we have sought is to be found in subdividing the caucus districts, until it is possible for every member of a district to be personally acquainted with all the rest, to *know* the man that he chooses to represent him.

This is simply acting in accordance with the great law of division of labor. Large organic or inorganic molecules are in highly unstable equilibrium, and tend to break up into smaller and more stable units. Large heterogeneous bodies of men are like them. Nothing can be done with men until they organize. Nothing is so easily swayed in any direction as a crowd. Nothing is so unreasonable or so fickle as an unorganized mob. It is unnecessary to illustrate a law by which all nature, animate or inanimate, is pervaded, and which is the foundation of our modern civilization. We see it in the development of the tree, from trunk to branches, from branches to twigs, from twigs to leaves. We see it in the change from the country store, with its miscellaneous assortment of goods, hardware and ribbons, corn and candy, to the city shop where only one class of merchandize is to be found. We see it in the instinctive organization of a group of children playing games, where the first step is to choose a leader. And in the caucus itself we see that nature's laws will be obeyed; for what are the political "rings" but attempts at this organization? Misgrowths they are, but unless they satisfied a want, they would not exist. The children of this world have been wiser in their generation than the children of light.

In point of fact we have outgrown the existing political organization or framework, just as a cherry-tree outgrows its bark, or a boy his clothes. Now bark and clothes are necessities, but they need to be enlarged and varied with time. And caucuses are necessities, for any meeting for consultation concerning representatives, whatever it is called, is really a cau-

cus; but the simple gathering of a small New England town becomes with the growth of population entirely unfit for its purpose. The reason is plain enough. In the early days life was confined within a circle of a few miles, everybody knew all about his neighbors, and they all spent their lives together, went to the same church, met in the same town-meeting, and elected the best men of the town as their representatives, because their numbers were so few, and their habits of life were such, that they *knew* the best men in town. Like the members of the "Butty-gangs," their work was marked out before them, and they had only to choose from a small circle those whom they knew to be most competent to further the common interests.

How is it now? Take the case of New Haven. It is for some purposes a city, but for others it is still a town. Imagine a town meeting of the voters from a population of 60,000. Is it likely that deliberation will be mature, that wisdom will be listened to, that anyone knows anything about the names that are proposed? An organized ring is a necessity under such circumstances and there are plenty of men shrewd enough to understand it.

It is in consequence of the observed inconvenience of overgrowth that towns differentiate into cities, with their subdivisions into wards. This is good so far as it goes, but the ward is still far too large to allow the necessary conditions of wise action to come into play. It is impossible to fix an exact limit within which the average man may be supposed to be confined in his acquaintance, but so far as the observation of the writer extends, a neighborhood of fifty voters is large enough for the political unit, and this only with minority representation. With the ordinary majority rule it would be better to have not more than twenty-five men meet for nomination, for reasons that will presently be explained. In the ordinary New England town the school-districts would form convenient divisions for organization, as the school-houses would serve as places of meeting. In cities, that part of a street contained between two streets that cross it, a block in its common linear, not solid sense, might possibly answer. Under this system there would naturally arise three cases. Some neighborhoods would consist entirely of wealthy and cultivated individuals.

There would be little trouble in such a case, and with a neighborhood of fifty, and three delegates to be chosen, but only two votes allowed to each individual, representation would be as nearly perfect as any human institution.

Secondly, some neighborhoods would consist of a mixed class, poor and rich, laborers and capitalists. Here the best results might be expected. The laborer, when joined with his fellows in a large crowd, looks at the capitalist as an abstract tyrant and inflames himself against him. Let him, with only a few of his own class, meet this abstraction as an actual flesh and blood acquaintance, of rather pleasant manners, with no implements for grinding the faces of the poor about his person, and the natural influence of superior ability will have its effect. Democratic envy cannot thrive under such circumstances; it dares not openly proclaim itself except in that nursery of bad passions, a crowd. Want of space forbids dwelling on this point, but it might reasonably be expected that such a neighborhood would return its best men as delegates.

Thirdly, in a neighborhood composed of the poorer classes, or even of the vicious classes, the result could in no case be worse than it now is. On the other hand, it is only reasonable to suppose that here too the best men the place afforded would be chosen, because the people would know who was the best man among them; and the trouble is not at all that the best men are not chosen when they are known, but that they are not and cannot be known under the present system. Anything better than this it is impossible to have under universal suffrage, for there is little hope that any large body of the lower classes will elect a desirable representative.

If now we look at these classes as a whole, we find that we have secured the good effects of minority representation. There is much confusion about this minority representation. The fact is not observed, that in any representative government some must be unrepresented. All that minority representation does is to give to unusually large minorities a representation that they ordinarily fail to obtain. But there must always be small bodies of citizens that are not satisfied with the representatives chosen, unless the phenomenon of defeated candidates is to disappear entirely. Now the subdivision proposed above will come as near to giving every man a

representative as any scheme of minority representation possibly can. The difference will be in this respect. The subdivision of the districts would require the insertion of another term in the series. The delegates chosen would not be for election, but to nominate candidates for election. They would be delegates to general caucuses, and the same principle of avoiding unwieldy masses would forbid the sending of delegates directly from the towns to the State convention. The forty or fifty chosen men from a town of 1,000 voters would be obliged to choose three or five from their number to represent them in a county convention, where the delegates to the State convention would be at last chosen. But the process, as a little reflection will show, would be a continual selection of the best material. Its complexity is more real than apparent, and after all it is only a despotism that can be really simple.

The failure of the electoral college may occur to some as an objection to this scheme. But the electoral college is a part of the organic political machinery of the United States, while this scheme is intended for the use of parties; although, if successful, it might perhaps be adopted into the constitutions of our governments. And further, the failure of the electoral college is explained by this scheme. Who knows anything about the thirty or forty names of electors on the ticket he votes in New York? How could he find out anything about them if he wanted to? It may be that he knows nothing of the candidate for president, but it is easier to find out about one man than about forty. The electoral college has failed for this simple reason, that the acquaintance of the people with their electors was impossible, while something at least could be learned about the one or two prominent candidates for president. The college might even yet be revived into usefulness by some such division of districts for nomination as is here suggested. But the theory of election by an elected body is not affected by this practical failure in one instance. For a long time it gave us a United States Senate which was the equal of any parliamentary assembly in Europe. The reason it no longer does so is because the State legislatures are now composed of men unknown to those who elect them. The judgment of De Tocqueville is not to be disregarded as to the importance of this method. He says:

"The time must come when the American republics will be obliged more frequently to introduce the plan of election by an elected body into their system of representation, or run the risk of perishing miserably amongst the shoals of democracy."

"I do not hesitate to avow that I look upon this peculiar system of election as the only means of bringing the exercise of political power to the level of the people. Those who hope to convert this institution into the exclusive weapon of a party, and those who fear to use it, seem to me to be equally in error."

That time has come. No one can contemplate our municipal governments, and reflect on the large proportion in which the population of the cities already stands to that of the whole country, bearing in mind also the growing tendency of population to concentrate in towns, without feeling anxiety for the future of the republic.

Why "this peculiar system of election" was regarded by De Tocqueville as the only means for our salvation, has been explained above. Men must learn to choose a representative as they choose a lawyer or a doctor; not one who will carry out all their whims, but one who will do their business as faithfully as he can, exercising his superior knowledge where he sees it will be advantageous. Not one who will sacrifice his judgment to that of his patients or clients, but one to whose judgment they are willing to yield their own. Such men cannot be discerned in a crowd; they are only to be found by personal acquaintance.

It is not likely that any existing party will be persuaded to adopt a reform that would be the doom of most of our political managers. Should there arise a new party, however, there would then be a favorable opportunity for trying the experiment. Whatever difficulties may be in the way, it may be confidently asserted that radical reform can be obtained only by working in this direction. Reform thus obtained will be permanent because the size of the political unit will be fixed by the limit of a certain number. Without some such reform we may look to see the new party captured at the outset by the politicians as at Cincinnati, or gradually brought into subjection by skillful managers, as has been the case with the Republican party.

ARTICLE V.—MILL ON THE FOUNDATION OF MATHEMATICS.

A System of Logic, ratiocinative and inductive. By JOHN STUART MILL.

WHEREIN lies the peculiar certainty always ascribed to the sciences of Geometry and Arithmetic? asks Mill. (Logic, 4th ed., i, 253.) "Why are they called the Exact Sciences? Why are mathematical certainty, and the evidence of demonstration, common phrases to express the very highest assurance attainable by reason? Why are mathematics considered to be independent of experience and observation, and characterized as systems of necessary truth?" The rational curiosity embodied in these queries will find small satisfaction in the answer of Mill, who replies "that this character of necessity ascribed to the truths of mathematics, and even, with some reservations, the peculiar certainty attributed to them, is an illusion, in order to sustain which it is necessary to suppose that those truths relate to, and express the properties of purely imaginary objects." (p. 253.) Like most of those who have addressed themselves to this abstruse and complicated inquiry, he has incumbered his path by aiming at once at a general solution of the problem, and framing the discussion in terms intended from the commencement to meet the case of both the demonstrative sciences. But the more abstruse is a subject, the easier it is for error to step in under the cover of generalities, and it will greatly increase our chances of success, if we confine our attention in the first instance to the more simple conception of Number, and afterwards turn, with whatever insight we may have obtained into the evidence of arithmetical certainty, to the more complicated relations of Position and Figure.

The doctrine of Mill (i, 281) is, that arithmetic, in the same sense as mechanics or optics, is an inductive science, resting on what are incorrectly called definitions, but are in reality generalizations from experience, inasmuch as they are to be understood, not only as propositions explaining the meaning of the

names, two, three, four, etc., but also as covertly asserting the existence of real things corresponding to such a meaning. "We may call, Three is two and one, a definition of three; but the calculations which depend on that proposition do not follow from the definition itself, but from an arithmetical theorem presupposed in it, namely, that collections of objects exist which, while they impress the senses" as a group of one and one and one, may be separated into two parts, consisting of a group of two and a single one.* "This proposition being granted, we term all such parcels threes, after which the enunciation of the above-mentioned physical fact will serve also for a definition of the word three."

The truth of the covert assertion thus implied in the definition of each individual number is a truth "known to us from early and constant experience, an inductive truth; and such truths are the foundation of the science of number. The fundamental truths of that science all rest on the evidence of sense; they are proved by showing to our eyes and our fingers that any given number of objects, ten balls for example, may, by separation and rearrangement, exhibit to our senses all the different sets of numbers the sum of which is equal to ten." (p. 286.) Thus, according to Mill, the way in which we learn that the addition of a fresh ball to a group of two will produce a group of three, and not of four; that a group of four things may always be divided into two groups of two each, and never into a group of two and one of three; is by inveterate experience, only, by constant observation of the result when groups of actual objects are so combined or decomposed, just as we learn that sugar is sweet or snow cold. The bare statement of such a conclusion in reference to numbers within easy grasp of the imagination should be sufficient to show that there must be some secret flaw in the reasoning which leads to so flagrant a paradox.

The source of the confusion in the mind of Mill may be traced to his fundamental doctrine "that no definition is ever intended to explain and unfold the nature of a thing. All

* The words of Mill are, "which, while they impress the senses thus . . .", may be separated into two parts, thus .. .;" which I can only translate into language in the words of the text.

definitions are of names, and names only, but in some definitions it is clearly apparent that nothing is intended except to explain the meaning of the word, while in others, besides explaining the meaning of the word, it is intended to be implied that there exists a thing corresponding to the word." (i, p. 162.) Definitions of this latter description consist of two parts; first, a proposition enouncing the meaning of the term defined, "which gives information only about the use of language, and from which no conclusions affecting matters of fact can possibly be drawn;" and secondly, a covert postulate, affirming "the real existence of things possessing the combination of attributes set forth in the definition;" a fact which may lead to consequences of every degree of importance, and, if true, may be foundation sufficient on which to build a whole fabric of scientific truth. (i, 163.) Now, in the first place, it cannot be admitted that definitions are of names only, and never of things; that no definition is ever intended to unfold the nature of a thing. Whenever the word to be explained is the name of a thing of which the person to be instructed has no previous conception, the meaning can only be conveyed by explaining the nature of the thing signified.

I explain the meaning of the word Dragon to a person who has no conception of such an animal by the definition. A dragon is a serpent which breathes flame; from whence he will learn at the same time the meaning of the word Dragon, and the nature of the thing signified, without reference to the question whether such a creature actually exists, or ever has existed on the surface of the globe, or not. The hearer, who takes his notion of a dragon from this definition, will see *a priori* that every possible dragon must necessarily be a serpent and must breathe flame, because what he means by a dragon is a creature characterized by the combination of these attributes; and if ever a dragon is to be discovered in actual existence, it must be by the actual apprehension of both the attributes in question.

In the same way it will be seen that every definition, converted into an universal proposition, will necessarily be true of every thing signified by the term defined, or, in other words, that every thing entitled to that designation will necessarily be possessed of the character set forth in the predicate of the defi-

nition, because it is only by the exhibition of that character that it is made an example of what is signified by the term defined. Thus every definition, after it has performed its primary duty of laying down the sense in which the term defined is to be understood, will, by those who so understand the term, be recognized as a necessary truth, provided the subject of the proposition has sufficient reality to give room for the question of truth or falsehood. If no such thing as a dragon was to be found in the world it could not be said that the proposition, every dragon breathes flame, was either true or false. It is manifested, however, that the real existence of the kind defined can be secured by no postulate or assumption, but only by positive knowledge of some individual in actual existence.

The condition which converts the definition of a dragon from an exposition of the meaning of the word into an assertion of positive fact, will be no assumption of the real existence of serpents breathing flame, but the discovery of an animal so characterized in actual existence.

Whether the definition is to lead to a real advance in knowledge or to remain a barren truism, must depend upon the question whether or no it is possible to deduce from it any attribute of the species defined that must not itself be directly apprehended in the recognition of an individual of the species in actual existence.

If it could be shown that the notion of some ulterior attribute not necessarily present to the mind in the conception of a serpent breathing flame, such, for instance, as the notion of carrying a hidden jewel in the head, was logically involved in the description of a dragon, it would be manifest, to those who followed the demonstration, that any actual dragon (if such there were in existence) must necessarily carry a jewel in its head, and the insight of that necessity, on the occurrence of an actual dragon, would give knowledge of a fact not directly perceived in the apprehension of that particular animal. But, in truth, no conclusion of such a nature can be drawn from the definition; from whence it can only be inferred that a dragon is a serpent and that it breathes flame, both of which propositions, to one who takes his notion of a serpent from the definition, are manifest truisms.

So also it must be with all definitions of natural species, which are known to us only by observation of things characterized by certain general resemblances, without insight into any principle in the constitution of the creation from which its attributes can be logically deduced. The difference in the case of number arises from this—that the different phases of number, two, three, four, five, etc., are not made known to us, like so many phases of color, by observation in actual existence, but the general idea of number being conceived as consisting of an aggregate of units, one and one and one and one, etc., we see from the contemplation of the idea itself that it admits of existence in various degrees of complexity, according to the length of the string of units of which it is composed. We then, by a purely mental operation, independent of experience of any particular phase of number beyond the very lowest, construct the notion of an indefinite succession of numbers, one, two, three, four, five, etc., continually increasing in complexity, the notion of each succeeding number being formed by the addition of one to the number immediately preceding; and having ourselves constructed the idea signified by each of the names, two, three, four, etc., we reason with absolute certainty concerning the consequences which follow from the principle of construction. Thus we see that every number, consisting of a series of the form one and one and one, etc., admits of being broken up in various ways into combinations of subordinate series of less extent. The number six, for example, which fundamentally consists of the series one and one and one and one and one and one, may be broken up in the form of (one and one and one and one) and (one and one), or in that of (one and one and one) and (one and one and one). Thus it is seen that the number six, by the essential nature of its construction, is equal, either to four and two, or to three and three, although the equality to either of those combinations is not necessarily present to the mind in the conception of six itself, and consequently, the demonstration of the equation will not present us with an idle truism, but will constitute a real advance in the knowledge of number.

In our system of instruction, arithmetic is taught as an art and not as a science. The elementary relations embodied in the addition and multiplication tables are given out as the tools

which the scholar is to work, without any attempt to deduce them from a logical analysis of the numbers themselves. But this is because arithmetic is taught at so early an age that it is more important to implant the elementary facts in the memory of the scholar than to educate his power of speculative thought, and not on account of any inherent difficulty in a complete demonstration.

Number is the attribute apprehended by the process of counting, which consists in the recognition of successive objects as things of the same kind, taking note, at the recognition of each fresh object, of the extent to which the repetition of the kind has been previously carried. When the attention is simply directed to the fact of repetition, without distinguishing the precise amount, the aggregate series is considered as consisting of *many* things of the kind in question, and the contrast between the aggregate object apprehended in such a manner, and that to which attention is directed at each repetition of the kind, gives rise to the conception of the latter as *individual* or *one*. Thus the idea of unity consists in a mental reference to the possibility of repetition of the kind to which the object is referred, or, what amounts to the same thing, in the negation of actual repetition, the negative character of the idea being witnessed by the structure of the word *individual*; what is not broken up into many. We should never have conceived an object as *one* unless we had previously had experience of something apprehended as *many*, but as soon as the notion of *one* has been evolved in the way above-mentioned, we see that *many* is logically composed of one and one and one, and so on, until the entire group has passed under review. It is this relation between the ideas of multiplicity, or plurality and unity, that is expressed by Cousin in his somewhat mystical formula of the two contrasted orders of ideas. In the order of time, he says, the idea of unity presupposes that of multiplicity, but in the order of reason, multiplicity presupposes unity.

The lowest degree of plurality is where there is a single repetition of the kind, where a group consists of one object, and one other of the same kind. The numeral character of such a group is designated by the term *two*; which is accordingly defined by the proposition, two is one and one.

But this definition is not the expression of a fact learned by generalization from experience. Our conviction that one and one are two does not arise from uniform experience that a group of two things may always be decomposed in the form of one and one, but from consciousness that what we mean by *two* is nothing else than the aggregate of one and one. In apprehending a group as consisting of two things, we do but bring under review, at a single glance, the elements which have been apprehended, in however transitory a manner, as one and one.

Having thus attained to the conception of the number two, we may imagine the addition of another unit to an ideal group of two, which will thus be enlarged to a group of one and one and one, presenting to the mind the numeral character designated by the name of *three*.

In like manner, the association of an additional unit with a group of three will give rise to a group of one and one and one and one, and so, by addition of one to the highest number of which we had previously distinct conception, we continually advance to the conception of a number one degree higher, so long as we are able to keep distinctly before the mind the precise amount of repetition by which that particular step in the numerical scale is characterized. But such a limit, without some artificial aid in keeping count of the amount of repetition, would very speedily be reached, and in the lowest stage of mental cultivation would probably not be placed beyond the number three or four. The requisite aid, however, is not far to seek, and is found by all families of Man in the quinary division of the hand, the fingers of which supply a ready scale on which to tell off the units of any group of less than six, of whose number one might wish to take count. Thus, beginning at the thumb of the left hand, the first finger would mark a single repetition of the kind in question, or the occurrence of a second member of the group to be counted; the middle finger a second repetition, or a third member of the group; and in this way primitive man might learn to associate a definite amount of repetition with each of his four fingers, and might attain to distinct conception of the first five numbers antecedent to the use of any vocal designation. But, sooner or later, the demands of language would give rise to the use of

spoken names,—one, two, three, four, five, designating the numbers told off on each successive finger; and these, being constantly repeated in regular order, constitute a series so firmly fixed in the memory, that each name serves at once to bring before the mind the preceding portion of the series, and thus affords a standard of the amount of repetition signified, as distinct as that supplied by the fingers passed over in telling numbers on the hand. When the fingers on one hand are exhausted, we may either go on through a second series of the form, five-one, five-two, &c., which are actually found in many rude dialects, or the higher numbers may be told off on the other hand with a fresh set of names, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, corresponding to the fingers of the second hand. When the ten digits are exhausted, we advance to the conception of higher numbers by the continued addition of one, with designation of the form ten-one, ten-two, &c., two tens, two-ten-one, two-ten-two, &c., three tens, &c., ten-tens, or a hundred, and so on as far as may be required, using the convenience of compendious names for such of the powers of ten as may be found most appropriate for resting-places in the process of numeration.

The composition of such a system of numbers is enounced in the definitions :

- (2) Two is one and one.
- (3) Three is two and one, &c.
- (11) Eleven is ten and one.
- (12) Twelve is eleven and one, &c.
- (20) Twenty is ten and ten or two tens, &c.
- A hundred is ten tens, &c.

From whence all possible relations of particular numbers may be demonstrated, because these definitions afford the means of reducing all arithmetical systems to, or of building them up out of, their constituent units, and thus of bringing the systems to be compared into a condition in which they may be ticked off against each other, unit by unit.

To show, for example, that seven and six are thirteen, we have :

By definition (8)—eight is seven and one,
Or eight is equal to seven and one.

Adding one to each side :

Eight and one are equal to seven and one and one ; or, by definition (9) and (2),

Nine is equal to seven and two.

Adding one again to each side :

Nine and one are equal to seven and two and one ; or, by definition (10) and (3),

Ten is equal to seven and three.

And so on till we come to

Thirteen is equal to seven and six.

As the number of a set of things depends upon the length of the series "one and one and one, &c.," corresponding to the individuals of the enumerated class, as each is successively brought under review in the process of counting, without reference to any difference between one individual and another, it is plain that the aggregate number can in nowise be affected by variations in the order in which they are counted. If I have a set of balls, black, white, green, red, and blue, the aspect under which I regard them in counting will be as one and one and one and one and one, whether I take them in the order of black and white and green and red and blue, or of green and red and white and black and blue. And so, if I jumble together a set of (m) white balls and a set of (n) black ones, the tale of the whole will be the same, whether in counting I pick out first the black and then the white, or first the white and then the black. In other words, the sum made by the addition of (n) to (m) things is the same as that made by the addition of (m) to (n), or, algebraically,

$$m + n = n + m.$$

From similar considerations it may be shown that the product of two factors (m) and (n) is independent of the order in which the factors are taken ; that (m) times (n) is the same as (n) times (m), or algebraically, that $mn = nm$.

Suppose that we have five groups of seven balls each, it is obvious that the aggregate number will be seven times as great as if there were only one ball in each group, when there would be only five in all, so that the aggregate of five times seven is the same as of seven times five. Or to take the matter more in detail, let the balls of each of the five original groups be marked

1, 2, 3, &c., 7. Then there will in the aggregate be five ones, five twos, &c., and five sevens, making in all seven groups of five each, whence it appears that things which constitute five groups of seven each may be otherwise arranged in seven groups of five each, or, in other words, that five times seven is equal to seven times five.

It has already been shown that every definition (in virtue of the principle that the term defined is to be understood in the sense enounced in the predicate of the proposition) will necessarily be true of every actual example of what is signified by the term defined; that the predicate of the definition may be affirmed with absolute assurance of every thing legitimately designated by the term defined. Thus every definition may be regarded as a self-evident principle of necessary truth, provided the subject is defined by attributes that are found in actual existence; and it is because the entire fabric of arithmetic can be raised upon a basis entirely composed of definitions in which that proviso is fulfilled, without a single appeal to the evidence of experience, that it is entitled to the name of an exact science and may be considered as a type of perfect demonstration, affording absolute assurance of numerical relations between groups of actual things.

When arithmetical laws are spoken of as independent of observation and experience, it is of course not intended to exclude the experience necessary for the comprehension of the subject-matter of the science. Experience supplies us with the notion of one and of more than one, of unity and of repetition or addition, and with these materials, without further aid from experience, we are able to construct the notion of the entire series of numbers, one, two, three, four, five, six, &c., by the continued addition of one to the preceding number in the series, enouncing the fundamental constitution of those conceptions in the successive definitions,

Two is one and one,

Three is two and one,

Four is three and one, &c.,

From whence the entire system of arithmetical relations may be demonstrated or deduced by regular course of logical infer-

ence.

ARTICLE VI.—JUDGE FARRAR'S MANUAL OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

Manual of the Constitution of the United States of America. By
TIMOTHY FARRAR, LL.D. Third edition, revised, with an
Appendix. Boston: Little, Brown & Company. 1872. 8vo,
pp. xii, 566.

THE Constitution of a State is that in which its individuality consists—the aggregate of the acknowledged rights and obligations, the institutions, customs, and fundamental laws, which underlie its political existence and action, and in which it differs more or less widely from other States. It need not be written. The Constitution of Great Britain, though unwritten, is as real, as definable, as that of the United States. It cannot be written in full; for there are usages that pervade the organization of society and government too numerous to be codified, too subtle to be described, too intimately identified with national life to need formal enactment, which yet are implicitly recognized by the entire community, and the violation of which is deemed by common consent not only a breach of the law, but a violation of the national compact. There may be, also, essential portions of a constitution which the framers of the document that bears this name are ashamed to write. Thus slavery was for three-quarters of a century a part of the Constitution of the United States, which yet bears no trace of it, and might have been indited in precisely the same words, had there existed no property of man in man. Thus, too, the system by which the vast army of office-holders have a tenure of office contingent on their loyalty to the party in power is an element—while destructive, seemingly indestructible—of our Constitution; yet no politician, of however brazen front, would dare to propose it in the shape of a formal amendment.

There can hardly fail to be broad discrepancies between the written and the actual Constitution of a State: for the life of a people is fluent and changeful, even when not progressive;

and as from the very nature of the case the fundamental law embraced in the constitution admits of verbal alterations and additions less promptly than the statute-law, there will grow up modifications by tacit consent, which will embarrass the strict constructionist, yet which will nevertheless have all the prestige and force of positive enactment, and which will not infrequently give rise to such *ex post facto* expositions of the written constitution as can never have entered into the thought of its framers. In like manner, portions of the constitution may be gradually obsolescent, and may at length be wholly disused, without the formality of repeal; and the words, now meaningless, may be retained for what they were once worth, or with the vague idea that in some future exigency they may become again significant. Yet as there are always honest, but narrow minds, that will be scandalized by practical deviations from the letter of the constitution, and pragmatists who will draw mischief from them, a written constitution ought to abound in words and phrases that admit a generous breadth of interpretation, to define and prescribe only what is indispensably necessary to the order of the State and the working of its government, and to leave all minor details to subsequent legislation. The permanence of a constitution depends on its flexibility; while to insist pertinaciously on its literal or traditional construction is the surest way to bring it into discredit and peril. There cannot be a less appropriate metaphor than the hackneyed figure of the ship of state. No ship can outride the waves of advancing knowledge and conscience. But a raft is safe where a ship would founder. A raft may be warped and racked, and may let in the water through its seams, without sinking. Rotten timbers may be cut adrift, and sound timbers spliced to the fabric in their stead, till not a log of the original structure remains, and yet it shall seem to preserve its identity, and shall keep the same cargo afloat and well-conditioned.

The circumstances under which our Constitution was framed gave it precisely the character of which the raft is a symbol. A rigid, compact form of government, circumscribed and guarded at every point, was impossible. There were among the framers and their intelligent constituents great diversities of

political training, prepossessions, and tendencies. Some were disposed to borrow largely from English precedents; others showed strong democratic proclivities. Various plans had been discussed in advance in the several States, and each of these had its friends and advocates. Social institutions and habits differed widely in different parts of the country, and intercommunication had not been sufficiently established to create any community of type or sentiment between remote provinces. Compromise and mutual concession alone could produce harmony among the members of the Constitutional Convention, or procure the sanction of their plan of union by the individual States. It is to this elastic, yielding construction that our Constitution owes its persistent life through flood and storm, and may owe its permanence for centuries to come, if those charged with its pilotage will only keep it free and flexible as our fathers made it.

Our present Constitution is nominally identical with that of 1788, yet is in many respects widely divergent from it. The formal amendments which have passed through the prescribed processes have, indeed, changed some principles which were deemed fundamental. But yet greater alterations have been effected by the silent growth of opinion and practice, by which unrepealed provisions have passed out of use, and words and phrases have been endowed with a sense which was not and is not in them, but only in the altered condition of the body politic.

A constitution is, as its name implies, a creation, not a creator. It does not make a people, but is made by a people. It implies a pre-existing nation. It may be made early in a nation's history; but unless there were some previous reason why the inhabitants of a certain territory should regard themselves as one State, and not as several, or as part of a larger State, it would be impossible that the steps antecedent to a written constitution should be taken, or that the usages which are the basis of a written constitution should have come into being. This is no less true of a nation formed by the union of several else independent States than of one of more simple structure. A confederation is not a constitution. England, France, and Spain may be closely confederated for numerous

valuable ends; but unless they have by some common or mutual act made themselves one people, they cannot frame a constitution.

Of commentaries on the Constitution of the United States the list comprises many works of various merit. They might be divided into two classes,—those which aim primarily to determine what the Constitution was in the intention of its founders, and those which occupy themselves chiefly in expounding what it has become and is in the hands of their successors. The book before us fulfills both these purposes, and adds to them a third,—the clear and earnest exhibition of the obligations laid upon our people and their rulers by that instrument, yet left unrecognized in practice. The venerable author stood nearer the cradle of our republic than almost any now living man. His lifelong intimacy was with those who had its interests most at heart. His father—a centenarian—was one of the New Hampshire judges at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and was for many years Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of that State. The son, for some years Daniel Webster's partner in legal business, and ever after his friend and correspondent, held an honored place in the New Hampshire judiciary, until a democratic legislature—after a fashion peculiar, we believe, to that State—abolished the court of which he was a member, in order to unseat judges whose crime was dissent from the then dominant party. Bred in profound reverence for the Constitution, familiarly acquainted with not a few of its ablest expositors and defenders, and intimately conversant with the literature appertaining to it, the legislation founded upon it, and the judicial interpretations of it, he devoted to it the busy retirement of an old age which, so far as mental vigor was concerned, was to the very last a culmination rather than a decline. The opinions of such a man on many points are but readings of authentic history, and on all they carry with them as high authority as can attach itself to individual opinion. We do not propose to analyze the treatise in detail, but shall content ourselves with presenting a few of its salient features, and for the sake of brevity we shall do this in our own words, with the understanding that we are for the most part but abridging the contents of the book under review.

The Constitution, the laws made in pursuance of it, and the treaties negotiated under it, are declared, in the instrument itself, to be "the supreme law of the land;" and it ordains a government for the purpose, and, of course, with the power and duty, of executing it. It follows from this that the national government has paramount power in all the particulars in which such power is conferred upon it by the Constitution, and in the measure in which it is so conferred. In some matters the power is in terms exclusive; and in these the State governments are powerless, even though the national legislature or executive make no provision for them. In other matters the power is vested permissively in the national government, and in these its action supersedes and renders void any parallel exercise of authority on the part of the States; while in case of its failure to legislate, the States may supply the void by their own legislation. There are other powers expressly vested in the States, and still others belonging to them by manifest implication, as in their very nature appertaining to local administration, and to interests which must somehow be provided for, yet are in no sense national or general. The words "the supreme law of the land" are decisive as to the long-mooted question of paramount State rights under the Constitution, as to which, from the very outset, opposite ground was taken by northern and southern statesmen,—a controversy which attained its climax in the great rebellion, and its final settlement in the subjugation of the recusant States.

Our government is not a mere confederation of sovereign States. This is implied in the preamble to the Constitution, which is not "The several States," but "We, the people of the United States do declare and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." These words denote a previous national existence, bearing even date with the Declaration of Independence in 1776, in which the inhabitants of the colonies are pronounced to be "one people," with "full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do." From that time onward the specific powers thus enumerated were never exercised or claimed by the individual States; but for

these purposes the States were thenceforward a nation. The confederation which preceded our present government was much more than a confederation. Its government exercised many of the acts of sovereignty, and in many essential matters of jurisdiction and administration it succeeded without question to the former legitimate rights of the royal government. But its organization—adopted, without experience, to meet existing exigencies—was necessarily imperfect, and it proved itself inadequate, not as a confederation, but as—what it was meant to be—a national government. It was solely because of this inadequacy that measures were taken for the establishment of a government that should better subserve the purpose for which the confederation had been created.

The preamble to the Constitution names first among its purposes, "to form a more perfect union," thus implying the recognized existence of a previous union. There is not a word in the Constitution which can give color to the theory that the national government was designed or expected to be voidable by the action of any individual State. Its provisions expressly annul State-sovereignty by vesting in the general government precisely those rights and powers by which independent States are characterized. As well might Boston, Philadelphia, or Baltimore, Middlesex County or Kings County, by virtue of the local authority vested by the State Constitution in the local magistrates, claim a position independent of State control and jurisdiction, as can any individual State act for itself within the scope of the authority conferred by the national Constitution on the general government. Such has been the almost universal doctrine of Northern statesmen. The gravest charge brought against the old Federalist party in the North was that it maintained the right of secession; but the most that can be affirmed with any certainty is that there were vague hints of such opinions in the private correspondence of a very few prominent members of the party during the war of 1812,—opinions which were in no instance publicly avowed in any legislature, convention, or political assembly. On the contrary, the whole tone of Southern opinion, speech, and writing, for many years previous to the rebellion, was in favor of the virtual independence of the States, and conse-

quently of the right of secession, for sufficient reasons. This doctrine was taught in the colleges, professed in the local legislatures, and proclaimed on the floor of Congress. It was held without question or concealment by large numbers of men whose predilections were in favor of the national government; and among those who resigned office in the army and navy, and took an active part on the Southern side in the civil war, or held offices of trust in the Southern confederacy, were not a few honorable men, who were opposed to secession while the question was in abeyance, but who honestly believed themselves bound by the action of their respective States, regarding allegiance to the State as a duty paramount to loyalty to the nation of which it had ceased to be a member.

The supremacy of the national government is still farther implied in the determination of the form of the State governments by the Constitution. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government." If the States were mere members of a confederation, each could elect its own form of government. New York might be an hereditary monarchy; Virginia might vest its government in an aristocracy composed of the representatives of certain old colonial families; Rhode Island might be organized under the tumultuous régime of the Athenian democracy. But by a republican government was and is understood a government exercised by men chosen by the people at large, and acting by their authority and in their behalf; and were a government of a different type established by either of the States, the whole power of the Union is pledged by the Constitution to reverse such action, and to restore the rights of the people thus disfranchised. Surely the authority to determine what government a State shall have, includes paramount authority over such State.

On this ground, what was the position of the rebel States after their subjugation? These States by the act of rebellion abjured their guaranteed rights, and were dissolved as bodies politic. Their territory by conquest passed again to the jurisdiction of the national government, which had no obligations towards them other than those of justice and humanity to their inhabitants. These States did not legally and properly revert—

to their former condition by the mere cessation of active hostility. The executive had, by the Constitution, no right to terminate the war; for the power to declare war, vested not in the President, but in Congress, includes of necessity the power to put an end to it. Till peace is concluded by the same authority which declared and maintained the war, conquered enemies are fittingly under military government; and on no other footing had our executive the right, without the direction of Congress, to receive the States that had forfeited their equal place among their sister States. It was competent for Congress, in declaring the war at an end, to provide for the government of those States, with a view to their highest welfare and to that of the country at large; to restore them to their position immediately, after a series of years, or in certain future contingencies; to establish territorial governments wholly dependent on the supreme executive; to change geographical divisions, so as to make more or fewer States; or to apply different methods of administration to different portions of the conquered territory, according to their respective ability for self-government. Instead of this, the conquered States were rehabilitated in their former rights and powers, some of them without intelligent and loyal citizens enough to fill the requisite offices; were left without military or any adequate control; and were suffered to prolong the rebellion—in some instances till the present time—by outrages against the peace of the country, and by general insubordination and lawlessness. South Carolina and Louisiana, there is reason to fear, are thus ruined beyond redemption, so far as the freedom and prosperity of their white inhabitants are concerned; while in other of the late Confederate States there is evidently a work of reconstruction yet to be completed by the national government.

Slavery under the Constitution existed only by sufferance, not by enactment or express recognition. There can be little doubt that it was then regarded as but a temporary evil, from which time and the progress of events would gradually relieve the nation. It is certain that there was at that period a very strong anti-slavery feeling in Maryland and Virginia. The earliest anti-slavery societies were formed in those States; they numbered among their officers and zealous members the very men who

occupied the foremost places in society, public trust, and private influence; and their constitutions and printed documents, if reissued twenty-five years ago, would have been classed among the most rabidly incendiary literature of the abolitionists. The framers of the Constitution undoubtedly thought that it would outlast slavery, and they therefore carefully worded the instrument, so that it might provide for the then existing condition of society in the slaveholding States, without bearing indelible tokens and vestiges of a death-doomed institution. Slavery was then not profitable, except on the sugar and rice plantations; the waste of slave-life in the swamps and the mills was not sufficiently large to stimulate the home-market; and as to the natural increase, the black population was believed to be stationary, if not declining. It was therefore thought expedient to permit the "importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit," for twenty years. Shortly afterwards the cotton-gin was invented, and long before the twenty years had expired, slave-labor had become so lucrative in the cotton States, as to raise up a new antagonism to the foreign slave-trade on the part of those States where slave-labor had been found unthrifty and worthless, but where enormous profits might be made by the breeding of laborers for a Southern market. Had not sectional interests been thus thrown into the same scale with humanity, it may be fairly questioned whether Southern greed and Northern sycophancy would not have prolonged the legal existence of the African slave-trade, notwithstanding the indignant protest of religion and philanthropy.

But slavery, while it should last, needed protection. With the extended northern frontier of the slave-States, with the numerous water-courses parallel to the sea-coast, and with mountain-ranges so situated as to leave broad intervening tracts of level country over which escape was comparatively easy, there would have been, but for legal obstructions, a constant and rapid current of fugitive negro migration into the free States. Hence the necessity of providing for the delivery of any "person held to service or labor in one State under the laws thereof, escaping into another,"—a provision not unreasonable, even between the free States, at a time when it was the

universal custom to bind apprentices by legal indentures for a term of years. Under this provision were enacted, always by the aid of Northern votes, a series of fugitive-slave laws of gradually increasing severity, the last of which condemned to fine and imprisonment not only those who should give shelter or aid to the fugitive, but all who should withhold their assistance, when required, in his apprehension and restoration. The instances in which this barbarous law was carried into execution against the friends of the slave were very few, and occurred principally in the slave-States; but it is impossible to say how large a part it bore in the awakening of public feeling to the atrocious criminality of slavery, and in hastening its final abolition. Certainly the slave-power performed no more suicidal act than this.

The only other recognition of slavery in the Constitution is the provision for adding, in the enumeration for determining the number of representatives to which each State is entitled, "to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons." This provision is an anomaly. It leaves the *status* of the slaves undefined. If they were "persons" bound to service, they were on the same footing with apprentices and others "bound to service for a term of years." The latter, at the time of each successive enumeration, were no more free than the former, and if only free persons were to be represented in full, but three-fifths of Northern apprentices—then a numerous body—should have been counted for representation. If, on the other hand, slaves were not "persons," but chattels, there was no more reason for counting them at all than for counting the other animals—horses, oxen, mules—employed in aid of human labor. The latter, as is well known, was the theory of American slavery. The local legislation with regard to it was designed for the protection, not of persons, but of property,—not for the defence of the slave's human rights, but to avert loss or damage from the master's human chattels.

The slave-States, under the Constitution, acquired a much larger weight of authority and influence in the lower house of Congress than was rightfully theirs on their own theory.

Every Southern member represented a much smaller number of constituents than any Northern member. In some of the States nearly half of the members represented not persons, but property. A given number of citizens in South Carolina was represented by nearly twice as many members as were chosen by the same number of citizens in New York. The only seeming counterpoise to such an immense advantage was the provision that direct taxes should be levied on the basis of this enumeration,—a provision which has been tacitly ignored by the levying of what have had the force and stringency of direct taxes on certain specific descriptions of property and income. It will appear, on a careful analysis of votes, that this representation of property has been an essential factor in all the numerous acts of Congress for the protection and extension of slavery. Had the free citizens of the slave-States alone been represented, there has always been a sufficiently large number of loyal Northern votes to create a majority, if not for any aggressive movement upon slavery, yet against any measure designed to buttress or perpetuate it. But slave-representation had so swollen the Southern minority, that only a few recreant Northern votes were needed to give legislative preponderance, in every instance for a long series of years, to the slave-power.

The several departments of the government—legislative, executive, and judicial—are distinctly defined and limited by the Constitution, and neither can invade the province of the others, or interfere with their action, except in specified cases and modes. The President virtually constitutes one branch of the legislature, his signature or implied approval being required for the passage of an act by a mere majority of both houses, and his veto sufficing to negative an act, unless subsequently passed by a two-thirds vote of each house. This power is of the utmost importance, as preventing hasty legislation under strong popular excitement. There are not infrequent instances in which the sober second-thought of Congress would willingly retract steps already taken, and the veto-power, judiciously exercised, may postpone a final decision till the impulse which superseded sound judgment has subsided. The President, if wise and conscientious, can hardly

exercise this function, unless for the public good ; and if he be merely mindful of his own reputation, he is not likely to perform an act counter to the wishes of those on whose favor he most depends, unless he has good reason to believe that they and the people whom they represent will on mature consideration approve his course. It is believed that the President's veto has been very seldom interposed, except for reasons which could claim respect and deference, and in by far the larger number of instances the bill returned with objections has failed to become a law.

Each department of the government is its own legitimate interpreter of such portions of the Constitution as relate to its own rights and duties. The judiciary has always claimed and exercised the right of determining the extent and limits of its jurisdiction under the Constitution and the statutes enacted in pursuance of it. There is a broad territory left undefined and uncovered by these authorities. Jurisdiction in certain classes of cases is expressly vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court, and by the statutes in the inferior courts ; certain other classes of cases are excluded. But with regard to cases not specified, the question lies open whether the United States courts have cognizance of them. The Constitution seems to confer on them a jurisdiction, unlimited save where exceptions are expressly made. "The judicial power of the United States (i. e., the whole power appertaining to matters that can in any sense or for any reason belong to a national court) shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The courts, however, have in general taken the opposite ground, and have declined jurisdiction except in cases in which it has been expressly conferred by the Constitution or the laws. Yet their right (we would also say, their duty) to take cognizance of any case not otherwise provided for is unquestionable. The only remedy for the undue usurpation of judicial authority would rest with Congress, which can enact new limitations and exceptions, or can impeach and convict the judge who has exceeded his rightful jurisdiction.

The authority of the courts is confined to the trial of cases, and those cases must be tried under the existing laws. The

judiciary has no legislative authority. It cannot legitimately pronounce a law enacted by Congress unconstitutional;* for the authority given to Congress to enact laws of necessity makes that body the sole judge of the constitutionality of its own acts. The judiciary, in pronouncing a law of Congress null and void, usurps for itself the office of the legislature. The remedy for a legislative infraction of the Constitution must be found in added light, discretion, or loyalty on the part of the legislature, or in the sounder judgment of some future Congress.

On the other hand, Congress cannot interpose its check on the decisions of the judiciary, set aside its judgments, or remit its sentences. The functions of the two departments are entirely distinct and separate. The judiciary acts in individual cases as to what makes them *cases*, that is, constitutes their individuality, their unlikeness to other cases. Its aim is to ascertain particulars, such as must be determined by specific evidence, or by reasoning based on proved or admitted facts. The acts of the legislature are general, including an indefinite number of specific cases, not in their individual features, but in what is common to them all. They are virtually general when they seem to be particular; for private bills (so-called) are simply declarative, pronouncing an individual case to belong to some recognized class to which an existing law, rule, or custom is applicable. Thus as to a private pecuniary claim, the question before Congress is not whether a certain sum is justly due from the United States to the individual citizen (a question which might on a proper issue come before the judiciary), but whether, being due, it falls under a class of dues recognized by previous legislation, or by some acknowledged though unwritten principle of law which Congress has implicitly sanctioned. The Court of Claims is not strictly a judicial tribunal, but a commission created by Congress to facilitate and expedite a portion of its own work, and to prepare for its action such reports as might with equal fitness be made by committees of its own body.

* It may, in a case at issue, pronounce a State law void, as inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States; for its decisions in every case must of necessity be in harmony with the Constitution and laws of the nation.

The legislature exercises, under the Constitution, judicial functions only in cases of impeachment. The Senate has "the sole power to try all impeachments," which, in accordance with the immemorial usage of the British Parliament, must be presented by the lower house. Impeachment is a general term, and may include charges of any kind, against any person whatsoever; and there have been, in the earlier periods of the parliamentary history of Great Britain, cases of the impeachment of private persons, for offences which might have fallen under the cognizance of the courts of law. But under our Constitution it is implied that this process shall be instituted only against public officers, inasmuch as it is provided that "judgment, in cases of impeachment, shall not extend farther than removal from office and (not *or*) disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States." The person impeached is not, however, released from further responsibility, whether acquitted or condemned by the Senate, but is "liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law." Though the Senate cannot exceed the above-named terms of judgment, it may, in certain cases, convict the person impeached without removing him from office. There is nothing to prevent a simple vote of censure or reprimand. A judge might be convicted of misdemeanor, arbitrary proceedings, or usurped jurisdiction, without being deprived of his place on the bench. But on "conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors," removal from office is the least sentence that can be passed on "the President, Vice-President and all civil officers," by which last phrase, as it occurs in the Article on the Executive, is manifestly denoted any officer belonging to the executive department.

The judges of all the courts are, by the Constitution, to hold their offices "during good behavior," and there is no other way than trial on impeachment by which it can be legally determined whether a judge has been guilty of such misbehavior as ought to unseat him. Inability is not an impeachable offence, and is not inconsistent with as "good behavior" as the disabled functionary is capable of. By the Constitution, a judge who without fault of his own becomes unable to perform his duties,

may yet retain his office and his undiminished salary. The judicial office is peculiarly favorable to longevity, and there have been numerous instances in which judges of the United States courts—in one district three district judges in succession—have retained the title and the compensation of office long after they had become unable to discharge its functions. The recurrence of this evil will, in the future, be prevented, no doubt, by the law which permits a judge, after having reached a certain age, to resign with an adequate retiring pension,—a provision which might be worthily copied in those States in which the judicial office still retains a permanent tenure.

It is not necessary, in order to authorize impeachment, that the accused person be charged with immoral or illegal acts, or with anything which under ordinary circumstances would imply criminality. A man's position determines in some degree the magnitude of his offences. What in a private and obscure citizen would be an indecorum, an error of judgment, a foible, a fault, may in a high official be a crime or a grievous wrong. Mere acts of questionable propriety on the part of a judge have repeatedly been held worthy of impeachment as "high crimes and misdemeanors;" and in one case, early in the present century, a judge of previously stainless reputation, whose abnormal acts were well known to be the consequence of insanity, was convicted, without defence or counsel, on the charges made against him—trivial, even had he been accountable for them—and removed from office, mainly through the intrigues of an unprincipled man who succeeded him, and who closed his own life by many years of senile *dementia*, during which he suffered severely from the neglect and abuse of the very kindred whom his salary supported. In general the requirement of a two-thirds vote of the members of the Senate present, in order to convict on impeachment, is an adequate defense for the accused, is sufficient to neutralize a prosecution on purely party grounds, and, indeed, is often likely to prevent conviction when authorized by law and evidence. The sentence of the Senate on conviction under impeachment is irreversible. The Senate, in its judicial capacity, is a supreme court; its decisions can neither be revised nor set aside by any other tribunal; and they are in express terms exempted by the Constitution from the interference of the executive.

As to all other offences than those tried on impeachment, and even as to these under any additional sentence by a court of law, the President has unlimited power to pardon or reprieve, including the remission of fines and forfeitures. His power to pardon may be exercised before conviction, so as to supersede trial; and it is absolute, relieving its subject, not only from punishment, but from all legal disparagement or inability, and replacing him, so far as he can be thus restored, in the position which he held previously to his indictment. This feature of our Constitution was undoubtedly borrowed, with too easy faith, from the corresponding prerogative of the British crown. Such power would not now be conferred *de novo* under any constitutional monarchy, and it can be regarded only as one of the few surviving relics and vestiges of the arbitrary authority for good or evil vested in royalty in the time of the Tudor and Stuart dynasties. It is a power which no chief magistrate in our time and land can exercise safely and judiciously. This is the case with the governors of our several States, much more with the executive head of a great nation. As long ago as when Secretary Seward was Governor of New York, he said, as the result of his own experience, that there was no criminal so vile or so dangerous that an adroit lawyer could not, after the fresh memory of the crime had been worn away, procure for his pardon a petition signed by so strong an array of respectable citizens, as to extort the desired boon, if not from the chief magistrate's sense of justice and humanity, at least from his self-consciousness as a candidate for the votes of the people. It is impossible that the President of the United States can have any authentic knowledge of a twentieth part of the cases in which he is solicited to interpose his clemency, which will always be besought with the show of strong reasons, when the condemned person has influential friends, or can command the money which will purchase them. The instances of actual hardship or wrong in the case of penalties legally inflicted must bear an infinitesimally small proportion to the whole number of cases, and so far as punishment has any efficacy in the prevention of crime, its certainty is of far more importance than its severity. Society would be rid of a serious evil, nuisance, and danger, were the pardoning power abrogated,

and instead thereof a legal arrangement made for a new judicial investigation, whenever fresh evidence may cast a reasonable doubt on the guilt of a person undergoing a sentence of the law.

No part of our Constitution affords room for so wide a diversity of interpretation as the eighth section of the first Article, which enumerates under eighteen specifications the powers of Congress. The government must of necessity derive its entire complexion and character from its legislative department; for, except under a despotism, law is supreme, and the executive and judiciary departments hold with regard to it an auxiliary place. The last clause in the section gives Congress authority "to make all laws which shall be necessary for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." Now as the preamble declares the government instituted "in order to form a more perfect union, establish peace, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty," and as these ends can be subserved only by laws to be faithfully administered and executed, it may be reasonably inferred that the right of legislation is co-extensive with these ends, and that Congress may, save in matters expressly excepted, pass any laws that shall be deemed conducive to these ends. The enumeration of powers in the first seventeen clauses of the section is then to be regarded, not as exclusive, but merely as indicating some of the more obvious subjects of legislation. As new exigencies, not specifically provided for, occur, they properly come within the scope of national legislation, so far as they affect the national safety and well-being. It is claimed, on the other hand, that the last clause was intended as a mere summary and general statement of the contents of the preceding clauses, and that the powers not enumerated are not conferred. To this interpretation it may be objected, that the framers of the Constitution must have been aware that, with the growth of the nation and the expansion of its various interests, unforeseen occasions for legislation would necessarily present themselves; that they intended to establish a permanent and

efficient government; and that a government so closely limited must in the nature of things become less and less efficient with the lapse of years. In point of fact, while both parties have adhered pertinaciously to their respective theories, the action of Congress has obeyed the leading of necessity. The strict constructionists have opposed, on the ground of constitutional limitation, such legislation as for other reasons they deemed objectionable; while they have never found any difficulty in referring to some one of the enumerated powers such measures as were in accordance with their views of the general welfare or with the policy of their party for the time being.

Thus the power "to coin money" has received a very wide interpretation. There can be no doubt that these words were meant to apply to a metallic currency alone. But it was in the pretended exercise of this power that the old United States Bank was chartered, though its bills were never in any proper sense money, but only the representatives of money. By virtue of this same power the legal-tender bill was passed, endowing the depreciated evidences of the indebtedness of the United States with the properties of money, and thus substituting actual paper money, stamped, but not coined, for gold, silver, and copper coin. These measures were undoubtedly constitutional, if necessary or useful; but they properly belonged to the general and unenumerated powers, and to refer them to the power "to coin money" was simply a not very ingenious word-jugglery.

Again, the power "to establish post roads" was not intended to include the power of making them, still less that of subsidizing joint-stock corporations for the construction of railways. So far as the making of roads is necessary for the general good, on routes on which they cannot be constructed by the local governments or by private enterprise, it is undoubtedly desirable that the national government should construct or subsidize such avenues of travel and traffic. The war of the rebellion, which nearly cost us our great empire on the Pacific, demonstrated the necessity that the coasts of the two oceans should be clamped together by iron bands; and while the government should not have suffered itself on this behalf to be cozened out of uncounted millions, the enterprise was most fitly a subject

for munificent aid from the national treasury, but not under color of "establishing a post road."

It is only by an abuse of terms that internal improvements in general, the removal of the obstructions of rivers, the dredging of harbors, or the maintenance of light-houses, can be brought within the scope of the enumerated powers; yet many of these operations are so obviously necessary, and so entirely beyond the scope of any local authority and ability, that the government which would withhold action in their favor would be worthy of the dark ages.

The only mode of promoting "the progress of science and useful arts" specified in the Constitution is the granting of copyrights and patents. Yet Congress has made large grants of land for educational purposes, has established and directed the Smithsonian Institution, has incorporated a National Academy, has organized a bureau of education, has sent out various scientific expeditions, has agitated schemes for a national university, and has in various ways, by the publication and distribution of books and documents, contributed largely to the diffusion of knowledge.

In fine, the very fact that the United States are not a confederacy, but a nation, imposes upon the general government all rights and responsibilities that properly belong to a nation, and authorizes all kinds of legislation, not expressly reserved to the States, which can contribute to the national prosperity and progress. There are many measures for the public good which for geographical reasons cannot be effected by the individual States. The boundaries of the States are in many instances arbitrary lines, and in few more definitely marked than by the course of a river. In numerous cases the concurrent and harmonious action—and that action continuous—of several States would be necessary to execute the plans of improvement which a single State might devise. Unity of interest is essential to our common well-being. This unity can be created and preserved only by the exercise of the largest powers on the part of the general government. For interests that are exclusively sectional the local legislatures have adequate powers secured to them under the Constitution. Their extension and predominance have already brought us to the brink of dismemberment

and anarchy. The opposite policy alone, wisely and firmly maintained, can restore and consolidate our national union, and ensure for our people the destiny which we trust is reserved for it in the counsels of the Divine Providence.

We have touched only on a few of the many points to the discussion of which our author has brought his ripe wisdom and his singularly clear and forcible style of exposition. His book is worthy to be made a "manual." It analyzes the Constitution clause by clause, is affluent in quotations from first-hand authorities, and comprises many noteworthy comments on the decisions of the United States courts. It was written during the momentous crisis of the late rebellion, and the last edition contains notes suggested by the events and discussions that have ensued upon the restoration of peace. It is pre-eminently a work of our day, and possesses a peculiar value as having been written under the light elicited by the most fearful trial that the constitution of any nation upon the earth has endured and survived.

ARTICLE VII.—INTERCOLLEGIATE CONTESTS.

THE growth of learning and of the estimation in which culture and cultivated men are held naturally draws those organized institutions which represent and foster the scholarship of the country into closer and more cordial relations to each other. Their interests are seen to be substantially the same; their work, a common work; the ends they aim at, identical; and the tendency to better acquaintance and cordial fellowship and a community of plans and measures keeps even pace with the increasing appreciation of sound learning and the steady broadening of the field it may occupy and of the influence it may exert.

It is one of the pleasing proofs of this large and most pervasive culture that senseless animosities and petty jealousies between different colleges are forgotten and buried out of mind, while with an emulous friendship they seek to outdo one another in the standards of scholarship and in actual attainments. The college system of the country is not yet thoroughly elaborated and settled; it is indeed scarcely more than in tolerable working order, and is susceptible of almost unlimited improvement. The oldest colleges of the country are still in the formative state, conducting experiments in the modes of discipline and training whose value can only be determined by the result. The younger colleges are most attentive observers of every modification and supposed improvement in methods, and are prompt to avail themselves of every change which has a demonstrated value. And it is not impossible that these newer colleges, from their more elastic organization, their comparative freedom from traditional and stereotyped methods, and the special forces gathered in them, may sometimes furnish hints of real value to the older schools.

At least there exists this mutual relation and prompt intercommunication between the colleges of the country, as a marked feature of the times and a happy augury of the more varied culture and nobler manhood that shall proceed from

these schools in the years to come. The associations of college officers, and of teachers of all grades, for mutual acquaintance and consultation, for vigorous discussion upon a wide range of topics connected with their work, for the concerting of new and improved methods of teaching, of discipline, and of administration, are at once the evidence and result of the drift of the times.

Associations among the undergraduates in different colleges for various purposes have also lately appeared; and those which have as their chief object the management of a public trial of skill and power are at this time attracting no little attention both in the colleges and in the outside world. And while there are many questions concerning the internal affairs and ordering of colleges which are almost wholly of local and special interest, there are yet many others in which the general public of intelligent men have a real concern and feel a vital interest. Such is the relation of the college to the interests of society at large, not merely to sound learning and a pure morality, but to social refinement, to literary taste, to civil order, to political capacity, that whatever affects the college, in any marked degree, is felt with gain or loss throughout the state or nation. It is not the interests of generous culture and a broad manhood alone which will gain or suffer loss, according as our colleges pursue steadily their proper end, or are drawn aside therefrom; but the whole community has a vast stake in these schools of liberal training. And thus it is wholly appropriate and quite in their line for college officers carefully to consider this comparatively new phase of undergraduate life in intercollegiate associations; while the general public may also properly be invited to the same inquiry, as to a matter in which it has a real concern.

Intercollegiate contests are public trials of power and skill, in which a certain number of colleges appear by designated representatives to determine the question of their relative superiority as to the particular matter of the contest. The subject of contest may be anything agreed upon. In this country it has actually been something involving a preparation that lies chiefly in the line of physical culture and the development of muscular skill and dexterity in specific directions; or some-

thing the preparation for which, or the performance of which, or both, chiefly occupies the intellectual powers. Base ball and Rowing are examples of the former; Chess, Composition, and Oratory, of the latter. In either case the objects of such contests are—

1. To test the powers of the competitors, their general culture, and their special training for that feat; to test also the discipline afforded by the colleges which are parties to the contest.

2. To develop and increase interest in special kinds and lines of mental work or of physical culture and sports, among those who engage in the contest, among the undergraduates in the colleges represented, and among men of learning and taste generally.

3. To bring colleges and the men connected with them into better acquaintance with each other; to promote fellowship on common grounds; to dissipate groundless prejudices and narrow conceits; and to effect a practical recognition of the community of interests which unite these schools of liberal culture.

The physical contests have perhaps been most common, and are most in vogue in the eastern colleges to-day. The Annual College Regatta is a permanent feature in the associations of many of these older institutions, and takes its place in the public recognition among the sports which the newspapers faithfully herald and report. The intellectual contests are just now rising into an unwonted prominence and importance, in the colleges of the interior and in those of the east also; so that the question of their expediency is a matter of grave moment to the greater part of the colleges of the country. These contests, of both kinds, are likely to awaken an intense interest among the students of those colleges which are engaged in them; they absorb a good share of thought and strength and time, and to this extent divert from the proper work and discipline of the college; and thus they properly demand a careful examination of their advantages and disadvantages, and a thorough discussion of their merits.

Are these contests, of either kind, a desirable feature of college arrangements and relations? Is it expedient to provide for them and to encourage them? Especially is it worth while

for colleges, that have never recognized the necessity or importance of such special incentives to exertion, to open the way for them and include them among their permanent forces? This is the question which it is attempted here to answer; a question which has a practical bearing upon some of the more vital interests of all colleges, and which is receiving the special attention of many college officers at this time.

For convenience, the advantages of these contests will be first presented, so far as they are usually urged, or may be clearly seen; and then their disadvantages, so far as they have been proved to exist or can be seen to be inevitable.

1. We name first among the things which may be urged in favor of these contests, the readiness and spirit with which undergraduates usually enter into them. It is the almost universal fact that young men are prompt to engage in these combats, and even lavishly free in their expenditure of time and labor in preparation for them; and they follow them with the utmost zest. College Faculties do not need to urge their pupils to take their share in such exercises; they rarely, if ever, suggest them, or dwell on their propriety or importance. Their interference, if called for at all, is needed rather in the way of regulating and restraining the excitement, spontaneously developed, within reasonable and healthful bounds.

This fact is a presumption in favor of these contests, provided they are desirable on other grounds. It is a great gain in any proposed arrangement to be sure of the voluntary and hearty coöperation of those who are to be active in it. And one of the serious obstacles in the way of certain much needed college reforms is the deep prejudice of the students in favor of the evils to be removed, and the steady opposition which all attempts at their abolition are sure to call out. This ready interest of students in these contests is, therefore, in their favor, and will always make it easy to sustain them. Of course, it is not decisive as regards their absolute value.

2. A consideration more relied upon in justification of these contests is this: that they furnish an additional and very powerful stimulus to that class of exercises and that kind of training which are involved in them. And this stimulus, and the benefit of it, are not confined to the competitors alone,

but are distributed generally among the students in the colleges joined in this association; they even affect the methods and training of the colleges themselves, and to some degree, it may be urged, reach the community at large. The forces that concur to this result, and their action, are familiar. It is an honor to any student to be selected as the representative of his college in such a trial of skill. This selection is understood to be made on the ground of natural powers and acquired skill; and the last is the more powerful factor. The possibility of winning this choice seems to lie within the reach of a large number of the students; and thus that special training which is likely to win the prize is actually followed by very considerable numbers. And the special attention which these give to the matter in hand, by a natural and inevitable contagion, rouses a marked and unusual interest in the whole body of students.

If Oratory, for example, is assiduously cultivated by a half or a third of the students in a college, this will give tone to the aims and efforts of all, and the other half or two-thirds, almost unconsciously, will be drawn to greater interest in this line of culture, and to greater improvement therein. And it is highly probable that this activity on the part of the pupils will react upon the instruction given in the college; and the drill in Literature and Rhetoric and Elocution will be marked by increased attention and greater thoroughness. It may, perhaps, be thought that if this effect were to be produced in all or the greater part of the colleges in some considerable section of the country, an elevation of the literary standards and taste of the whole community might be reasonably anticipated, and the quality of public address very sensibly heightened.

The force of this view depends on these assumptions: first, that the exercises called for by these contests are good and desirable as a part of the training of undergraduates; and, secondly, that these exercises are not sufficiently favored by the ordinary college arrangements. If the object of the contest is objectionable in itself, or in some one or more of its necessary circumstances, this special interest and attention which it evokes merely aggravates the evils and doubles the objections. Or if the regular drill of the college provides all the training

in these particular directions which undergraduates can profitably receive, under such regulations and with such incitements to thoroughness and excellence as long and varied experience has proved to be wise and wholesome; any arrangement which carries the force that is given to such and such exercises beyond this due degree, that breaks in upon the just distribution of work in the regular course of study, is by that fact proved to be inexpedient and highly undesirable.

3. Another plea for these contests rests upon the fact that they bring different colleges together upon a common ground, and thus tend to promote acquaintance and kindly relations among these neighboring and kindred institutions.

This end is most desirable, doubtless; and every college must see that its highest interest lies in this direction, and be disposed heartily to favor any arrangement that clearly promotes this end. It would seem that this must be, in a measure, the result of intercollegiate contests; and so far this consideration makes in their favor.

Some question might arise as to the kind and degree of the acquaintance and fellowship to be thus secured; whether it would not be confined chiefly to the students, the least permanent part of the college community, and to a small part of them; whether the mutual knowledge thus gained would not be very superficial and limited to a few, and those not the most significant, points of common interest. Certainly the colleges are not shut up to this single mode of intercommunication, to this special basis of friendly relation. The various associations of college officers throughout the land afford at least as sure a means of mutual knowledge and good fellowship as these contests.

4. Kindred to this, yet distinct enough to be considered by itself, is the claim, that by bringing different colleges into friendly rivalry and healthful competition these contests react favorably upon the general spirit and work of these colleges. Excellences and deficiencies in the training and regulations of the competing colleges will be made to appear in these contests; and a very powerful influence will be developed by the publicity of the contest and of its result to correct the latter and extend the former. The colleges that afford superior facilities

for culture and secure higher results will be recognized as doing this, and will thus exert a wider influence in improving the educational forces of the country. The colleges that are deficient will be forced to mark the fact more distinctly, and will be incited to attempt and to accomplish more work and a higher style of work.

The force of this argument seems to be confined to such contests as have for their object some exercise which is included in the regular drill of the college; it cannot apply in the case of regattas or matched games of base ball. If the contest involve some point of scholarly attainment, and have essentially the character of a competitive examination, there is real weight in the claim before us.

5. It may sometimes be urged that these contests are of value as affording the public the means of comparing the relative merits of the colleges concerned in them. But any one who knows upon what almost incidental and trivial points the decision in such contests often turns, even when they are most fairly conducted; how imperfect a reflection of the college and of its real work any single student, even though he be most judiciously selected, must necessarily be; and how extremely few points in the training of a college can be brought out and made the subject of a contest; anyone, observing these things, will be slow to give much weight to this claim. Probably this claim is not often seriously maintained.

Other claims may be made out for these contests; but those already cited cover the essential points in the defence. We proceed, therefore, to consider their objectionable features, the dangers and evils that have already appeared, or that may reasonably be expected to appear, in connection with them.

1. We name first among the objections that lie against intercollegiate contests, that they necessarily distract the attention of those students who are at all interested in them from the regular daily work which the college requires, and engross an undue amount of time and strength and thought; and the greater the interest in them the greater must be the diversion and distraction. Those who give enough attention to rowing or oratory to be successful in these special exercises are almost sure to fail in other points, and those such as are vitally connected with their success as students.

Thorough, broad, well compacted scholarship, the style of culture the college is meant to yield, can be gained only by making it the leading and engrossing aim, by giving the best and largest part of one's enthusiasm and strength to the prescribed work, and by making all things bend to this distinctly cherished end. In just so far as these contests call our students away from the patient, hard, steady, accurate work which the college arrangements all favor, the fixed habit of which is the best result our college system yields; in just so far they are antagonistic to the very aim of the college training, an evil which it is difficult to see what possible good that comes from them can at all counterbalance. And that this is an almost unvarying result of these contests, the nature of the case makes certain, and well attested facts clearly demonstrate. And where this disturbing force affects any considerable number of the students in a college, the general scholarship of the classes and of the college cannot but be more or less seriously lowered. Not individuals alone are affected injuriously, but the discipline and culture of the whole college suffer actual loss.

One who is thoroughly conversant with the facts of which he speaks, as they have appeared in Amherst College, says: "They (the Regattas) have occupied so much of the time and engrossed so much of the thought and feeling of the rowers, that their scholarship has uniformly suffered, and in instances not a few been almost ruined by it. They have been a source of irregularity in attendance on college exercises, and so of disturbance to the classes and to the college." The demonstrated advantages of an arrangement that involves such mischief should be many and great to warrant its introduction or continued existence.

2. Intercollegiate contests are also objectionable because they tend to exaggerate the importance of certain kinds of skill and power to the disparagement of the many-sided generous culture which the college seeks to give. The latter is slow and difficult to win, and is not adapted to produce striking effects or make an imposing display. The former is comparatively easy to gain, and commands a prompt, if somewhat tinsel, reputation. A factitious value seems to centre in these special subjects, and the publicity of the trial and the honor that may

be won in them, make the ordinary work of the student seem dull and prosaic. A well known college officer in a western State, who has observed carefully the workings of the Intercollegiate Oratorical Contest upon the students in his own college, after speaking of the generally favorable results thus far, adds; "The thing that needs to be guarded against is the tendency to magnify the rhetorical work beyond its due proportion in the course of training, so as with some to hinder full fidelity to the regular drill. We hold all steadily to regular work, making no allowance for these special appointments. Still the tendency is revealed, and we are warned of a danger in that direction."

The ambition to be a good oar, or a fine writer, or a finished orator, will in many cases supplant the purpose of mastering all the branches of polite learning; and weaken the powers, and wofully cripple the career of any one who yields to this tendency. And there is no thoughtful college officer who will not deplore this tendency as a very great evil; one which the scholarship of the country can ill afford to encounter. We need to cherish every force that favors sound learning, wide and accurate and catholic culture, and that creates a taste and demand for it and an appreciation of its generous fruits. Our college system, as it matures and consolidates, is working strongly and healthfully in this direction; and we cannot too zealously guard it from any modification or specious enlargement which shall turn it aside from its legitimate aim, or hinder its steady, sound development according to its fundamental ideas.

If it were to be urged that rowing, for example, furnishes an excellent and manly exercise; and that it is possible and even desirable to connect with the purely intellectual training of our colleges something which shall also train the body and keep it in wholesome condition, and yet not interfere in the least with the most faithful performance of regular college duties: or that oratorical contests simply call for the comparative exhibition of such skill and training in this art of oratory as the colleges secure, and that, therefore, these contests can be made to work in, naturally and with healthful effect, along with the stated requirements of the college: the answer in either case seems

to be obvious. On *à priori* grounds these things might be so. But experience assures us that such limitations and due restrictions upon these contests, as would effectually guard against their interrupting the proper discipline of the college, would at once strip them of half their attractiveness and make it well nigh impossible to sustain them. They are rarely, if ever, conducted on such wise and moderate principles; and if they were, the special interest they are meant to arouse would fail to be awakened, and it would require special governmental interference to keep them in operation.

3. These contests cannot well be kept free from personal rivalries and jealousies; and judging from past experience, they are almost as likely to put colleges in antagonism and heated opposition to each other as to establish and cultivate friendly relations. This is not a necessary result; is not at all an intended or anticipated result; is probably not the uniform result in fact. Yet human nature remaining unchanged, with all the contingencies that must attend such public competitions, the facility, the almost certainty, with which a party spirit is aroused, whichever way the decision turns; it is not unreasonable to apprehend that the mutual relations of the competing colleges might not be greatly improved by this kind of association. Not that colleges are natural foes to each other; but that here the seeds of enmities seem to be planted in the very substance of the intercourse it is proposed to establish between them.

This evil might be much less and less imminent in those contests which involve only intellectual powers and acquirements; and perhaps it might in all cases be effectually overcome. But it would require, to secure this, constant watchfulness, an intelligent and determined purpose, on the part of all concerned in these contests; a degree of steadiness and self-control which undergraduates do not always exhibit.

4. These contests are not a fair criterion of what the colleges do, or aim to do. The objects embraced in them must be vastly extended, and their conditions almost fundamentally changed, before this can be the case. Applying to special subjects, and those for the most only incidentally, if at all, connected with the proper work of the colleges, these contests

are more likely to stimulate conceit than to correct it; and are pretty sure, if they affect public opinion at all, to give a false and partial impression in regard to the character and work of the colleges represented in them.

The best criterion of what a college is, and of the work it does, is the result of its regular stated discipline as that is to be found in its graduates from year to year; and this criterion is open to every one's observation and is presented in a way to be most dispassionately judged. And by this standard, so far as there is any occasion for such a decision to be formed, the public will naturally determine the merits of the various colleges that come under their view. Thus colleges are already put upon a competitive trial on a grand scale before the general public, without any such special arrangements as these contests involve; a trial which covers all parts of their work and influence, and the decision of which is continually making up, and is subject to revision as often as the changing facts in the case demand it. And this general trial reacts, in an effective and thoroughly healthful way, to correct faults, to overcome deficiencies, and to tone up the drill of the colleges to the highest attainable degree.

5. Another feature of these contests which exposes them to danger, and must render their influence uncertain, is the fact that they are under the control of undergraduates, in circumstances where the public opinion of their own colleges or of the community at large cannot make itself effectively felt; men who are to a great extent irresponsible to any tribunal, liable to whims and caprices, not always having the good of their college or of the college system at heart. The good sense and genuine manliness of our undergraduates would greatly counteract this danger, so far as they could make themselves felt and heard. The force of public opinion might be expected to exert a check upon excesses, and positive obvious evils, as it has at times already. But even with these checks, no one could be thoroughly assured that these contests would be steered clear of the manifold and marked dangers that lie along their course.

Without enumerating other disadvantages, and conceding that there may be advantages of real weight not set down in

this discussion, we will leave the subject at this point. The weight of considerations seems on the whole to be against these contests; at least, it is sufficient to make us hesitate before embarking, or encouraging our students to embark, in this kind of intercollegiate association. It is probable that some of these evils would be less serious in an Oratorical or Rhetorical contest than in a Regatta. It may be possible to combine the interest and work in preparation for such contests with the regular work of the college without detriment to the drill of the college or the culture of its students. But experience alone can make us sure of this, and for that we shall not have long to wait. The Literary Contests between Eastern Colleges, and the Oratorical Contest between Western Colleges, are conducting the experiment upon a large scale and furnishing the means of a sound conclusion in this matter. The friends of colleges and of the genuine culture and manliness they are meant to nourish will follow this experiment with a careful eye, and will weigh, with dispassionate thought, its ascertained results.

ARTICLE VIII—COSMISM.

Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy. By JOHN FISKE. James R. Osgood & Co., Boston, 1875.

WE have been expecting, for some time, the evolution of an American Spencer. There is something popular about Spencer's Philosophy. It is fascinating to "the people who believe in nothing but what they can hold fast in their hands." It appeals forcibly to an iconoclastic disposition. It inflates very satisfactorily the self-sufficiency of a mind which would gladly be persuaded that all possible truth can come easily into its possession. Judging from the "relation of our social organism to its environment," we are naturally led to expect a wave of this chromo-philosophy, just as we expect a wave of communism in our politics.

This inevitable Spencerian movement must of course have a leader, of whom imagination has furnished us an ideal. He was to bring to the task a mind sharpened by New England winters. He was to be what Mr. Spencer is not, a scholar in philosophy. With Yankee acuteness, he was to re-arrange, in some sort of logical order, the chaos of ideas which Mr. Spencer presents. Perhaps rough contact with New England Puritanism would intensify his opposition to the religion of the deluded theologian. Thus prepared and moulded, he was to write voluminously of course. Spencerism is nothing unless voluminous. Never has there been a system of philosophy—if we except that of Hegel—which would so poorly stand the test of condensation. A concise and clear-cut statement of the fundamental principles of our modern doctrine of Evolution would expose too plainly its inconsistencies.

In the continuous redistribution of Matter and Motion, there has at last been evolved, by integration of the homogeneous, the American Apostle of the Truth hitherto hidden from the eyes of men. A series of states of consciousness (plus a Something?), resident in Cambridge, has worked over a certain

amount of sunshine, and has communicated it to the other possibly existing series of states of consciousness, in the shape of a book entitled "*Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*."

In most respects, this series of states of consciousness, which was the antecedent attendant upon the appearance of the book as a consequent, answers to our ideal of the coming philosopher. His presentation of Spencerism is, in some important particulars, an improvement upon the original. Our attention is especially attracted by the following facts. Mr. Fiske gives a new name to the school. He develops much more fully than does Spencer the fundamental doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge. He forsakes Spencer's pseudo-deduction, and boldly defends the "objective" method of constructing the Philosophy of the Universe. He supplants Spencer's contradictions on the Freedom of the Will, with an analysis of the subject, which, were it not so old and time-worn, we should pronounce the most masterly thing in the book. Finally, he pays throughout a flattering amount of attention to the narrow-minded "theologian" of our day; and concludes his work with an elaborate presentation of a Something which he thinks it might gratify our aspirations to worship, and to call God.

Beyond this, the book pretends to be nothing more than a compilation from Spencer's various works, with more or less quotation from Wallace, Bain, Ferrier, Lewes, and even Taine.

We shall confine our criticism to some of the particulars above mentioned, in which this author, as compared with the others of his school, may lay claim to more or less originality.

Mr. Fiske gives to his system the title of "Cosmism"—a much happier coinage than is the word deanthropomorphization, of which he is also guilty. This name of Cosmism he defends at some length. Cosmism is a good term, though it is as applicable to one metaphysical system as to another. But we are perfectly willing that Mr. Fiske should call his system Cosmism or any other ism, provided that it be clearly understood what is meant by it.

We should pass over this matter of the title without comment, were it not for the rather amusing contortions into which Mr. Fiske is thrown by the mention of two other terms, Positivism and Materialism, both of which he indignantly rejects.

Mr. Fiske proves that Cosmism is not Positivism, by proving that it differs from the Philosophy of Comte. Has he not dealt some powerful blows, here, at a shadow? No intelligent critic ever asserted that Spencer was a servile follower of Comte. Grant that Positivism and Comtism are interchangeable terms, and Mr. Fiske need have no fear of being called a Positivist. But "the Cosmic Philosophy," according to Mr. Fiske, "aims only to organize into a universal body of truth the sum of general conclusions *obtained by science*."* Its method is "objective." In its doctrine of the origin of knowledge, it is purely sensational. Now Positivism is by many used in a wider sense than that expressed by the word Comtism. It is often applied to any system of Philosophy which is sensational and "scientific." Used in this sense, Spencerism and Comtism alike become simply species of Positivism. In view of this equivocation in the meaning of the term, were we wrong in asserting that Mr. Fiske is fighting a shadow?

So, too, in regard to the other defamatory name which the malicious theologian has affixed to this system of Philosophy—that of Materialism. We have no desire to insist upon calling Mr. Fiske a Materialist, against his wishes. Provided that his exact doctrine be clearly understood, the name itself is of very little importance.

Cosmism undertakes to explain all the phenomena of the universe by the Law of Evolution. "Evolution is an integration of matter, and concomitant dissipation of motion."† "These super-organic phenomena (of mind) do not fail to conform to the universal law."‡ "There is no manifestation of Mind which is not mysteriously conditioned by movements of matter."§

Life is "the continuous maintenance of an equilibrium between the organism and its environment."|| "Mind is but the highest form of life."¶ "The ultimate elements of Mind would seem to be feelings, and the relations between feelings."** "The ultimate unit of which Mind is composed is a simple psychical shock, answering to that simple physical pulsation which is the ultimate unit of nervous action."†† "The con-

* Vol. i, p. 98.

† i, p. 350.

‡ i, p. 352.

§ id.

|| ii, p. 67.

¶ ii, p. 78.

** ii, p. 118.

†† ii, p. 131.

tinual redistribution of nervous energy among the cells, is the objective side of the process of which the subjective is the recomponding of impressions; for every renewed grouping of impressions, for every revived association of ideas, there is a nervous discharge between two or more cells along formerly used sets of transit fibres; and for every fresh grouping of impressions, for every new connection of ideas, there is a discharge along new transit-lines."* "The transfer of an undulation from one cell to another, is the objective accompaniment of each subjective unit of feeling of which thoughts and emotions are made up; the formation of a new line of association involves the establishment of a new transit-line or set of transit-lines; while the revival of an old association involves merely the recurrence of motion along old transit-lines."† "Owing to the mysterious but unquestionable correlation which exists between the phenomena of Mind and the phenomena of Matter and Motion, it is possible to describe the evolution of the former by the same formula which describes the evolution of the latter."‡ Volition is the "resulting action which depends upon the comparative strength * * of two groups of motor nerves nascently excited."§ "A comet 'forms its own future,' in the same way that a man does. The state of a heavenly body at any given moment is a product partly of the forces, molar and molecular, with which it was endowed at the preceding moment, and partly of the forces simultaneously exerted upon it by environing heavenly bodies. The case of human volition differs from this in nothing save the number and complexity, and consequently relative incalculableness of the forces at work."||

Now Mr. Fiske emphatically denies that this is "Materialism." "This kind of misrepresentation," he says, "is dear to the theologians, and we may contentedly leave them an entire monopoly of it."¶ He "steadily refrains from the chimerical attempt to identify mind with some form of matter or motion."** "The phenomena of Mind are in no sense indentifiable with material phenomena."††

The position of Mr. Fiske, in brief, is this. By the contin-

* Vol ii, p. 139.

† p. 141.

‡ p. 162.

§ p. 178.

|| p. 180, note.

¶ p. 74.

** p. 162.

†† i, p. 352.

uous redistribution of matter and motion, under the law of Evolution, muscle, nerve, and brain matter are formed. Life itself is not a mysterious entity, but a simple continuity of adjustment of the internal to the external. Every phenomenon of mind has its "objective" side, which is explained in terms of matter and motion. A new thought is, objectively, a new transit-line between cells. Every thought and feeling and wish is thus preceded and mysteriously but invariably conditioned by molecular motion in the brain.

Just here Mr. Fiske stops short, and when it is suggested that he might logically take one step more, he indignantly asserts that he has not taken it. Nevertheless, he denies an *occulta vis*,* and claims as "the only Cause known to science, the unconditional, invariable antecedent, which may be termed the Phenomenal Cause."† From the primitive nebulous matter up to protoplasm, and from protoplasm up to the transit-line between brain cells, Mr. Fiske presents an unbroken series of phenomenal effects, consequent upon phenomenal causes. He finds no trouble in any of the sequences because of the mysteries involved, although he admits that the bond of connection and the mode of operation are utterly and forever inconceivable. He even creates missing links in his series with startling ingenuity. But when he comes to his last unconditional, invariable antecedent,—molecular motion in the brain, with its consequent—the conscious thought-process, he starts back with the exclamation that the attempt to identify the two is chimerical. True, indeed! The truest thing in the whole thousand pages before us. Yet it is difficult to understand how a mind, thoroughly trained in the only true culture, that given by "scientific habit of thought," can break off the argument just where Mr. Fiske does. Are we wrong in saying that the Cosmism of Mr. Fiske stops where it does, not because of inexorable logic, but in defiance of it?

Let us leave this part of our subject with a simple dilemma.

If the doctrine of Evolution does not "scientifically" explain the phenomena of Mind, it falls short of its own conditions regarding the scope of philosophy, and in spite of its lofty claims to be the one and only true philosophy of the universe,

* Vol. i, p. 155.

† p. 154.

it collapses into a physical science, dealing only with matter and motion.

If the doctrine of Evolution *does* explain "scientifically" the phenomena of Mind, it explains them as it explains all other phenomena, by its own hypothesis of Evolution, an hypothesis which recognizes but two primitive factors, Matter and Motion, and which acknowledges but one process, *their* continuous redistribution. Minds not sufficiently cultured by scientific habits of thought have usually called this Materialism. If Mr. Fiske shrinks from the term, well and good; we have no desire to force it upon him. Only—we should be glad to see him shrink a little less, from logical consistency.

In his discussion of the Relativity of Knowledge, Mr. Fiske has a great advantage over Mr. Spencer, in that his studies in Philosophy have created certain transit-lines, motion along which is comparatively easy.

Collecting the most important statements from the first four chapters of the "Outlines," our author's argument, establishing the psychologic basis of his system, may be stated as follows:

We cannot conceive of atoms of matter as either divisible or indivisible. Nor can we conceive of the origin of the Universe. Atheism means self-existence, which means the absence of causation, which means the absence of commencement. But to conceive existence through infinite past time, manifestly exceeds our powers. Pantheistic self-creation requires us to imagine a change without any cause—which is impossible. Theism gives us the same incomprehensible self-existence in the Creator of the Universe, that Atheism does in the Universe itself. Grant a First Cause, and we must regard it as infinite and absolute. But a First Cause, as a cause, cannot be infinite; for in becoming a cause, it passes its former limits. It cannot be absolute; for the absolute is that which exists out of relations; but a cause is related to its effect. Hence we infer, that we can know only the Relative. That is, "We cannot know things as they exist independently of our intelligence, but only as they exist in relation to our intelligence. The possibilities of thought are not identical or co-extensive with the possibilities of things. A proposition is not necessarily true because we can clearly conceive its terms, nor is a propo-

sition necessarily untrue, because it contains terms which are, to us, inconceivable."

All knowledge is classifying. Cognition is possible only through recognition. Distinction is necessarily limitation. Hence if we conceive a First Cause at all, we must conceive it as limited, in which case it cannot be infinite; and also as different from other objects of cognition, in which case it is relative, and cannot be absolute.

All our knowledge consists in the classification of states of consciousness, produced in us by unknown external agencies. It is a classification of experiences. Being the product of subjective and objective factors, it can never be regarded as a knowledge of the objective factor by itself. A necessary truth is one that is expressed in a proposition of which the negation is inconceivable, after all disturbing conditions have been eliminated. A proposition of which the negation is inconceivable, is necessarily true in relation to human intelligence.

This test of inconceivability is the only ultimate test of truth which Philosophy can accept as valid. We can have no deeper warrant for the truth of a proposition than that the counter-proposition is one which the mind is incompetent to frame. When any given order among our conceptions is so coherent that it cannot be sundered except by the temporary annihilation of some one of its terms, there must be a corresponding order among the phenomena.

Our belief in the existence of the Unknown Reality is ineradicable. The doctrine of Relativity cannot even be intelligibly stated without postulating the existence of this Unknown Reality, which is independent of us. *There can be no impressions, unless there exist a something which is impressed, and a something which impresses.* Abolish the noumenon, and the phenomenon is, by the same act, annihilated.

Since what we mean by Reality is inexpugnable persistence in consciousness, it follows that Absolute Being is the Reality of Realities.

Absolute existence, the Reality which persists independently of us, and of which mind and matter are the phenomenal manifestations, cannot be identified either with mind, or with matter.

The relations of difference and no-difference are subjective; we cannot say that there exists, independently of consciousness, anything corresponding to them.

To attempt to do any sort of justice to this reasoning, covering, as it does, nearly all of Psychology and Metaphysics, would carry us far beyond the limits of this Article.

We can only call attention to a few of the more noticeable points.

Though it asserts, yet nowhere does it explicitly use, as a primary datum of consciousness, the Personality of Mind. Nowhere does it recognize the Will, as at the basis of every deliverance of consciousness. This Spencer admits, and uses, in order to distinguish the subjective from the objective, and thus to establish a temporary Dualism.

Yet this argument of Mr. Fiske's involves no less contradiction than does that given by Mr. Spencer. The book before us brings out more clearly, if possible, than does the "*First Principles*," the one grand defect which destroys the whole system—the logical suicide, of which Mr. Spencer never dreams, but which evidently is more than suspected by Mr. Fiske.

He must start from some beginning—some "ultimate fact in consciousness, which underlies and precedes all demonstration."

Now, the logical starting-point of this phase of Cosmism, if we have analyzed it correctly, is found in the assertion: "There can be no impressions, unless there exist a something which is impressed, and a something which impresses."* That is, we are conscious of sensations, feelings, impressions, whatever they may be called. We know at once, without argument or demonstration, that we exist to be impressed, and that Something also exists, and really exists, to impress us. "Take away from the argument all the terms which relate to real existence, and the argument becomes nonsense."† This direct knowledge of the actual existence of the Something enables us to formulate the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, which enables us to state the test of Truth (which involves the two elements—the inconceivableness of the negation and the relativity to human intelligence);‡ and this enables us to assert the indestructibility of matter and motion; and from this we formulate

* Vol i, p. 37.

† p. 37.

‡ p. 60.

the Law of the Persistence of Force: then, proceeding synthetically, we find that we are deceived in the apparent necessity of our laws of thought, independent of all experience. Such laws, for us, are only well-traveled transit-lines, which we have inherited. They are not an essential element of mind, as mind. They are simply the formation of experience, or of countless experiences, through the past ages. Being originally inferences from experience, they cannot have been always, and everywhere, *necessary*. They therefore lose their character of universal validity.

One of these apparent laws is that of Causation, which compels us to believe that Something must produce impressions, if impressions exist in consciousness. If this law of causation is not of universal necessity, if it is a mere inference from experience,—guessed at, no matter how many ages ago,—we are led to doubt its necessity, in our own minds,—to believe that we may be deceived in it after all. We are not so sure as we were, therefore, that Something impresses impressions, and the Absolute Existence, and the Relativity of Knowledge, and the Persistence of Force, and the whole Philosophy of our Evolutionists, becomes an enigmatical and forever insoluble "Peregrinus," with no more claim to certainty than the ravings of Swedenborg.

Mr. Fiske attempts to escape from this logical embarrassment by quoting from Spencer the statement that "the deepest warrant for the conformity of a given proposition, with experience, is the unthinkableness of the counter-proposition;" and from Lewes, the converse, that "a contradiction is inconceivable only when all experience opposes itself to the formation of the contradictory conception."*

In other words, all that is meant by necessity is perfect congruity with all experience. Now in the original statement of the Law of Causation, with which this whole argument starts, Mr. Fiske either does or does not include this interpretation of the idea of Necessity as a part of the primary datum. If he does not, he has no right to come back, afterwards, and force upon his postulate a meaning not originally contained therein. If he does so interpret Necessity at the outset, this interpreta-

* Vol. i, p. 68.

tion must either be or not be a primary deliverance of consciousness. If it is not a primary delivery of consciousness, he has no right to use it as if it were. Only on the supposition that it *is* a primary deliverance, can he logically employ it in the foundation of his structure. But this supposition Mr. Fiske himself explicitly denies: for he makes the fatal admission, "that so long as individual experience is studied without reference to ancestral experience, the follower of Kant *can always hold his ground* against Locke (in ethics as well as) in Psychology."* Then the conception of Necessity, as toned down, or rather, diluted, by the ancestral experience theory, is *not* a primary deliverance of the individual consciousness. This system starts, then, with a belief in Causation, as individual consciousness gives it, and builds up upon that belief an argument which finally explains the belief itself, by ancestral experience; and so robs it of the sole characteristic which make it a valid basis for the argument—the characteristic which makes legitimate the word "must."

If *this* is not it, there is no such thing possible as logical suicide. Yet it is from the height of such Logic as this that we are asked to look down with pity upon the blind gropings of Plato and Descartes; of Leibnitz and Hamilton, and Cousin, and Kant, and all the others who, because unskilled in "scientific habits of thought," have made false claim to the title of Philosopher. It is simply an insult to one of our grandest words to call such reasoning "scientific."

A second contradiction in which Mr. Fiske is involved here, is found in his refutation and subsequent affirmation of Idealism.

The refutation is good. It is sensible and rational. It shows a more complete understanding of the question at issue than we usually find in those who attempt to discuss it.

But Mr. Fiske should have omitted just two statements: one is, that "the psychologic basis (of Idealism) has never been shaken."† The other is that singularly unfortunate definition of Reality given by Mr. Spencer.

Mr. Fiske tells us that "without postulating Absolute Being—existence independent of the conditions of the process of

* Vol. ii, p. 326.

† i, p. 74.

knowing—we can frame no theory whatever, either of internal or of external phenomena, and since, as I have already observed, what we mean by Reality is *inexpugnable persistence in consciousness*, it follows that Absolute Being is the Reality of Realities; and that we are justified in ever tacitly regarding it as such.”*

Absolute Being, then, is the Reality of Realities, which is the inexpugnable persistence in consciousness of inexpugnable persistences in consciousness! The passage just quoted either contains a flat contradiction, or it is nonsense—or it carries with it a meaning for the phrase “persistence in consciousness,” which neither Mr. Fiske nor Mr. Spencer has succeeded in making intelligible. If we understand the Idealism of Berkeley, it may be summed up in the one phrase, that “Reality is persistence in consciousness.”

But Mr. Fiske approaches dangerously near to Skepticism also. He would find great difficulty in facing the logic of Hume, with his assertion that “we know nothing directly, save modifications of consciousness.”†

The dogmatism of our author is really impressive. If assertions are proof, he is undoubtedly neither a Materialist, nor an Idealist, nor a Skeptic, nor an Atheist. The mere mention of such names arouses in him great indignation against the “penny-a-liners” who dare to suggest that mere denial is not always satisfactory, when a man is on trial for a capital offense in Philosophy.

Mr. Fiske disproves Idealism and Skepticism. If there were anything new in his argument, we should thank him for it. But even as “Kant, after laboriously barring out ontology at the main entrance, carelessly let it slip in at the back door,”‡ so, must we add, does Mr. Fiske, after laboriously barring out Idealism and Skepticism, furtively and unconsciously admit them in his very definition of Reality!

Of course, in his general position, Mr. Fiske is neither an Idealist nor a Skeptic. We allude to these incidental contradictions simply because they show how fatal to any system a carelessly constructed psychologic basis may be.

But there is another defect in this argument, which perhaps best of all illustrates the logical trickery of these “few dis-

* Vol. 4, p. 87.

† p. 86.

‡ p. 52.

ciplined minds"* who are the happy possessors of the doctrine of Evolution. At the very outset we are summoned to a holocaust of every attempt which has ever been made to explain the phenomena of the Universe. Self-creation, Self-existence, First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute—these, even as possible objects of thought, are swept away with ill-concealed disdain. The established Theism, for example, is inadmissible, because it is nonsense to talk about an infinite and absolute First Cause. The Absolute ceases to be absolute, when related, as a cause. The Infinite, which causes, becomes that which it was not—consequently it was not infinite.† If our so-called God is absolute and infinite, He is not a Cause. If He is a Cause, he can be neither absolute nor infinite.

As we turn away, sadly, from this wholesale slaughter of systems, we are astonished by the sudden appearance of the ghost of Cosmism, loudly proclaiming its own resurrection. "The Cosmic Philosophy is founded upon the *recognition of an Absolute Power, manifested* in and through the world of phenomena."‡

This particular Absolute very kindly consents to allow itself to be recognized—in spite of the assertion that "it can be known only by ceasing to be the Absolute."§ This particular Absolute condescends to be "manifested through phenomena," though the Absolute is defined as that "which exists out of all relations."||

In what possible sense of the word does Mr. Fiske "recognize" this Absolute? In itself, out of all relation? Where, then, is the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge? Is it recognized in relation to the knowing mind? Then "it ceases to be absolute." This use of a fundamental postulate, denied to every opponent, is refreshingly cool, to say the least. Is it not, without exception, the most bare-faced self-contradiction presented by the whole history of Philosophy?

Yet our author gives a suggestion as to the word jugglery, by which he would endeavor to defend his position. He uses language "symbolically."¶ When hard pressed, in "the very bottom of the problem," he delicately substitutes for the "Absolute," the "Unknowable Reality."**

* Vol. ii, p. 471. † i, pp. 7, 8. ‡ p. 263. § p. 15. | p. 9.

¶ p. 90.

** p. 91.

Now the simple fact is this. Mr. Fiske denies to other systems the use of the absolute, because said absolute is unthinkable. Yet he bases his own system upon an absolute. He either does or does not use the term in the same sense, in both cases. If he does, he stands self-convicted, and his system vanishes. If he does not, he would confer a great favor upon his readers by explaining wherein his absolute differs from that other absolute, which we cannot define without destroying.

"But," our author might say, "I use the word merely as a figure of speech, a symbol purely subjective." A very unfortunately chosen word, then, for he always *uses* the word with a connotation, which impresses us throughout with the feeling that he means by it just about the same that other people do. If he does not, there is a vacuum beneath his system which he will have great difficulty in filling up. If his Absolute Force, which lies beneath manifestations, is not the Absolute of Metaphysics, he has still to tell us what it *is*, and he has a hard task before him to give any even verbal definition of it, which would not be perfectly satisfactory to the metaphysician.

The subject of Anthropomorphism is so closely connected with this question of the Conceivability of the Absolute, that we cannot refrain from quoting here, in full, one passage from Mr. Fiske.

Mr. Fiske, remember, struggles for words by which to express his contempt for that remnant of Mythology called Anthropomorphism. Yet listen to the following: "Deity (by which he means his Absolute Force) is unknowable just in so far as it is not manifested to consciousness, through the phenomenal world,—knowable just in so far as it is thus manifested; unknowable in so far as infinite and absolute—knowable in the order of its phenomenal manifestations; knowable, in a symbolic way, as the Power which is disclosed in every throb of the mighty rhythmic life of the Universe; knowable as the eternal Source of a Moral Law, which is implicated with each action of our lives, and in obedience to which lies our only guaranty of the happiness which is incorruptible and which neither inevitable misfortune nor inevitable obloquy can take away. Thus, though we may not by searching find

out God, though we may not compass infinitude or attain to absolute knowledge, we may at least know all that it concerns us to know, as intelligent and responsible beings."*

Ah, Mr. Fiske, you have handled this question of the Absolute very clumsily. You have denied at the outset that the Absolute can enter as a factor into any system, and then you have persistently employed it yourself. You have shown up the absurdities of your adversaries, because, forsooth, they hold substantially the very position at which you yourself arrive after your almost interminable wandering; you deny to the theologian the right to attribute Personality to the Absolute, because such attribution would limit, and by limiting, destroy the Absolute. But you predicate of the Absolute manifestations under relations of Time and Space; and it never occurs to you that you likewise limit, and by limiting, destroy the Absolute. If your argument from the Inconceivability of the Absolute destroys his personal God, does it not in like manner destroy your manifested Force?

He admits the relativity of his knowledge,—that is that he cannot be conscious without being conscious; you, by various periphrases, come to the same conclusion. He claims to know God as manifested; you claim to know Force as manifested. He claims that God is manifested as Will-Power; you claim that Force is manifested as Motion. He admits that God, "in so far as infinite and absolute," cannot be represented to the mind by a mental picture; you admit the same regarding your Force. Nevertheless, he holds that God is absolute and infinite; you assert the same of your Force. He does not aspire to "compass infinitude;" neither do you. As "an intelligent and responsible being," he claims to know all that it concerns him to know; and so do you. He uses the terms, will, thought, wish, purpose, anger, love. You use the terms, Force, Power, co-existence, sequence.

Consciousness gives to you both a Dualism—Mind and Matter. You both practically admit it. Furthermore, you both admit a cause of the phenomena manifested.

Now you express this Cause, in so far as you express it at all, in the formula of Matter. The theologian expresses it in the

* Vol. ii, p. 470.

formula of Mind. By the necessities of Mind, one or the other mode of expression must be employed. The course of your own argument is an apt illustration of this mental compulsion. Probably no one ever wrote who was less willing than yourself to give definite expression to this ultimate Something. Yet you are compelled to call it a Force, a Power, infinite, absolute, indestructible, bound in manifestation by laws of Persistence, Rhythm, etc. •

The theologian differs from you only in that he chooses the higher, purer, more philosophical formula. "But," declares Mr. Fiske, "I do not identify the Absolute with Matter; I explicitly deny that it can be so identified." Out of relation to our minds we know nothing about this Ultimate Something. That is a mere truism. It is just the same as "when we are conscious we are conscious." Considered in relation to our minds, the Something must be expressed by one of the two sets of symbols furnished by consciousness. Mr. Fiske chooses one, the theologians the other. That is the sum and substance of the whole matter, and that being so, every objection urged by Mr. Fiske against the anthropomorphism of the prevalent theology is emphatically a double-edged sword, which, if it cuts at all, cuts with extreme precision, equally on both sides.

Pardon us, if, at the risk of repetition, we re-state the argument. The Absolute either is or is not unthinkable. If it is, every system,—that of Evolution included—which employs it as thinkable, builds upon a contradiction, and commits logical suicide. If it is not unthinkable, then it is as thinkable for one author as for another, and he who claims a monopoly of it is guilty of very unphilosophical arrogance.

Now the doctrine of Evolution is based upon a Something called absolute Force. This something either is or is not the absolute forbidden to the theologian, as unthinkable. If it is, the argument convicts itself. If it is not, Mr. Fiske has still to explain to us what this is, which is infinite and yet not infinite, which is absolute and yet not absolute.

Under the doctrine of Relativity of Knowledge, this Something, if cognized at all, must be cognized through its manifestations. It either can or can not be so cognized as existent. If it can not, no one, not even Mr. Fiske, can assert its ex-

istence. If it can, others besides the "few disciplined minds" have a right to such assertion.

Still under the doctrine of Relativity, we must, if we assert the existence of this Something, express our assertion in terms relative to consciousness, for even the terms Something and Existence are, in some sense, relative. "From first to last, whether we give a theological, a metaphysical, or a scientific explanation of any phenomenon, we are interpreting it in terms of consciousness."*

Now consciousness enables us to formulate either two and only two modes of existence, or it enables us to formulate more or less than two. If less than two, it is one, or none at all. If none at all, the only possible philosophy is a Nihilism of the blindest kind. If one, and one only, the only possible inference is that that one mode of existence is the existence of consciousness itself, and the only possible philosophy is an Idealism, more or less egotistical, according to the degree of logical consistency.

If consciousness enables us to formulate more than two possible modes of existence, then, we presume, it would not be questioned that Matter and Mind must be the two, and Abstract Force or something else, a third. But if we assert the existence of this abstract Force, or something else, we must express it in terms relative to consciousness. Consciousness must then give us, directly or indirectly, knowledge of such existence. Such a deliverance of consciousness, to be used in Philosophy, must, according to Mr. Fiske's own canon, be established by *verification*. But so far from verifying it is he, that he explicitly and emphatically denies it. "The attempt to detect the *occulta vis*, or hidden energy, in the act of causation, is but the fruitless attempt to bind in the chains of some thinkable formula the universal Protean Power."† We are not questioning now, remember, the fact that Mr. Fiske *does* assert the existence of a Force, which is neither Matter nor Mind. The only question is, can we assert that existence, in independent terms of Force, which are neither quasi-material nor quasi-psychical? This, we say, Mr. Fiske explicitly denies.

* Vol. I, p. 171.

† p. 161.

If, then, consciousness gives us neither more nor less than two possible modes of existence, it must give us two and two only; and those two are universally conceded to be the subjective, Mind, and the objective, usually called Matter. Then this Ultimate Something, if spoken of as existing, must be spoken of as in one or the other of these two modes of existence. Mr. Fiske employs both forms of statement. He uses generally the terms expressive of what he believes to be material existence. Yet he finally asserts that if driven to the alternative, he would rather say "God is a Spirit," than "God is Force."*

Perhaps he intends it as additional evidence of the fact that there is no such thing as Freedom of the Will, that, although he would choose the word Spirit, he nevertheless constantly uses the term Force. But if we take him at his word and assert the spiritual existence of the Something, or assert the existence of the Something in terms of spiritual existence, we are compelled to predicate of it the essential attributes of spirit—and how quickly the elaborate argument against anthropomorphism vanishes. But if, on the other hand, we accept the drift of this book, as expressing the existence of the Something in the formula of material existence, even then, by his own confession, our author's expressions of existence are still anthropomorphic,† and he is in a very exposed position for one who proposes to throw sharp stones. He struggles hard, to be sure, to conceal himself before the return missile comes, but he effectively destroyed all shelter when he established the doctrine of Relativity of Knowledge.

It is to just this point, we said, this choice of the anthropomorphic symbols furnished by consciousness, beyond which consciousness cannot go, that the controversy between Mr. Fiske and the theologian reduces, and in its choice between the two no honest mind has ever hesitated.

Beneath these symbols, in his prospectus, Mr. Fiske claims to go; but beneath these symbols, in the development of his Philosophy, Mr. Fiske does not go. He does succeed in accomplishing one thing, and but one. He does manage to hide, beneath the expanse of his system, some of the most important questions at issue. Other systems, according to

* Vol. ii, p. 449.

† i, p. 183; ii, p. 449.

our author, are shipwrecked, at the outset, upon the problem of ultimate Causation. But so gently does he carry the mind out into the boundless in Space, and back into the infinite in Time, that a careless reader might easily be tempted to forget that even the remotely distant nebulous matter presents precisely the same metaphysical problem as do the immediate phenomena of our daily life. A shrewd postponement of difficulties, this is. But it does not answer them; it does not remove them; it can not make us ignore them. What Spencer called the "irresistible momentum of thought" will not be weakened, or deflected, by merely placing the object a little farther away. To these ultimate questions, regarding the Why as well as the How, the mind persists in returning, and neither Bain, nor Spencer, nor Taine, nor Fiske, can satisfy us by their evasions of the inevitable.

There are other points of interest involved in this "psychologic" basis of the argument before us. It would be interesting to follow out the Sensationalism involved. The question of the absolute, and the question of the origin of knowledge, might be investigated together, by an analysis of Mr. Fiske's use of the word "conceive." But his confusion of conception with imagination, of thought with mental image, is as old as the word "idea." The only thing original, in this respect, in the work before us, is that Mr. Fiske is uniformly and consistently confused—which is more than can be said of Mr. Spencer, who occasionally uses the words by mistake in their proper significations.

But we must pass by this time-honored battle-ground, as we must pass by the subsequent discussion of the Will, with the simple expression of amusement at the self-complacent way in which Mr. Fiske marshals the ghosts of arguments long since slain. The limits of this Article forbid our paying attention to more than one more question involved in Mr. Fiske's system, and that is the direct question of Method.

We doubt if any one could read the chapter entitled "The two Methods" without a feeling very much akin to indignation. Usually Mr. Fiske is accurate in his quotations and his presentations of historical development in Philosophy. But even honesty seems to have deserted him here. We do not believe that even in Lewes' History of Philosophy one

could find more gross misrepresentations and positive misstatements crowded into fifty pages, than there are in this one chapter.

Suppose some one, going back into the remotest antiquity, should collect all the absurdities he could find, which, as scientific hypotheses, had ever had a single supporter; and then, selecting from these a few of the most exquisitely ridiculous, should hold them up to the world and cry out "here you have, 'in its absolute purity,' Mill's Combined Method in physical science." Our friends the Physicists would hardly honor him with a passing sneer. Yet see the fairness and truthfulness with which Mr. Fiske presents to us the "subjective" method of constructing Philosophy. He starts with the assertion that that "subjective method rests upon the assumption that the possibilities of thought are co-extensive, or identical with the possibilities of things."* The subjective method does nothing of the kind; what it does rest on is the assumption that the possibilities of thought are co-extensive, or identical with the possibility of things *as thought of*.

From whom does Mr. Fiske take this definition? From Descartes, Schelling, Hegel, and Plato—which is just about as fair as if we were to judge of Mr. Fiske's assertions in Physics by the statements of his fellow evolutionist Anaxagoras, or of his Logic by the incoherencies of Taine's "Intelligence."

Mr. Fiske quotes Descartes' definition of truth as "clear and distinct conception," without thinking to add his qualifying phrase that "it should be *so* clear and distinct that there could be no occasion for doubting it." Nor does he remember to add another explanation given, when, in answer to the objection that his word *seulement* excluded all other things which would possibly pertain to the nature of the soul, Descartes says, "To which objection I answer, I did not intend to exclude them, according to the truth of the thing, but only *according to the order of my thought*."†

Again Mr. Fiske quotes from Plato the following: "It seems to me, therefore, that I ought to have recourse to reasons, and in them to contemplate the truth of things. Thus always adducing the reason which I judge to be strongest,

* Vol. i, p. 98.

† Preface to *Meditations*.

I pronounce that to be true which appears to me to accord with it; those which do not accord with it, I deny to be true." But he neglects to place by the side of this another passage from the same dialogue, "First principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully considered; and when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, *with a sort of hesitating confidence in human reason*, you may, I think, follow the course of the argument."

Again our author quotes Plato,—from the Republic, this time: "Whenever a person strives by the help of dialectics to start in pursuit of every reality, by a simple process of reason, independent of all sensuous information, never flinching, until by an act of pure intelligence he has grasped the real nature of good, he arrives at the very end of the intellectual world." This passage is so garbled that it is rather difficult to recognize it. But if we insert after the word "reason," the clause found in the original, "using the hypotheses (*ὑποθέσεις*) not as first principles (*ἀρχάς*) but only as hypotheses," and if we remember that Plato calls this the "Knowledge of Shadows"—we obtain some idea of the candor with which Mr. Fiske approaches the question of Method.

Still speaking of Plato he says, "for he elsewhere tells us that *since* (the emphasis is Mr. Fiske's) all knowledge is a revival of pre-existent ideas, *therefore* from any one idea we can arrive at all the others, owing to the logical connection existing between them; and in this conclusion he states the fundamental canon of the subjective method, as employed by modern metaphysicians, from Descartes to Hegel."*

A reader, ignorant of the facts, would naturally infer that with the modern metaphysicians, the premise accompanied the conclusion, and that the Platonic pre-existence of ideas was the basis of Modern Philosophy!

Mr. Fiske next proceeds to illustrate the workings of the subjective method. For this purpose he takes—the solid, evenly-balanced, consistent thinkers of the Intuitionist school, in its maturity? By no means. He starts with Plato, and quotes, not those keen analyses, upon which the world has never improved, but his wildest extravagancies. From Plato

* Vol. i, p. 100.

he leaps to Spinoza, and from Spinoza to the last man in the world he had any right to select—Hegel! And it is in the ravings of Hegel that Mr. Fiske claims to find the “subjective method in its absolute purity.”*

There must indeed be something “incurably vicious” in a method which relies for its defense upon such outrageous distortion of facts. Mr. Fiske’s presentation of the Subjective Method is false, throughout, from beginning to end—as false as his representation, everywhere, of the nature, and position, and attitude of the Christian religion. In both cases he presents us excrescences, and calls them normal outgrowths, of “absolute purity.” The statement that the subjective method limits the possibilities of things by the possibilities of thought is utterly indefensible, as a statement of fact. Descartes’s strongest expression is that “all that which I recognize clearly and distinctly to pertain to a thing, pertains to it *en effect*.” But it would be very difficult to distort even that into the statement, that “the possibilities of thought are *co-extensive* with the possibilities of things,” especially in view of the subsequent remark that “I have no knowledge of those things (external causes of sensations) except that given by these ideas; so I cannot help thinking (*il ne me pouvait venir autre chose en l’esprit*) that those things are like the ideas they cause.”† The “clear conception” of Descartes shows better its identity with the inconceivability test of Mr. Fiske, in the hands of Malebranche. “We should give entire consent only to the propositions which appear so evidently true, that we cannot refuse it to them, without an internal pain, and the secret reproaches of the reason.”‡

Spinoza’s definitions we yield to Mr. Fiske. But from the other philosophers, “from Descartes to Hegel”—why does not Mr. Fiske favor us with some quotations, by which to establish his definition?

He might have quoted from Locke, that “we may not think that they (ideas) are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject; most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the names which stand for them are like our ideas.”

* Vol. i, p. 121. † *Méditation Sixième*. ‡ *Search after Truth*, Book I, ch. i, sec. iv.

Or from Leibnitz, "I should rather say that there is a kind of resemblance (between ideas and objects) not entire, and, so to speak, in terminis, but expressive, or a sort of relation of order." Or from Berkeley, that "the various sensations, or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together, cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them." Or from Reid, that "as to the nature of this Something, I am afraid we can give little account of it, but that it has the qualities which our senses discover." Or from Hamilton, that "the total or absolute cognition in perception is only matter in a certain relation to mind, and mind in a certain relation to matter." Or from Kant, the repeated assertion, that "the understanding cannot make of its *à priori* principles, or even of its conceptions, other than an empirical use." But what need of further quotation? Mr. Fiske can find a few statements to his purpose in those philosophers who are more or less tinged with Realism; but even in those exceptional cases it takes more imagination than a historian of Philosophy ought to possess, to insert into them such a principle as this, which Mr. Fiske quietly spreads over the whole school. The truth is simply this. If, for example, the statement of Plato, that "the same thing cannot at the same time, with the same part, act in contrary ways about the same," be a limitation of the possibilities of things, by the possibilities of thought—we admit the charge, and might quote whole chapters from Mr. Fiske's own work, to show that he himself is as exposed to the same accusation as any "metaphysician." But this is very different from the assertion that because Michelet's fanciful explanation of the cry of a new-born babe is "involved in the idea," it is therefore "also conformable to fact." When Mr. Fiske wishes to establish for his own use the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, he takes great pleasure in quoting from Mansel, and Hamilton, and Kant. But when he wishes to overthrow their subjective Method, he suddenly forgets that doctrine of Relativity, for which he had before praised them, and accuses them of having utterly ignored it.

But this wretched misrepresentation is not worthy of further consideration; neither is the other accusation brought against the subjective method, namely, that it "ignores verification,

and forgets to test its premises as much as the inferences,"* an accusation as puerile as the rejection of Metaphysics, because it is "incapable of making discoveries."†

Let us turn from this flimsy attack and see what substitute for the subjective method is offered by "philosophic maturity."

The "objective" method, it is called. It is the "method of science."‡ It "starts by verifying its premise, and not content with any apparent congruity in its syllogistic processes, it does not definitely accept the conclusion, until that also has been confronted with the phenomena."§ "A scientific explanation is a hypothesis which admits of verification—it can be either proved or disproved; while a metaphysical explanation is a hypothesis which does not admit of verification—it can neither be proved nor disproved."§ This method seems to centre upon the one word, Verification. "Verification is the comparison by means of observation, experiment; and deduction of the order of conceptions with the order of phenomena."¶ Very well. Let us turn this test about, for a moment, and apply it to Cosmism. A Something *infinite, absolute, indestructible*, exists. Will Mr. Fiske please *verify*, by comparing conceptions with phenomena? And, if successful, will he then please reconcile it with the fact that "we are incapable of transcending our experience?"

This Absolute Something is a "Power." If it be true that experience gives to us, not Efficient Power in Causation, but only invariable sequence, the existence of this absolute Power is a pleasant task for verification, by an appeal to experience.

Again, "a uniform state of consciousness is in no respect different from complete unconsciousness."** A very dogmatic assertion. How would Mr. Fiske verify it? By an appeal to experience, we presume, which furnishes uniformly the activity of change in consciousness. Very true—up to the limits of experience. But to go *beyond* experience, and to assert, absolutely, that a thing must or must not be—as Mr. Fiske in this and innumerable other cases does assert—is not this Metaphysics the Unscientific? Can it be *verified* by comparing the conclusion with facts?

* Vol. i, p. 99.

† p. 128.

‡ p. 98.

§ p. 109.

§ p. 127.

¶ p. 108.

** ii, p. 119.

Let us sum up this whole question of Method. A system of Philosophy is or is not consistent with itself, and true to facts, as facts are known by the human mind. If it is not, it is not Philosophy, but nonsense. If it is self-consistent and true, it is judged to be so by the producing and by the recipient mind. If a system is judged by mind to be self-consistent and true, that mind judges it by its own laws. That system of Philosophy which is judged to be self-consistent and true, is logical; that which is logical is logical just in so far as it is congruous with the laws of Thinking, and it is logical *because* of that congruity with mental law. The ultimate test, then, of the self-consistent and the true in Philosophy, is found in the Laws of Thought, in the minds of the Producer and the Recipient. These Laws of Thought must be "ultimate facts in consciousness which underlie and precede all demonstration." Not verified? They are their own verification. Verification itself is preceded by and conditioned upon them—impossible without them. Now these Laws of Thought, with which a system starts out, either are or are not necessary—in the strictest of all strict senses of the word, necessary. If they are necessary, those conclusions which they imperatively and unconditionally demand are TRUE, if there is in the world such a thing as truth. The premises find their "verification" in the fact that they are the primary postulates of that consciousness which is involved in verification. The conclusion is verified by the absolutely "inexpugnable" certainty of its premises, and the absolutely indissoluble bond which unites it to them. This is what lies at the basis of, and conditions, and legalizes every thought-process, and this is called Logic; and the method which starts from this and works outward, is called the Subjective Method; and it is the only conceivable method by which the mind can ever dream of attaining the self-consistent and the true. Diminish by one jot or tittle the imperative necessity of this underlying and formulating Logic, and you cut off forever from the vocabulary of human thought the words "is" and "must." If there is truth, if there is certainty, if there is knowledge, if there is a ringing yes or no, possible to the human mind, it is because and only because of the absolute validity of the Subjective Method. Over against it stands skeptical Skepticism,

a dubious suggestion of doubt, a question which does not dare to face its own interrogation-point, a hopeless impotence of mind, which has not the nerve to assert that it is impotent. Between these two there is no middle ground. There is no such thing as an "objective" method—outside of the "few disciplined minds" who possess the doctrine of Evolution. There is no such thing as a *valid* thought-process, unless it be valid because of its obedience to the laws governing the thought-process. But a process of reasoning, even about Cosmism, *is* a thought-process, and if such reasoning goes out into the world of matter, or goes back to the nebulous mist, and then, through the tremendous circle of the ages, returns upon itself with conclusions which banish from its method the one word "must"—then Logic, and Method, and Certainty, and Truth become the dreams of diseased fancy; and we are left to stagger beneath the doubt which consistently doubts itself—which questions even the process by which it became doubt.

"Objective" method? A method which by thinking draws in from the object, laws to govern the thinking subject in its very search after law? Yes,—there is a process called Method; and the word objective is prefixed to the word Method. It is the process by which the Cosmism of Mr. Fiske is built up. Does it not judge itself? Could anything be more overwhelming than its self-condemnation?

"Cosmism" is a very elegant dress for so old a skeleton to wear; but it has masqueraded so often, in so many different disguises, and has so often been stripped and sent back into the darkness, that its reappearance, now, causes more amusement than terror; and the imperturbable common-sense of mankind smiles at its follies,—and lets it go its way to a new self-destruction.

ARTICLE IX.—THE NEW TRANSLATIONS OF LAOCOON.

Laocoon. Translated from the Text of Lessing. With Preface and Notes by the Rt. Hon. Sir ROBERT PHILLIMORE, D.C.L. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874. 8vo, pp. 360.

Laocoon. An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry. With Remarks Illustrative of Various Points in the History of Ancient Art. By GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING. Translated by ELLEN FROTHINGHAM. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1874. 12mo, pp. 245.

FOR several reasons Lessing's *Laocoon* is and is destined to be permanently a classic. The most important piece of the noblest figure in German literature, it embodies his best qualities of style and exhibits the nature and working of his mind in transparent clearness. He who would (as it is commonly put), if having the choice between truth and its pursuit, choose the latter, discloses by his fine analysis in these pages how admirably fitted he was to pursue truth, and justifies the choice. To one who could thus trace to their source the causes of human feeling, define the fields of the various arts, and support his theory of limitations by a wealth of learning, so finely controlled by insight as to make the suggestion of pedantry impossible, the pursuit of truth might well promise more delight than a vast body of *axiomatic truth*. The possession of the latter, given to man without effort or appreciation on his part, might well seem to Lessing a dead and deadening thing, but the pursuit of truth difficult of attainment, with the prospect even of slight success, would involve the fulness and activity of life. Often as Lessing has been reproached by Vilmar, Goedeke, and others, with a relative indifference for the truth itself, his famous saying does not bear that construction: "If God held all truth shut in his right hand, and in his left nothing but the ever restless instinct for truth, though with the condition of forever and ever erring, and should say to me, 'choose,' I should bow humbly to his left hand and say,

'Father, give; pure truth is for thee alone.' " It was not that to him the truth was not precious, but that the struggle alone could make the victory a victory, and that truth is not truth save to him who has, by thinking and experience, attained it. Does he not here admit that the *attainment* of truth by *effort* is that to which by the elements of our life we are called; that the very conditions of our being, freedom, thought, and conscience, pre-suppose a goal, to strive towards which is needful for our best life? The purpose to attain the goal makes the dignity: the possibility of attaining it, partly, at least, the joy of life; for the condition of "forever and ever erring" does not mean on all points, or even if it should have that breadth, it is not meant that the truth is not worth the struggle. Knowing that we shall not, indeed, get an overstock of truth, and perhaps that God only intended that we shall attain enough to quicken us in its pursuit, his meaning was that, when man is putting forth every effort to attain it, he is by that act most truly, most nobly, a man. To give his version of this idea in the words just preceding the oft-quoted passage (and they are the key to his meaning, and the more paradoxical statement ought never to be quoted without the key): "Nicht die Wahrheit, in deren Besitz der Mensch ist, sondern die aufrichtige Mühe, die er angewandt hat hinter die Wahrheit zu kommen, macht den Werth des Menschen." The absurd idea that, if by energy and long-sustained perseverance in pursuit, a man was about to grasp some fragment of truth, he should let it fly as a bird, as Malebranche said he would, that he might keep running after it, is a caricature of the meaning of the great Lessing. Certainly in that case the "Mühe" would not be "aufrichtig."

The *Laocoon* established some points for the criticism of art adverse to the strong tendencies and beliefs of that age, and is itself an answer to the foolish charge that, as Goedeke says, "not the result of investigation, the truth was to him the main thing." It *was* to establish the *truth* of these principles that Lessing wrote the treatise, but the worth of the work, as far as Lessing is concerned (he himself would say), is to be measured by the difficulty with which he arrived at the truth. That we cannot determine, but it certainly required a grandly original mind and an ardent love of truth to write thus against

the authority of Winkelmann and the habits of his age. That this writing marked between poetry and painting the limits, which in their main features are still observed, though a century of progress and criticism in art has found some minor things to modify, gives proof enough of Lessing's devotion to truth, and the permanent value of the principles supplies another reason why the treatise still attracts thinking men.

But without reference to the principles, as a monument of language it would hold its place as a classic. Lessing, as the reformer of German literature, claims respect quite as much as when we consider him the pioneer in sound art-criticism. The German prose, that, now over a hundred years old, has never been matched in any writing upon *abstract subjects* (though the romance prose of Goethe has a charm quite as unique, but very different), is concise and definite. Every word makes a point, and unlike much German prose, the thought runs on. What Mr. Lowell says of German prose in general, that "it has such a fatal genius for going stern foremost, for yawning and for not minding the helm without ten minutes notice in advance," however true of Kant, or Richter, or Gervinus, is hardly applicable to Lessing. At all events, it is the clearest, though the weightiest, the most finished, as well as the most solid German prose that there is. "All archæology aside," says Cherbuliez, "it will always be well to read him in order to learn from him how thought enlarges its gains and makes its fortune (*fait sa pelote*); it is an art of which he is master." Cherbuliez thinks that Lessing learned the art of expression from Voltaire; Mr. Lowell says, of Diderot. Undoubtedly French prose was of service to Lessing, in spite of his contempt of the French, and especially of Voltaire as a man; but Madame de Stael's remark, that Lessing expressed himself as a European, is perhaps juster.

It will give an idea of how this piece marks an epoch in German literature, if we recall the fact that it is the first of the master-pieces of the really great writers. "*Die Briefe die neueste Literatur betreffend*," published between 1759 and 1765, were not wholly Lessing's, and had hardly enough of unity to be reckoned as a systematic whole. When Lessing published the *Laocoon* in 1766, he was thirty-seven years old,

Goethe only seventeen, and Schiller but seven. Thirteen years later he published the *Nathan*, so that Goethe to a large degree, and Schiller far more, had, or might have had, the intellectual calmness of Lessing's best writings to neutralize the tendencies of the "Storm and Stress" period, which, it is true, Lessing's criticism helped to evoke. Lessing's *Dramaturgie*, it has been said, had a great influence on Goethe, but *Götz von Berlichingen*, published four years later than this work of Lessing's, hardly reveals it. Schiller's earlier dramas exhibit no trace that can be ascribed to Lessing's individual influence. For Goethe and Schiller the "Storm and Stress" period was powerful: they were unable at first, and there is little evidence that they tried, to oppose the current of the time. The voice of Lessing must have been for them, in comparison with the roar around them, small, if not perfectly stifled; and it is for us, rather than for Lessing's contemporaries, that the *Laocoon* marks the epoch. But all the more for this reason, that Lessing was a somewhat unmoved figure, above or behind all that fermentation, that he was sufficient to himself, that no tempestuous clouds could hide his serene light, as it is revealed in these pages, has the *Laocoon* interest for us.

Within the last year two translations of this treatise have been published in English. One is the work of our countrywoman, Miss Frothingham, whose devotion to German literature does not find its first expression in the translation of this work. The other is by an English judge, the judge of the Admiralty, issued by Macmillan & Co., with that sumptuous elegance for which their books are famous. There was something attractive in the promise which this book held out. We have heard so much of the scholarship of English statesmen, and the popular mind has so come to regard the distinguished Englishman as having a large knowledge of what is elegant in letters, that a translation of *Laocoon*, with notes by Judge Phillimore, and illustrated by photographs, seemed quite appropriate. Gladstone's Homeric studies did not, it is true, push far back the limits of ignorance in respect to Greek life, but they did evince considerable scholarship. Lord Derby's translation of Homer was not exactly a poem, but it was at least creditable as amateur work. That the domain of art-criticism

in the immortal fragment of Lessing should be made to yield new laurels for England, and show anew to the statesmen of our own country the service that may be rendered to scholarship by public men, and the advantage to public men of a resource in letters, was in reality something pleasant to anticipate. But a glance at Judge Phillimore's notes dispels at once the illusion that any thorough discussion of principles is to be found therein. The notes reveal a somewhat careful use of the ordinary encyclopedias to ascertain the dates of the birth and death of the various authors quoted by Lessing, and contain an occasional extract from a popular English or French writer, either controverting or confirming some minor position of Lessing—Chapman's translations of the Homeric passages cited by Lessing, and other such matter. For instance, DeQuincey is compelled to contribute the one-sided passages in which he opposed some of Lessing's rather broadly stated principles. It might be interesting to some English readers to compare these notes with the very words of Lessing in their connection, but no one will be inclined to regard the collection of these, or the facts from the encyclopedias, as any great service to letters.

We are then thrown back for the *raison d'être* of this book upon the translation itself. We cannot doubt that it was a pleasure to the distinguished judge to translate the treatise (and we should be glad if our own public men had oftener pleasures of this sort); but does the translation, not to say in the elegant form in which the buyer must pay for it, but in any form, justify its publication? We fear it does not. Not merely does Judge Phillimore show that he is not versed in the German language, but in many passages, where a scanty familiarity with German might be atoned for by the sharpness of a critical faculty, he reveals but a confused sense of what the author is saying. It augurs little for the value of the translation, that on the very first page, in the fifth sentence of Lessing's preface (Judge Phillimore's sixth sentence) painting and poetry are made to change places, and each performs the office which, Lessing says, the critic assigned to the other. The translator says: "With respect to the latter rules" (the rules that have more authority in poetry) "poetry *could be aided* by the illustrations and examples supplied by painting."

The original says: "With respect to the latter rules, poetry accordingly could supply painting with illustrations and examples." That a translator could suppose that poetry would need to be furnished with illustrations and examples by painting, when by the very condition of the sentence poetry has almost a monopoly of such illustrations and examples, would have been without this illustration inconceivable. Neither Lessing, nor the critic whom he quotes, say such a thing, but just the opposite, that poetry out of its abundance of one class of examples shall supply the want of painting, and painting from its abundance of another class supply the want of poetry. Judge Phillimore makes each take of its poverty and contribute to its sister's abundance.

A fair test passage for the ability of the translator to get hold of the idea is found in the preface. The German is: "Aber wir Neueren haben in mehreren Stücken geglaubt uns weit über sie wegzusetzen, wenn wir ihre kleinen Lustwege in Landstrassen verwandelten: sollten auch die kürzern und sicherern Landstrassen darüber zu Pfaden eingehen, wie sie durch Wildnisse führen."

We give of this passage three translations: the first by Tutor Beasley of Leamington College. This translation was published twenty or more years ago in London by the Longmans, and the fact that it has been some time out of print, and no other good one had taken its place, was adduced by Miss Frothingham as justifying the publication of a new translation. The second translation is by Judge Phillimore, and the third by Miss Frothingham.

"But in many points we moderns imagine that we have advanced far beyond them, merely because we have changed their paths into highways: although by this very change the highways, in spite of being shorter and safer, are again contracted into paths as little trodden as though they led through deserts."

—BEASLEY.

"But we moderns have often believed that in many of our works we have surpassed them, because we have changed their little byways of pleasure into highways, even at the risk of being led by these shorter and safer highways into paths which end in a wilderness."—PHILLIMORE.

"But we moderns have in many cases thought to surpass the ancients by transforming their pleasure paths into highways, though at the risk of reducing the shorter and safer highways into such paths as lead through deserts."—MISS FROTHINGHAM.

The first translation is not definite, for the insertion of "again" in "are again contracted" has a suspicious look, as though the translator had an idea that the highways in the two parts of the sentence were the same. Possibly that was not the translator's thought, and the "again" means for him that what were the highways of the ancients are reduced again to what one may suppose them to have been at the dawn of civilization. The uncertainty left as to his meaning is, however, very reprehensible. The second translation (we wish the reader to note how plumply it gives the inaccuracy fairly deducible from Beasley's rendering) is nonsense. Lessing is distinguishing here between what was held important by the ancients in art and literature and what we regard as important in the same fields. Those pleasure paths, which were only now and then resorted to by them, we moderns have made our highways. Their highways, shorter as being straight lines between fixed points, going directly to the end sought, and safer as being for them in the centres of activity, become (because we abandon them and the activities which they involve) paths for us, which lead through wildernesses, where we are liable to blunders and disasters. In Judge Phillimore's translation we have changed "the little byways into highways," and are likely to be led by *these* shorter and safer highways into paths which end in a wilderness. One may ask, if the highways first-mentioned are the same as the highways last-mentioned, as the "these" certainly implies, than what are the latter shorter? Certainly not than the "byways," for, from the "byways" the first-mentioned highways are *all* made, and must be of equal length. Equally certain is it that they are not shorter than the last-mentioned highways, that is, than themselves. Can it be that he means that the highways are shorter and safer than the paths which they themselves become, and which end in a wilderness? We give up the problem. It is, perhaps, not the first time that a little pleasure path has ended in a wilderness. The meaning of the German is not transparent at first, but perfectly clear if one thinks out the connection. It is pleasant to note that Miss Frothingham has given the correct rendering, though she would have done well to translate the "darüber."

We need not go outside the preface to find another example of a very imperfect statement of Lessing's meaning, though we have difficulty in believing that the translator in this case had not acumen enough to discern and give the correct presentation. Speaking of "Pseudo-criticism," "Afterkritik," Lessing says: "Ja diese Afterkritik hat zum Theil die Virtuosen selbst verführt. Sie hat in der Poesie die Schilderungssucht und in der Malerei die Allegoristerei erzeugt, indem man jene zu einem redenden Gemälde machen wollen, ohne eigentlich zu wissen, was sie malen könne und solle, und diese zu einem stummen Gedichte, ohne überlegt zu haben, in welchem Masse sie allgemeine Begriffe ausdrücken könne, ohne sich von ihrer Bestimmung zu entfernen und zu einer willkürlichen Schriftart zu werden." Judge Phillimore translates this as follows: "This spurious criticism has partially corrupted the virtuosos themselves. It has generated a mania for pictorial description in poetry and for allegorical style in painting, while it was sought to render the former a speaking picture, without really knowing what could and ought to be painted, and the latter a mute poem, not having considered how far such ideas are susceptible of expression, without departing from their proper end and without falling into a purely arbitrary style of phraseology." (p. 3.) On the last and very confused sentence we remark first, that "was sie malen könne und solle," (the "sie" referring definitely to Poesie) is not rendered by the English words "what can and ought to be painted." It should be "what it (poetry) can and ought to paint." Second, the translation of the last three lines is equally, that is utterly, wrong; the thing which has not been "considered" is how far "*it* (that is, *painting*) can express general ideas without departing from *its*," not *their* "proper sphere, and without becoming," not "falling into," "an arbitrary method of writing," by no means "a purely arbitrary style of phraseology." The three already given are the most glaring misrepresentations, if not misunderstandings, of the author, which the four-paged preface contains, but certain minor deviations are quite worthy of notice. In one sentence what is represented as a condition by Lessing through the word "Falls" is assumed as a fact and "Falls" altogether omitted. On the same page "einleuchtend" is translated "bril-

liant," which is at least questionable. On page 4, "herzuleiten" is translated "arrange," where it must have its common meaning of "deduce." The sentence is too comical not to be given entire. "We know as well as any nation in the world how out of some granted definition to arrange all that we want to arrange in the very best manner." Lessing says "to deduce all that we wish to from a few assumed definitions." The use of the pronoun "him," when speaking of the *Laocoon* as a work of art, is not English, and the words, "as I set out from the *Laocoon* and often return to him, I have thought it right to give him a share in the title of the work," smack so strongly of German pronominal agreement in gender as to suggest the query, whether Judge Phillimore would translate "Ich habe einen Brief erhalten, aber ich habe ihn noch nicht gelesen," I have received a letter, but I have not yet read him. We pass by one or two minor points, in regard to which there may possibly be room for difference of opinion, but before leaving the preface remark that if one may judge from the simple brief note upon the preface, Judge Phillimore's Greek is better than his German. To the quotation from Plutarch, which is Lessing's motto, "*Ψλῆ καὶ τρόποις μιμήσεως διαφέρουσι*," our translator observes correctly that Lessing gives a broader meaning than in their original connection the words can have. But then Lessing took them away from their connection, and without any connection they will bear the translation, "objects and methods of imitation," as well as the other, "material (means) and methods of imitation." Is it then quite *certain* that Lessing "mistook" the meaning of "*Ψλῆ* in its connection? After the want of perspicacity which Judge Phillimore's translation of the preface showed, this acuteness in regard to the Greek seemed a little surprising, but a note on a sentence in the twenty-second section of the treatise warrants the inference that Judge Phillimore and other properly educated Englishmen are as familiar with Greek as the ancient Greeks themselves were. Lessing's sentence is, "Homer ward vor Alters unstreitig fleissiger gelesen als jetzt." Judge Phillimore's translation, to which for this sentence (the one next it has a blunder sufficiently egregious to atone for several correct pages) we cannot seriously object, is "Homer was certainly more diligently read

in ancient times than he now is." Lessing proceeds then to speak of Greek painters and shows that by ancient times he means the best days of Greek art *in Greece*. Judge Phillimore's note on Lessing's assertion is, "This remark is happily inapplicable to England. Homer has always been taught in her public schools, especially at Westminster. Witness also the Grenville Homer, the translations of Chapman, Pope, Cowper, Sotheby, Lord Derby, and Mr. Gladstone's more recent and well known works. In France Homer has never been much read or much understood, and I am afraid the same remark applies to Italy and Spain. R. P." Therefore the celebrated men of England are as familiar with Homer and hence with Greek as were the celebrated men of Greece. Q. E. D. But poor Spain and poorer France! But France too has had translations of the classics, as Judge Phillimore himself, in one of his encyclopedical notes admits, this time apropos of Madame Dacier, "born 1654, died 1720, a French lady acquainted with, but not deeply read in the classical authors of Greece and Rome, and employed as an assistant by the editors of the classics in usum Delphini. She translated several classical works not perfectly understood by her. Her translation of Homer was the work which pleased her countrymen most; but it was never esteemed by real scholars and had many of the defects of the French school. R. P."* It was certainly very naughty of Madame Dacier to translate "authors not perfectly understood by her." We suppose that Judge Phillimore has no idea that any Englishman, least of all one clothed with the spotless ermine of judicial functions, could do so wicked a thing. But to turn from all allusion to the performance now under notice, the proverb of "glass houses" and "stones" is not without application, if England is to accuse France of inaccurate translations. Not to speak of certain English classical translations, whose mistakes the American teacher sometimes corrects, we refer the reader "for the translation of an author not perfectly understood" to an English rendering of "*Schleicher's Compendium*" by H. Bendall, published by Trübner & Co., London, 1874.

* The initials of the judge, R. P., have a funny effect at the end of these notes. They are quite unnecessary. The notes would not be taken for Lessing's, if R. P. were omitted.

After having paid a compliment to Judge Phillimore's Greek scholarship, and finding so good a reason for it, it is not pleasant to be obliged to deduct anything from the recorded credit, but we find in one note evidence that his Greek knowledge after all is not as exhaustive as was probably that of Zeuxis, or any fine Athenian gentleman of the age of Pericles. Near the close of the fourth section Lessing uses the word *Skävopoeie*. Upon this word we have a note of which the following is part: "The word used by Lessing is generally mistranslated as "acting" or "la mimique,"* but the paraphrase of De Quincey, "subsidiary aids in mechanic apparatus," conveys the true meaning of the word, which I think has in every edition of Lessing a misprint. It stands *Skävopoeie*: it should be *Skanopoeie*, from the Greek *Σκηνοποιία*, "tabernaculorum constructio;" see Stephens' Thesaurus on the word citing Polyb. 6:28, 3, page 51. If Judge Phillimore had consulted a little more carefully his Liddell & Scott or (perhaps as a German scholar he uses it) Passow, he would have found Lessing's word *Σκευοποιία* which has no such meaning as "constructio tabernaculorum," but from the primitive *Σκευή*, attire or dress, signifies "the preparing of masks or other stage equipments." The adjective *Σκευοποιός* is by no means a rare word. True, the word *Σκηνή*, a tent, and then the stage, or scenes, was sometimes used in the sense of *Σκευή*, but accuracy is here with Lessing, not with Judge Phillimore, the *upsilon* of the Greek being given as the semi-vowel *v*.

To return to the translation, the first section of the treatise presents fewer grave mistakes than the preface. But we note that "Wuth" limited by "in dem Gesichte" is translated on one page "torture," and on the next page, in precisely the same collocation, "furious vehemence." The word torture is not used in English prose to denote the result of pain in expression. The word "Wuth" denotes rage or violence. In reading the translation "furious vehemence," one cannot help wondering how Judge Phillimore would translate "grimmige Wuth," or "die grimmigste Wuth," expressions not uncommon now and more frequent in the writers of the "Storm and Stress" period.

* Doubtless from a French translator "acquainted with, but not deeply read" in the works of Lessing.

"Die Oeffnung des Mundes gestattet es nicht," in a quotation from Winkelmann, is translated on page 6, "The opening of the mouth does not show this," instead of "does not admit it" (such a cry). On page 8, "einer zusammenhängenden Rede" is translated "a continuous reading," instead of, a connected discourse. "Vielmehr um der leidenden Natur ihr Recht zu geben," apropos of Venus' cry on being wounded, is rendered "rather to give her a right to a suffering nature," instead of to give a suffering nature its due. Judge Phillimore's reference of possessives in general is apparently mere guess-work. On page 10, the clause "that by the former, the poet intended to represent the barbarians, by the latter, the people of civilization," should be, that the poet intended in this way to represent the former as barbarians, and the latter as people of civilization. On the same page, line 11, the translation of the words "auf beiden Theilen" is omitted before "without many." In the last sentence, on page 11, "notwithstanding it" does not refer, as it seems to, to the outward expression of such a soul; but to the condition in the first part of the sentence, and the conclusion should be rendered "then the reason why the artist, notwithstanding this truth, did not wish to imitate this cry in his marble, is not to be found in the fact that he was giving expression to such a soul, but," etc.

"Freilich ist der Hang zu dieser üppigen Prahlerei mit leidigen Geschicklichkeiten, die durch den Werth der Gegenstände nicht geadelt werden," is on page 15 thus rendered, "In truth the connection between this extravagant boasting and a fatal dexterity, which is not ennobled by the worth of the object." Beasley's translation is similar, "It is true the propensity to this wanton boasting united to abilities tolerable in themselves, but unennobled by an exalted subject." It should be: Indeed, the tendency to this luxuriant *display of paltry* dexterities, which are not ennobled by the worth of the subjects. On page 16, "der mittelmässigen Portraits" is rendered "portraits of the moderately successful," instead of *indifferent* portraits! The translation of the second section abounds in inaccuracies, but we note only two or three more. "Weil der Anblick des Schmerzes Unlust erregt" is rendered "because the aspect of it excites what is unpleasant in pain." How our

translator got at that rendering, and what he means by it, are equally inconceivable. It should be "because the sight of pain excites unpleasant feelings." "Für einen Orakel ertheilenden Jupiter" is translated "for a Jupiter instructing an oracle" instead of *communicating* oracles. In section iv, page 85, "who does not know" is given for the English of "wem dabei einfällt?" The third and fourth sections are perhaps the most accurate parts of the translation, but we should call the fifth very slovenly, did we not think that its blunders with those that have preceded, substantiate the charge of ignorance of German combined with a want of perception. Let the reader take the following sentence from page 57 and study it as English: "Whatever parts of the body, above, below, or between the coils could be seen, would appear amid the pressure and the distension not to have been caused by pain within, but by weight without!" One might struggle some time with the idea "that what parts of the body could be seen would appear to have been caused by the weight without," and perhaps at last believe that it must express some mysterious dogma of a recondite philosophy. But the clear Lessing said, "What one would have seen of the body above, or below, or between the coils would have appeared in the midst of compressions and tumefactions, *which* were caused not by inward pain, but by outward pressure." How did Judge Phillimore arrive at his translation of this passage? Before giving an opinion on that point we will quote Tutor Beasley's translation of the same sentence: "Those parts of the body which would have been still exposed above, below, or between the folds would have been seen amongst compressions and distentions, the effect not of inward pain, but of external pressure." Will the reader compare the renderings by the two English gentlemen, and see if there is anything in the first one published to suggest the second. We think there is, and cannot see where Judge Phillimore obtained his idea, "that the parts exposed were caused by the weight without," except by taking the words, "the effect not of inward pain, but of external pressure" in Tutor Beasley's translation away from their belonging as appositive to "compressions and distentions," and construing them as a predicate after "would have been seen," whose sub-

ject is "whatever parts." Tutor Beasley's sentence is somewhat ambiguous, and that a translator with the German before him (where the concluding clause is adjective and relative, whose subject pronoun must refer to the words, "Pressungen und Aufschwellungen,") could understand the "die nicht von dem inneren Schmerze, sondern von der äussern Last gewirkt worden," to refer to the parts exposed, would be impossible except for a Phillimore led by a Beasley. Do we then mean to imply that Judge Phillimore used Mr. Beasley's translation as a guide? That indeed is our implication, and we ask the reader to compare the translations of the passage from the preface concerning "die Lustwege," and "die Landstrassen," which were quoted from the two gentlemen, as well as their renderings of the passage concerning "Prahlerci mit den leidigen Geschicklichkeiten," which were given a few pages back, and judge for himself. Where Mr. Beasley is ambiguous, and one of the two possible interpretations of his rendering is unintelligible, Judge Phillimore generally presents us with unintelligibility. In some cases, where Mr. Beasley really had a glimmering of Lessing's meaning, Judge Phillimore buries it so deep that there is no chance of resurrection. In regard to single words, Judge Phillimore sometimes corrects Mr. Beasley. But in regard to obscure sentences the judge, with a sort of consciousness that the tutor was fresher or more at home in the German, puts himself into his hand, and by this mediumistic utterance, we get sentences that are neither English, nor German, nor Lessing, nor Beasley, nor Phillimore, but confused amalgamations in various proportions of these five elements. We shall give one more illustration of this, and then dismiss this painful part of the matter. First, the German from section xvii, page 99, of the Stuttgart edition, 1873. "Er will uns die Kennzeichen eines schönen Füllens, einer tüchtigen Kuh zuzählen, um uns in den Stand zu setzen, nachdem wir deren mehrere oder weniger antreffen, von der Güte der einen oder des anderen urtheilen zu können." Tutor Beasley renders as follows: "His (Virgil's) object is to enumerate the good points of a beautiful colt or useful cow in such a manner, that on meeting one or more of them we would be enabled to form a fair judgment of their respective value." Judge Phillimore gives the passage as

follows: "He desires to show us the signs of a beautiful foal or of a cow, that is a good breeder, in order that we may be in a condition, in the event of our meeting with few or more of these animals, to form a judgment as to the goodness of the one or the other." Miss Frothingham's is better. "His object is to tell us the characteristics of a handsome colt or a good cow, so that we may judge of their excellence according to the number of *these characteristics*, which they possess." No one familiar with German needs to be told that "deren" refers to "Kennzeichen," and that Miss Frothingham alone gives clearly the sense of the passage. First, then, we have Lessing's clear and admirable German. Then Beasley's smooth, but ambiguous English, hiding as often by its smoothness its incorrectness. For it must be admitted on examination that his "them" refers more naturally and incorrectly to "the animals." Then comes Judge Phillimore with his genius for getting the worst possible construction from his guide, correcting, indeed, one word, "tüchtig," but boldly translating "deren," "animals," where Beasley only looked towards this meaning, and giving us a sentence that "yaws," as Mr. Lowell would say, far worse than the German and has no sense. How, one may ask, if we have Virgil's "characteristics" to judge by, do we depend on the number of animals we meet for ability to determine their excellence? We determine the excellence solely according to the number of the good characteristics, which we find, and not at all by the number of animals.

If any scholar say, after having carefully compared these quoted passages, that there is no valid evidence that Judge Phillimore has followed Mr. Beasley, we, though holding that there is such evidence, shall not begrudge Judge Phillimore the benefit of the doubt. It certainly is pity enough that a book published under such auspices, dedicated to the scholarly Gladstone, should be so sorry a performance as it is, even were its author under obligations to no one for suggestions.

We are tempted, in spite of our resolution, to give one more blunder from the large number found in comparing one-half of the translation with the original, because this one shows how hopeless a confusion sometimes results when the translator depends wholly on his own mother-wit. Lessing's text says, in

section xviii, when comparing the shield of Virgil with that of Homer: "Aber anstatt dass wir bei dem Homer nicht bloss die Anstalten zur Arbeit, sondern auch die Arbeit selbst zu sehen bekommen, lässt Virgil, nachdem er uns nur den geschäftigen Gott mit seinen Cyklopen überhaupt gezeigt" (then follows the quotation from Virgil), "den Vorhang auf einmal niederfallen." There is an omission in this text without doubt, although Lachmann's edition, and all the editions that the writer has seen, give the words as above printed. Between "wir" and "bei dem Homer," in the first line, should stand "wie." It is instead of our obtaining not "in Homer," but "as in Homer." Both the sense and Homer's description imperatively require it, and Judge Phillimore has steered to so much of truth in his rendering, only to founder afterwards in fifty fathoms of error. He translates: "But instead of our seeing as in Homer the preparation for the work, we see the work itself." Just the point that Lessing makes and makes over and over again in his reasoning for Homer, we have here denied to Homer and made for Virgil, to whom Lessing refuses it. The point is that Homer shows us the process of the shield's construction, Virgil the shield *after it is made*. One is tempted here to ask, to what purpose should a man be more familiar with Homer than the Greeks were, if his remembrance of Homer's shield is no more vivid than this? In the words of Judge Phillimore's own translation, but one page back, "Homer does not paint the shield as perfect and already made, *but as being made*" (werdendes). Again, "He (Homer) availed himself of the much praised artifice of changing that which is co-existent in his design into that which is successive, and thereby presenting us with the living picture of an action, instead of the wearisome description of a body." Again, "We do not see the shield, but the divine master as he works." In spite of all this argument in his own translation, in spite of the familiar Greek, and of the unmistakable German, "but instead of our getting a sight not merely of the preparations for the work, but also of the process itself as in Homer, Virgil, after he has given us only a single glimpse of the busy god with his Titans, lets the curtain fall," Judge Phillimore makes Virgil do what Lessing assigns to Homer, and expressly says Virgil did not do. Not satisfied with this, he takes away again from

Virgil in the next sentence what he has just assigned him, and does not know that his rendering makes confusion of the whole passage. Seduced, perhaps, by the complacency resulting from his conjecture of the omitted "wie," he dared to trust his own powers to guide him through the passage. He thus gave another evidence of his fatal genius for going wrong. He should have followed Beasley here, for here Beasley was right.

The *Laocoon* can be bought in Germany for ten cents. The retail price of this pretentious mistranslation is four dollars. Miss Frothingham's little book is then something to be thankful for, provided it is accurate. To say that her German is better than Judge Phillimore's would be to say little. To say that her English is always as good, and often better than Tutor Beasley's, is to say something. But to say that as a readable English book and a presentation of Lessing's meaning this is a superior performance, is really her due. Her edition contains translations of nearly all the Latin and Greek quotations, which the fine classical education of the English, in Judge Phillimore's estimation, ought to make it unnecessary to translate, but which he with odd caprice sometimes renders and sometimes passes by. Miss Frothingham's knowledge of German is thorough. Not that there are no defects in her renderings, and it seems especially unfortunate that many of the little words, which seem unimportant in the German, but really add much to the thought, have been omitted. Such for instance is the "darüber," by this very process, whose absence was regretted in her translation of the sentence from the preface concerning the pleasure paths and highways. Such is the omission of the "sie waren es," when Lessing, speaking of Philocletes' cries, says, they resounded not less terribly through the island than in the camp, and "they were the thing" that had caused his banishment to the island. "Ich will bei dem Ausdrucke stehen bleiben" can hardly be rendered, "I will confine myself wholly to expression," as on page 11, though it has been so rendered often. The connection requires, I will stand by the expression or statement.

But most, though not all of Miss Frothingham's inaccuracies, come from the desire to make a readable English book, and from a conviction that the translation of every phrase and word will seriously interfere with the facility with which the reader

should comprehend the thought. We believe in the other theory of translation: that the more literal the more worthful is the rendering, especially with respect to so noble a prose piece as this. We believe the highest respect for the organic life and perfection of the original requires literalness, not to the point of constructing faulty English, but to the point of sacrificing euphony, and even elegance, for clear and exact statement. Who would imagine that Miss Frothingham's "even though in mortal terror of his enemy's sword," on page 14, is the English of "wenn sie unter dem Schwerte des Siegers Schrecken und Todesangst ergreift"—when fear and deadly anguish takes hold of them beneath the conqueror's sword? Or who familiar with German would conjecture that behind, "Rather must we acknowledge that he was right in introducing the cry, as the sculptor was in omitting it," page 21, are the words, "Wer muss nicht vielmehr bekennen: wenn der Künstler wohl that, dass er den *Laocoon* nicht schreien liess, so that der Dichter eben so wohl, dass er ihn schreien liess?" How far below the original in force of antithesis is the translation! Pages might be filled with passages where Miss Frothingham, intending only to trim off the excrescences from her English, has pared the original to the quick. This may be considered by some a question of taste. Others will agree with us that in the treatment of Lessing at least it is a question of loyalty, of truth.

But when the worst has been said, it must be conceded that one knowing no German can here find an easy, smooth statement of all that Lessing virtually said. There is a strong, clear sense, and a profound respect for the author in every sentence. No translation can give the indefinable charm of the author's words, and for this reason all translation, using the word in its full sense, is an impossibility. We regret, as already stated, that Miss Frothingham has not been more literal, but from her stand-point her work is well done. Americans may justly take a little pride that the disappearance of Beasley's translation has called forth from a countrywoman one altogether better. If the next distinguished Englishman, who essays the *Laocoon*, will take Miss Frothingham as a guide, we are sure he will have better success than has overtaken Judge Phillimore.

ARTICLE X.—REV. HENRY M. GOODWIN'S "CHRIST
AND HUMANITY."

Christ and Humanity; with a Review, historical and critical, of the Doctrine of Christ's Person. By HENRY M. GOODWIN. New York: Harper & Brothers, publishers, Franklin Square. 1875.

IN the judgment of thoughtful minds it will be conceded that the author of this work has made a valuable, and in some respects fresh, contribution to the already vast literature of Christology, although his ideas are not new in the history of Christianity, but are reflected in ancient opinions which at the time were pronounced heretical under the names of Apollinarian, Eutychian, Patripassian; they appear also in the transcendental deification of man by the German Mystics of the Middle Ages; in more modern times they are seen in the philosophical speculations of Schelling and Hegel regarding the metaphysical unity of the divine and the human; and they are enunciated in substance by our own theologian, Horace Bushnell, in his views upon the essential humanity of the divine nature as manifested in the Lord Jesus Christ. In fine, the idea of some kind of identity of the divine and the human as existing potentially in all men but only perfectly expressed in the one God-man, Christ, has run through theology and philosophy. There has always been a contest about the person of Christ. The orthodox Church has, for the most part, been content to abide by the decision of the Council of Chalcedon, that in the one person of Christ were two distinctly separate natures; or, that the Divine Word, the second person of the Trinity, took to himself "a true body and a reasonable soul," so that not only a human body, but a human soul, was comprehended in the complex nature of Christ. In a word, it was assumed as a doctrine of revelation, very much as the Trinity itself was assumed, that there *were* two natures, the divine and the human, in Christ's one person, but how they exist, or how they came to exist, was not attempted to be ex-

plained, was deemed inexplicable. This perhaps showed the wisdom of the early Church in not going beyond the record that "no man knoweth the Son but the Father."

It has been felt, however, in many ways, that here was a theme, or department of theology, which was exceedingly obscure, even after the sharp contests of the fourth and fifth centuries A. D.; and that a question of the utmost depth and importance was still left open. The harmonious development of Christian truth, it may be, required this. Here is the central theme, the very root-principle of Christianity. Our author says in the opening sentence of his Preface: "If apology were necessary for the appearance of a new volume on so old a theme as the Person of Christ, it might be found in the fact that the old has become the new—and it will ever be the grand centre of regard and interest of all Christian minds. The thought of the Christian world is being turned, as never before, to this central Person of history, with the feeling that here, in this wonderful Life and Character, is contained the secret that will explain the riddle of the world, as well as the power that alone can cure its evils." Theology is progressive chiefly on the inductive side, in the higher reason and consciousness of minds supernaturally guided and developed, and why has not the time now come for combining the rays of maturer Christian thought and experience upon the profoundest theme of theology—the Person of Christ? Is there a deeper subject? Is there one involving more vital issues? Does it not go to the root of Unitarianism and orthodoxy? Does it not involve the scientific questions of the day in regard to the origin and nature of man? Does it not comprehend the Christian life, the way of salvation, and the gospel itself? Has the Council of Chalcedon, or any other council, settled the question, or put a stop to men's thinking upon it? Is not the truth of the Person of Christ, who is both source and sum of Christian doctrine, as fairly open to the researches of a reverent reason, as the subject of the Trinity, or of the Atonement? Dr. Dorner himself declares that the doctrine of the Trinity was evolved in its present dogmatic form from the early controversies upon the Person of Christ. We know of few persons better fitted than the author

of this volume, by mental culture, by power of concentrated thinking upon high spiritual themes, and by simple love of truth and spirit devoid of ambition, to re-open this profound question of Christian thought.

The book is dedicated, with warmth of respectful expression, to Horace Bushnell. It would not perhaps be too much to say that it is the fruit of his powerful inspiring influence upon a rich and thoughtful mind. It is divided into two parts. The first part consists of seven elaborate discourses upon The Divine Humanity of Christ—The Son of Man—Christ the Root of Humanity—The Human Development of Jesus—The Image of God—The Human Trinity—Man's Place in the Creation. The second part comprises a historical and critical Review of the doctrine of Christ's Person.

The commonly received orthodox view of Christ's nature presents, according to this author, an unscriptural and falsified image. It lacks the single and perfect view of the Biblical image of Christ. He is conceived of now as divine, and now as human, or as both together in a kind of unity called one person, but which is really and practically a *duality*; our author would bring by his theory these two aspects of Christ's person into a real unity, or *identity*, so as to give a single, distinct, and adequate—and, so to speak, a *stereoscopic*—image of the God-Man, without blur or imperfection. Taking his stand on the sublime Old Testament truth that man was made "in the image of God," he reasons that there is something essentially divine in humanity, and something essentially human in the divine—an eternal humanity. It was then no strange thing for the Divine Logos, nor was it any violation of his nature, to become flesh. The Logos did not "assume humanity," as is said in the language of the schools, but, as the Scripture says, "*became* flesh," not as a mere conjunction with it, not as an inhabitation of a bodily nature, not as a superaddition to a human spirit, but by such a self-emptying, or "*kenôsis*" of the divine, as made God a true man without taking to Himself a human soul. The human soul is eliminated from this view of Christ's person because not wanted, because the divine soul is itself already human. A real unity of the Person of Christ is thus secured—a perfect and single image is obtained. There is no confusion

of wills, or composition of wills, as in the *dual* view of the Council of Chalcedon, of John of Damascus, of the fathers, and of the orthodox Church to this day.

Mr. Goodwin has sought to find a ground for the Incarnation deeper and more permanent, and a conception of its reality less contradictory and confusing to reason, than has hitherto prevailed. The attempt to merge the two natures brought together from without, each retaining its own properties "without conversion, intermixture, or confusion"—to combine two heterogeneous natures in one person,—has been tried for nearly fifteen centuries, in every conceivable variety of form and combination; and the problem, he thinks, is not yet solved, and never can be on these premises, for it is an attempt to make the impossible possible.

"The view advocated in this volume," he says, "proceeds from a different idea or starting-point, viz., that the Incarnation is not a *synthesis*, or union of opposite natures, but a *development*, or the determination of the Divine in the form of the Human. The essential Humanity of Christ, aside from its unessential and fleshly robe, is traced to its true origin and eternal existence in God, and not derived from the race He created, and of which He is the original. It is thus a *Divine* Humanity, and identical with His Divinity. For as Dörner has truly said, "the Deity can be shown to be the principle of itself and of humanity, but the humanity can neither be the principle of itself nor of the Deity. Still less can our fallen humanity be the source of that sinless and ideal Humanity which we behold in Christ." The "Son of God," who is also the "Son of Man," is to be conceived of not as God and man *united*, but as a Person in whom these natures have their *identity* in one being, who is both divine and human in his attributes.

We have indicated, as far as we can do in a brief sketch, what is the general theory maintained in this book, for the fuller development of which we must refer our readers to the book itself. Written in a bold but reverent spirit, and in a clear style which has at times marked beauty and force, it will delight readers who love to dwell in these lofty places of spiritual thought. It will open more of the riches of the

knowledge of Christ. It will relieve the difficulties of some minds in respect to the anomalous nature of Christ's person as presented in the creeds. It is not only a worthy contribution to theological science, which we hail in these day of superficial thinking, but it has many practical bearings of a noble and fructifying kind on life, character, and philosophy.

The Darwinian theory of development, as now carried to its extreme, beyond, we think, the more just ideas of its originator, presents the bestial view of man's origin. It is well to bring into clear light the divine element in man's nature, or we sink into the brute from which, it is claimed, we are descended. Nothing but a strong theory that lifts up the race to God can meet a strong theory that pulls it down to the level of the animal. The elevating force must be more powerful than the depressing.

Another advantage of this theory is its mediating quality in variant and opposing theological beliefs. It forms a *via media* between sincere though extreme views of the proper humanity and divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ. The honest Unitarian is right as far as he goes, but he stops immeasurably short of the truth. He believes—in his theosophic philosophy of nature—in the divinity of humanity, but he looks only at the humanity of Christ, not seeing in the Divine Logos the original divine man, the Ideal and Redeemer of fallen humanity, the root and ground of humanity itself because He is divine. He sees in Christ but an ordinary though lofty man. He does not see the true God in him. On the other hand, the orthodox believer looks chiefly at the divinity in Christ, and hardly discerns his glorious humanity, through which, or united to which, his own sinful humanity becomes redeemed and glorified, and made "a partaker of the divine nature."

In what has been said we have perhaps seemed to favor the theory of the book. It certainly has its charms. It profoundly stimulates thought. It opens new views of the nature and work of Christ. In it we somehow feel that a mighty truth, not for the first time presented in misty grandeur to the mind, has been laid hold upon, which the creeds have heretofore failed satisfactorily to explain, and which the author with all his power struggles in vain to represent because probably it is

past the power of any man entirely to comprehend and clearly to set forth. It will lead, we hope, to a deeper study of the subject and of the Scriptures; and here, we would suggest, there seems to be some failure in the argument. The mystery of "God manifest in the flesh" rests upon the basis of Inspiration. Its primary proof and conditions are therefore found in the Word of God. There should have been, we venture to say, on so important a question, more of critical examination of texts—especially of that class of texts which set forth Christ's humanity. Here, to our mind, as yet, is the chief, we will not say insuperable, difficulty, with the theory. When our Lord said, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt;"—"my soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death;"—"Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit;"—"my meat is to do the will of Him that sent me;" and where it is written, "Jesus wept"—"who was tempted in all points like as we are"—in such passages, if a human soul is not meant—a soul comprising reason, sensibility, and will, that go to make up a human personality *distinct from* the divine—we hardly know how language could express this. Does the Divine Logos speak and do these things? We may come to believe in Patripassianism, or Theopassianism, but that those things written in the Scriptures of the life of Christ, where words, acts, feelings of the simplest and most natural kind, which belong distinctly to a human soul,—that those things can be ascribed to God, or to an impersonal human nature which is but an organ of the divine nature, or to a form in which the divine nature manifests itself—this is hard to conceive. Harder still is it to conceive of the shrinkage of the divine into the human,—so that the divine shall form the soul of the human in its finite limitations. Mr. Goodwin attempts to meet this difficulty by the analogy of the human spirit in the human body; but the analogy is an imperfect one, since the human spirit, though made in the image of the divine, has a beginning, a birth, a growth, corresponding with the birth and development of the physical nature. They are fitted to each other, at least during their union and life together. But how can we believe the Eternal and Divine to begin, to be born, to be made? How can He increase in wisdom and knowledge?

How can He be shut in to the ignorance of infancy, and grow to the omniscience of God in the period of a human life?

There is the danger of mixing up the boundaries of the divine and the human, as well as the opposite danger of obscuring the divine parentage of man. In speaking of the unique being of Christ, we may indeed reverently, by way of speculation, conjecture that his incarnation is not so much a change of nature as of form and condition, and that his divinity may be brought over to the side of his humanity so that his is a divine humanity, not less but more human because it is divine, though this leads very close to the doctrine that the incarnation is a mere theophany in which our veritable human brother and Saviour vanishes away; but it seems to us that there is some tendency in Mr. Goodwin's book to lose sight of the distinction between man and the "Son of man," to regard man as Christ, to speak of man as divine, to clothe him with the incommunicable nature of God. In the language of Eckhart, and Tauler, and the old German Mystics, there was much of this daring phraseology which is wonderfully fascinating; but should we not, since Luther's day at least, be very careful in the use of indefinite terms and forms of speech upon such themes.

We should like to dwell longer upon this volume because of the great importance of the subject, and because the book is a promise and fulfillment of better things in American theology. It gives signs of new life, progress, and power. It is written in a calm, truth-seeking, and believing spirit. It is in the genuine line of productive investigation, wherein the scholastic and analytic are subordinate to the rational and spiritual elements of thought. A loftier idea both of the nature of God and of man must be conceived, in which not the distinctions which separate the two but the vital relations which, above all, in Christ, harmonize the two, must be chiefly regarded, before we can arrive at the fundamental and divine truth of Christianity. This treatise aims at least in that direction. It opens an old and deep fountain of theological inquiry long sealed up by the rigid hand of tradition. It will be of great assistance to many minds laboring with the complex questions that theology and the creeds—not the Scriptures—have raised respecting the

580 *Rev. Henry M. Goodwin's "Christ and Humanity."* [July,

nature of our Lord Jesus Christ. If it does not satisfy all questions and clear away all difficulties from this profound and mysterious theme—if it does not even succeed in establishing its own position—it is still a work of an ennobling and elevating character, and it will, assuredly, in the author's own words, lead its readers "to think more divinely, and at the same time more humanly of Christ, and more reverently of themselves and humanity."

ARTICLE XL.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

GODET'S COMMENTARY ON LUKE.*—The Commentary on the Gospel of John, by Dr. F. Godet, of Neuchatel, Switzerland, was published nearly twelve years ago, and immediately took its place among the most prominent works upon that Gospel. The learning of the author, his exegetical skill, his thorough knowledge of the controversies with regard to the genuineness and origin of the book, and the full sympathy of his spirit with that of the Apostle, gave him all the qualifications necessary for the work which he had undertaken. The result of his labors was such as to awaken hope in his readers that he would take upon himself the exposition of other parts of the New Testament; and when it was announced, some years afterwards, that he had prepared a commentary upon Luke's Gospel, scholars were prepared to welcome it with much favor. The first edition was rapidly exhausted, and, in 1870, a second was published, of which the volumes now before us are a translation. The publishers have rendered a service to the English-speaking public by this work, and we are happy to see the intimation that, if these volumes meet, as we are confident must be the case, a favorable reception, a translation of the Commentary on John will, also, be brought out. The most valuable works of an exegetical character on the first three gospels are, mainly, in other languages than our own, and this is the case, though perhaps not to so great an extent, with regard to the fourth. The English reader, therefore, who is put in possession of these works through good translations, has the best means of studying this portion of the New Testament placed in his hands. Dr. Godet's volumes will certainly be ranked among the most useful ones upon the Gospel of Luke. The present work, like the one upon John, is full of the evidence of scholarship, and is, thus, adapted to the use of students and theologians. But the

* *A Commentary on the Gospel of St. Luke.* By F. GODET, Doctor and Professor of Theology, Neuchatel. Translated from the Second French Edition, Vol. I. by E. W. SHALDERS, B. A., Newbury, Vol. II. by M. D. CUSH. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner, Welford, & Armstrong. 1875. Two vols. 8vo, pp. 441, 462.

author states his design to be not merely for these persons, but also for all cultivated readers, and accordingly he suits his commentary to their wants. He has very happily succeeded in meeting the demands of both classes, not impairing the value of his work for scholars in the more technical sense by making it what others would desire. With much earnestness he enters into the discussion respecting the authorship of this Gospel, and the relation of it to those of Matthew and Mark. He is evidently familiar with the entire field of controversy, having carefully examined the views of all, even the latest, of the writers who oppose his own. In an introduction of some fifty pages, he opens the matter so far as is necessary to prepare for the exegetical discussion of the text. Here he sets before the reader the different explanations of the book, and of the sources from which it was derived, as they have been given by different modern critics, and presents the external evidences with regard to its existence in the primitive Church and respecting its author. He, then, proceeds to the interpretation of the book from chapter to chapter, keeping always in mind the subjects which had, thus, been opened. In this way he brings out the plan of the work, its unity, and many of the internal proofs that it was written by Luke, not as a mere compilation, or as founded upon the other gospels, but as a history in the true sense of the word, which drew its sources, indeed, from brief oral or written accounts already in existence, but wrought out what they furnished into a new and elaborated work. This part of his plan he carries out carefully, developing his views with regard to the Evangelist's purpose and object, while he is unfolding the meaning of his words. Finally, at the end of the commentary, he returns to the topics of the introduction, and, with the preparation now made, he proceeds to present the difficulties involved in other theories, and to set forth and defend his own. His own theory is, that Luke wrote his history, in Greece, at the same time when Matthew was compiling his "*Logia*" in Palestine [the real work of Matthew being the preparation of the collection of the Discourses of Jesus, and the setting of these in a narrative of the life of Jesus being the work of one of Matthew's disciples] and when Mark was compiling the narratives of Peter at Rome. Luke thus did not and was not able to use the writings of these Evangelists. But he worked on written documents, mostly Aramaic, which were collections more or less complete of detached descriptions or discourses which many Christian disciples

had written out. These detached accounts of the history of Jesus were the earliest works in the transition from oral evangelization to written compilation. In them, and in the collections of them, "we possess a basis firm enough on the one hand and elastic enough on the other to explain the resemblance, as well as the diversity, which prevails between the synoptical gospels." The resemblance and diversity can be satisfactorily explained in no other way. In the defense of this view of the origin of Luke's work, as well as of those of Matthew and Mark,—the statement of which, as we have given it, is, to a considerable extent, in his own language,—Dr. Godet displays both candor and ability, and, certainly, maintains with much force his own side in the discussion. In the publication of these volumes, and in the announcement of the second volume of Oehler's Biblical Theology of the Old Testament and of Luthardt's Commentary on the Gospel of John, as soon to appear, the Messrs. Clark are making most valuable additions to the Foreign Theological Library during the year 1875.

MEYER'S COMMENTARIES ON ROMANS AND JOHN.—We take pleasure in calling to the attention of our readers the fact that two volumes of Meyer's admirable Commentary appeared at the close of 1874, in the translation which is now in course of publication by Messrs. T. & T. Clark, of Edinburgh. These volumes are the second of those on the Epistle to the Romans, completing the Commentary on that Epistle, and the first of those on the Gospel of John. The one on John's Gospel covers the first seven chapters, and is to be followed during the summer of the present year by a second volume, which will include the remaining chapters. These volumes, like the former ones already noticed in the *NEW ENGLANDER*, are imported into this country by Messrs. Scribner, Welford, & Armstrong, of New York, and are sold at \$3.00 each.

GLOAG'S INTRODUCTION TO THE PAULINE EPISTLES.*—The studies of Dr. Gloag in connection with his Commentary on the Acts seem to have concentrated his interest upon Paul's life, and to this fact we may owe the preparation of the present work. In

* *Introduction to the Pauline Epistles.* By PATON J. GLOAG, D.D., Minister of Galashiels, Author of "A Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles," etc. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner, Welford, & Armstrong. 1874. 8vo, pp. 480.

regard to the Pauline Epistles, he undertakes to supply a need in England, apparent in these later years, of an introduction written from another standpoint than that of destructive criticism. The earlier work of Davidson belonged to a time already passed by, and had accomplished its purpose. The later work of that author contained the evidences and results of his great change of views, and could not represent the opinions of those who stood in his own former position. The time for a new attempt in this field of New Testament study seemed to have arrived, and the progress of the destructive criticism seemed to require it. Dr. Gloag has prepared a carefully-written volume, with a thorough investigation of the questions involved, but with particular reference to the views of Baur and the method of successfully opposing them. He presents his readers with a brief and fair statement of the evidence and argument for the Pauline authorship of the several Epistles, and treats of all the subjects which are appropriate to his work clearly and well. The volume will be regarded as a contribution to the literature of the subject at the present time, and will remind the reader of the former work of the author, which has many excellent points. We notice that, contrary to the opinions of most of the best scholars now, he assigns to Paul, though not confidently, the authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

THE MIRACLES OF OUR LORD.*—The author held for many years, in addition to his professorship, the office of preacher to the University; but has resigned this office in order to devote himself to the duties of his professorship. He is known as an author by his *Beiträge zum Schriftverständnis*; and holds high rank as an exegete.

The present work belongs to apologetics rather than to exegesis. It is intended to establish the historical credibility of the miracles attributed to Jesus in the gospels, and also incidentally their philosophical possibility, against the recent skeptical criticism in Germany. Of this skepticism, the author regards Strauss as the representative, and aims particularly to refute his views as presented in his volumes on the Life of Jesus. In doing this, however, he

* *The Miracles of Our Lord in Relation to Modern Criticism.* By F. L. STEINMEYER, D.D., Ordinary Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin. Translated, with the permission of the author, from the German, by L. A. WHEATLEY. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George street. 1875. New York: Scribner, Welford, & Armstrong. pp. viii and 274. Price \$3.75.

discusses the critical objections to our Lord's miracles by other writers, and takes occasion in passing to point out the defects in Schleiermacher's doctrine of miracles, which led Strauss to assert "that Schleiermacher was in advance of his age, in so far that he, though perhaps he had no clear conception of it, has aimed at the standpoint occupied by himself (Strauss), without being able to attain it." The author adds that "as regards the working of miracles by our Lord, *considering the actual results*, we can discover no difference between the two authors."

In the introduction (pp. 1-49), the author considers the problem as propounded by Strauss, the method of solving it, and the value of the solution; also, Jesus as a worker of miracles. In considering these points, he discusses the definition of *miracle*, the relation of miracles to doctrine, their apologetic value, the motive of our Lord in working them, and their significance.

In respect to the significance of our Lord's miracles, he divides them into four groups: I. Miracles considered as signs of the kingdom of Heaven; II. Miracles considered as symbols; III. Miracles as witnesses of the power of the kingdom as it advances in the world; IV. Miracles as prophecies. Having classified our Lord's miracles in these four classes, the author proceeds, in the body of his work (pp. 50-269), to a particular examination, at once apologetic and exegetical, of the gospel narrative or narratives of each miracle.

The work is evangelical in doctrine and spirit, and is marked by the usual characteristics of German scholarship. We notice that the author vindicates at considerable length the reality of the demoniacal possessions.

COMMENTARY ON THE PROVERBS OF SOLOMON.*—This is the first of three volumes of Commentary on the writings of Solomon. These three volumes form the last section of the series of Commentaries on the books of the Old Testament by Keil and Delitzsch. The excellence and value of the commentaries contributed by Dr. Delitzsch to this series are well known to scholars and clergymen, and highly appreciated by them. The volume before us exhibits the breadth of learning, thoroughness of inves-

* *Biblical Commentary on the Proverbs of Solomon.* By FRANZ DELITZSCH, D.D., Professor of Theology. Translated from the German by M. G. Easton, M.D. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George street. 1874. New York: Scribner, Welford, & Armstrong. 8vo, pp. xii and 372. Price \$3.00.

tigation, and mastery of the subject in hand, which are characteristic of the author's preceding volumes. This volume contains the introduction (pp. 1-51), and the commentary on chap. 1-17, inclusive. The second volume, and the volume on Ecclesiastes and Solomon's Song, are announced as in preparation.

PRINCIPAL DAWSON'S LECTURES ON NATURE AND THE BIBLE.*—

Principal Dawson is widely and favorably known as a lecturer, educator, and author, of high repute for scientific attainments, and an earnest believer in Christianity. He says: "The standpoint of the writer is not that of a theologian or a metaphysician, but of a student of nature, who, while he has been chiefly occupied with investigations and teachings in Natural Science, has been a careful and reverent student of Holy Scripture, not with the view of supporting therefrom any particular school of theology, but of learning, for his own spiritual guidance, the mind of God." The lectures are a concise, but vigorous, proof of the harmony of Science and the Bible. In the outset, the author rejects the explanation of seeming discrepancies, that the Bible was not intended to teach science. The field of revelation is, indeed, in the domain of spiritual realities, wherein science confesses itself at fault; and it is eminently characteristic of the Bible that it refuses to commit itself to scientific or philosophical hypotheses and grasps firmly those problems most important to man as a spiritual being. Yet it does trench sometimes on the domain of science in its references to natural facts as illustrations of spiritual truths; and especially in its narrative of the Creation and its subsequent allusions to it. The author affirms that the accuracy of the Bible in these references is "remarkable—unexampled so far as I know in any other literature;" and proposes to show that "the order of creation, as stated in Genesis, is faultless in the light of modern science, and many of its details present the most remarkable agreement with the results of sciences born only in our own day."

In the prosecution of his argument in the first lecture, he presents the fact that we are indebted to the monotheism of the Bible

* *Nature and the Bible.* A Course of Lectures delivered in New York, in December, 1874, on the Morse Foundation of the Union Theological Seminary. By J. W. DAWSON, LL.D., F.R.S., F.G.S., Principal and Vice-Chancellor of McGill University, Author of *Archæia*, *Acadian Geology*, *The Story of the Earth*, &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1875. (Illustrated with 10 plates.) pp. 257. Price \$1.75.

for the knowledge of the unity of nature. "Even science has a right here to express its obligations to the Bible; for, had not this already taught the unity and uniformity of nature, it is doubtful if we would yet have emerged from the crudities of Greek philosophy, or would have achieved many of the great scientific triumphs of modern times." Thus it strikes the foundation from the superstitious and nature-worship of the heathen religions. "We find the great Hebrew law-giver, in the beginning of Genesis, grasping the whole material of heathen idolatry, whether in the heavens above, or the earth beneath, and bringing it within the compass of his monotheistic theology; and this testimony to the unity of nature pervades the whole of the Bible. Also, he places man on the throne of creation, as its lord under God, and lays beneath his feet all the created things which the blinded nations worship." In the remainder of the first lecture, the accordance of the Bible with nature is unfolded under four heads: The Bible is at one with nature in affirming the constancy of natural law; in holding the doctrine of progress and development in nature; in affirming use and adaptation in nature, in connection with the idea of design and final cause; and in recognizing type or plan in nature.

In the five remaining lectures, the following subjects are severally discussed: Biblical views of the Universe as a whole; the science of the earth in relation to the Bible; the origin and history of animal life in nature and the Bible; the origin and early history of man according to science and the Bible; review of schools of modern thought.

Many of the thoughts and arguments in these lectures are presented more fully in other works of the author. The lectures are incisive and suggestive, and deserve to be widely read.

A quotation is incidentally made from an address recently delivered in a Scotch university by a man of some scientific standing, who illustrated the ignorance of clergymen respecting science by the hymn:

"What though in solemn silence all,
Move round this dark terrestrial ball;"

and suggested that if Addison had substituted "splendid solar ball," "the hymn would have sung just as well, and would have had the advantage of being right instead of wrong, would not have shocked our convictions of truth and tended to destroy the respect that really educated men ought to have for religious in-

struction." We submit that what is most strikingly illustrated here is the Gradgrind realism and incapacity to appreciate poetry, characteristic of some professed scientists, whose skepticism is more conspicuous than their science. It reminds us of a change actually made in a hymn, by some of the German rationalists of the last century, from, "The world is all asleep," to "Half of the world is asleep," in order to insure accuracy. But what is most amusing is, and this Dr. Dawson suggests, that if the suggestion of this solemn critic were adopted and a change made which would cause "really educated men" to respect religion, we should sing, not as poetry, but as poetry rectified into exact science, the astounding assertion that all the fixed stars revolve around the sun once in twenty-four hours.

We quote one of Dr. Dawson's opening paragraphs: "The Bible states a fixed and distinct dogma as to creation, while science in its contemplation of the method of nature is progressive, and continually changing its point of view. The Bible stands like some great hoar cliff, which to the theologian, accustomed to view it always from one point, presents no change; . . . but to the scientific thinker, drifting on the current of discovery, its outline may perpetually change. It is natural to the one observer to believe that there is only one aspect which can be true; while it is equally natural to the other to think that the form of the cliff is liable to many mutations, or that it may even be a mere bank of cloud, which some strong wind of discussion may dissipate altogether. In contradistinction from both these extreme views, it is the duty of the Christian student of nature to endeavor to ascertain for any given position in the study of the method of the world, what are its actual points of contact with revelation, and to expose such misconceptions as may arise from partial and imperfect notions of either."

THE BIBLE REGAINED.*—The title of this volume is indicative of the author's purpose and plan. The Bible has been, according to his view, lost by reason of erroneous theological speculation. He proposes to regain it, and to give the true representation of God in his relation to man, by going behind these speculations to the Bible itself and tracing out the system of religious truth, in

**The Bible Regained, and the God of the Bible Ours; or the System of Religious Truth in outline.* By SAMUEL LEE. Boston: Lee & Shepard. New York: Lee, Shepard, & Dillingham. 1874. 16mo, pp. 285.

its outlines, as there set forth. The undertaking is a bold one and one which requires much thought and study, but those who are familiar with the writings of Mr. Lee, whether in his volume on Eschatology, or in his briefer articles in the *Quarterlies*, know that he is a man of thought and boldness. The latter quality is sufficiently displayed in the first pages of the present work, when he says that he would "sooner choose the Deity of some of the philosophers of Greece and Rome for his heart's trust and love than the God of Drs. Shedd, or Hovey, or Hickok," and, again, that he is "aware of the penalty attached to the law of regular succession in theology, and is ready to meet it;" and adds, "When John Brown was going to the gallows, he expressed the opinion that to hang him would probably be, to the cause he loved, the best use that could be made of him." The reader who follows the course in which the author develops the subject will find equally clear evidence, in the subsequent pages, that he has reflected much on the great theme on which he speaks, and that he has thought freely and for himself. We cannot help feeling a certain satisfaction, when a man of as true spirituality and as real mental ability as Mr. Lee has, speaks out his mind thus fearlessly. But we doubt whether the efforts of just this kind ever "regain the Bible" as successfully and as completely as their authors imagine. They see some errors in theology, or they see the over-pressing and too exclusive pressing of some truths, on the part of men who claim the strictest orthodoxy. But they are so engrossed, and often so distressed, by their view of these things, that they think the Bible is lost, when it is not, and think they regain it by some extreme and violent reaction from these particular errors—a reaction which carries them beyond the limits of truth, into equal or greater errors on the other side. Mr. Lee's book presents an illustration of what we allude to, as we think. He has been so impressed by the extremely harsh statements of some writers with regard to God's "looking with infinite complacency upon the lake of fire and brimstone, in which his depraved and sinning creatures are writhing in agony," and by the failure to present the great truth that "God is Love" in all its richness and fullness and beauty; that he has brought himself to believe that penalty is not an element in moral government, and that all the ordinary views of the atonement are little less than absurd. Mr. Lee testifies, indeed, to the effectiveness, in spiritual results, of the love side of Christianity in his own pastoral experience, and we

have no doubt of the truth of what he says. We have ourselves little sympathy with those who call this presentation of Christianity by hard names, as if penalty were the best and the sweetest thing spoken of in the Scriptures. But we do not believe the Bible is likely to be regained by leaving out penalty, or that God is quite as far even from what Mr. Lee calls the strictest old orthodoxy, as He was from the system of the Greek and Roman philosophers.

Mr. Lee's plan is a large one. It carries him from the Creation, through the Fall, the Antediluvian, Patriarchal, and Mosaic periods, to the Kingdom of Heaven as established by the Messiah, and to the disproving and rejection of the doctrine of Eternal Punishment as commonly held. He has, however, compressed his statements into a brief space, presenting, as the title of his book indicates, only the outline of the system of Religious Truth as he holds it. His great object seems to be, on the negative side, to show that one of the most fundamental errors in theology is that penalty is an element in moral government, and that out of this has sprung the doctrine of different persons in the Deity, of whom one, the Father, is sternly holy, and, hating sin and sinners, takes holy delight in punishing them, and another, the Son, is loving and kind and ready to suffer for men—making thus, as he claims, two Gods unlike each other; and, also, the doctrine of the atonement in its governmental and commercial forms, and of probation as limited to this world, and of eternal woe and despair for all sinners who do not accept the grace of Christ, even those who have been guilty of but a single sin, and, in a word, of justice as the primal element in the Divine character, the element to which all others are subordinate and from which the Divine happiness comes. In opposition to this fundamental error and those which are thus, more or less immediately, connected with it, he attempts, on the positive side, to show, by tracing the religious history of man and the Divine government over man from the beginning, as represented in the Scriptures, that the fundamental element in God is Love; that man, as made in the image of God, has the same thing as the fundamental element of his being when in his normal and true state; that "the moral government of God is simply and purely moral, and that consequently its sole appeal is to the moral functions, i. e., that penalty, as appealing simply to fear, is not and cannot be an element" in this government. "During the Theocracy, the moral and the civil were united in

the same government—the civil law, with its penalties, to be inflicted in time only, and the moral, with its moral influences, addressing the moral in the human constitution. In the Kingdom of Heaven, the administration of the Messiah is purely moral.”

These statements, drawn from the introductory pages of the volume, will give the reader the outline of the author's work, so far as its main design is concerned. The limits of this brief notice will not allow us to set forth, in any extended way, the mode in which he carries out his purpose. He believes that all the plan of God's government is, as he says, “purely moral;” that the atonement is to be explained with reference to this fact; that the reach of this moral plan is far beyond this life, so that men may have opportunities of reformation hereafter who have neglected them here; that the idea of eternal punishment, as commonly held, is a false one; that if there be any such thing, in any sense, it will be only because of a perpetual rejection of perpetually repeated offers and opportunities, and that, with regard to this, the Scriptures leave us in uncertainty.

Mr. Lee carries the Love side of the Gospel to its extremest bounds. His views with regard to judgment and the future are governed and modified, in considerable degree, by the theory which he presented in his earlier work, entitled “*Eschatology*.” Many persons, especially among those most attached to “the form of sound words” and those who give their lives to standing upon the “watch towers of Zion,” will think that, so far from regaining the Bible, Mr. Lee has lost it altogether. We do not hold this opinion ourselves, for we see evidences in many places that he holds fast to it and is only revolting against the harshness of views which are, perhaps, no nearer the Bible than his own. But whether all his readers, especially among the less thoughtful or less educated portion, would, after the perusal of his book, be as near the truth as they were under the guidance of their old teachers, we think may be seriously questioned. We are always a little doubtful about books which propose to “regain the Bible,” because they almost uniformly, as we said at the beginning, go too far, and because they are founded, often, on what is purely subjective to the writer. But, if they are read for the good there is in them, and for assisting the mind in a fair and honest investigation of the truth on all sides, such books may be not hindrances but helps towards the attainment of the truth. We think Mr. Lee has pointed out some errors in the views of

those from whom he most earnestly differs, but he has fallen into equally great or greater ones of his own.

McCOSH'S REPLY TO TYNDALL.*—This little book originated in an Introductory Lecture delivered in Princeton College to the Class in the History of Philosophy. This was afterwards written out and published in the *International Review*. This paper, with some additions, now appears in this book. President McCosh, in following Dr. Tyndall's course of thought, points out his remarkable blunders in his historical sketch, and criticizes his positions and arguments. He then considers "great principles overlooked by Tyndall, but having a deep foundation in nature," which are presented under the several heads of *Intelligence, Final Cause, Laws and Types, Life, Mind in Man, A Personal God*.

In discussing the present tendency of scientists "to fall back on the picturing power of the mind," and the rash "hypotheses about the origin of things, about world-making and world-ending," to which it has led, he says, "Mr. Mill is partly responsible for this." Yet Mill, in his *Logic*, prescribes severe principles regulating the use of hypotheses, which, if observed, would exclude these extravagances of the scientific imagination. For instance, he allows the use of hypothesis to aid in discovering an unknown *law*, and admits that in that case the hypothesis is proved to be a law of nature if "it explains the phenomena." But if the hypothesis is used to discover an unknown *cause*, it is not to "be received as true merely because it explains the phenomena." As an instance of the "legitimate employment of the hypothetical method," he mentions Newton's determination of the law of gravitation. In exemplifying the illegitimate use of the method, he says: "The hypothesis (of the vortices of Descartes) was vicious simply because it could not lead to any course of investigation capable of converting it from an hypothesis into a proved fact. The prevailing hypothesis of a luminiferous ether I cannot but consider, with M. Comte, to be tainted with the same vice. It can never be brought to the test of observation, because the ether is supposed wanting in all the properties by means of which our senses take cognizance of external phenomena. It can neither be seen, heard, smelt, tasted, nor touched. The pos-

* *Ideas in Nature Overlooked by Dr. Tyndall*. Being an examination of Dr. Tyndall's Belfast Address. By JAMES MCCOSH, D.D., LL.D., President of Princeton College. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1875. 12mo, pp. v and 50.

sibility of deducing from its supposed laws a considerable number of the phenomena of light, is the sole evidence of its existence we have ever to hope for; and this evidence cannot be of the smallest value, because we cannot have, in the case of such an hypothesis, the assurance that, if the hypothesis be false, it must lead to results at variance with the true facts." (Mill's *Logic*, B. III, chap. 14, §§ 4, 6.) The current hypothesis of molecules and atoms evidently falls under the same condemnation.

THE SOCIAL LAW OF GOD.*—This book is an indication of a feeling that exists in the minds of many that there is peculiar need, at the present day, of a distinct and emphatic preaching of the laws of righteousness. The impression is prevalent that the principles of truth, justice, honesty, integrity, and chastity have not that hold upon social life which they once had. "I have long thought it the pressing need of our time," says Dr. Washburn, in his preface, "to know the unity of Christian faith with the simplest laws of ethics." And again, in his first sermon, he says, "If there be a truth which needs to be preached in a time when our Christianity has become too often a theological opinion, or a ritual of the fancy, it is that the gospel is a law in its noblest sense; a law that rebukes the real sins of the household, the church, the social life, and demands of us a real righteousness; a law as rigid as the tables of stone, yet large as the mind of Christ."

We think that Dr. Washburn has done a good service in calling attention to this subject, and in discussing practical ethics on the basis of the Ten Commandments.

The sermons are written with clearness and force, with originality of thought and beauty of language.

CHRISTIC AND PATRISTIC BAPTISM.†—This is the fourth and concluding volume of Dr. Dale's Series on Baptism. In the preceding volumes he has treated successively Classic, Judaic, and

* *The Social Law of God. Sermons on the Ten Commandments.* By E. A. WASHBURN, D.D., Rector of Calvary Church, New York. New York: T. Whitaker, 2 Bible House. pp. 212.

† *An Inquiry into the Usage of Βαπτίζω, and the Nature of Christic and Patristic Baptism, as Exhibited in the Holy Scriptures and Patristic Writings.* By JAMES W. DALE, D.D., Pastor of Wayne Presbyterian Church, Delaware County, Pa. Philadelphia: Wm. Rutter & Co. 1874. 8vo, pp. 630. Price \$5.00; to clergymen, \$4.00.

Johannic Baptism. The volume before us is really two volumes in one. In Christic Baptism, he treats the teachings of the New Testament respecting Baptism. His definition is: "REAL Christic Baptism is a thorough change in the moral condition of the soul effected by the Holy Ghost and uniting to Christ by repentance and faith, and through Christ reëstablishing filial and everlasting relation with the living God—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. RITUAL Christic Baptism is not another and diverse baptism, but is one and the same baptism declared by word and exhibited (as to its purifying nature) by pure water applied to the body; symbolizing the cleansing of the soul through the atoning blood of Christ by the Holy Ghost." Patristic Baptism is an investigation of Christic Baptism as exhibited in the truth and error of patristic writers.

The volume exhibits the elaborate and thorough investigation characteristic of the preceding volumes. Whatever dissent there may be from the author's interpretation of particular texts, the series is a remarkably full thesaurus of information on the subject which it treats.

THE SECRET OF CHRISTIANITY.*—"This little book," as the author himself calls it, startles one by the audacity of its undertaking, the freedom of its generalizations, and the positiveness of its conclusions. Yet the reader is presently reconciled to the seeming presumption by the mature reflection, manly style, and ample information that pervade its pages. We hardly find in any new book, within the same compass, more suggestiveness, or larger results of thought and reading. Our curiosity is piqued to learn something more of the author, who gives us only his name. In these respects it reminds us of *Ecce Homo*, though not so remarkable as that work for beauty of composition. It makes a greater show of learning by frequent references to authorities not generally known or accessible. In the outset the writer says:—"This little book, it is easy to see, is one of grand pretensions. It promises to show the essential difference between Christianity and all other religions,—to describe the causes of that modern progress which has raised our life so far above that of antiquity." The "secret," as he regards it, we may briefly indicate as the many-sidedness of Christianity, by which it always opposes itself

* *The Secret of Christianity*. By S. S. HEBBERD. Boston: Lee & Shepard. New York: Lee, Shepard, & Dillingham. 1874. 12mo, pp. 210.

to the dominant tendency of any age in whatever direction it tends, as human thought always does in some direction, to excess. It holds all the fundamental or vital elements of truth as no other religion does, and hence at some point antagonizes and corrects every other. But the book may be better described by noting the subjects of the several chapters, of which the first relates to "the civilization of India." "There are two moral tendencies," says the author, "by the one or the other of which all ancient civilization was controlled. The one tendency turns the spirit to the outer world, to seek for objects of reverence, of support, and guidance." Under its influence "man becomes submissive and reverent: he is weighed down by a deep sense of his own unworthiness; he puts his trust only in an external and divine authority; he yields readily to every bond that may be placed upon him." This tendency ruled "the civilization of India." Its idealism made account chiefly of the Absolute, disparaging all phenomena as only shadows, and man among them, and disparaging the present as compared with the future. As India carried out this process of development, so Greece carried out the other, which "turns the spirit inward upon itself, teaching it to rely upon its own impulses and powers." Under its influence "man grows proudly conscious of human dignity: he trusts in his own intellectual energies rather than in things divinely revealed; he is animated by the spirit of enterprise and freedom." This "Hellenic civilization" is the subject of the second chapter. The third chapter treats of "the Essence of Christianity," which is defined as "Faith in Christ," and as having these two factors, "the love of a personal ideal, of the man Jesus," and "the sense of dependence and spiritual need." "Combine the two" factors, "and you have the most effective reforming influence that the world has ever known." The first factor or element embodies "the Hellenic tendency," "the other the Oriental." The fourth and fifth chapters treat of "the Catholic Age," particularly mediævalism, as having in ascendancy idealism, or the Oriental element, addressed to the sense of need,—this element having been required by the foregoing civilization. The sixth and seventh chapters treat of "the Protestant Age" as characterized by the Hellenic element in ascendancy, as seen in industrial movements, the progress of science, and the sentiment of freedom and equality. This, too, was called for by the excess of the other element, and could not have brought about its benignant results without

lessons and influences from that other. But this the author conceives to have mostly fulfilled its office. "It is quite evident," he says in the "Conclusion," "that the free humanistic spirit is rapidly approaching the climax of its development. It is sweeping forward to its final excesses. It has pushed the great body of men into a condition of doubt, of utter indifference to spiritual things, of intense worldliness, like that which characterized the last days of classical civilization. Hence, in accordance with its fundamental law, Christianity must soon undergo another transformation. The sense of spiritual need will again be aroused to its fullest activity. A new age of faith will begin." With this somewhat dogmatic and portentous utterance he stops. How Christianity will antagonize the tendency now dominant to excess, he does not tell us, nor claim to know. We may believe with him that, as his whole argument goes to show, the religion of Christ has resources for this as for every foregoing emergency. It will be asked, as in respect to *Ecce Homo*, how far this writer is "orthodox," particularly as "the essence of Christianity" would seem to invite a clear deliverance on that question. But he hardly goes beyond saying that "the theology of Christ has for its basis the doctrine of the Divine Paternity," and that He is "a perfect type of character," the "personal ideal," and also "not simply a Master to be loved and revered," but "a Saviour to be leaned upon." The absence of a more distinctive doctrine, when moreover it would fall into the line of his main argument, is significant. It occurs to us that the author is not wholly consistent with himself when he says that under the influence of the idealism of India man "is weighed down by a deep sense of his own unworthiness," (p. 9) and yet that it tended to "the weakening of the moral sense" (p. 24). We cannot but think, also, that as the author represents Buddhism to have been a protest against the Brahminical system, and the doctrines of Pythagoras and Plato against the Hellenic tendency, so there have been always exceptions to systems, and counter-currents to modes of thought, which are numerous enough and strong enough to weaken the force of such generalizations as the author chiefly delights in. Nevertheless, we must recommend his work as a suggestive and profitable handling of a great theme.

SACRED TABERNACLE OF THE HEBREWS.*—That one has willingly devoted the requisite time and labor to the preparation of so large a work as this on the subject of the Hebrew Tabernacle, is itself a fact that betokens a certain fitness for the undertaking, and all who know Mr. Atwater recognize in him the reverence, industry, fidelity, and patience, which it must demand. The preface tells us that in his "first year of theological study an instructor called his attention to the Hebrew sanctuaries," and thus "determined his specialty," and that "he retired from the pulpit," "after thirty years of work in the ministry," in order to give himself wholly to the subject, as he could not do in a pastoral charge. It shows too that he has availed himself of the modern and less accessible sources of information. One is reminded anew how the long and earnest study of the Bible has created for each department, however minute, a literature of its own, and how far German scholarship has carried the division of labor into every field. The work is divided into two books: the first, the *History of the Tabernacle*," comprising nine chapters, treating severally of the edifice, its furniture, erection, attendants, sacrifices, lustrations, calendar, migrations, and expenses; the second, the "Significance of the Tabernacle," in eighteen chapters, showing that it was significant, and setting forth its relation to the Mosaic revelation and to Christianity, its symbolism of number, form, color, and various substances, and the interpretation of the parts before noted, and recommending the study of it to Christian readers. Though "intended especially for clergymen," it is meant to be readable for Bible students generally, who will find here a mass of information and suggestions which they could not collect for themselves, and which will not only help their understanding of much of the Old Testament, but show them more clearly the light it sheds on the New.

THE WONDERFUL LIFE.†—Some writer, in noticing this volume, has said that of all the Lives of our Lord, multiplied as they have been of late years, it may seem surprising, yet seems most fit, that the best should be written by woman, for whose sex He has done

* *History and Significance of the Sacred Tabernacle of the Hebrews.* By EDWARD E. ATWATER. New York: Dodd & Mead, publishers, 762 Broadway. 1875. 8vo, pp. 448.

† *The Wonderful Life.* By HESBA STRETTON, author of "Lost Gift," "The King's Servants," etc., etc. New York: Dodd & Mead, publishers, 762 Broadway. 12mo, pp. 325.

so much. Without going so far as to call it the best in a department so diligently cultivated and successfully reaped by well-known writers, we can say that it fills a place no other has attempted to fill, and on the face of it appears well suited to its purpose. In the preface, dated Christmas, 1874, the author calls it too modestly "a slight and brief sketch," which "is merely the *story* of the life and death of our Lord," adding, "It has been written for those who have not the leisure or the books needed for threading together the fragmentary and scattered incidents recorded in the Four Gospels." "Of late years," she says, "these records have been searched diligently for the smallest links which might serve to complete the chain of those years passed among us by One who called himself the Son of Man, and did not refuse to be called the Son of God. This little book is intended only to present the result of these close investigations, made by many learned men, in a plain, continuous narrative, suitable for unlearned readers." The task, it will be seen, calls for care not only, but rare skill in composition, especially for simplicity, perspicuity, and ease. And while availing herself of the best aids, the writer has succeeded in adapting herself to the unlearned without being vulgar, and, we may add, to children without being childish. The matter is distributed in three books, each divided into short chapters. The first, entitled "The Carpenter," deals with the early life to "the first Passover." The second, "The Prophet," beginning with "John the Baptist," extends to the "last Sabbath." The third, "Victim and Victor," covers the closing scenes. Readers of every class will find a charm in the narrative. We should not wonder if it finds more readers than any of the more imposing volumes in whose track it follows with so much modesty and grace.

THE CHRISTIAN IN THE WORLD.*—By the will of the late Hon. Richard Fletcher of Boston, the sum of five hundred dollars is to be offered biennially, for the best essay, "setting forth truths and reasoning calculated to counteract worldly influences, and impressing on the minds of Christians a solemn sense of their duty to exhibit in their godly lives and conversation the beneficent effect of the religion they profess." The prize was awarded to the author of "The Christian in the World," in accordance with the provision

* *The Christian in the World.* By Rev. D. W. FAUNCE. Boston: Roberts Bros. 1875. pp. 326.

of the will of Mr. Fletcher. In the selection of a theme for the essay, the donor of the prize understood well one of the needs of our day, and indeed of all days, and we trust his legacy will be the means of great good.

The essay of Mr. Faunce is well written. The thoughts are often fresh and striking, and the book may be read with pleasure and profit. But the writer has attempted too much. There is not sufficient concentration of thought and purpose in the book. Nearly half the essay is devoted to what the author calls "principles," which have about as much relation to any other subject of morals or religion as the one on which he professes to be writing. Of the remaining chapters, that on Prayer is good in itself, but it has no special reference to the "Christian in the World." The two last chapters, one of them entitled the "Christian in his Recreations," the other, the "Christian in his Business," are the only chapters that have a specific relation to his theme, and a more full and forcible representation of the topics connected with these chapters would have answered the purpose of the donor of the prize, and would have been at the same time more interesting and instructive.

We hope that many valuable works will be called forth by the "Fletcher Prize."

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

HIGGINSON'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.*—Mr. Higginson has made an interesting book, one which young folks read with pleasure. In doing this, he has, at the same time, succeeded in bringing forward the most important facts which should enter into a narrative of this compass, and in their proper order. We wish that all writers and compilers of school-books would profit by the example which he gives of a clear, simple style. There ought to be some kind of a censorship of school-books, in order that those which are faulty in this respect should be visited with a just condemnation.

BRIEF BIOGRAPHIES OF LIVING ENGLISH STATESMEN.†—This book meets a real want. It is not an easy thing to find just the

* *Young Folks' History of the United States.* By THOMAS WENTWORTH HIGGINSON. Illustrated. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1875.

† *Brief Biographies. English Statesmen.* Prepared by T. W. HIGGINSON. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1875. 16mo, pp. 363.

kind of information which is here supplied. Mr. Higginson has furnished sketches of eighteen of the most prominent of the political characters of the English parliament: Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Disraeli, Mr. Bright, Earl Russell, Earl Granville, the Duke of Argyll, Lord Cairns, the Duke of Richmond, the Earl of Derby, the Marquis of Salisbury, Sir Stafford Northcote, Mr. Gathorne Hardy, the Marquis of Hartington, Mr. Forster, Mr. Lowe, Sir William Harcourt, Mr. Goschen, Mr. Childers. This admirable little volume is to be soon followed by another, which will contain sketches of English radical leaders; and by a third, devoted to French politicians.

MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS* (Vol. V).—The fifth volume of this work opens at the date of the Missouri compromise. Mr. Adams's hatred of slavery is declared in emphatic terms. "The impression," he says, "produced upon my mind by the progress of this discussion is, that the bargain between freedom and slavery contained in the Constitution of the United States is morally and politically vicious, inconsistent with the principles on which alone our Revolution can be justified,"—and much more of the same purport. He favored the compromise from love to the Union, but he questioned whether it might not have been better to call a National Convention and organize a new Union of exclusively free States. As we come down towards recent times, the Diary acquires an increased interest.

LIFE OF DR. GANNETT.†—The late Dr. Gannett was a man of upright character, of an honest and pure mind, and a warm defender of the Christian Revelation, in opposition to the infidelity which infected the Unitarian denomination in the closing period of his life. At an early day, he was one of the most decided and prominent champions of the Unitarian theology. He did not alter his doctrinal opinions, as far as we know; but, as he grew older, and circumstances changed, he naturally directed his energies more to the defence and inculcation of the truths which are held in common by Christian believers. His Memoir, by his son, is well written, and will be read with tender interest by the many who held the late Dr. Gannett in high esteem.

* *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, comprising portions of his Diary from 1796 to 1848. Edited by CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. Vol. V. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1875.

† *Ezra Stiles Gannett*, Unitarian minister in Boston, 1824-1871. A Memoir by his son, WILLIAM C. GANNETT. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1875.

ZSCHOKKE'S HISTORY OF SWITZERLAND* is used quite generally as a text book in the schools of the Swiss Republic, and furnishes a concise but readable sketch of the history of that very interesting country, from the time of the invasion of the Cymbri to the Sonderbund war of 1847. The relation of the Swiss to France, Germany, and Italy, has been so intimate for at least four hundred years, that the careful reading of this book will be found to throw much light on general European history for all that period. Mr. Albert Mason has published a new edition of the translation which was made some years ago by Mr. Francis George Shaw.

MISCELLANEOUS.

THE PROGRESS OF ASSYRIAN DISCOVERY.†—Year by year the wonder grows. Since the excavations by Botta and Layard, thirty years ago, began to uncover the buried architecture of Assyria, with its wealth of sculpture; especially since Rawlinson, Hincks, and others began to read and interpret the arrow-head inscriptions, there has been constant progress in the work of recovering the lost history of an empire that was carving on the rocks the names and victories of its kings, and covering the walls of its great palaces with its records, as long ago as when Egypt was building the pyramids. The wonderful revelations which the physical sciences have made, within the same period, are hardly more wonderful than the excavations which have brought out the long-entombed remains of Assyrian palaces and temples, and the decipherings which have extorted from mysterious letters on sculptured slabs, and on bricks and clay tablets, the secrets of a history and mythology that had dropped out of the world's memory almost two thousand years ago.

Mr. George Smith, one of the learned men connected with the British Museum, and already distinguished by his attainments in Assyriology, has made a new contribution to our knowledge of Nineveh, in a volume which will find not so many readers as it

* *The History of Switzerland.* By HEINRICH ZSCHOKKE, continued by EMIL ZSCHOKKE. Translated by FRANCIS GEORGE SHAW. New York: Albert Mason. 12mo, pp. 405.

† *Assyrian Discoveries.* An Account of Explorations and Discoveries on the Site of Ninevah, during 1873 and 1874. By GEORGE SMITH, of the Department of Oriental Antiquities, British Museum, Author of "History of Assurbanipal," &c., &c. With Illustrations. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co. 1875. 8vo, pp. xvi, 461.

might have found if the matter of it had been more thoroughly digested. In the year 1873, and again in 1874, he visited the region of the Tigris and the Euphrates, and made new excavations in the two localities where Layard made his memorable discoveries, Nimroud and Kouyunjik. He says of his two visits: "They were both of such short duration that they could not yield such complete or satisfactory results as I could have wished; but the great number of interesting inscriptions I discovered under such difficulties, and in so limited a space of time, ought to speak strongly in favor of completer and systematic excavations on these ancient sites." His operations at both sites, deducting time lost by the interference of Turkish officials, did not last four months in all. But he tells us, "So rich were these mines of antiquities that I obtained over 3000 inscriptions and fragments of inscriptions, beside many other objects. These inscriptions and objects were not of slight interest, but included some texts and antiquities of first-class importance." He reports large additions from these researches to our knowledge of early Babylonian history, and gives a formidable, though imperfect, catalogue of Babylonian monarchs, whom he regards as historical, from "Izdubar (probably the Nimrod of the Bible)" down to Cyrus the conqueror, B. C. 539. How far back the records of Babylonia reach, he does not yet presume to know; but he is sure of a date as far back as the twenty-fourth century before Christ. He finds also "new and welcome material for estimating the progress of Assyria in early times," and concludes "that the country gained a prominent place in the world much earlier than some have supposed." New light is thrown upon "the period of Assyrian history contemporary with the kings of Judah and Israel," and the Assyrian legend of the flood, so strangely coincident in many points with the story in the book of Genesis, though partly known before, is now "much more complete."

HITTELL'S HISTORY OF CULTURE.*—This history is intended to be "a manual prepared for the multitude" and "adapted to the comprehension of the million." It treats first of "Savagism," then of "Barbarism;"—as barbarians he treats the Quichuans of Peru, the Aztecs of Mexico, the ancient Egyptians, Hindoo Aryans, and Persians; then of "semi-civilization," the Pheni-

* *A Brief History of Culture.* By JOHN S. HITTELL. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 549 and 551 Broadway. 1875. 12mo, pp. 329.

cians, Carthaginians, Jews, and Chinese; then of "Pelagian civilization," "the Middle Era," "the Press Age," and "the Steam Age." A history thus covering the whole progress of mankind from the savage state to civilization, and the varied development of civilization in all ages and nations, and involving the discussion of the multiplied and complicated causes affecting it, is too great a work for one human life. The attempt to present so immense a subject in a manual cannot accomplish more than a cursory mention of the most prominent events and characteristics already familiar, and must necessarily be superficial and unsatisfactory.

The author announces his purpose thus: "I have done my best to compress within a few hours' reading the chief lessons of historical philosophy, to show that man is a progressive animal; that his advancement has been constant; that, though his speed has sometimes been checked for a brief period, relatively, his career has never turned backward; that the useful arts have made the chief epochs in history and are the main bases of civilization; and that progress increases in geometrical ratio with the course of time, and tends, since the beginning of the Iron Age, to greater liberty and the emancipation of human nature from the restrictions imposed on it by barbarism."

The breadth of the author's views and his capacity to judge of the motives of human action and to appreciate the great movements of history, may be inferred from his account of the Protestant Reformation: "It was started by a man who had no idea when he began of the point at which he would end. He became involved in a dispute about a question of ecclesiastical discipline, and it led him on until he had renounced the authority of Rome, and had repudiated many of its dogmas. The fact that Luther was an Augustine monk may have stimulated him in his disposition to attack the sale of indulgences which had been intrusted to the rival order of the Dominicans, and in his district to an unpopular and disreputable fellow named Tetzl, who was charged with spending part of his gains in gross and notorious debauchery." Of Mohammedanism, he says: "Islam is a tolerant religion. Its followers do not regard infidelity or heresy as criminal, and persecution for theological opinions has not been their rule. They never had an inquisition or witnessed the burning of an unbeliever under authority of law. . . . No wars of compulsory conversion like those of Charlemagne, no expulsion of unbe-

lievers, like that of the Moriscoes from Spain, stain the record of Mohammedanism."

TAINÉ'S NOTES ON PARIS.*—No one is better qualified to present one phase of life in the great French capital than M. Taine. He has given an additional piquancy to the present work by making it appear to be the result of the observations of a "Monsieur Frederic-Thomas Graindorge; a Frenchman by birth, who after receiving the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Jena, spent over thirty years in the United States, where he acquired a fortune in the pork and petroleum business. M. Taine professes simply to have edited the notes of this keen-eyed cosmopolite, who had lived long enough to have had all illusions dispelled. The book is a terrible satire on the hollowness of fashionable life in Paris.

NEW PUBLICATIONS.

Scribner, Armstrong & Co., New York City.

Hours in a Library. Leslie Stephen. 12mo. pp. 311.

Hours of Christian Devotion. Translated from the German of A. Tholuck, D.D. By Robert Menzies, D.D. Second edition. 12mo. pp. 541.

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ARTICLE I.—ON THE VALUE OF EMPIRICAL
GENERALIZATIONS.

Autobiography. By JOHN STUART MILL.

Three Essays on Religion. By JOHN STUART MILL.

ALL reasoning of whatever kinds has for its materials the contents of consciousness, and consists in the interpretation made of particular portions of them, or of the whole. What we deal with in any given process of thinking, whether the off-hand, habitual thought of every-day life, or the wider and more cautious considerations of science, or the widest comprehensions of philosophy, is necessarily some one, or several, or all, of our feelings and the ideas which appear along with them or have grown up out of them.

The materials being common to all reasonings alike, what is distinctive of any one System of Thought must be the interpretation put upon the materials. The Intuitionist Philosophy, which represents the intellectual activities, and more remotely the moral and emotional life of mankind from the earliest civilizations down to a period not very remote, is founded upon the conviction that the mind which we consult and make use

of has an independent, absolute authority of its own; an original infallibility, disturbed or eclipsed in careless thinking and perverse conduct, but ever awaiting recognition and ready to respond truthfully when interrogated aright. What we have to do is to clear away the cloud of error which has gathered around the mind, whether arising from the particular experiences of the individual, or floating in from the larger experience of society, or of the race; to penetrate to the interior oracle or light, whose disclosures when clearly ascertained are our ultimate truths. In this conception mind is an entity apart from all others, separated in origin, essence and destiny, by the deepest of differences from the body in which it resides and the material universe to which the body belongs. Its knowledge, therefore, of those experiences which come to it from the body and the universe is knowledge of its own. To say that it is supplied through the senses with phenomena of external things is to say that it has antecedent, innate powers of feeling, perceiving, remembering, and reasoning. It is able to declare on its authority that things perceived exist, and that the unvarying order perceived among them is an order which must needs be.

To this the Empirical Philosophy, which has never been wanting among men and now for two or three hundred years has been a distinctive form of their thought, replies, this that you say of the mind is quite inconceivable, and if you will take the trouble to give a definite account of it to yourselves you will see that it is absurd. You say that the mind is a separate entity which does not come as the body comes, or go as it goes, drifting into the universe and out of it with no visible parentage and pedigree. This is a grievous anomaly which it behoves you to explain. The soul cannot be left in that plight, an unacknowledged waif and foundling in the midst of a respectable universe, where all other things have been born legitimately by derivation from preceding things. Possibly you hold that it is self-existent? But self-existence is either existence from eternity, which is absurd, or it is self-creation, which comes to the same thing, for to create itself the soul must pre-exist, it must already be in order to begin to be. Do you say that it is the offspring of some other soul, or souls?

We know that the body is born of other bodies, and perhaps you mean that the soul is begotten of the parent souls when the body is begotten. If so, you have propounded a very grotesque and disagreeable hypothesis which you cannot seriously expect us to accept as the basis of a philosophy. What you really say for the most part is that the soul is a creation of Omnipotent Power, meaning by creation the making of something out of nothing, which is inconceivable, and the making of something out of nothing every time a new body is born in the regular course of nature, which is preposterous. In short, if you analyze your own statements you will see that you are shut up to a choice between two alternatives: either you must say candidly that you know nothing at all about the matter, in which case you are no philosopher and we will have nothing to do with you; or you must agree with us that mind is a function of body and so is accounted for, like respiration, or digestion, or automatic reflex-action, by a concurrent redistribution of matter and motion

This is the distinctive doctrine of the Empirical Philosophy, to which it has tended from the first and which in our day it more or less openly maintains. Mind has originated as all other things known to us have, by evolution out of preceding things. It is only an integrated assemblage of changes arising in a particular structure upon which are concentrated impressions delivered by surrounding objects. Multifarious motions of the material universe are transmitted from all directions through the senses to the focus of the brain, where they become, or where they arouse, the feelings which compose the mind. What we call a faculty of the mind so composed, as the faculty of perception, memory, imagination, and so on, is a tendency or determination of the sensations to fall into some specific order of arrangement or combination rather than some other; perceptions, memories, ideas, reasonings, themselves, are sensations so arranged or combined. Thus, when the impressions made by some supposed external object, as a man, a mountain, the moon, a star, are grouped with other impressions almost exactly like themselves, we either say that we recognize, or identify, the object as perceived; or else we say that we remember it, or have an idea of it, as perceived before. In

other words, the recurrence of a sensation, or a cluster of sensations, in the mind announces the persistence of an object, or assemblage of objects in the environment. To know all this familiar scenery of the heavens and the earth is to have the enduring feelings which they arouse. This is the primitive and permanent furniture of the mind; cognitions composed of persistently recurring sensations answering to persistent facts in nature. When the sensations aroused by an external object are grouped with others not exactly similar, but differing in detail, then we recognize the object as generally resembling other objects—as belonging to a species, or genus, or order; we have a cognition of the race of men, or the range of mountains, or the stars of the sky.

This process of the segregation and classification of sensations goes on automatically to a great extent in every mind. Without any deliberation or effort the determinate structure of the sensitive centre throws the feelings into a definite order as they arise. The most undeveloped and undisciplined intellect has an unconscious science and philosophy of immense variety and compass due to the inherited organization of the brain. Indeed, the positive additions to the contents of the mind made outright by reasoning are far less than might be supposed. The original sensations of the astronomer, the physicist, the biologist, the universal philosopher, are very nearly those of the peasant, the main difference being that they have undergone a notable redistribution. The units of composition are about the same, but the multiples are far more numerous and complex. To the boor a man is another boor who lives next door or on the next farm; to the anthropologist he is a member of the human race; to the biologist an animal, to the zoologist an organism, to the evolutionist an integration of matter and motion. The boor has all the sensations which enter into the wonderful multiples of the thinker; he knows men and animals and organisms and matter and motion; but the structure of his brain lacks this high compounding power. Finer organization enables the philosopher to assimilate the group of sensations answering to an external object with more and more extensive groups having more and more occult resemblances.

The most significant trait in the philosophic thought of our time is the disposition shown everywhere to push this process of classification to its farthest possible bounds; starting from the varied phenomena of the universe as presented to consciousness to find some character or characters in which they all agree, some common attribute by which they may be included in a single class. We may describe the modern philosopher as one who takes the widest generalizations reached in the several departments of science and out of the term or terms repeated in them all forms an ultimate, universal generalization. Science itself has been preparing the way for this final, triumphant synthesis, as the automatic classifications of the mind have prepared the way for science. Departments which were formerly supposed to be radically separate, and so were worked independently of one another, have slowly coalesced and consolidated along with the discovery of their fundamental community of character. Thus the histories of the various mythologies are yielding the science of comparative religion; the arts and literature of different races a science of expression; their languages, comparative grammar; their forms of society, comparative politics, or what is called "sociology"; all the studies which concern man are merged, or merging, into the comprehensive study of anthropology, and this into biology, and this again into zoology, or the science of the organic world. So formerly the geologist and the astronomer wrought independently of one another, but now are working in concert since it is found that the transformations of the globe run back to an age of incandescence originating in the evolution of the sidereal universe out of the primordial nebula. Again, it was not suspected at first that optics, acoustics, electricity, magnetism, chemistry, and physics had anything in common, but when it was decided that sound, heat, light, and the actinic rays are all agitations of some medium, or media, of transmission, the conviction arose that the changes going on in the material universe are, without exception, modes of motion. Indeed, speaking historically, the Undulatory Theory of Light is the most important event in recent philosophy. Men still call themselves psychologists, physiologists, physicists, and so on, but the bent of them all is towards the interpretation of

mind as an affection of matter, and of all affections of matter as modes of motion. Thus the special sciences have been converging from the first towards a universal philosophy, and there can be no doubt that sooner or later they will meet there. We have already what is claimed to be at least the prospective draft of this final philosophy in Mr. Spencer's *Theory of Evolution*. The ununified cognitions of men generally, and the partially-unified cognitions of scientific men, are summed up in the wholly-unified cognitions of the philosopher, expressed in the formula of the redistribution of matter and motion, which is the discrete form of the concrete proposition that force consists.

Now in what consists the value of this process of empirical generalization? This is a very grave question, none indeed graver, since the process is offered as the form of all thought and the proximate source of all knowledge. Imprisoned among my own sensations, I find that some of them are the counterparts, or copies, of some of the others, that they have a lessening resemblance to some of the remainder, and that all of them together, however they differ, still in somewhat are alike. Thus, I have an aggregate of sensations answering to what I call my most intimate friend; along with it I am conscious of other aggregates which I distinguish from the first by a few details and by the general fact that they are fainter than the first. Pursuing the comparison, I find that this particular aggregate has a diminishing but never quite ceasing likeness to others farther and farther away; that what I call my friend is not only the equivalent of what I call memories of my friend, but more generally is a sample of what I call the human race, and still more generally represents a kind of animal, or an organism, or most generally of all a particular integration of matter and motion. I may go on in this way tracing out likeness after likeness until the entire contents of consciousness are sorted into groups, the groups merged in wider and wider ones, and all at last summed up in a single class. But evidently the mere fact of resemblance is not in itself very interesting or instructive. The most that can be said for it is, that it substitutes a convenient order for confusion; a particular sensation takes rank with multitudes of others instead of

acting on its own account; a whole class coheres together as a unit, "moving all together if it move at all," so that the mind is a symphony instead of a babel. But beyond this the similarity of sensations means little, and the cohering of similar sensations means little until it is found that there is some Power, some efficient Cause, which determines the similarity and the coherence. The vivid impressions I have of certain familiar features and tones of voice, with the resembling faint impressions which accompany them, derive all their significance from the fact that they are produced by an active power or agent which I recognize as a person and call my friend. This it is upon which my real knowledge and my affections are founded. The persistence of similarity between the recurring impressions is in itself of no great importance; what is important is this certainty of a persisting Cause beyond them, which is a totally different thing. So with all other cohering sensations; what specially concerns me is not the resemblance of the effects but the power of the causes, and the former is a mere matter of course if the latter is known. Mr. Spencer has insisted at great length that the fundamental relations of likeness and unlikeness have given rise to all the other relations found among mental phenomena, the relations of co-existence, sequence, co-extension, co-intension, connature, and so on; but after all, the phenomena are significant, not because so related, but because of the productive powers, the self within and the universe without, which they declare.

The empirical generalizations, therefore, are good for nothing, or not much, unless it is shown that the resemblances on which they are founded carry such transcendental knowledge. To classify the effects is unavailing if their similarity or uniformity does not necessarily announce unity in their causes. Whether it does or does not one thing is certain; the classification does not cover the whole, or the larger, or the more important part of the thought. It is but an incident in the process, or at most a means to the end; when we have ascertained the likeness we go on to affirm, on whatever ground, that beyond the likeness there ~~is~~ the determining power. If, now, with Mr. Spencer we take the "impression of resistance" as the typical form of the ultimate unit by whose combinations in different multiples all

the complex states of consciousness are built up, we immediately find that it is not the classification, or synthesis, of the complex states which yields the notion of force or cause, but the analysis of the constituent unit, for this seemingly simple impression of resistance decomposes at once into an impression of a something which acts, an impression of another something which reacts, and an impression of the relation between the two. The empirical process cannot help us to a notion which is already given in advance, repeated at every step and involved in every term of the process itself. In other words, all those spontaneous or automatic classifications which constitute, we say, sensation, perception, and memory, and those voluntary classifications which constitute reasoning and produce philosophies, go on perpetually, taking for granted that very elemental cognition which accounts for everything, the actions and re-actions resulting in universal evolution, the "transcending" antithesis between subject and object. If, on the other hand, we hold with Prof. Huxley, as upon any strict construction of the theory of Evolution we must, that all mental action is automatic, then it follows that consciousness is the powerless accompaniment of certain bodily changes—is a cause of nothing at all within or without, and any classification or any decomposition of its contents, any synthesis or any analysis, which ventures on the affirmation of force, or cause, is sheer guess-work or flagrant *petitio principii*.*

* It does not appear to have been noted anywhere how completely Prof. Huxley's revival of Descartes' doctrine has cut away the ground from under Mr. Spencer's Theory of Evolution, and yet the doctrine is in the Theory. So great a man as Leibnitz, supposed that Descartes took up the notion to escape the necessity of granting something like consciousness and immortality to brutes, the truth being that his extension of the hypothesis of Vortices—the first draft of modern theories of Evolution—to the animal world, committed him to the doctrine. Any action that arises from a process of universal evolution is automatic action and can be no other. Mr. Spencer has simply taken the next step in order, and included Man as a product of universal evolution; and Prof. Huxley has simply drawn the inevitable conclusion:—Man, like the other animals, is a product of universal evolution; like the other animals, therefore, he is an automaton. Mr. Spaulding has been at much pains to show that he and not Prof. Huxley was the first one to make this surprising and beautiful discovery. It is a discovery of anybody only in the sense of picking up an idea which the Rationalists of the 17th century—Descartes, Malebranche, Leibnitz and their followers—threw away, not because they were not familiar with it, but because they considered it absurd.

What, however, we wish especially to insist upon here is, that in any case the generalizations founded upon the mere fact of resemblance between our feelings must fail for the perfectly simple reason that the resemblance fails. Granting that the phenomena of consciousness are effects of causes, and that persistent similarity between the effects announces unity in the causes—for if we don't grant this there is nothing left to talk about—still we must demand on exactly the same grounds that persistent *difference* among the effects equally announces plurality in the causes. Here, for example, at the very threshold of classification, is this antithesis “transcending all others,” never to be transcended itself, between Subject and Object, between Mind and Not-mind, or matter and motion. We may resolve each into its simplest form, or dissect each into its ultimate unit, but Mr. Spencer himself hastens to assure us that the forms, or units, are unassimilable and while Consciousness lasts must remain so. If they are not assimilable how can they be classified? for classification is assimilation. In all our experience of them, past, present, and to come, actual or possible, they stand asunder each with incommunicable attributes of its own; so that we are constrained to believe by Mr. Spencer's universal postulate itself, or by any other criterion of truth, that they are forever two separate things, and if they have causes, then that the causes are separate. So again, on passing from psychology to physiology, from mind to life, we find that the Living is separated from the Not-living by characters which so far as yet discovered are incommunicable. Nobody, unless Dr. Charlton Bastian perhaps, ever saw an inorganic mass of matter converted into an organism. The universal experience has been that living beings are born from other living beings, and that they should ever be born from lifeless protoplasm ought to be inconceivable according to the postulate. So once more and more evidently, if we pass from physiology to physics and bring our empirical process to bear

It is scarcely necessary to add that it leaves the discoverers in a hopeless predicament. E. g., if consciousness is only the reflection of molecular motions of the brain, motion and reflection arising simultaneously, then we have an assemblage of phenomena called sensations, which, if causes can be assigned for them, certainly *work no effects*, in other words, a denial of the conservation of energy; good psychology, perhaps, but very bad physics.

upon the phenomena of Motion, Matter and Force. Whatever we may be able to do in breaking down the separateness of Mind or Life, we can certainly do nothing of the sort with these, for by the very terms of our theory, Motion is continuous, Matter indestructible, and Force persistent, neither of them, that is, admits of transformation into anything other than itself. Their very character as primitive, fundamental postulates is a fatal bar to their admission within one universal formula—it is wholly out of the question that they should ever be assimilated, and so generalized, or unified. It turns out, indeed, upon closer inspection, that it is either a misapprehension of the facts, or an abuse of the terms, to say that Motion is continuous, for any given quantity of motion diminishes under resistance and ends in energy of position; the *vis viva* involved in translation through space is only a particular manifestation of Force, interchangeable with the tractions of gravity and the repulsions of resistance, which are its other manifestations. Assimilation is so far legitimate and intelligible, for it is yielded by the facts. But we cannot dispose of Matter in that way, for Matter is, in the most rigid sense of the word, indestructible. We may pare away its properties one after another until nothing is left of it but a property of resistance, which we also decide to be the elemental form of force; but in the darkest depths of our metaphysical haze we inevitably stumble over this clear certainty, that it is “inconceivable” that there should be resistance without a something which resists. In other words, Matter is one thing, Force another, and the “antithesis” between them is never to be “transcended.” Add that Force resolves itself into two forces, attraction and repulsion,* and that it is inconceivable that it should act in a vacuum, is it not clear that our process of empirical generalization has got beyond the length of its tether? that no comparison of our sensations will yield

* “We cannot decide between the alternative suppositions that phenomena are due to the variously-conditioned workings of a single force, and that they are due to the conflict of two forces. . . . Each of the suppositions [into which these two may be analyzed] makes the facts comprehensible only by postulating an inconceivability. . . . However verbally intelligible may be the proposition that pressure and tension everywhere co-exist, yet we cannot truly represent to ourselves one unit of matter as drawing another while resisting it. Nevertheless, this last belief is one which we are compelled to entertain. Matter

a fundamental likeness, or common character ample enough to take in these immense and indomitable differences of Persistent Matter, Persistent Attraction, Persistent Repulsion, and a Persistent Æther?

We are evidently nearing the brink of that metempirical abyss from which we are solemnly warned by all the danger-posts of Empiricism. Let us, however, take one step farther before we turn back to the safe ground of experience and the knowable. All along we have been using the words "matter" and "force," as if there were some one thing which answers to matter or force, as if either assemblage of phenomena could be put into the singular number along with one of our substantive nouns. "Matter," no doubt, *matter* is a noun of the singular number, but how about the *thing*? We ourselves have no particular objection to say that the thing is singular too; if the reader likes, we will take the doctrine of Descartes that extension is the essential attribute of matter and not resistance, so that all space is full, and matter, therefore, one. But the catastrophe which has overtaken the Cartesian Vortices is proof enough, if any were needed, that evolution cannot be derived from matter of that sort. A Theory of Evolution must be founded on the Atomic Theory. Matter is an assemblage of separate aggregates each of which is composed of a number greater or less of "ultimate units." What right have we to classify, or generalize, this infinite or indefinite number of units as "matter?" On the ground of their resemblance to one another? No doubt each atom is the duplicate of any other, for that is in the theory; but it has one supreme difference beside which all resemblances sink into nothing, that it is a completely distinct and individual thing never merged or lost in any other—for this is in the theory too. Let the reader

cannot be conceived except as manifesting forces of repulsion and attraction"—i. e. *matter can't be conceived except by postulating an inconceivability.* (*First Principles*, Pt. II, ch. 9.)

"The inconceivableness of its negation is that which shows a cognition to possess the highest rank—is the criterion by which its unsurpassable validity is known." *Principles of Psychology*, Pt. VII, ch. 11.

The meaning of this is that the dualism of persistent force upon which the whole Theory of Evolution is built is a flagrant contradiction of the "universal postulate" by which the validity of the Theory is to be known.

pause for a moment over this amazing atom, equipped with its atomic forces of attraction and repulsion, diffusing its influence by the æthereal medium throughout the universe forever; entangled in the concourse of other atoms, locked up in "solids," driven out in vapors, tortured in the combinations of chemical affinity, but never parting with its identity or any infinitesimal of its proper force; a persistently separate thing, having, therefore, if any cause at all, then certainly a cause of its own. Then let him remember that what we call "matter" and have been manipulating in our formulas as a single thing, is really the throng of these atoms, each with its cause behind it; that what we call "force" is really the play of these special forces of attraction and repulsion, no one of which is ever sent away from the atom to which it belongs, and each having, as before, if any cause at all, then a cause of its own; and finally, that what we call the "æther" is either a virtual denial of ultimate units and an affirmation of the infinite divisibility of a certain kind of matter, or else, if it have ultimate units of its own, then that there must be separate causes for them and for the forces with which they are endowed.*

We are quite well aware that all this is metempirics, or ontology, of the most scandalous character; but who is to blame? We have only admitted into the words the implications which it is impossible to keep out of them. Either the terms and propositions of the Empirical Philosophy are a mere *usus loquendi*, a particular way of putting things, a method of enumerating phenomena, good or bad, according as it is convenient or not; in which case there is nothing more to be said: or they contain an explanation; in which case there is this to be said, that it is the empirical process itself which has got us into metempirical confusion. It has cleared the track behind by piling up trouble in front, like a railway train in a snow-drift. Pursuing the dwindling resemblances, it is brought to at last by the growing differences—finds instead of the unity sought for, an inevitable plurality, a multitude of causes behind phenomena, or a most complex first cause; and so precipitates the old question of "sufficient reason," or final causes; the question, that is, whether these many efficient causes, or this

* See note below, p. 637.

complex first cause, can possibly have wrought out the universe as we find it, with its reciprocal adjustments and concurrent action, without something answering to personality, consciousness, intelligence, and will.*

II.

Here we might appropriately rest the case, were it not that the Empirical Philosophy claims, and is perfectly consistent in claiming, a far more important function than this one of satisfying the intellect by ascertaining the composition and order of phenomena. There is already, as sooner or later there could not but be, what we may call an empirical propaganda beyond the library and laboratory, bent upon the readjustment of the whole life of the individual, moral and spiritual as well as physical and mental, and the reorganization of society upon the basis of a few generalizations expressing the broadest, fundamental resemblances of things to one another. All changes within the bounds of our experience are redistributions of motion consequent upon different integrations of matter, and beyond the one persistent force which produces them all there is nothing which anybody knows or can know. This, or something like this, is the Credo and Paternoster which Prof. Huxley takes into the London School Board and Prof. Tyndall before the British Association,† which Prof. Beesly and Mr.

* "Even that school which is most accused of atheism doth the most demonstrate religion, that is, the school of Leucippus and Democritus, and Epicurus. For it is a thousand times more credible that four mutable elements and one immutable fifth essence, duly and eternally placed, need no God, than that an army of infinite small portions or seeds unplaced should have produced this order and beauty without a divine marshall."—*Bacon*.

† It should be observed, however, that Prof. Tyndall has an esoteric faith of a very different kind, which belongs to his "happier," extra-scientific moods, and which we are inclined to trace to the influence of Mr. Emerson. It has never been defined, but may be vaguely summed up as a recognition of the mystery of being, and answers to the consciousness of the Absolute, with which Mr. Spencer has contrived to suffuse his philosophy of the Knowable. No one can complain of it, for it is the source of much of Prof. Tyndall's literary power, and lends a charm to all his writings.

We may add that Prof. Tyndall has reason to complain of the very unequal justice visited upon him for his address as President of the British Association. What he did was to acknowledge at the end of an ample recapitulation of other people's opinions an inclination of his own to look for the promise and potency of

Harrison take into politics, Mr. Morley into history, Dr. Congreve into religion, and upon which Mr. Spencer is at the moment founding his "sociology." Over and above the question of the validity of the generalizations, we have, therefore, to inquire into their sufficiency for this further use that is to be made of them. Supposing their scientific and utilitarian values to have been determined, then what are their ethical and spiritual values? Of what service are they likely to be that Life of the Emotions upon which so much of individual character and happiness depends, by which families and States are held together, out of which all the arts, literatures, and religions of mankind have been born?

Life, emotional as well as any other, in Mr. Spencer's definition, is the correspondence between internal relations of the organism and external relations of the environment; that is, in less abstract terms, it is made up of our intercourse with surrounding things; whether it includes anything more than this, an intercourse, for example, with the Absolute Reality behind things, we will not stop to inquire. So much, at least, it is by common consent; from the phenomena of the outlying universe with their infinite variety and change come delight, admiration, reverence, love, the sense of beauty, grandeur, goodness, and sacredness; our household and social affections, which are the bonds of the State, the feelings which we put

all life in matter; whereupon the press of two continents fell to scourging him as a "scientist" astray beyond the limits of experience, dogmatizing upon subjects which he had no business to pretend to know anything about. But what, in the name of all consistency, is the theory of evolution but an elaborate affirmation that in matter, i. e., matter as endowed with force and capable of motion, is the source of all changes, including the changes which constitute life? Yet Mr. Spencer is not castigated for poaching beyond his own preserves, although his philosophy never claimed to be anything more than a "unification" of the several experimental sciences. The truth is that Prof. Tyndall put the idea bluntly into a single naked proposition, while Mr. Spencer has expanded it into octavos and drawn over it the delicate euphemism of "construing Mind and Life in terms of Matter and Motion." So much safer is circumlocution than an epigram; and we cannot but think that Prof. Tyndall should have known that we would all have forgiven him, if, instead of a rider to his Address, he had favored us with a "Synthetic Philosophy." Perhaps, if he has advanced beyond the stage of development recorded by himself some years ago, when so far from having a Theory of the Universe, he could not even pretend to a theory of magnetism, it is not yet too late for him to redeem as a philosopher the character he has compromised as a "scientist."

into marble, or verse, or ritual, come from these, if from nothing beyond. How commanding and how comprehensive this higher life is, even upon the most guarded description of it, any one can see; and our complaint of the empirical generalizations is, that the very deficiency which impaired, as we suspected, their scientific value, more palpably and fatally impairs their ethical, or poetic, or religious value. We do not say now that they are false; if need be, we will grant that they are true. What we do now say is that they are uninteresting, prosaic, and profane, having small power to minister to those emotions which are the better life of any man or of any people. And the reason why they are so is, that in their pursuit of the characters which all phenomena have in common, they leave out the characters by which any one phenomenon is differentiated from the rest. That *individuality* which is the principal source of our best feelings is forgotten for a community of nature whose power over the feelings is in an inverse proportion to its breadth and comprehensiveness.

Let us take as an illustration the most satisfactory generalization of recent science, the undulatory theory of heat and light. All the splendors, colors, and warmth of the universe are believed to have this in common, that they are waves of motion propagated through an æthereal medium as sound is a wave propagated through the medium of the air. A burst of thunder differs from a flash of lightning, the heat from the light of a fire, the white splendor of noonday from the hues of sunset in that the wave of transmitted motion is in some way more or less than the other waves. So far as the objective phenomena are concerned, it is quite as correct to say that we hear the flash of lightning or see the thunder as to say what we do when we hear thunder and see lightning. In all cases we equally perceive certain modes of motion and in none do we perceive anything more. This generalization is so sufficient that "it accounts for all the phenomena of reflexion; for all the phenomena of refraction, single and double; all the phenomena of dispersion; all the phenomena of diffraction; and all the phenomena of polarization"—briefly, for all the phenomena there are, with the trifling exception of the phenomena as they

* Prof. Tyndall. *Lectures on Light.*

are directly known to us, the *sensations* of sound, light, and so on, which appear within consciousness; and considering that the phenomena it *does* explain are only known as inferences from these it does *not* explain, it might perhaps be objected that the explanation is incomplete. Nevertheless, on the intellectual and utilitarian side the formula that all these wonderful diverse appearances are modes of motion remains the most satisfactory and beautiful generalization since the discovery of gravitation. But when we pass from explanation to enjoyment, from reasoning to emotion, the case is distinctly otherwise. Let anyone sit down before the next sunset, or autumnal splendors of an American forest, or come over into the Mediterranean during the wonderful midsummer calm when the sea gives itself up to undisturbed communion with the cloudless and intense sky, and try the formula on his own feelings. He will find at once not only that it is helpless but that it is irrelevant and in the way. So far from being lifted by it into any more vivid sense of loveliness and magnificence and power, he will feel a nameless deterioration passing over the face of heaven and earth. "The vision and the faculty divine," what is most purely spiritual in his own consciousness, dies within him; "the light that never was on land or sea" fades from the world around him. The explanation is that, independently of all the prosaic conclusions drawn from it, the empirical generalization begins and proceeds by excluding the characters which differentiate phenomena, and in these characters are the real sources of feeling. Light is glorious, not as a mode of motion, for heat is all that, but as light, and music is melodious not as motion but as music. So of any of the varieties of sounds, light, and color; so of any of the objects which they reveal to us; their poetic or spiritual values are in the differences which constitute the individual and not in the similitude which constitutes the class.

The case, however, is not quite so simple as we have stated it here. This individuality upon which emotion dwells and which reasoning suppresses is not an individuality out of relation, for all things are bound up together as parts of a whole. There must therefore be some law of association for feelings as well as for ideas. For example, to take the first

illustration that offers: I happen to have been watching for a week or two the blowing of a solitary rose in my window seat, above which hangs the cage of a canary, a great and sweet singer, and beyond which lie blue breadths of the sea and the sky. The unfolding of the flower advances melodiously with an accompaniment of song, rhythm answering to rhythm as it were—for all change is motion and all motion rhythmical—while its deepening crimson borrows a contrasted charm from the deep azure outside. Sometimes an unexpected similitude appears here, for there are times of perfect calm when the transformations wrought between daybreak and dark upon the bosom of the Mediterranean remind one of nothing more than the blooming of a flower—are a kind of efflorescence of the sea. To these associations, which would be rather far-fetched if they did not come of themselves, it is easy, by a little invention, or by help of the poets, to add many more, as Tennyson's characteristic line,

God made an awful rose of dawn;

until at last the full-blown rose is loaded with a wealth of various suggestion and allusion. Upon reflection I find that these fanciful analogies have a surprising basis in fact; their charm, whatever it may be, is no "pathetic fallacy," not in the least dependent, as it has so often been supposed to be, upon illusion, but upon reality; and the question directly arises how it happens the poetic assimilations are so much more interesting than the empirical. We come back at once to our previous explanation. In both the resemblances are real, indeed if we follow them far enough are ultimately the same, but the former have not only maintained, they have heightened the individuality of the flower by the associations from far and near with which they have surrounded it. It is more than ever, by very reason of its suggestiveness, an original thing which never was before and separate from all others, a kind of significant personage, full of manifold meanings but with an incommunicable life and loveliness of its own. "A fact," says the philosopher, "is a stupid thing until brought into connection with some general law," but the first step of the poet or the artist is to isolate his fact, and then to throw it into yet bolder relief, to accentuate

its individuality, by gathering about it all manner of similitude and symbol. Here, for instance, are some of the earliest lines of Wordsworth:—

I've watched you now a full half-hour
Self-poised upon that yellow flower;
And little Butterfly! indeed
I know not if you sleep or feed.
How motionless!—*not frozen seas*
More motionless!

the startling image of the frost-bound sea serving to bring out vividly the inexpressible stillness of the butterfly on the flower. This trifle is a sample of a great deal of Wordsworth's poetry, especially of those audacities which kindled the wrath of the critics fifty years ago. The Lake Poets, it was complained, make their art offensive by the meanness of their topics; they violate all proportion and the fitness of things by going into irrelevant raptures over matters beneath serious notice, wasting upon butterflies and daisies an amount of emotion which would have been extravagant to spend on the tremendous topics of Euripides or Lucretius. There was force in this criticism; certainly it is applicable to much of the subjective twaddle which passes for poetry to-day; but in Wordsworth's case at least, it was only an unexpected application of the old art, or artifice, of individuation which has characterized true poetry from the first. That separateness and newness of quality and that wealth of meaning which had been sought for in exceptional events or among eminent personages, Wordsworth found so abundantly in common things, the scenery and people of every-day life, that he refused to go any farther for his inspirations. So the butterfly stands out on his canvass as motionless as the polar sea in midwinter, the "small celandine" is ushered in with the pomp of a newly-discovered star, the beetle steps forth

A mailed angel on a battle day *

* Glasses he had that little things display,
The beetle panoplied in gems and gold
A mailed angel on a battle day.

* * * * *

There did they dwell—from earthly labour free,
As happy spirits as were ever seen;
If but a bird, to keep them company,
Or butterfly, sate down, they were, I ween
As pleased as if the same had been a Maiden Queen.

and the protagonist of the *Excursion* is a retired pedlar. To the Edinburgh Reviewer this sort of writing will always seem a kind of solemn trifling, but the effect of it was to bring down poetry out of the clouds and the cloister into the real life of man, and to make it illustrate, in homely fashion, as no one had ever done before, the law which governs the entire range of our feelings, domestic, social, æsthetic, or devotional. To the poet the primrose by the river's brim is very much more than a yellow primrose; it is this particular primrose, which never was before, having a small history, an expressive physiognomy and grace exclusively its own, over which he pauses to weave all manner of fancies and tenderness; a rather comic pause no doubt, when the poet is a middle-aged gentleman with a family and a stake in the country, perhaps a stamp-distributor or an exciseman. But then what is an affection, what is having a home and a stake in the country, or a faith and a devotion, what is powerful emotion of any kind but a pause over some object which fills the mind for the moment to the exclusion of others? The fact is, if we go to the root of the matter, this law of the emotions is a primary law of all thought, for by common consent of the philosophies, consciousness is so constituted that it can attend distinctly to only one thing at a time; its states, however composite, are dynamically single states which succeed each other one by one, so that, rigorously speaking, the whole process of comparison and classification which now-a-days is set to do so much, is subsequent and subordinate to our consciousness of the individual thing itself. To perceive, to remember, to imagine, especially to reason, is no doubt to classify objects by their likenesses, but long before this, and most of all, it is to *feel* the objects as they actually are in themselves, while an emotion is such a feeling prolonged, intensified and added to.* The primitive fundamental thought, and all the sympathies, interests, and affections, which together make up the real life of any of us, are a dwelling pathetic or meditative, upon particulars as they arise in consciousness one after another.

* This brings us back to what was remarked above, at p. 611, that it is not the synthesis, or classification of the composite states of consciousness which supplies the fundamental idea of philosophy, but the analysis of the constituent unit.

Now the effect of this natural, spontaneous action of the mind, which fills up in this way the larger and nobler portion of our life, is necessarily to multiply to the utmost the profusion and the variety of the universe about us. Association is used to heighten individuality and individuality brings out the interminable differences and the multitude of things. By segregating and emphasizing each particular object in turn, we diversify the whole. But to the faculty of reason, which has special exigencies of its own, which seeks to comprehend things, to get at their order and give an account of them—a motive unknown to pure emotion—this multitude and variety of the universe is intolerable. Entangled and bewildered among the details, its first step is to get rid of the individualities which are so indispensable to emotion; to find repose and ease among the characters in which things are alike, the universal forms by which whole assemblages of phenomena may be held together and handled as one; those similitudes, for example, which enable us to speak of all men as “man,” all organic action as “life,” all atoms as “matter,” all changes as “motion,” all attractions and repulsions as “force,” and so on. This is a release and an equipment for the intellect of inestimable value. For the intractable concrete phenomena we substitute the convenient similitude, for the similitude the abstract term, and out of the abstract terms we build the general proposition; happily rid of the bewildering universe out of doors, armed with our simple, omnipotent calculus and a sheet of paper, we sit down to the most surprising and beautiful discoveries; and ever as we advance the better off we are, similitude merging into similitude, term into wider term, proposition into more general proposition, and into the universal formula at last whose ample circumference comprehends all things—except, perhaps, the incomprehensible universe out of doors. But meanwhile the penalty we pay for this disembarrassment and facility and power is the suppression of emotion; for emotion will not flow after the generalizations, though they widen never so beautifully, but clings in the most unphilosophical way to the concrete and the individual, the ungeneralized, ununified world outside. Already, for instance, when the flower in the window is classified as a rose, somewhat of its peculiar and original inter-

est is gone. Involved as the classification is in the very act of perception, needful as it is for the purposes of thought and of speech, its effect as we dwell upon it is to check feeling, for so far as the characters common to all members of the family are concerned one rose is as good as another. As the generalization widens, the charm goes on dwindling; the flower is less interesting as a plant than it was as a rose, less interesting as an organism than it was as a plant, and finally, when we touch bottom and introduce it to the fancy and the imagination as an integration of matter and motion, it is worth no more than the soil in which it is rooted or the pot in which it grows. How costly the process is may be best seen in the domain of our social affections. A formula yielded by all the relations of co existence and sequence, expressing the small residuum in which the entire universe participates, is totally inapplicable by the fireside, or in our friendships, or in our estimates of men: or, if applicable, then mischievous. I find as a matter of fact that no mental effort enables me to look upon my best friend as a mere "integration of matter and motion." This apparently is not the external relation to which the internal relations of my consciousness have been "adjusted," or if by some prodigious intellectual *tour-de-force* I do succeed in resolving all these affecting qualities which I have never found combined after this fashion in any other into the ultimate generalization, so that what seem to me to be the intelligence and strength of his will, the original cast of his character, the excellent efficiency of his life, are only the helpless spectra of cerebral excitations, behold my interest in him has vanished. My enemy fulfils the formula quite as well as my friend. So too of what avail is it to tell us that Dante or Luther or the Crusades or the French Revolution is a "concurrent redistribution of matter and motion?" The intellect, to be sure, is rid of certain perplexing contrasts and certain profound problems, but the imagination is paralyzed on the spot. So is Tetzels or Tupper or the Ashanti War a concurrent redistribution, etc.

Socrates, informed by the Eleven that he is to die at night-fall, sits down to spend the last hours of life with his friends. It so happens that he has been facing death now for many days, for the sacred ship returning from Delos has been detained by

adverse winds and until her coming the city cannot be polluted by a public execution. Perhaps the disciples, who have borrowed for the interview a composure not their own, interrupted now and then by that pathetic laughter which is apt to play around the cloud of restrained suffering and breaking at the last into irrepressible tears, have looked for some sign in their master too of disturbed consciousness and impending doom; not affright, or the affectation of courage, since they must have known him too well to look for that, but perhaps some unwonted ecstasy, or inspiration of death. It appears, however, at once that the only change which has taken place in him is a certain tranquil exhilaration, which touches with a last refinement the play of every faculty and brings out his innermost soul, so that the Socrates of this last day is the old, familiar Socrates of the Agora and the Lyceum, only more distinctly and wholly himself than ever before. There is the same sly, or bluff humor, the same keen, yet considerate and forbearing irony, the same transparent veil of comic make-believe through which so many luminous truths and so many gracious tendernesses have often shone before, the same intrepid, uncompromising dialectics—in every particular the wonted temper, manner, and methods of the man; but in the midst of all this and by means of it all, the appropriate summing up of the philosophy of his lifetime, at its closing hour, in the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. For death to Socrates is deliverance from the stains, the concealments, the deceptions of the body, from the fluctuations of phenomena and the falsifications of sense by which philosophy is perplexed and thwarted; the escape of the disimprisoned soul, *unclothed* and in its right mind, into the realm of Absolute Beauty, Goodness, and Truth, by which philosophy is consummated. Thus this last day is the fulfillment and coronation of an incomparable life, a life so unexpected at the time and so inimitable every since, that in all the chronicles of humanity there is only memory which overshadows this one, only one other scene for which we forget the death of Socrates. How is it possible to take the empirical formula into the contemplation of either of these two scenes? Let us suppose that the formula does effectively include and explain

every one of the phenomena around which the compassion and the reverence of men have gathered, out of which incalculable inspirations have been flowing, ever since; with Professor Tyndall that in matter are the promise and the potency even of these supreme manifestations of life; with Mr. Spencer that all this is but a redistribution, or the product of a redistribution of motion; is it not certain that the very sufficiency of the formula is fatal to the beauty, or the pathos, or the grandeur of the fact—the satisfaction of the intellect involved with the disappointment of the imagination and the heart? Socrates is more intelligible than I had supposed him to be, but the splendor and the loveliness of Socrates have vanished in some way with the individuality of Socrates, whether I will or no. So it is always and everywhere. What is true in these exceptional instances is true in different measure of everything whatsoever which has any appreciable character and life of its own. Human emotion dwells among the concrete realities and depends upon the differences and separateness of things, the incommunicable qualities which constitute the individual; and by an inveterate instinct or necessity of our nature it shrinks from following the reason into the region of abstract generalizations and universal forms, for ever thinning out as their circles widen; which reduce all things, not only to a common denominator but to equivalent values. What can it do with a process to which Socrates is no more interesting than any other Greek, the Greek than any other man, Man than any other aggregate of matter? with a Law of Evolution and Dissolution which is given by a dozen atoms clashing together in a cubic inch of æther as completely as by the illimitable universe itself?

This antipathy of pure emotion to pure intellection is at the root of, or to state the case more adequately, includes, the conflict between religion and science, in so far as religion is the expression of one mode of emotion. A religion of any kind, from fetichism to Christianity, from polytheism to pantheism, or to Mr. Matthew Arnold's "stream of tendency," or even to Mr. Spencer's Unknowable Absolute, is the discrimination of some active force, power, cause, which we individualize, distinctly or vaguely, and which we invest with the highest associations known to us. Disguise our processes, guard our terms as we

will, the object of religious thought and feeling issues as a kind of Person which gathers to itself the noblest suggestions of the universe about us and of our own interior consciousness. It wears the robe of infinity and eternity, is possessed of the faculties of intelligence, volition, beneficence—is an *alter ego* with the limitations struck away. We may brand this as “anthropomorphism” if we like, as a degradation of the Most High to our own rank and kind, but we can’t alter facts. This is religious feeling acting within the limits and according to the constitution of the human mind; and so long as man is religious at all he will be so after this fashion and no other; will cling to his gods and resent any generalization of the phenomena of universal Being which sets them aside or swallows them up. No doubt other and more sordid interests have complicated the issue; the conflict between science and religion has been entangled with the conflict between science and the church. But this has never been the main thing and in our day is of less import than ever before. The roll of the “drum ecclesiastic,” to which Professor Huxley replies ever and anon with all the indignant trumpets of persecuted intelligence, seems to us to have subsided into a sort of conciliatory tattoo which ought to reassure the most apprehensive, and soothe the most irritable empiricist. But if science has less to fear than ever before from the extinguished thunder of episcopal anathema, there yet remains, however depressed, however bewildered, however inarticulate, the abiding profundity and power of man’s emotional nature, which will assuredly sweep away the dikes of empiricism unless empiricism can content it, as it has swept away other repressive dogmas and institutions before.

This dualism between the intellect and the emotions includes too the “quarrel between philosophy and poetry,” ancient already in the days of Plato* and vigorous as ever in our own. Perhaps its fraukest expression on the part of the poets is in the bitter lines of Keats:—

Do not all charms fly
At the mere touch of cold philosophy?
There was an awful rainbow once in heaven;
We know her woof, her texture; she is given
In the dull catalogue of human things.†

* *Phædo*, *Symposium*, *Republic*.

† *Lamia*.

It appears even in the far more catholic genius of Wordsworth :

Nature was at his heart as if he felt,
Though yet he knew not how, a wasting power
In all things that from her sweet influence
Might tend to wean him. Therefore with her hues,
Her forms, and with the spirit of her forms
He clothed the nakedness of austere truth.
While yet he lingered in the rudiments
Of Science and among her simplest laws
His triangles—they were the stars of heaven,
The silent stars !*

That is, he mitigated the austerity and wasting power of the abstractions by translating them into the concrete living realities—the triangles fed his imagination through the splendor and the silence of the stars. Everywhere in the poetry and in the plastic art of the race there is traceable this consciousness, or instinct of aversion to the simplifications of philosophy as threatening the sources of inspiration in the mysterious charm of the universe. And this consciousness, most articulate in religion and in poetry, is the accompaniment of all emotion whatsoever; is wrought into the life of everyone of us, into the structure of every society, into the whole development of civilization. It is not the Bishop of Lincoln with whom Prof. Huxley has to reckon, but with—well, with Prof. Huxley; that is with the constitution of our nature, the appointed channels and the uncontrollable flow of the life of man.

But the most remarkable thing here is that philosophy itself is quite aware of all this, has in a sort confessed judgment from the first by an uneasy consciousness of its own that the abstractions in which it ends at last are, in themselves, powerless to satisfy the heart and occupy the life of man. This feeling is the real secret of Prof. Huxley's sensitiveness to the fulminations of the clergy; it prompted Prof. Tyndall when he "rose to explain" after his address before the British Association; and it has profoundly modified, not only the tone, but the very form of Mr. Spencer's exposition of the universe. There is an air of deprecation, rising now and then into anxious disclaimer, which pervades all that Mr. Spencer has written; a perpetual halting on the brink of the abyss, a perpetual suggestion of

* *Excursion*, Book I.

magnificent alternatives, which, if it confuses his meaning upon every critical question of philosophy, has spread around his system as a whole a kind of luminous haze of non-committal, a guardian atmosphere of conservatism as remarkable as anything in philosophical literature. The exact definition of half a dozen general terms would convert the Theory of Evolution into blank materialism or into pantheism, or even, as a critic has suggested, into a form of pure scholasticism. Mr. Spencer hesitates to define from no unworthy motive, but from this suspicion common to thinkers of all the schools, Intuitionist as well as Empirical, that after all the game is hardly worth the candle, that life is none the ampler or richer for the discovery of universal forms and ultimate truths, the universe no more intelligible, or if more intelligible then less impressive than it was before. "The last worst calamity," says Sir William Hamilton, summing up the opinions of some of the greatest of his predecessors; "the last worst calamity that could befall man as he is at present constituted, would be that full and final possession of speculative truth which he now vainly anticipates as the consummation of his intellectual happiness"—a startling confession if ever there was one. What is philosophy good for if *this* is the whole of the matter? Why should we philosophize, i. e., set off after truths whose possession is a last worst calamity? Because, says Sir William Hamilton, the pursuit itself is a delightful and wholesome exercise; and he seems to think that this is the justification which philosophers have always trusted to. "The intellect," says Aristotle, "is perfected not by knowledge but by activity—the end of philosophy therefore is not knowledge but the energy conversant about knowledge;" so Richter: "It is not the goal, but the course, which makes us happy": and Burke: "In this pursuit, whether we take or whether we lose our game"—whether we discover the truth, or lose it, or take an error for the truth—"the chase is certainly of service." All of which recalls Mr. Anthony Trollope's famous apologia for fox hunting; nobody cares anything about the fox *quâ* fox; indeed when you come to think about it the slaughter of the captured brute is a wretched business; but the chase is a **very** glorious and wholesome thing. But this explanation will not

do at all in philosophy, for apart from the fact that it puts a premium upon obscure truths and reduces speculative truth and speculative error to the same value, there can be no sincerity and so no wholesome exercise in the search if we are convinced that discovery and possession are a "last worst calamity." We are already in possession of verities which do directly and efficiently minister to our happiness. Why leave

The common growths of mother earth,

the available phenomena of the world about us, among which our emotions are at home, where our life belongs, to go into the wilderness after disappointing abstractions—an exodus without any promised land? Accordingly it will be found that in fact philosophy has always played the game for the stakes; whatever its misgivings as to the results, it has betaken itself to the pursuit of abstract truth, not for the sake of the mental discipline involved, but for the sake of the truth. Plato, whose works are less a system of philosophy than an exposition of the supreme importance of philosophizing, begins by proscribing outright the emotions of which the poet, the artist, and the natural man make so much, as belonging to the inferior, that is the bodily and mortal part of our nature. Emotions are the excesses of sensation; sensation involves the distortion and misrepresentation of exterior phenomena; and the phenomena themselves are in perpetual flux and transition. The world, as directly known to us, is full of unreality and illusion by reason, first, of its own changefulness, and, then, of the false reports of it which are given in to us by our senses. Nothing, therefore, can be vainer, nothing more mistaken and more disappointing than the ordinary life of man, including all the institutions and arts which have grown out of it. The inner and outer life of the individual; the relations of the family; the relations of the sexes; the forms of the State; the pursuit of pleasure, wealth, fame, power; music, poetry, painting, and sculpture; all these are sensation or the expression of sensation, and there can be no beauty, no goodness, no justice, no right order in them, since that upon which they are founded and of which they consist is organized illusion. Hence first of all we must abolish the old false laws and order; we must put away the foolish tales of the gods; we must suppress the fam-

ily; we must exile the poet; and for our individual selves we must escape from the sensible impressions of the world about us, and the passions which they produce, into the seclusion and silence of the soul, to the end that we may begin there, in the pure radiance of the intellect, the study of truth and right anew. But unhappily the soul is indissolubly bound up with the body while life lasts; intellection ever goes on with sensation, pure thought is ever beclouded or dazzled by the phenomena which throng in upon it from without. How then are we to effect this needful renunciation and escape? There is only one way; we must save ourselves through philosophy; by careful collation, comparison, and classification, we must work our way inwards from the shifting and illusory multitude of our sensations to the stable *similia in multis*, the simple, persistent characters in which sensations agree and are at one. For example: from our varied and confusing impressions of what seem to us to be beautiful things, or acts, or events, we must penetrate to that abstract, abiding Beauty which is represented in them all; from our impressions of things which are temperate, or becoming, or virtuous, or courageous, or just, we must elicit the anterior, universal Temperance, Fitness, Virtue, Courage, Justice. So of all our innumerable sensations; we must escape from their thralldom and correct their deceptions by putting them together and so abstracting the characters which are common and constant, not true of them now or here, but everywhere and forever. So far the process is pure empiricism, but the results are metempirical; for inasmuch as sensations are joint products of the soul and the body, modifications of the soul determined by actions of its environment, it follows that these "*similia in multis*" are not only the general forms, or Species, of exterior phenomena, but moreover also are innate Ideas of the soul itself, not originating in phenomena but only aroused or revived by them; standing forth, therefore, the clear expressions and the sure pledges of the soul's separateness, pre-existence, and immortality. This is not all, for this marvelous correspondence between soul and body, between subjective Ideas and objective Species, neither of which produces the other, is a thing to be accounted for. There must therefore be some "ultimate reality" manifested in both which

has adjusted them to each other; back of the Ideal and the Phenomenal there must be the eternal immensity of the Absolute. To the mind of the Platonist there can be no more incongruous blunder than to describe the possession of these abstract truths of philosophy as a "last worst calamity." It is subjection to the senses which is the real calamity, the primal source of all the ignorance, corruption, and misery which have filled the world since time began. The Abstract, the Ideal, the Absolute alone are worth having, for they alone are "knowable,"* abiding and beneficent. Everything therefore must be founded upon philosophical truths and regulated in the light of them. Our individual duty consists in, our happiness depends upon, our coming to the knowledge and possession of them. He who sacrifices the seeming for the substantial world, who, in the midst of the false lights and fugitive wealth about him, builds upon the absolute truth and good, is the only wise and happy man. Self-approval dwells within him, the real universe waits upon him, incalculable treasures and power deliver themselves into his hands; disaster cannot harm him for it only breaks the strength of sensation; and death quite disimprisons him. Society, too, must be organized according to these truths. Its forms must copy the ideal order, its legislation be the voice of absolute justice, its arts the expression of absolute beauty. So only can the enduring "Republic" be planted among the vanishing empires and anarchies of mankind.

On the whole this, as it is the earliest, so is it the most comprehensive and sufficient vindication of philosophy which has been given hitherto. Beyond its spacious provisions no later thinker has been able to go very far. Philosophy is the renunciation of one world for the possession of another more substantial and magnificent one. We depart from the concrete things of the sensible universe, abundant and sufficing as they seem to be to the careless thought of ordinary life, to discover if we can what is common and abiding about them. At first sight it is not much that we find; we appear to have lost more

*The whole curve described by philosophic thought from Plato to Hamilton and Spencer is measured by this fact, that to Plato the "Unknowable," or the "Forever-Inscrutable" is phenomena, and the "Knowable" or "intelligible" the Absolute alone.

than we gain. But what then? These meager abstractions are our intuitions and God's ideals. A fact, says Agassiz, whom we have already quoted, is a stupid thing until brought under some general law. Why is not the general law a stupid thing too? Because the laws of the universe respond to the reason of man, as the intellection of God. This is the conception which leaves the *Essay on Classification* a kind of lonely monument of the past, a belated protest of the Intuitional Philosophy amid the science of the time. We are apt to regard it as an amplification of the paltry teleology of Paley, whose back was broken the other day by Mr. Darwin's discovery that adaptation of means to ends may as easily mean self-adjustment as design. But what Agassiz finds in the universe is not chiefly the relation of means to ends, but the ampler and nobler one of words to thought, of beneficence to love, of action to desire, of creation to art. We must go beyond the machine shop of Dr. Paley, or the Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, to follow and fathom this magnificent induction. It is a one-sided conception, no doubt, as Plato's was, since it makes nothing of the "stupid" facts until classified and reduced to their general laws; yet it contains a hint of a reconciliation between philosophy and life better than Plato's, for why may there not come a more generous and capacious civilization than ours or our ancestors, wherein this world of the Ideal and Absolute, with all its abstractness, and this other world of the Phenomenal and Relative with all its illusions, are included as one—Mind and the Manifestation of mind? "The Man of Science," says Wordsworth, in one of his forgotten prefaces, "seeks truth as a remote and unknown benefactor; he cherishes and loves it in his solitude; the Poet singing a song in which all human beings join with him, rejoices in the presence of truth as our visible friend and hourly companion. Yet poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge; it is the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all science. If the labors of Men of Science should ever create any material revolution in our condition and in the impressions which we habitually receive, the Poet will be at his side, *carrying sensation into the midst of the objects*

*of Science itself.** . . . If the time should ever come when what is now called science, thus familiarized to men, shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh and blood, the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and will welcome the Being thus produced as a dear and genuine inmate of the household of man." And this, if true of science and poetry, is no less true in the larger sphere of philosophy and life.

Now what we have to point out here is that, alone among all the systems of thought which have appeared among men, the Empirical Philosophy is forever by its own express or implicit limitations deprived of these compensations of the Intuitional Philosophy; and excluded from this possible alliance between philosophy and life. Its generalizations wear nothing of the splendor of the Ideal, or of the Absolute; and it is impossible that they should ever be welcomed as "dear and genuine inmates of the household of man"—they cannot be incorporated into the life of the individual, into the organization of society, or into the development of civilization. In the first place, they represent nothing in the mind independent of the forces which produce them, for what we call our ideas and intuitions are but the registered results of experience. The structure and functions of the universe have determined those of the brain, so that there are no relations there, contingent or necessary, which the environment has not inscribed there; and the hand which has traced the inscription has made the tablet to receive it. Register and record, mind and the intuitions of mind, have been turned out together a "concurrent redistribution of matter and motion." The ultimate similitudes which we have sifted out of the innumerable differences of things affirm an order of the universe which denies the separateness and spirituality of the soul. In the second place, while the empirical generalizations do not deny the Absolute, neither, on the other hand, do they in any way represent it. They are

* The italics are ours. Plato values the abstract generalizations because they get rid of the deceptive phenomena and their attendant feelings, and bring to us the absolute reality. To Wordsworth the phenomena are everything, because the sources of feeling, and the generalizations are nothing until they become so familiar as to be a kind of phenomena productive of feeling. In the hands of the Empiricist the generalizations make way with the absolute and phenomenal alike.

positive as to the materiality* and mortality of the soul, for the soul falls within their range; they are silent as to the Absolute, for that lies beyond them. It is true that an essence or substance of some sort is recognized beneath every phenomenon, an ultimate reality behind all modes of mind, matter, motion, and force; Mr. Spencer going so far as to say that this ultimate reality, being given along with every objective relation, is necessarily given with every subjective relation too—is an inexpugnable element of all consciousness. It is, however, in itself, existence out of all relation, and, therefore, not to be likened unto anything else, or included in a classification; so that the formulas that all changes known to us are modes of motion, all motions, affections of matter, all matter and motion, forms of persistent force, are ultimate truths which are totally irrelevant to the ultimate reality; that is to say, we gain nothing at all, so far as the Absolute is concerned, by generalizing phenomena into force, for the whole Absolute was already given in the concrete phenomena precisely as much as it is given in the abstract generalization. It is a constant indefinable quantity which hovers in the background all the way through the process, an indeterminable x repeated along with every term of the equation. Mr. Spencer therefore cancels it from his philosophy not only as unknowable *per se*, but as having no knowable influence upon the evolutions and dissolutions of the universe, or upon the factors of force, matter and motion involved in them. What determines the order of co-existent and sequent relations is persistent force. What determines force no one knows. To say that the Absolute does is to bring the Absolute into relations, that is, to philosophize about it; to say that it does not is to limit it, that is, to philosophize about it in another way. Again, it does, or does not, determine persistent force precisely as it does or does not

* This word is very offensive to most of the empiricists, notably to Mr. Spencer and Prof. Huxley, who declare that they are as much spiritualist as materialist. It must be granted that the word is unfortunate, for it is not pretended that mind is matter, but only that it is an affection or function of matter. However, when the structure falls to pieces the function ceases, dissipation of motion always going with disintegration of matter. Whether this is Materialism, or Spiritualism, or both, or neither, or a *tertium quid*, or what not, is a mere question of words not worth the paper and ink which have been wasted on it.

determine any concrete manifestation of force, for the whole Absolute is given with any particular fact or relation just as much as with the universal relation. The universal relation, therefore, i. e., persistent force, *is* the Absolute, or, is superseded by it, if the Absolute is that which determines. So we go on floundering deeper and deeper into the mire with all the *ignes fatui* of ontology flaming through the fog overhead. There is nothing for it but to put the Absolute out of court as one of those redundant witnesses who swear in the same terms to everything. It exists, no doubt—out of doors—but it has no knowable influence on the ongoing of the universe. Perhaps it possesses inconceivable attributes of personality, consciousness, and will; or if attributes, however inconceivable, are impossible in the Absolute—though how anything *can* be impossible to the Absolute no one knows—then perhaps it has something inconceivably transcending all these, the hyper-consciousness, and hyper-personality of Mr. Spencer's theology. All to no purpose, for these bewildering faculties, or no-faculties, or hyper-faculties, have nothing to do with the manifestations of persistent force.* And now in the third place con-

* Since this paper was written, a review of Prof. Fiske's "Cosmic Philosophy" has appeared in the May number of the *Fortnightly*, which announces distinctly the some time impending rupture of the English empiricists with Mr. Spencer's metaphysics. The time, it appears, is coming when the doctrine of Evolution will have to be saved "from its best friends"—meaning nobody less than Mr. Spencer and Prof. Fiske. The main point of Mr. Spencer's "pure metaphysics," the Article goes on to say, is the Unknowable, a burdensome heritage which Mr. Spencer, for some unaccountable reason, has chosen to take over from the most unscientific philosophy of modern times (Sir William Hamilton's *Philosophy of the Unconditioned*); the main point of his "mixed metaphysics" is the Persistence of Force, which is really only another aspect of the Unknowable. Both of these are purely ontological abstractions which cannot be brought into any intelligible relations with forces and work, causes and effects, as they are known to us. They are a kind of deck load which must go overboard to save the ship. We beg to refer to what we have written in previous Articles, and to pp. 615 and 635 of this one.

Perhaps the reader will be curious to hear the empirical theory of Evolution as amended by the *Fortnightly*:—"The doctrine of evolution, as we understand it, is a connected account of man's knowledge of the world, which is intended to guide human action, and is founded on the practical assumption that the whole of nature is uniform, and, therefore, the whole of knowledge is uniform. It consists of two principal parts: physical and psychological. The first tells the story of sensible things as interpreted by scientific method; the second tells the story of

sider into what a predicament all this ingenuity has landed us. We have excluded the Absolute as the "forever inscrutable;" we have denied innate Ideas. What remains then is Sensations. But it was the uncertainty and delusiveness of sensation which prompted the intuitionists to philosophize. We can get no truth, they said, about anything from the direct reports of the senses, so we must go for truth to abstract ideas and intuitions of the absolute. This order we have exactly inverted. We say now there is no truth to be got out of the absolute, and that innate ideas do not exist, so that we must go for the truth to sensation. Empiricism, therefore, is pure Sensationalism, and Sensationalism, if it is serious, must mean that the senses are to be trusted. Does Empiricism affirm this? On the contrary, it denies it more distinctly than any intuitionist ever did. It has merged psychology into physiology, and the result of physiology is that not one single impression or relation which arises in consciousness resembles in any the remotest degree the external object or relation by which it is supposed to be aroused. The bewilderment of Socrates, a very rude physiologist, has ripened into a scientific demonstration that the whole presentation of phenomena to the mind is misrepresentation. There has surely never been anything more curious than this in the whole history of thinking. We have exactly boxed the compass, settled the certainty that consciousness lies all around the circle. It affirms, or seems to affirm, that we are surrounded by a universe whose forms and

the internal world of consciousness as interpreted by the same method. It is found that this last account, so far as it extends, corresponds with the other in a very remarkable and definite manner. Any further inferences from this correspondence as to the character and meaning of the relations between the external and the internal world seem to us to lie for the present outside the doctrine." It appears from this that the doctrine of evolution is an enumeration of phenomena ("a connected account of man's knowledge of the world"), but founded on these "practical assumptions:" (I) there is an external world, past, present, and to come; (II) the whole of nature is uniform; (III) we have a knowledge of this uniform nature; (IV) we can adjust our actions to this knowledge. Here then, under this most innocent meal, are, Realism, the Uniformity of Causation, and Free Will—for human action is not determined by the uniform action of the external world, but guided by man's knowledge of it. The *Fortnightly* having saved evolution from Mr. Spencer, it is now in order for somebody to save it from the *Fortnightly*.

relations are thus and so; that we commune with this universe by certain antecedent faculties of perceiving, remembering, reasoning: that we are in possession of certain innate ideas and intuitive cognitions of necessary truth; that we have a self-determining power which enables us to control our own thoughts and acts, and to influence the world about us. All these affirmations are false. Empiricism has ground down this seeming soul of ours, with its separateness, its innate faculties, ideas and powers, into a mere congeries of sensations, and has beautifully shown how it is that sensation cannot tell the truth if it tries. Now the predicament we spoke of is this: by blasting the character of consciousness you necessarily ruin your own; if consciousness lies after this wholesale fashion there is no way of proving that a philosophy founded upon it has got the truth. In reality you concede the character of the witness by putting him on the stand, and all these startling disclosures which you have got by ingenious cross-questioning go down at once before the simple affirmations of the witness when left again to himself. In other words, the empirical generalizations may all be perfectly true, but you can't get them to work. Consciousness may be nothing but an accompaniment or reflection of automatic action of the brain; all the same when your synthesis is ended you cannot act yourself or induce any one else to act on the hypothesis that men are automata; do what you will you must proceed upon the conviction that mind is separate and different from matter, that its faculties are its own, that it has a self-determining power over its states and over its environment, and that the liberty and power of action bring responsibility for the act. This is not merely a "good working hypothesis," it is the only hypothesis which will work at all. All individual character and life, all ethics and legislation, and rule, the entire organization of society, the entire development of men and of man, must be founded upon it forever. It is not merely perilous, it is impossible to found them anywhere else. Life has nothing whatever to do with these ultimate empirical truths, and no option about them but to leave them alone.

Let us recapitulate. The Empirical Philosophy proposes to ascertain truth by the process of comparing together the sensa-

tions, simple and complex, which compose consciousness. Its materials are sensations; its instrument is classification; its proximate truths are the characters in which sensations of any particular group are alike; its ultimate truths are the characters in which all sensations are alike. We accept this process, properly conducted, as providing a legitimate and convenient enumeration of the phenomena. We object to it as providing an explanation on the following grounds: (I) In determining, rightly or wrongly, relations of resemblance between our sensations it leaves out of account, or takes for granted, the related terms, and in these terms, however we describe them, as "ultimate units," or "nervous shocks," or "sensible changes," or "simple feelings," or "simple impressions of resistance," lies that very relation of cause and effect by which things are explained. (II) In its pursuit of some universal relations or relations of resemblance it omits those persistent differences and individualities which are always presented by phenomena. This omission is not only fatal to the philosophical value of the empirical generalizations but (III) in another aspect of it is equally so to what we may call their spiritual values. They leave the universe more bewildering and unaccountable to the intellect and at the same time less impressive to the imagination. This latter is a disadvantage under which all philosophy labors more or less, for in reasoning of any kind there is a necessary sacrifice of emotion, which, however, we expect to be compensated for in the final results of the reasoning. But Empiricism is deprived of all these compensations, for (IV) it excludes the Absolute from the phenomena of the universe, (V) it suppresses all innate faculties and intuitive Ideas among our sensations, and so, (VI) forces upon us a theory of the nature of man which, whether true or false, it is wholly impossible for us to take into the conduct of life or the organization of society. Distinguishing the Empirical Philosophy from Empirical Science as an extreme application of the scientific method, we say that the Philosophy has no intellectual, no spiritual, and no practical values—is no provision for the reason, the heart, or the life of man.

This being so, in what way are we to account for the

popularity of the Empirical Philosophy, which, as we have said ourselves, is a distinctive form of contemporary thought? This is a question which requires a long answer. Had we space for it we should begin by qualifying the allegation. What really distinguishes modern thought is the observation of phenomena, as what distinguished ancient thought was investigations of the first causes and issues of phenomena.* Evidently our intuitions, if we have any, are as applicable in one case as they were in the other; in other words, Empiricism is only a particular way of observing phenomena. And the fact is, that what seems to be the spread of Empiricism is in large measure the spread of Rationalism, an appeal against ancient beliefs, not to experience but to reason, not to the observed order of the universe but to the intuitions of the mind; a continuation of the antecedent philosophy in the very act of denying portions of its dogma, and a denial of the Empirical Philosophy in the very act of accepting some of its conclusions. We go farther; the whole popular unbelief of the last three hundred years is rationalistic, and Empiricism itself has no vitality which it does not draw from the Rationalism in the midst of which it has been engendered. We submit this remark without further comment to the consideration of theologians. Christianity is to be defended, not by spending powder on Hume, or Mill, or Mr. Spencer, but by coming to terms with the reason of Man. In the second place, we should recall attention to the fact, already noted, that the *process* of Empirical Philosophy is not only a legitimate, but an indispensable part of all mental action, automatic, popular, scientific, and philosophical. If in the investigation of efficient causes men formerly leaned to intuitions and Rationalism, it is not surprising that they should end by leaning to sensations and Empiricism, in the observation of phenomena. The chaos of contemporary philosophy has not come from the use of a false method but from the abuse of a right one. The creation of the future will come, if it ever comes, from the union of the two—Rationalism and Empiricism. And in the third place we should point out that the *results* of the Empirical process are in possession of one irresistible charm. They are brand-new. Old

* *New Englander* for April, p. 329.

enough in themselves they have fallen upon this generation, which does not trouble itself much about antiquity, with all the power of surprise. We have worn out the inspirations of the old beliefs, God and creation, the soul and immortality, are the warm and fluid conceptions of the infancy of the race. Long ago they have stiffened into dogma and crusted over with institutions and laws; or, struck into the coinage of popular thought and speech they have lost their lustre in passing from hand to hand. The poetry has turned into prose, the spiritual into the material, the sacred into the secular, the kingdom of heaven "which cometh not with observation" into a pompous and oppressive kingdom of this world like any other. In every way the new is become old, the fresh commonplace, the vivid enthusiasm of the past the dull convention of to-day. In the midst of these faded traditions, the decay and incapacity of emotions, comes Mr. Spencer and Professor Tyndall with their fascinating surprises, to tell us that in matter are the promise and potency of all life, in the redistributions of molecular motion all the fine rhythms of the soul, and that the universe flows from no paltry anthropomorphic First Cause, but from that incalculable grander source the "Forever Inscrutable." This is a most unexpected gospel and attractive precisely because it is so; the apocalypse of a new heavens and a new earth which it is not in the nature of man to be indifferent to. How wonderful that Persistent Force should be capable of all this, that Matter and Motion should know how to rise through all these admirable transfigurations. How much diviner they are than you suppose them to be, O fools and blind! And if they have come so far in the past who can tell whither they tend in the future? what bewildering metamorphoses of loveliness and grandeur they will pass into in those remote ages

when I, and probably you

Have melted away into infinite azure—in short when all is blue.

But let us say it sincerely: restless as we are beneath the ashes of our extinguished emotions, bound by the yoke of custom

heavy as frost

And deep almost as life,

this new world of thought with its revolutionary dogma and startling surprises has a legitimate attraction and a use. For

the moment, liberty lies that way, the unfettered, spontaneous, idiomatic action of the mind. The silence of ontology and the clamor of empiricism mean—*ennui* and reaction.

But now in the nature of things novelty is one of those charms which won't wear. If the Empirical Philosophy has vitality in it, it must submit to grow old-fashioned and familiar in its turn. Let us imagine, if we can, that it has at least supplanted its predecessors and conquered the race; that men, having "conducted the Deity across the frontiers of the knowable" and having renounced the separateness, the self-determining power and the responsibility of the soul, have bowed down to Persistent Force and committed themselves to the resistless flow of universal Evolution; that the empirical generalizations have been incorporated into the structure of society, that their sweetness and light fill all literature, art, and worship, that they determine all the activities of the world, until the consciousness of every man is supersaturated with them; what will come of it all? We hazard a prediction that there will come of it an era of tyrannous convention and commonplace more insufferable than man ever felt or dreamed of before; an era, that is, of thwarted impulses and repressed passions, and therefore, either of fatal revolutions, or else of return to the forsaken faiths of mankind. And this remark will explain to the reader why we have put the last words of Mr. John Stuart Mill at the head of a paper on the Values of Empirical Generalizations. Whoever would like to know the effects of pure empirical training on character and happiness, or to forecast the style of the coming millennium, let him give a month or two to the *Autobiography* and the *Essays on Religion*. If at the end of his studies he is still unable to account for the mental and moral phenomena he has found—the exhausted interest of the philosopher, the *ennui*, the dejection, the faltering return to discarded superstitions—by what he already knows of empiricism, then let him give another month to Mr. George Henry Lewes's *Problems of Life and Mind*. He will find there the pure atmosphere and perfect temper of the new creed, and so, probably, be helped to the understanding of Mr. Mill's experiences by a few of his own.

ARTICLE II.—OPPORTUNITIES FOR CULTURE IN THE
CHRISTIAN MINISTRY.OR, SOME REASONS WHY CHRISTIAN STUDENTS SHOULD CHOOSE
THE MINISTRY FOR A PROFESSION.

AMONG the signs of our time, indicating the growth of a more generous and natural estimate of Christian institutions, is a change of public sentiment as to the Christian ministry. The sacerdotal aspect of this profession is plainly waning before the public eye, while its *humane* aspect, if a simple word may be used to cover an idea wide and multiform, is in the ascendant. Nor is this change of the public mind capricious. It is the logical result of the old-time Protestantism, coöperating with the more modern study of nature and the modern development of philanthropy.

In public estimation, therefore, a minister now is much less a priest, than he is a teacher, friend, and leader. His merely professional qualities are of less consequence than are his personal. As a power in society, the profession itself is less;—the man himself is more; so that the arena to which public demand now calls the Christian minister being thus more natural in its scenery, and more various in its affiliations with men, is also more vital and imperative in its practical interests, and while less priestly and pedantic, is on the whole more stimulating, more healthful and attractive than ever it has been before.

But it is discouragingly obvious that this changed sentiment concerning the ministry has not yet thoroughly affected the very class of persons who have most need to feel it;—I refer to the Christian young men in the colleges. They are a noble class of men, and they cherish a lofty ideal of devotion to the highest ends; but year by year a decreasing proportion of them are choosing the ministry for their profession. Breathing the exhilarating air of the time, they are repelled from the old sacerdotal idea of the ministry, and with the newer, more humane and more fascinating idea of that profession, they are yet unacquainted. Something should be done to correct this prejudice,

to inform this ignorance, to dispel these shadows of mouldy tradition, and to show young men what a preëminent and royal field is now opened in the Christian ministry, ample enough to justify their purest ardor, and to attract their noblest ambition.

Much indeed is now being done to this end. Such courses of lectures upon preaching as have been recently introduced at Yale Theological Seminary and elsewhere, are in this regard invaluable. Uttered by men whose own ministry is even with the times, brilliant and devoted, they set forth a most manly and attractive ideal of the sacred profession. They have already accomplished much towards enlightening the minds of Christian students, who in various quarters are pursuing their academic studies.

Yet these students are even now too much in the dark. Like those who in the midst of modern productions, are still intent upon an antiquated text-book, they yet fail to discover the changed aspect of the ministerial profession. They do not yet understand what pastors themselves are coming to understand, how directly this profession puts men in the line of the noblest modern culture, and how surely it may lead them to that fine and complete manhood which their best ambition could crave. This matter must be opened still further. Students as a rule have no lack of desire for the glory of a finished manhood. They must then measure this argument in favor of the ministry, that it opens a straight path toward such a manhood. This argument is indeed, partly old, but it is also in a vigorous sense, a new argument; for it rests upon a view of the ministry, long discredited, newly developed and every hour coming into bolder relief in the public mind. These young and ambitious Christian students are needed in the ministry. For there is, in our own country at least, imperative need of more ministers,—ministers too, who shall be prime men. But other professions beckon and Christian students obey. They must be called back in the name of considerations noble and novel, more apparent in the busy public arena than in the library or the cloister, which clearly indicate the vital, special, and practical connection at present existing between the fulfilling of a true Christian ministry and the attaining of a generous and athletic character.

Let it be, of course, distinctly understood that no rival claim is to be advanced, adverse to other professions beside the ministry. Service in the Kingdom of God is broader than is any profession: and men should work where they are best fitted to work. Yet, so soon as any important profession is slighted, it becomes imperative. If there were but a meagre supply of blacksmiths in the State, the anvil would call for men more loudly even than the Senate-chamber. Now, as matters stand, the profession of the Christian ministry is slighted by Christian students to-day. It is not weighed for what it weighs. And this is the omen of no insignificant peril. For there is a human instinct which in all ages, and notably in the strongest and safest times of the New England history, has peremptorily joined the two ideas of intellectual culture and of religious priesthood:—as though the understanding, purity, and fearlessness requisite for priesthood, were to be sought most naturally along the path of mental discipline. Christianity endorsed this common instinct, by its embodiment of the typical teacher and the typical priest in the same Person. But this instinct seems within the present generation to have lost its voice in the minds of Christian students. Culture does not, as it used to do, broaden the avenue of acknowledged responsibility toward the gods. This is the token of peril;—for society is always imperiled when special mental gifts and acquirements are not guarded with an accompanying sense of special responsibility, as of mediation between the people and the Lord.

And it cannot be denied that this token of peril is now but too evident. A proud and splendid science now too often banishes conscience, or at best makes of it a mere subject and deputy, courteously providing it with permanent retirement as resident envoy in the land of religious dreams. The danger now is not so much that an illegitimate intellectualism will overcome religion as that a legitimate intellectualism will swallow up religion. Thus the intellectual Macedonia is everywhere unwittingly calling to the educated men of religion, "Come over and help us." There is a growing apprehension that religious institutions and forms, whether of ritual or of thought,—churches, politics, liturgies, systems, creeds, dogmas, cannot of themselves preserve the worship and the faith of men

intact, genuine and warm underneath the blaze of the intellect of the world. What is needed therefore to minister to the age is the religious soul in educated men. There is thus pointed need, of many men who shall accept mental endowment and the opportunities of mental culture as a consecration to a priesthood of God,—in other words, to the ministry of the gospel. But the urgency and grandeur of this demand in our day is not measured by Christian students in the colleges.

The profession of the ministry is then really slighted by young men; and because it is, it has become imperative. Its full claim is not allowed, and therefore must be urged. And it can be urged perhaps with most effect precisely at the point already indicated, viz: by showing that the instinct of a true manhood, and the spirit of a successful ministry are in our day identical, and that the very impulse toward a muscular, healthy, and finished culture, which prompts the generous-souled youth to seek a liberal education, will also, if followed, lead him straight on toward the Christian ministry as his profession.

It may be worth while to state some of the grounds of this argument.

It is plain of course at the outset, that in such a question very much will depend upon what style of ministry we have in mind. For all our theories will be measured by the unceremonious test of what ministers actually are. And we may as well concede that we are not what we ought to be. Perhaps we ourselves have taken up our grand profession without grasping it in its full scope, or profiting by its wealth of reflex educative power. The connection in question can be made out only between the *true* Christian ministry, and the development of a noble manhood.

First, then, look at the fact in a general way. Every young man who is true to himself is bound to ask evermore two imperative and vital questions;—the one—how shall I best become personally worthy? an unprofessional question;—the other—how shall I, in my chosen earthly calling, achieve success? Practical life becomes a farce or a fatality, according as these two questions are found to be in grotesque or cruel discord. The Christian minister draws his freedom and his strength

from his discovery that for himself these questions are in closest accord, and that his answer to the one is identical with his answer to the other. The claim of his chosen profession upon his intellect and heart is therefore imperial and incomparable. You may point out to him the difficulties and discouragements of this profession. You may speak to him of thankless service, of unappreciated toil, of meagre pay, and contrast such a prospect with the more brilliant career upon which he might otherwise enter; but he will calmly and not without joy reply, "Yes! I know all this, but I am not dissatisfied, for character outweighs all. For the sake of the culture I welcome the sacrifice. As a matter of pure personal interest merely, I am more than contented, for what my profession demands of me in the pulpit and pastorate is simply identical with what the best part of myself demands of me as a man, and which is therefore most valuable for me. I seek the truest professional success, and the finest personal attainment along the same road."

Young men sometimes get the impression that the tendency in this profession must be either towards dogmatism or towards sycophancy. This impression is the ill odor of an obsolete tradition. There need be now no lack of lustiness in the ministerial profession. Men suppose that a profession which swears by ancient dogmas, which formulates an antique ritual, which for station and support is dependent upon popular caprice, must necessarily take upon itself a certain tameness, and be unfavorable to the most athletic manhood.

This notion is a mistake in its assumption, but partly we, as ministers, are to blame for the mistake. We have sometimes been too politic to be free and too timid to be wise. A bolder method would not seldom have served our cause better. It is easy, but not wise, for a minister to be a time-server, or a prophet of cant, or a valet to rich and foolish churches, or yet an effeminate rhetorician, or a mere piece of decorous ecclesiastical furniture. All this is poor in policy as well as false to duty. It is the practical strength of the true minister that his profession helps his practice, and that his policy and his duty are one. All this is evident whether we consider the end or the instrumentality of the ministry.

For the true *end* sought by the Christian minister is both private and public. In respect to individuals, it is to build

them up into a perfect Christly manhood. In respect to society, it is distinctly to advance the kingdom of God, which is the empire of duty and of love on earth. Now, in the way of reflex influence, nothing so develops the higher manhood in the subject as his own effort to develop it in others; and nothing so develops the most impartial and fervent public sympathies as the effort to promote in declared terms a world-wide kingdom of love. And accordingly the churches now do not want for their ministers men of technical words and tame devices. The blood of the ministry must be red, its hand ungloved, its brain facile and forceful. Society sets before the minister the same end that he would choose for himself.

The same identity between the professional and the personal necessities appears when we consider the *instrument* which the minister must employ in his professional work to the achieving of its end. That instrument is his own spiritualized manhood. Sermons, lectures, learning, culture, intellect; these are instrumentalities, but only subordinate ones. They are like the scaffolding to the architect, or the colors and brush to the painter. The true power of the Christian ministry is largely the power of *witnessing*.

"Be thou an example to the believers" writes Paul to Timothy. The New Testament idea is that of the Holy Spirit working through an enriched and sanctified manhood upon the masses of men to renovate and lift them up in character. The minister is not a sacred ornament, or a pious appendage, decorous and weak. The pulpit may flash and flame with noble passion. This should be beyond all others the *fearless* profession.

A minister's professional instrument, then, is *himself*—his own holy nobleness of soul. This is his tool, and the tool will be polished by using it. The *minister*, not the sermon, is the agent and bright engine of God in raising men towards Himself. The true and divinely ordained way for the minister to accomplish his end, is to strive evermore himself to be such a man as he seeks that others should be. Sermon-writing is subordinate. The best way to acquire a fine style is to have a fine soul and pour out the whole of it in one's writing. Paul does not exhort Timothy to weave for himself an elaborate priestly robe, of words, of arts, of studied manners, of profes-

sional technics;—he exhorts him to be a full, finished, exemplary man. The stronger and more scriptural definition of the Christian ministry gives prominence to the personal qualities over those which are purely professional: and this definition is endorsed by the public demands of the present time. It is, then, in the direct line of his professional necessities that the Christian minister seeks for himself the large liberty of a natural, rational and holy life. The people want to find in their minister more than anything else, *a man whom they can trust*. Mere intellectual cleverness is shallow and volatile compared with this symmetrical trustworthiness. As Goethe said:

"Your discourses which are so refined,
In which humanity's poor shreds you frizzle,
Are unrefreshing as the mist and wind,
That thro' the withered leaves of autumn whistle."

FAUST. *Brooks' translation.*

Both the end and the instrument of the ministry therefore illustrate the preëminent excellence of the personal culture which this profession affords.

But this argument from identity between these professional activities and the personal pursuit of worthy character is made clearer and more variedly forcible still, when we analyze the activities themselves more closely. For the Christian minister is required by his profession to stand at that wonderful midway point between the ideal and the actual which is the most favorable one for the finest personal culture. He stands between God and man. On the one hand is the absolute and the perfect,—the doctrine of God,—the revelation of Christ,—the realms of conscience and the moral reason. On the other hand is Human Nature, a strange, splendid, ruined principality, whose complex and ominous changes are patent every hour in the field of the world around him. This he is to understand and minister unto. On the one hand, therefore, he occupies similar ground with the mere student, the philosopher, the scholar, the poet: while on the other hand he is where men of affairs are. He is with the statesman, the philanthropist, the practical citizen. But, besides this, he is also an artist, for his task as between these two mentioned realms, is to render the truth and beauty of the former realm into the dialect of the

latter, and rebind the severed links between the two. He is to translate God to hewers of wood and drawers of water. He stands, then, at a focal point, so far as his own culture is concerned.

The Christian minister is, therefore, not a specialist, though he works in a special field. His field is the center. He is at once the Christian teacher, the Christian poet and inspirer, the Christian artist, and the Christian leader and practical man. He would awaken *life*—the *life* of God, from which both the natural and supernatural flow, in the souls alike of scholars and of artisans. His book is the Bible, and like the Bible, he speaks not to any separate or special department of human nature by itself—but addresses himself synthetically to the whole nature, of which the intellect and the religious aspirations are inseparable parts. So the minister's manhood is most variously nourished. That manhood is steadily led toward the threshold of the heaven whose beatitude blends the utmost glory of worship, of thought and of art. In that manhood he must unite the intellectual with the religious,—and this is a much healthfuller and deeper way than those clever writers imagine who are drenching us with a cant of exhortation upon this subject.

This conception of the ministerial character is no dream. The reason why it might seem so is because we ourselves have narrowed our professional functions in obedience to false and effete standards. Like timid soldiers, we have too often been diligent in sweeping out the tent and burnishing the guns, when we should have been in the midmost stress and splendor of the battle-field, or at the head of the conquering charge.

A good minister is a full man. In this profession, elaborate one-sidedness is intolerable. A Christian preacher and pastor, ministering between God and men, should have a character like the light, complete, well-woven, transparent. In his professional relations he may be likened to a pane of window glass, set between the dark and the light, making the dark light and the light visible, tinging no color, deflecting no ray, impartial toward the one side and toward the other, unseen itself, making all else seen.

Thus, the very embarrassment of the ministry is its peculiar

strength. The minister indeed is brought constantly and abruptly back from the fields of pure thought to commonplace men and every-day affairs. But precisely here is the vast advantage, for by this means his mind is steadied, kept right side up, made healthful and practical. Says Zinkie, in his book on "Extemporaneous Preaching," page 114: "As the clergy must devote a large portion of their time to parochial work, there are many of the laity who are able to follow up intellectual pursuits far more thoroughly than is possible for the clergy." Undoubtedly, but yet the *spirit* of a clergyman's intellectuality may be and should be as high,—its *tone* as pure and rare, as that of any literary man; while, on the other hand, the clergyman gains immensely over the scholar by his enforced practical acquaintance with life as it is.

Preaching also, when rightly done, is a kind of oratory whose reflex education is of the richest and noblest possible. The eloquence of the Christian pulpit is the eloquence of truth in love. It is a kind of address in which the imperial impersonality of truth blends with the vital personality of love. This is what the modern pulpit demands. This also affords just the culture adapted to secure a ready and lofty manhood. Life spent in such professional work is intense and focal. Everything is in it; yet its own radical spiritual impulse is so energetic as to make it, though various, yet coherent and sane, and protect it against dispersion. The minister is not a mere talker. He is sternly held to genuineness in his words. Indeed there are not a few men in the ministry who believe that on these various accounts more life is to be found in this vocation than can be found elsewhere;—men who choose this profession because herein they are brought closest to the mid-whirl of human power and human passion. Paul lived a more intense and various life than did Nero,—Martin Luther than Henry the Eighth. Because in this profession the drama of human life becomes most thrilling,—because here one is close upon the center both of its trial and its triumph,—because here nature and spirit join, and as it were, overlap in a double thickness;—because here hearts are open, and society soluble, and motives marshalled and destiny decided;—because here the forces dealt with are the grandest, and the problems presented, the

most fascinating and difficult,—because here, in a word, is the meeting ground between two worlds,—and because, compared with the interest of this work both for the individual and for society, every other professional work seems tame,—for these reasons it is that some men are in the ministry.

Are we not justified, then, after even so brief a glance at the end and instrumentality sought and used by the Christian minister, after this rapid analysis of his professional functions, in concluding, that when, as the result of your most thorough analysis, your most complete synthesis, you have reached the innermost spirit or principle or ideal of a true Christian ministry, you will have also reached a precise definition of the innermost spirit and principle and ideal of a noble manhood?

In a solemn sense, therefore, the minister of Christ comes to love his profession *as he loves his own soul*. He will not then plan a sermon as he would draw a diagram, or preach as he would tell an amusing story. His profession is not a mere earthly garment, or a concession of the soul to gross and bodily wants, or a way to transitory honor among men. It has indeed its routine, its special disabilities, its merely professional aspects,—it does burden him with the world's heavy woes; but it is peculiar and blessed in this, that with the same hand by which it provides for him food and shelter, it also provides for the best culture of the most worthy personal character, and with a singular completeness introduces him to those activities which shall for him be rational and fitting forever. Should love be the law of his individual life? It is also the law of his ministry. Does his manhood require the harmonious development of conscience, intellect, imagination, passion? The profession he has chosen calls for the exercise of all these together, and both stimulates and regulates them.

Herein is solid strength and lasting advantage. So far and so fast as one becomes a truly successful minister, he becomes a worthy man and thus acquires the royalty of true freedom in this world. His profession becomes both vitalized and vital. His work is his play and his passion. While he builds for time, he in the same act "lays great bases" for eternity. His whole life runs naturally into his profession

and he seeks and strives for perfection therein as he seeks for personal virtue, and the favor of God.

This way of stating the argument is general. Even when so put it is entitled to great weight; but there is another and more specially modern aspect of it, which gives to it yet greater weight, and should make it decisive in the minds of Christian young men in the colleges. It has been already intimated that these general considerations already adduced, gain a new and peculiar force from the novel conditions of our own time.

Young men are invited to the ministry not only because this profession is always favorable to the best personal culture; but especially are they invited *now*, because the *peculiar* qualities which are just now in most earnest demand for a timely manhood and a triumphant ministry are, in each case, the same. In illustrating this, the argument will confine itself to the mention of three qualities, which both in personal character and in the ministerial profession are now preëminently needed and desired. They are *Reverence*, *Sympathy*, and *Joyfulness*.

Of course, these qualities are always admirable and requisite both in a finished manhood and in a faithful ministry; but our argument goes further than this. It goes so far as to affirm that these three qualities are now the indispensable ones. They are made peremptory by the unique and unavoidable conditions of the time. In their combination, (for it is in the harmony which they together produce that the indescribable power and beauty dwells) they afford just that color and light which the nineteenth century is declaring to be the one thing needful for character. Not to possess them would have been at any time a misfortune; not to have them now is failure. So then, because these qualities, and the blending of them, are now held to be as indispensable for a successful ministry as for manhood itself, and because the profession of the ministry, as now to be conducted, tends strongly to foster them, and make them regnant in character, therefore we gain herein a new purchase and pressure for our argument in its *present* appeal to noble minded young men to choose this profession for their own.

For example, take *Reverence*,—a quality essentially moral, a sentiment that lies at the bottom of all pure and lofty charac-

ter. When has there ever been in history an age in which reverence was either so necessary or so difficult to maintain, as in the present age? This sentiment which is the foundation at once of morality and philanthropy, is nowadays undermined and endangered. It is easy to see the reason for this, and the reason why a reverent temper is now so invaluable to a young man in his career. For observe the present state of things among us.

Irreverence is the license of the intellect, when divorced from the restraining companionship of conscience. And the tendency to such irreverence is now both personally and professionally the common and commanding peril; for the great modern idea of liberty, which, as Maurice De Guerin says, "Is the thought which drives the age before it," has thrown wide open the door for this intellectual license. The good wine of freedom, lawlessly used, intoxicates the reckless brain, and so is turned to poison; and men are led away by the fascinations of the theory, latent in the most brilliant literature of the century, and distinctly avowed by Renan, in his criticism upon St. Paul, that artistic self-culture is the supreme virtue. This theory is true enough to be enchanting, and false enough to be deadly. Self-culture is a part of the supreme virtue, but only a part.

The moral character of educated young men is therefore imperilled to-day, precisely where an efficient ministry is imperilled, at the point, namely, where the law of intellectual liberty shelves off into the madness of intellectual pride. The times call for reverent men. The churches call for reverent ministers; for it is too plain that manly integrity and ministerial efficiency are breaking down at the same point, from a lack of the truly reverential spirit. One is at a loss to decide whether scientists or theologians are the more wanting in what Schiller calls the sure mark of the philosopher, "That he shall always love truth better than his own system." We might pause here to put in a plea for reverence. We honor that body of scholars banded together in all lands, who constitute the extra-papal hierarchy of the world. In them is our hope; but the too frequent assumptions of infallibility among them are as absurd and as dangerously immoral as are the ecclesias-

tical assumptions of the priesthood. We are but students all, for matter is mystery, and spirit is mystery, and the connection between them, is also mystery. Thought has its present boundaries, and its law of slow progress from these boundaries, outward toward the unknown. It is, for example, yet impossible, and perhaps always will be, to resolve the moral intuition of holiness into intellectual elements. No one has yet reduced the Confessions of Augustine under the categories of the Comtean philosophy. The scientist may rejoice at the accuracy and completeness of the results he attains; but he should not be proud until he can also analyze with equally facile chemistry his own *joy* in view of that completeness. *Why* should the human spirit delight in view of completeness? Thus we approach a limit beyond which our analysis cannot go. At that limit the Deity reveals itself in the last irresolvable unit. The way to cultivate reverence is thus to study individuals; as, for example, in the matter of historical investigation, if the historian looks at men merely in masses, as Buckle and Taine are apt to do, and as it is the fashion of the age to do, he will be arrogant, while if he studies one man thoroughly he will be reverent. The Christian minister deals with men both in masses and one by one.

But returning to the direct channel of argument, observe, then, how this state of things applies to the question in hand. In our time a vague and diluted pantheism tends to substitute for reverence towards God, or the spirit of worship, a refined self esteem, and a materialistic science tends to resolve worship into intelligent curiosity, while the thousands know no other deity than mammon. In such a time, therefore, when the common tendency is so far forth immoral and unholy, the sheet-anchor at once of the individual manhood and of ministerial efficiency is humble, adoring reverence of the living, holy God.

The same temper of reverence should also extend to all natural and historical studies; for God is in nature and history. To this should be added reverence for man,—for the human body and mind,—that marvelous and complex production, which is the blossom of nature and the chief factor in history, as well as the living link between nature and what we call the

supernatural. Such reverence for God and for man will issue at last fittingly in affectionate reverence for Jesus Christ and his truth. Finally, reverence is due even toward the Unknown. Even before this veiled portal, let us humbly bend the knee, because for ought we know, God himself may be hiding His power within.

But in every one of these particulars, the present tendency is adverse to reverence. The motto of our ambition reads: "*Eritis sicut deus, scientes bonum et malum*"; and alas! the choice of this maxim results finally in a knowledge and then a tyranny of the evil without the good, under which tyranny lawless and irreverent pride must at last eat the ashes of its former madness. Here is the subtle, stealthy, sovereign peril of the time. Educated young men may not realize the peril until it is too late, but if they do realize it, or even fear it, is it not wiser for them to choose a profession, which, without surrendering a grain of legitimate liberty, without cramping the freedom of the intellect, yet serves for a protection against the danger? In a brilliant, proud, and eager age, we must needs, for manhood's sake, choose a reverent profession.

For the higher reason in the soul, of which a part is properly intellectual and a part moral, must be either a man's queen or his mistress; and when, as is now so often the case, the moral elements are ignored, or lowered from their true throne of equal authority with the intellectual elements, reason ceases to be heard longer as the voice of God in the soul, and is even fallen, —a tainted mistress rather than an holy queen.

Thus character is undermined, and the foundations of true manhood destroyed. The professional necessities, therefore, of the minister are his personal safeguard in this particular, and do much to protect a young man from that baneful license of the mind, which may indeed at first excite brilliant flashes of intellectual faculty, but which passes quickly into reaction and bitterness, and finally conducts to corrosion and decay.

The same course of reasoning applies in the matter of *Sympathy*. By sympathy is meant mainly an intellectual quality. It is the correlative and complement of reverence, which is properly moral. This is the quality which makes criticism candid, and charity careful and consummate. It involves in-

dependence also, for a copyist cannot be a sympathizer. It is that wide catholicity of temper, genial and keen, by which one shall discover, appreciate and ally himself to every exhibition of truth or excellence, whatever may be its kind, or with whatever of falsehood or evil it may be accompanied. For such intellectual charity the present demand is urgent, and more than urgent. And it is needed as much professionally in the minister as personally in the man.

For we are caught in the midst of an age at once exuberant and transitive. A discriminating sympathy is our main safeguard against dogmatism and our best surety for progress. Novelties are springing up on all sides. Nothing is to be wholly trusted, nor yet is anything to be entirely despised; for everywhere truth is tangled with error, right mingled with wrong. It is as if some chief spirit were prophesying in the world, as of old in Ezekiel's valley of dry bones; and behold there is a noise, and a shaking, and a thrill of life in all the valley; but arising from the dust of death, bone has not yet come to his bone. A thousand opinions are clamorous for a hearing. A thousand differences wait to be harmonized. The sarcasm of Cicero is truer now than ever, that "there is no absurdity which is not receiving the endorsement of some philosopher." Truth lies in shreds and broken masses, dismembered and scattered all over the field.

Amid circumstances so exciting and perplexing, noble manhood should not indeed weaken itself by diffuseness, but it must enlarge and sweeten itself by sympathy. Patient charity is utterly indispensable. Blessed now as never before are those, who, whether in the pulpit or out of it, are the intellectual and spiritual peacemakers. We must be able with facile and nimble thought, to pass from Jonathan Edwards to Tennyson, and from Tennyson to Kant, and from Kant to the morning's newspaper, and from news to Neander, and from Neander to Huxley, and from Huxley to Anslem,—from the thinker to the actor,—from the actor to the sufferer;—from facts to fancies—from ideas to affairs;—and in each instance be prompt with ready accuracy to detect and sympathize with whatever is excellent in the man or the subject before us. Science, Poetry, and Prayer must not be separated, nor made the watchwords of opposing realms.

But it is also to be noted that this special demand for intellectual sympathy is as pressing upon the minister as upon the man. The minister now must be a *mediator*. Protestantism, for example, must mediate between science and the spirit of Roman Catholicism. In this time of general unloosing, when the high tide is lifting everything from its traditional moorings, and re-arrangements are easy, the minister must improve the opportunity for mediation. He must gather together the Fleets of God. He must clear away the debris of centuries, and bring the things which are alike into accord, and make men see eye to eye. The natural and the spiritual must be brought into evident harmony, and their real unity proved and embodied in the persons of those who shall be at once noble men and fruitful ministers. The minister must indeed be bold, and his attitude in fundamental respects definite, but he must also make the pulpit luminous and fragrant with a sympathy unprecedented, keen, careful, constant, universal. In this respect, therefore, as in regard to the sentiment of reverence, there is now an identity between personal and professional necessities, and the Christian student is called even for manhood's sake to choose the ministry.

Finally, a like identity is apparent in connection with the third indispensable requisite, viz: *Joyfulness*, a quality essentially belonging to practical action, just as reverence was held to be a moral state, and sympathy an intellectual temper. The times demand both a glad ministry and a glad manhood. This gladness, moreover, must be of a noble and peculiar kind, for we are in the current of a rush after mere amusement which in our own country at least has never been paralleled, and which seems almost insane. Part of this is due to a reaction from the sombre pietism of earlier generations, and part due to the recklessness of those who released from the social and civil bondage of other lands, come here to find a novel independence and a dangerous facility of freedom. Sensual pleasures are eagerly sought, for the prejudice of man still insists upon divorcing righteousness from delight. This perilous craving for mere pleasure in the public mind can only be met and ministered to by the noble flame of a truer joy. Negations and prohibitions will be laughed at. There is possible for men a high state of

victorious gladness in which righteousness and delight do go hand in hand. This is the true joy, and it must be gained, not by ignoring or evading evil, but by meeting evil bravely and overcoming it. True men must imitate the Master of men who went against the steady spears with a face steadier even than they.

The minister's manhood, then, must for *his* own sake, grapple with evil and subdue it, and so celebrate within the soul the joy of a true triumph over it. The minister's profession must also, for *its* own sake, unceasingly pour this personal triumph into the language of the pulpit. The personal and professional necessities are therefore here again identical. The people may be tickled, but they will not be moved by a merry-andrew; nor will they care for ecclesiastical punsters like the German Lunde; nor on the other hand will they choose a preacher who is overshadowed, as John Foster seemed to be, with the woe of the world. Never so little as now will men adopt a religion which unveils to them the terrible valleys of moral ruin and death, and there leaves them to struggle and pray, cheered only by the promise of a heaven hereafter. Men must see that there is a land of Beulah—a region of triumph on *this* side of the river. In that high state of victorious gladness, at once peaceful and martial, must be the dwelling place both of a commanding manhood and of an effective ministry.

For the sake of clearness it was perhaps necessary to speak thus separately of the three indispensable qualities, *Reverence*, *Sympathy*, and *Joyfulness*; but the finished force of the argument we have undertaken, which identifies between a cultivated manhood and a truly successful ministry, is only felt when the three are not separated, but are considered in one. For it is only when combined, in character or in work, that they afford that rare and unique tone, which is the crown of the finest personal culture, and also the secret of the most productive ministerial labor. The real spirit so urgently called for at the present time, both in the person and in the profession, is not, properly speaking, reverence alone, or sympathy alone, or joy alone, nor is it strictly an association of them, but it is rather the subtle, vital blending or fusion of the three, in a single living state and action of the soul, one quick, irresolvable energy, which

shall be at once humbly reverent, independently sympathetic, and victoriously joyful. It is the identity of this vital energy in the true manhood, and in the true ministry, that proves and illustrates the close alliance which the demand of the times is developing between them.

This great argument, then, in favor of the ministry, that it affords the finest personal culture,—an argument strong and persuasive always and on general grounds, is thus in our own day made peculiarly opportune and decisive; for now as never before in the history of the ministry, personal character is identified with professional character and governs professional success. Surely, other things being equal, or, indeed, very unequal, a Christian man should choose that profession which will most broadly and beautifully build up the Kingdom of God within his own soul. This, the ministry, in the new and better aspect of it in which it presents itself to young men at the present time, certainly offers to do. In this profession as no where else, and as never before even here, the personal and professional ideals are the same.

Here then, we leave the subject. We respectfully leave it with Christian pastors, who, by their own lives and by the type of their ministerial work, must give practical efficacy to any theoretic argument in favor of their royal profession. And especially do we leave this subject with Christian students in the colleges. The sacred ministry calls them, and as supporting its call we urge upon them an argument old indeed and always weighty, but now enforced by a multitude of novel and fascinating considerations. For the times are changed; and the ministry is in many respects changing with the times. These changes, in which the profession as such is sinking and the man rising, we believe to be on the whole for good. They certainly add immense and pointed force to the present argument.

Two kinds of necessity press upon Christian students, to both of which they are bound to respond; the necessities of personal culture and character, and the necessities of professional success. We have aimed to show that in the Christian ministry the honorable student may find these two great claims most fully and practically harmonized. To this ministry then

we invite them. Here is the glory of the sacred calling, and here the greatness of its unmatched attraction. For the Christian minister's profession thus becomes his life. His work for others and his work for his own soul are one. Alike on behalf of his profession and on his own behalf, his eager spirit will heed that sublimest appeal, by which the ideal of perfect character asks of him supreme and eternal loyalty and love. The work of his ministry is the education of his personal manhood. The power of his ministry is the power of his manhood. Its worthiness is his worth.

ARTICLE III.—LIQUOR AND LEGISLATION.

THE control of intemperance and its resultant evils as a problem in morals has interested thinkers in all times. Moreover, the vice has been so universal, and its bad effects not only in the offender but upon society at large, have been so constant and serious that not moralists only but governments also have become concerned in the matter, and, very generally, more or less legislative action has occurred with reference to it. Whenever an evil becomes widespread in society, that involves, or is immediately followed by open and violent injury to others from the practices of individuals, or which is an outrage upon prevailing sentiment, people naturally in alarm or disgust appeal to government for redress. For they deem this a social wrong, and to what end does government exist if not to right such wrongs. Civil punishments are accordingly visited upon drunkards, and legal restrictions have at different times been laid upon the traffic that has encouraged their vicious self-indulgence to the offense and hurt of society. Yet as the world generally has always regarded the appetite for wines and liquors as normal in itself, for notwithstanding the vast number of drunkards the number of temperate drinkers has always been vastly greater, as, in past history, almost none but the ascetics of certain religious orders have practised total abstinence, the law has rarely, if ever, until of recent years in this country, attempted anything beyond a mere regulation of the liquor traffic, not its suppression.

A few years ago in New England the philanthropy of some earnest men, more than their personal and material interest, became roused to effect a reform in the drinking habits of the country, and to diminish a vice, itself very prevalent in certain classes of society, and which statistics as well as common observation showed to be the proximate cause of more misery, crime, taxation, and offense of every sort than any other single vice by which society is afflicted, perhaps than all others together. The reform was at first carried on as a moral move-

ment only through all the well known temperance agencies of tracts, lectures, associations, and the pledge.

In this way people were brought to an intelligent appreciation of the magnitude of the evils of intemperance, such as they had never possessed before. Then with the root and branch thoroughness for which New England reformers are famous, it was proposed to render intemperance, and so its consequent evils, thenceforth forever impossible to any great number of persons by transferring the guardianship of temperance from the weak resolutions of individuals to the strong executions of law. It was proposed to exterminate the vice by measures so radical as even to interfere with the exercise of the corresponding virtue, to make drunkenness to cease from the earth by legally prohibiting the sale of intoxicating drinks.

In this way the subject of temperance has gained a prominence among political questions wholly new; it has risen to the first rank among such questions, and as a political problem is giving politicians more trouble to-day than it has ever given moralists from the days of Confucius down. This subject is no longer one of philosophic interest alone. It has come to be of intensest popular interest. It appeals to all alike as citizens, and already for twenty years in New England it has demanded of every voter a definite opinion of its merits. Meanwhile to the student of social science this difficult and apparently unique political question may do more than any other before the public to illustrate the real nature and functions of government, the possibilities and impossibilities of law, the relations of morals to politics, the field and limitations of that ancient strife between the rights of government and the rights of man, between the instincts of freedom in the individual citizen, and of self-preservation in the body politic.

Mr. Wm. B. Weeden of Providence, Rhode Island, has recently written a little book* containing a discussion of the fundamental relations of the liquor question to legislation. The book is especially pertinent and useful in that it deals rather with these fundamental relations than with merely proximate issues, though these latter are by no means ne-

* *The Moral and Prohibitory Liquor Laws. An Essay, by WILLIAM B. WEEDEN.* Boston: Roberts Bros. 1875.

lected. He would ask prohibitionists "to consider from their own point of view their attitude toward law—not any particular statute, but those great principles of government which hold society together." (p. 18.) It is often thought that the world would be saved much waste of words were only this method adhered to from the outset of every discussion. But Mr. Weeden has learned that the world will never attend to underlying principles until after these have been brought home to the experience of men, in what the world calls facts, which are the proximate issues. This is probably in the nature of things and so nothing to complain of. Mr. Weeden turns this knowledge of human nature to account in his discussion, and early presents us with the facts that suggest his theories. His temper throughout the book is serious and fair. His style, in the main, is clear, without literary pretension. His authorities are unimpeachable. His induction of facts is far from being so wide as could be wished and contains some important omissions that leave his incidental argument, as to the actual working of prohibition, inconclusive. The statements of fact that he makes would hardly be controverted, but they are not marshalled in such a way as best conduces to the strength of his position. His conclusions are often forcibly and suggestively put, but unfortunately are scattered through his pages from first to last with far too little order and discrimination. His main argument is not coherently nor concisely developed, and his incidental conclusions would probably to many minds carry more weight than his chief ones. There is nothing new in any one of the author's positions, though they may not hitherto have been all brought together in their present applications. Yet notwithstanding all its imperfections this volume is a significant one, and deserves the careful attention of thinking citizens, especially of all public men. It is significant, not as a literary production, nor even greatly as an argument, nor as in any way a novelty, but (1) as one of very few honest attempts to go to the bottom of the difficult matter of temperance legislation, (2) as a presentation of many ugly facts in the history of this legislation which have received too little attention from the country at large, (3) as an account of a better mode of legislation in this matter that has already, in another country,

been tried with remarkable success, and (4) as an admirable representation in miniature of the confusions and contradictions that very widely prevail as to the office of democratic law.

Mr. Weeden argues chiefly to show that Prohibitionists are wholly mistaken in the grounds on which they demand political action, desiring, as they do, to transfer to the sphere of civil law what the writer regards as solely a matter of morals. "The abstinent, inspired by a noble and passionate emotion, capable of enormous moral influence, have prostituted it in chasing an *ignis fatuus* through the mire of politics." (p. 26.) Incidentally Mr. W. endeavors to show that as a matter of fact the actual prohibitory laws, first and last, have proved tyrannically unjust, utterly inefficient, and, in their effects, terribly and portentously demoralizing to the private and political conscience. The book is one that deserves the most careful reviewing, and the subject demands to be brought before every reading citizen.

The statements of fact should be first examined, according to the writer's own order. Before doing this, however, attention should again be called to the tone of entire respect and even admiration which he exhibits for the moral earnestness that originated and has animated the political movement from which he so wholly dissents. He thinks, indeed, that the extreme position assumed by prohibitionists tends more or less to narrow the men both mentally and morally, a tendency incidental to all extreme positions. "Yet the enthusiasm of the abstinent in its personal and legitimate expression is not to be trifled with nor even argued with. It is a noble passion, ever elevating, though sometimes narrowing the man, and is entitled to respect and affectionate regard from us all. The man or woman who deliberately abandons liquors is generally moved from the depths of the soul. Those who have suffered, not in themselves, but in the wasted lives of their friends, cherish a passion for abstinence which is beyond and above criticism. We say again that we honor this emotion as one of the grandest forces of humanity." And then, in accordance with his argument, "The moral influence of abstinent should likewise have the fullest play. The personal power of one who refuses an indulgence is the strongest motive to influence

the self-indulgent. Society should favor this power of the individual by every means possible. It is the civic attitude . . . of the abstinents which the writer would call into the discussion. . . . By as much as we exalt and dignify the moral power of the abstinents, by so much do we dread its waste or misuse in the struggle to maintain laws faulty in conception, impossible in execution." (pp. 11, 12.)

And now for Mr. Weeden's facts. The moral reform "was too slow a process for the more ardent of the abstinents. They determined to turn the force already acquired into a new channel, and to bring the whole power of society to bear on the use of liquors. This system culminated in the Maine law, so called, which in its various forms of prohibition and execution has dragged its way through legislatures and courts for more than twenty years." (pp. 14, 15.) "Anything to stop traffic in the accursed stuff, the abstinents cried out. . . . Possibly the legal outlet afforded a relief from the excitement of the moral impulse under which the community labored. . . . Nevertheless, steady minded people could not vote it (liquor) a poison. The statutes were all arranged with contrivances to allow the use under one and another sort of fiction. The contrivances and evasions passed into ordinary customs, while the statutes were constantly growing more stringent technically." (p. 17.) The inefficiency of all the liquor laws as first constituted was acknowledged and complained of by foes and friends alike. Mr. Amos C. Barstow, leader of the Prohibitionists in Rhode Island, stated with reference to them that: "1st. It requires more evidence to convict a man under them than would be sufficient to hang him.

"2d. The penalties are inadequate. So true is this, that, in my opinion, the law is hardly worth enforcing. It only serves when enforced to fret and goad the rumseller, while it allows the traffic to go on. He can pay its penalties and grow rich in spite of it.

"3d. It allows towns to license the traffic. The State thus by giving this liberty sanctions the traffic, and becomes a party to the crime." (p. 57.)

This was the case in Rhode Island before the introduction in that State, in 1852, of the Maine law, and these statements are given as representing the opinions and arguments of the

prohibition party everywhere before Neal Dow's law came into operation. Then the Maine law was enacted in several States, proceeding against property as well as the offender, and giving stringent power of seizure. (p. 56.) Everything was done to make the law once passed effective. (pp. 59-60.) Prohibitionists were put into the public offices. Nevertheless, it is claimed that the traffic underwent no important change. The testimony is given of a gentleman whom Mr. Weeden regards as "thoroughly disinterested," "used to the observation of facts," and one who "knows how to reduce them to a scientific verity." He lived in one of the principal cities of Connecticut during the years 1854-6, and says he was "favorably situated to observe the workings of the Maine law when first passed and enforced in that State." This witness asserts (p. 61) that "the evils resulting from it were so serious that those of its most ardent supporters who were really in a position to see and feel the real state of the case, were quite willing to allow the law, in that city at least, to become a dead letter."

Mr. Weeden made efforts to get at the actual statistics of liquor consumption. (69, 72.) But neither "one of the best statisticians in Massachusetts," nor the Providence, nor the Boston and Albany railroad, could furnish any figures not merely approximative and open to criticism. Yet judging from external appearances, "wherever we travel, whether in Maine, Massachusetts, New York, or Ohio, we see about the same evidences of liquors and their consumption. In large places where new streets are opened we see about the same preparations for liquor selling, whether the location be in Massachusetts or New York. A village may show signs of an especial abstinence from liquors, but the next village will give equal evidence of a different habit. States having different systems, whether of license or prohibition, show no marked difference in their drinking habits." (p. 70.) But although difficult to obtain statistics which would show the changes in the amount of liquor existing and consumed since the operation of the Maine law, statistics of drunkenness are easily available and here they serve the same end. The report of the Boston Chief of Police for 1872 is quoted (p. 77) as showing that notwithstanding an act amended eleven times within four years, and mani-

fold in its provisions, notwithstanding faithful officers and many prosecutions, "Drunkenness, the evil, has not diminished." The State Board of Health of Massachusetts affirms, in 1871, that, "While throughout the State there is less drunkenness than formerly, it never was more rampant than now in Boston and some of the larger cities." (p. 79.)

As for the liquor dealers, they are hardly worse off after the Maine law than before it, and it is claimed that Mr. Barstow's description of the old law, quoted above, serves for the new, "for these men can still pay its penalties and grow rich in spite of it." "The liquor dealers in Providence have acquired large fortunes, built solid blocks of stores, and in every way evinced a prosperous traffic." (pp. 68, 91, 93.) A little more than a month after General Howard had publicly announced his conviction that the prohibitory laws of Rhode Island, if not a complete success, were a success beyond the fondest anticipations of its friends, the organ of the Prohibitory party printed the statement, that "The dealers in intoxicating liquors have made some slight changes in their mode of doing business, and the business goes forward just as defiantly as though it were a virtue to trample the statutes of a little State like Rhode Island under foot." (p. 90.) As to the consumers of liquor, Mr. Weeden finds no class of people whose old habits in this matter have undergone noticeable change. Neither the upper and middle classes (vid. pp. 60-63, 85, 93, 106, 109, 140-1), nor the laboring class (pp. 63-4, 93, 95-98), nor the dangerous class (pp. 64-68), is exempt from this charge, nor temperance men any more than the intemperate. (95, 106-110, 140-1.)

The two most remarkable modes of evasion the law has suffered are those described on pages 61-62, and 86-88. The first account, quoted from the words of a prosecuting attorney in Connecticut, who had been earnest in working to secure the passage of the law, regards the formation of clubs among young men. It reads as follows: "No sooner were the dram shops closed than the regular tipplers, uniting, formed various 'clubs,' or 'societies,' ostensibly for social or literary purposes. Rooms were hired, fitted up in good style, and stocked with an abundance of the 'ardent,' purchased at wholesale prices in New York. The rooms, open at all times to

members, became their favorite resort at night, and gambling soon became a marked feature of their festive gatherings. Not satisfied with fleecing one another, they soon began to draw in fresh victims, the more innocent the better. Young men who would have turned in disgust from a dram shop were easily enticed into a 'club room,' and those who would never have consented to play at cards in a public resort, were more ready to join in a game 'among friends, you know.' The infection quietly spread, especially among employes of the higher class, clerks and others holding positions of trust, who had been considered above all suspicion. At length the employers became aware that things were going wrong, and soon discovered the source of the evil. Urgent appeals were made by the prosecuting attorney and many of the best citizens—most of whom had been zealous and influential friends of the Maine law—to put an end to the pressure which gave these clubs their being and vitality. The law soon ceased to be enforced, but its evil effects long survived, as the clubs once organized maintained themselves for some time. Many a young man armed at all points against open temptations, succumbed to the insidious lure of a 'secret society,' with its promise of a social circle of 'good fellows.' That these clubs were really the result of the law, and that they owed their vitality in great measure to its enforcement, is, I think, capable of distinct proof."

Mr. Weeden gives this as representative of the facts everywhere. (vid. pp. 64, 69, 93, 118.) The second account referred to, regards the management of the liquor dealers when attacked by the State constabulary. Before quoting this it should be said that Mr. W. does not clearly indicate the difference in the working of the Maine law before and after the organization of this State constabulary. This institution was the last important new feature of the prohibitory law. (p. 58.) A State constable and his deputies "having no local associations" would certainly, it was thought, make the law effective, carrying out its seizure acts with little difficulty. The inherent weakness as well as bad tendencies of this institution are well shown. (pp. 81-83.) But the author seems rather to imply that no change in the traffic has occurred as its consequence, other than increased maneuvering on the part of the liquor dealers and the increased number of litigations.

Mr. W. tells us (p. 86), that: "The agitators set their machinery in motion during the summer, and in the autumn a lot of cases were under way. It is supposed (Dec., 1874), there are fully five hundred suits instituted. It is evident that if law and litigation would accomplish the suppression of the liquor traffic, there is enough in process in Rhode Island. They made a loud noise and one might suppose that no man would dare to tap a cask. Still the knowing ones said that the sale was going in different form but in as large quantity as ever. The State constables hustled about and worked faithfully as they could; there is no question of their integrity. They could not be entirely fair as politics are constituted. When a dealer had a strong political influence, and the shrewd ones among them have this, owing to the inverse working of these very laws, the constables found it convenient to pass him by. But they seized many stocks of liquors and large ones to await trial under the new statute. There is so much good done, you say; to get any substantial quantity of liquors out of the shops is a blessing. Innocent! you do not understand the plain ways of liquor laws. As soon as the State constable attaches, the dealer puts his legal machinery at work. The ownership of these large stocks of liquors is in men who live in New York. They at once sue and the U. S. marshal, one greater than the State constable, takes possession. Well, the liquors are safe, good women will say; some good is done. Not at all. The U. S. assumes no further responsibility than it is obliged to in any civil suit for any property interest. In this suit it only cares for the plaintiff who wants his liquor. Therefore the marshal appoints a keeper who is satisfactory to the plaintiff, and if he chooses he appoints a clerk of the Rhode Island dealer. The marshal has no other course open to him. He discharges his duty morally and legally when he satisfies the plaintiff. So the liquors have rounded the circumlocution office and passed back into the virtual control of the liquor dealer from whom they started. The dealer then goes on retailing with a small stock at the risk of seizure, but the bulk of his property is under the virtual protection of the U. S. Government." "Statute after statute was invented or evolved, broken, tinkered and refitted, damaged, whetted and repaired through a

sickening cycle of political history. No one changed his habits by reason of his vote for a liquor law." (p. 24.)

Such are the facts that Mr. Weeden presents as to the actual working of the prohibitory laws. It has not been the purpose here to call his statements of fact into question, but to furnish a resumé of them as they stand, leaving their minute criticism to other hands. How exactly given they may be, or how much overdrawn, cannot be here determined. Much has been quoted but more remains in the volume claiming a wide consideration.

It may be noticed, however, that the particulars are mostly drawn from an experience of prohibition in Rhode Island, or, rather, in the two cities of Providence and Boston. Very little is specified regarding the working of the law in the country as distinct from cities. What is told of Connecticut is only the report of two or three individuals, while from Maine, the representative State in this question, no details whatever are given. One or two general and sweeping statements only are made regarding the facts there. As for authorities, Mr. Weeden is said to be a manufacturer employing many workmen, whose personal habits he has had the best opportunities for studying. (vid. Ed. Ev. Hale, in *Christian Union*, 17 March, ult.), and for some of his more significant facts he vouches from personal observation. He relies, besides, upon the words of competent eye-witnesses of his own acquaintance, (pp. 61, 69), the friends of the law (pp. 57, 65, 69, 85, 89, 90, 113, 114), politicians and public officers of many departments (pp. 22, 91, 92), the *Rhode Island Acts and Resolves* (pp. 65, 68), the *Report of the Chief of the Boston Police* (p. 77), and the *Report of the Massachusetts Board of Health* (p. 79.)

Probably most readers would allow that his statements appear sound so far as they go, but they do not go far enough to demonstrate the entire failure of the law even in the State Rhode Island, at large, itself. Nevertheless, the least weight that can be conceded to them is enough to oppress one with the sense of a terrible weakness in American legislation. The story is black enough as it stands to demand that there be no further delay in its explanation.

Mr. Weeden explains by saying that the law is inefficient because unjust and tyrannical. It is unjust, First, because it is not a genuine expression and embodiment of public sentiment (pp. 80, 81, 88, 98, 100, 105, 106, 114, 124, 128, 130, 132, 139-140, 151, 176), and, Secondly, above all, because it is opposed to the nature of things in setting itself against inherent rights of individuals' attempting an *ab extra* creation of virtue, exercising authority in a domain where conscience only holds the jurisdiction. (pp. 17, 18, 19, 54-5, 64, 116-17, 131, 133, 136-7, 160-62, 201.)

I. His first ground for the injustice of the law the author supports by describing how the law came to be made. (pp. 16-26, 84-85.) Unfortunately he contents himself at this point with mere assertions, proving nothing. These assertions carry all the plausibility belonging to the *à priori* probabilities of the case. But it is a pity that the author takes no space to substantiate them.

He finds the law, in short, notwithstanding the sincere and lofty motives that suggested it, and that have all along furnished the impulse to its principal advocates, to be nothing better than a product of political chicanery and compromises. Had it been otherwise it would have been maintained. "If a very large majority had sincerely held the abstinent view and had effectively abstained from any use of liquors the law could have been administered as well as other laws on which the whole community agree." (p. 19.) This statement, at least, is almost self-evident. The efficiency of any law in a democratic country depends primarily upon its representing the real sentiment and according with the real life of the great majority of the people. And this is even true independently of either the morality or the expediency of a law. The history of democracies proves nothing more plainly than that a widely dominating public sentiment will support any law, however immoral it may be regarded by outsiders, or however destructive even of the material interests of the land where it exists. And wherever a democratic government fails to enforce its own law among its own constituents, the first presumption is and always must be that such a law has been artificially created, does not meet the requirements of the people nor

formulate its will. It may be worse than the public sentiment or it may be better, but in either case it is worse than no law if in the majority of instances it fails to fulfill its end. Of course no laws exist wholly exempt from violation. But very gross violations may occur while yet a law accomplishes its chief end. No law may be deemed a failure because it is not perfectly obeyed. That such an honor should be done to government has never been expected. But when the hostility issuing in violation is the only attitude of the whole class that the law directly affects, when in the places where the law was intended to do most good, the practice has even increased that the law condemns as a crime, when the important change looked for in the habits of the people as a consequence of the law cannot be seen at all, then it may well be suspected whether such a law be indeed demanded by the people and a natural outgrowth of the people's life, or the product of a mere majority vote secured by all the means well known to expert politicians.

Whenever it shall be demonstrated by a sufficient induction of the facts involved, that this position of Mr. Weeden is correct, then the first measures necessary to be taken in this matter of liquor law will be clearly indicated. For it cannot be ignored that although public sentiment may be educated to any point and then formulated into law, the law may not precede the sentiment. Beneath the form must lie the substance, or form is nothing save ideal. In an empire the people may be forced to suit themselves as best they can to the laws, but in a democracy the laws must suit the people. In America public sentiment is the great procrustean bed on which the laws are stretched, to be brought up to its requirements and cut down to its demand. Mr. Weeden sums up this position in these words: "Any law which does not work out public sentiment will be evaded, if not by the above process, by some other equally ingenious. But ingenuity never saved a public offender where the public were in earnest. The public mind assents to the theory of regulation; enthusiasts attempt to turn that sentiment into prohibition; the result in practice is a mush which is neither prohibitory nor regulative." (p. 88.)

II. But the first and last and chiefest aim of Mr. Weeden's book is to show, not, properly speaking, the immorality of the prohibitory laws, yet their injustice and mistake, upon what he regards as moral grounds. "The Morality of Prohibitory Liquor Laws" is the title of his discussion, and to this point he recurs with emphasis at every few pages of his volume.

It is allowed that government has the right to take regulative measures concerning the sale of liquor (105), and a very interesting chapter is devoted to showing how this may be done with the best results. But government may not suppress this sale, because man has a natural and moral right to drink. In the present case government has interfered with this inherent, personal right, (1) by attempting politically to enforce a moral reform upon individuals, (2) by putting into the category of crimes an act in itself not wrong, (3) by interdicting a practice which in every particular instance is only a possible and not a certain occasion of general harm; and (4) by prohibiting what at worst is never more than a very indirect, even when an actual cause of social injury or offense.

Mr. Weeden does not arrange his propositions in this order, but then he gives them no order, scattering them about in indiscriminate succession and reiteration. In order to get at the force of his own positions, it is necessary throughout his book to first discover where and what they are, and then to give them such classification as their relations seem to require. The only noticeable order in the author's argument is that already alluded to. The bulk of his statements of fact are offered to his readers first and the bulk of his explanations afterward. This very feature of the book is interesting as illustrative of the way in which, for the most part, the whole discussion of this subject has been hitherto conducted.

"The right to drink, or not drink liquors, is an individual right just as much as eating is individual, though the whole population should hover between dyspepsia and apoplexy." (19.) "Temperance or abstinence in respect to liquors are principles strictly within the domain of each individual. Each man has a right, morally, so long as no law of God is broken . . . (and) socially to choose for himself whether he will use or refuse liquors. The abuse of liquors at once carries the indi-

vidual beyond himself and creates the right of social interference. Consequently the use or non-use of liquors should be equal before the law; and there is no just reason for interfering by legislation or legal process with either practice." (54.) "As men are constituted to-day, as the principles of civilized law are to-day, the point at issue is, has a person a right, under the law, to drink a glass or a teaspoonful of alcoholic liquor? If he has that right he has a right to buy it, and if the State interferes to regulate the natural traffic it is bound to furnish reasonable means for the gratification of the buyer's desire." (183.) Edmund Burke is quoted: "They ought to know the different departments of things—what belongs to laws and what manners alone can regulate. To these, great politicians may give a leaning, but they cannot give a law." (64.)

"This principle of individual liberty goes to the foundations of every law, social custom, or personal opinion. It is too large and too important to be much affected by the evils of intemperance, great as these evils are, individually and socially." (160.)

In short, to drink alcoholic liquors if one wishes, is one of the natural rights of man, and therefore inalienable by legislation, directly or indirectly.

When any subject is treated of in its relations to the rights of man the very foundations of political science are touched. There is perhaps no other point of discussion in which it is more difficult to refrain from mere asseveration, and there are few persons indeed who are consistent in their own doctrines of this matter. At the same time nothing more imperatively demands quick and definite settlement, in the interests of democratic legislation than the very questions here involved.

It seems plain that Mr. Weeden, unfortunately, has not wholly escaped mental confusion in his presentation of the doctrine of Rights. For the most part this book is a defence against the usurpation of government of one of the natural rights, which the author regards as inherent in the individual. Yet in one place (149) in attempting to show how men may not confound social rights with personal wishes he quotes an apparently irrelevant passage from Cornwall Lewis to the effect that what men call their "original rights," "natural rights,"

&c., never inhere in individuals at all, but only in "sovereign legislatures . . . the sources from which all rights flow."

Passages quoted from John Stuart Mill and Mr. Mulford's "*Nation*" (160-1) showing how no legislatures nor majority decisions may transgress the rights of persons, set over against this from Sir Cornwall Lewis, can hardly fail of leaving the impression that the author has contradicted himself. The notion that natural rights can ever be rightly forfeited the author entirely ignores. He thinks they may be more or less restrained; but that circumstances ever arise in which they can be wholly forfeited has not distinctly occurred to him. He thinks there are extraordinary occasions where extraordinary legislative measures are justifiable, but that in the ordinary course of legislation the natural rights of man ever are or may be rightfully infringed upon he does not recognize. He likens the "civic attitude of the abstinents" to that of the old persecutors for heresy (pp. 17, 18) ignoring an important distinction between opinions and practices. Modern legislation in free countries has indeed done with attempting to control the opinions of men, and to a great extent their speeches, but to control their practices is the business of legislation; not all practices it is true, yet any and all of certain social bearings. It is but needed to find the rule as to what sort of practices legislation may control and what not, and this whole question of the relations of liquor to law, and many another, is immediately solved.

Every question of practice of course belongs primarily to the jurisdiction of conscience and so is a matter of morals. But obviously there are many questions of practice which society has determined to submit also to governmental arbitration, and so make them a matter of politics as well. Now what is it that extends a question from the sphere of ethics to that of politics?

(1.) Certainly, Mr. Weeden thinks, this may not be effected by any mere desire for moral reform. No mere moral sentiment may find legislative expression.

"To put one moral reform under control of government and get it out of the daily duty of the individual, seemed a gain to some short-sighted persons." (17.) "Those who think unwise laws can be sustained by the moral sense alone should

consider the old revenue laws of England," &c. (110.) "Failing in this moral sanction the prohibitionists substitute the pressure of a majority vote and the feeling which the evils of intemperance always excite in any humane person. Now both these principles are powerful in their legitimate sphere, but neither one can enforce a statute law unless it be sustained by other more powerful influences, which combined, make up even justice. Here is an appetite common, nay, well nigh universal. Stimulants are used from the poles to the equator. . . . Neither a majority vote nor a moral sentiment will change this essential principle, and make the gratification of a natural appetite into a crime against the State." (131.) "The waves of moral sentiment have driven the statute forward from point to point in the manner De Tocqueville shows the majority have power to do." (136.) "The temperate see a drunkard in the gutter, an orphan in the asylum, a whisky dealer wallowing in his gains; they transmute this moral sensibility into a legal right of prohibition. This legal right thus becomes a tyranny, for there is no corresponding change in the habits of the majority or of the whole public." (144.)

Here again Mr. Weeden lacks distinctness in his own ideas. He frequently asserts or implies that a law may not be made having no other basis than moral sentiment. He admits (128) that such a law is not necessarily a bad one. He states that, "If the great majority of society were totally abstinent a statute against the sale of liquors as a beverage might be maintained as an administrative expedient. There would then be "an efficient 'sanction' of the law, as the jurist's term runs." (128.) His confusion lies in implicitly contrasting the moral sentiment that prompts such laws as those under discussion with the "moral sanction" (130) which makes other laws effective as different in kind instead of degree. Mr. Weeden does not see that this very "feeling which the evils of intemperance excite," &c., instead of being quite another thing than the sanction is what constitutes the sanction provided only there be enough of it. He asserts that these statutes have been driven forward from point to point by waves of moral sentiment, which he thinks never succeed in giving moral sanction to a law and hence in good measure the practical failure observed in the

present case. But according to his own showing, and the facts which he first brings forward, there has been altogether too little moral sentiment and far too much political maneuvering, wherefore the failure.

This is a thing very easy to illustrate. Mr. Weeden himself furnishes illustrations which he by no means suspects of contradicting his own argument. "To put one moral reform under the control of government and get it out of the daily duty of individuals" Mr. Weeden thinks unjust and absurd. But there are many such reforms already there. On what ground are duelling, pugilist rings, wanton cruelty to animals, gambling establishments, brothels, bad books and bigamy ever illegal? Because they are a flagrant offense to the moral sentiment of a people. In times, communities, or countries where they are not such an offense they are not illegal. Bigamy is not such an offense to the Mormons, whose moral sentiment on the contrary even justifies it, and so they wish it also justified in law. Brothels are not a serious offense to the people of Paris and many other cities, and so the only obstacle to their legalization is removed and they are legal. It is not long since the moral sentiment of Baden was sufficiently roused to require a governmental suppression of the greatest gambling hell in the world. The moral sentiment of Spain finds no fault with bull fights and they legally exist. They could not exist under law in New England because the moral sentiment of the country would alone be strong enough to prevent it. Mr. Weeden tells of a time in New England when it would have been very easy to legally taboo the use of playing cards, and simply because the moral sense of past generations then looked with horror on all games of chance. This could not occur now because the moral sentiment has changed. The Mormonism of Utah has possessed its great immunities 'hitherto only because it has been impossible to organize on the spot juries sufficiently representing the moral sentiment of the American people at large. As a system of religious belief Mormonism is beyond the surveillance of law, but as a practice of polygamy it may fall under the law's condemnation, and yet not necessarily because it is an evil to society any other way than morally. As a matter of fact the experience of history may teach that

polygamy is less conducive than monogamy to the interests of society. But it is not on this ground that laws exist in America against it. As a people we are not at all given to relying on the lessons of any history but our own. We are not satisfied till we test things for ourselves, and in this case the best experience of polygamy this country has gained seems thus far to exhibit rather the material advantages than evils of the system. It is not on this ground at all, but simply because this thing is an offense to the moral sentiment of Americans that we ever legislate against it.

Is the self-vaunted, "stirpicultural" communism of Oneida county a thing right before the law of this land, or wrong? Thanks to the ethical element of that law such a community can only exist in defiance of law. It owes its continued existence to that principle of non-interference in the affairs of others so long as these do not materially interfere with our own interests, which is incidental to our democratic education; a meritorious principle which may be pushed to an extreme that becomes a fault. But Oneida communism, however tolerated by the State of New York, is an illegality, and is such for simply moral and not material reasons. The members of this community are said to form a peaceful and industrious society. They have well-tilled fields and well-kept town. The practices that form their bond of union as a society are of course a matter of common consent among themselves, and they do no violence to outsiders in any way save morally. The material damage which they inflict upon society at large is certainly indirect and apparantly remote and intangible. But just because they are morally an eyesore to the rest of the world, and an open pestilence to society, are their practices condemned by law if not by force or juries. Indeed if Mr. Weeden means to imply by his position regarding the prohibitory law as failing to embody general sentiment that if the law did so embody general sentiment, it would have good and sufficient reason for existence, then this present position he has himself precluded. For the general sentiment may be moral as well as æsthetic, or a sense of danger or any other sort, and the mere fact of a sentiment that prompts legislation being moral does not make it an insufficient ground of legislation, and it is inevitable that moral sentiment should ever be a

ground of legislation, provided only in any particular instance that it be sufficiently deep-seated and wide spread.

(2.) But the author reminds us of a difference between practices which are wrong in themselves, and drinking which is the exercise of a normal appetite, and he thinks prohibitory legislation unjust in treating as a crime what no one but ascetics, since the world began has regarded as other than a morally lawful act. Unfortunately for his argument, although this difference is a fundamental one in morals, in politics it neither has nor can find recognition. The illustrations already named serve to show that communities formulate their dominant sentiments into laws without any direct reference to the essential evil of the practices involved. If this sentiment coincide with the real ethical conditions of the case, well and good, but if not it makes no difference with the legislation. Morally wrong practices are legally permitted and morally right practices are interdicted according as communities or peoples see fit. Moreover this cannot be otherwise, so long as, in the first place, the practical convictions of a people make no demand for stricter laws, and so long, in the second place, as practices exist, which, whether wrong or right in themselves, a people decides to be in any way sufficiently offensive or injurious to society to demand legislative restrictions. If legislative action had to depend on the essential evil of a practice it would sometimes trespass on very debatable ground.

Mr. Weeden is aware "That a few abstinents take ground that drinking is an absolute infraction of God's laws," and says: "let them prove it and the liquor statutes will mend themselves very quickly." Alas! for men, there is no certainty of this, nor even likelihood. Human civil law does not conform itself so quickly to the mandates of the government of God, nor when so conformed is it therefore much more effective. There are many vices *per se* that get no legislation, as well as many morally innocent practices which yet government must control.

(3.) A third cause of injustice in the law is that it is intended to suppress a practice not necessarily hurtful at all even in remote effects. Of course neither selling liquor nor drinking it are necessarily wrong in themselves, but neither are they

necessarily hurtful in their effects, immediate or remote. "The evidence is no more certain that a pauper or criminal will be made when a man buys a glass of beer or whisky than it is when a person buys a rope that he will hang himself" (131). "A man desiring a gill of whisky or of beer has a right to it. The contingent fact that he may add other gills to his wants and thus make himself a drunkard or a pauper is in practical life too remote for the law to control by forbidding the first want. No legislation looking so far into future risks ever did succeed" (159). "The individual cannot be cut off from his normal activity because social good may in an uncertain contingency be harmed" (201).

Mr. Weeden has all along been unfortunate in the selection of his illustrations, for he could hardly have found any to tell more mercilessly against his own argument than those which he presents in its support. It is very true that the evidence is no more certain in the sense of demonstrative that a drinker will become a criminal than that a man with a rope will hang himself. But the probabilities that a man who drinks spirits under the ordinary bar room surroundings will come to this end are immensely greater than that a man with a rope, under ordinary circumstances, will hang himself. The evidence is not demonstrative that a powder mill or nitro-glycerine manufactory in the middle of a city will explode to general harm. But government does not wait for demonstration in such matters before taking stringent action. The law prohibits the dispensation of certain poisons at a druggist's without a regular prescription, and not because of any certainty, but because of probabilities as to their misuse. Yet the probabilities that arsenic or many other poisons bought without legal restrictions would in average cases come to misuse, are not so strong as that liquor will be misused by the bar-room drinker. Moreover, liquor misused may lead to as fatal results as any deadly poison. Manufacturing powder and selling arsenic are "normal activities" which yet government is everywhere permitted and obliged to control, and in all such matters the amount of control exercised is intended to be proportioned to the strength of probability as to the contingent harm and the amount of harm contingent.

The fact is, government must be constantly forecasting probabilities and acting with direct reference thereto. In the practical arrangements of life, private, social, and political, demonstrative evidence is very rare and many things must turn on probabilities. Government has ever to be watchful of "contingent facts," and must take measures with regard to "future risks." It is legislation not looking into future risks that never did succeed.

(4.) But admitting, as Mr. Weeden does, that the liquor traffic, although not necessarily a cause of public wrong, is nevertheless actually very often such a cause, he still thinks prohibitory legislation unjust for the cause is so remote and indirect. "The action of prohibition is indirect. It lays a penalty on a deed which is not a crime; which, in fact never becomes a crime, but, in certain contingencies leads a man into drunkenness, and thence he falls into crime. A process so winding and circuitous necessarily carries crooked ways and shaky proceedings into the administration of the law itself. Prosecutors, advocates, and witnesses are all moving in a false light which deranges the perspective of common justice and common judicial proceedings. The statute which forbids the sale has been broken. The person who participated in the act, the drinker, feels no sense of crime, indeed the law nowhere makes him criminal. The community in which the drinker moves—and a man rarely rises above the moral sense of those around him—does not regard the act of drinking as a crime. The state is placed in a position where it creates crime out of a simple act, not in itself evil, pursues by testimony not fair in the ordinary sense, and convicts under an unwilling as well as blind justice. The whole process from the inception of the law to the conviction of the criminal is artificial and not vital." (pp. 146-7).

"The use of liquors as a beverage, whether they be food or not, is something which the majority of the community have adopted into their every day life. With that common use there goes an abuse which engenders among us a vast amount of vice and crime. To attempt to stop the abuse and evil consequences by forbidding the use is no more practicable than it

would have been to cut off the use of pork by statute because much pork held "trichinæ and so injured the people." (156).

"To aggravate the results of contingent crimes does not raise the tone of the community. To maintain the moral tone of society in England, only a short time since, they thought it necessary to transport a petty thief or even to put him to death. The practical result was that there were more and worse hardened criminals. Society was not bettered thereby. . . . By constructively making an artificial criminal out of the liquor dealer, we have made these sellers into a hard set morally." (133).

"The individual must have his freedom even to injure himself, and must not be restrained until his acts directly injure other persons." (201).

It is rhetorically unfortunate to be reduced to frequent repetitions of well worn illustrations. But logically an argument may sometimes gain in force by what detracts from its rhetorical beauty. Many of the illustrations already used may be found to tell as forcibly against this last position as against any that have preceded. But first it should be remarked that Mr. Weeden exaggerates the indirection of the legal action that he describes. He represents it as touching a man because he innocently sells what another may innocently buy, and having bought abuse to his personal injury, when in a condition of personal excitement or irresponsibility he possibly disturbs the public peace or safety and so perpetrates a crime. This process, however, is shorter by one stage, for the law may collar a man so soon as he is drunk, without waiting for further developments.

Neither duelling, nor pugilistics, nor gambling, nor prostitution, nor infamous books, nor vagrancy, nor the sale of gunpowder or of any poison, or of lottery tickets, nor the carrying of concealed arms, none of these things nor many more come under legislative regulation because they "directly injure other persons." The injury involved either is confined to the perpetrators, or is an "uncertain contingency," or at worst only indirectly if at all touches a second party, affects society.

It appears from Mr. Weeden that sometimes the sale of lottery tickets is forbidden, and the reason for this prohibition

which he gives is: "Because they are used in gambling, and gambling is against the law." The sale and use of these tickets is neither wrong *per se* nor necessarily productive of gambling. In most countries of Europe lotteries in themselves are regarded as proper enough institutions so long as honestly managed. The New England moral sentiment does not prevail against them there. They are not only legalized but sometimes under immediate government control, and in so Christian and civilized a country as Saxony, where the proportion of adults unable to read and write is far less than in the United States, the lottery proceeds go to the national treasury. Yet because the sale of lottery tickets may, indirectly, lead to gambling, it is sometimes forbidden. But this ground of prohibition if good at all will hold with regard to the sale of liquors—for liquors are used in drunkenness and drunkenness is against the law. Gambling has never done the harm in the world that drunkenness has done, and if government ever has reason to fear the former, how much more at every time the latter!

The fact is, there have always been practices only indirectly harmful to the material interests of society, which yet society has been constrained to put into the category of crimes, or treat with stringent rules and penalties, because they have proved too dangerous, even though indirectly, to its welfare, or too offensive to its sentiment. To prevent abuses by controlling uses has been the habit of every kind of government in all history, and it has been an action not only acquiesced in, but demanded by every people whenever a given abuse has been considered sufficiently flagrant.

If by "aggravating the results of contingent crimes," Mr. Weeden means exaggerating them, his passage is plainer. Laws founded upon such an exaggeration must do the harm and suffer the fate of the old English law to which the author refers. But his illustration is wholly inapplicable to his argument, for the crimes contingent on the liquor traffic in this country so far from having ever been exaggerated have never been sufficiently known. The author could hardly have found an illustration to better contrast the difference of the very cases that he wishes to show as similar.

So then in these four ways Mr. Weeden thinks that politics, by prohibitory legislation, has usurped the rule of morals. In these four ways it has forestalled the natural rights of individuals, and thus the law has been a tyranny. If on the contrary, however, it have been shown that governments have always been not only permitted but obliged to assume this very office and authority, then plainly the injustice of the law considered must be explained another way. If these things be so the true explanation has already, most likely, been presented in the position of the author first described. The entire failure of any law in a democratic community to express the real sentiment of the people is alone sufficient evidence of mistake if not injustice, as well as adequate explanation in the majority of cases of the inefficiency of such a law.

But after all Mr. Weeden may be disposed to charge this criticism with the material fallacy of irrelevant conclusion. He has expressly and frequently stated that prohibitive legislation only is what he condemns, while regulative laws in this matter he strongly advocates. Surely, it would seem, there is an *ignoratio elenchi* somewhere in this discussion, but to which side, if either, does it belong? Certainly it is no less an unpleasant than an ungracious thing to be finding so much fault with so meritorious an undertaking. Mr. Weeden's book is no less admirable in temper than in purpose, is valuable for the facts it brings to bear upon its subject, presents an interesting summary, so far as it goes, of various hypotheses that have been urged on different sides of this discussion, and does what destructive criticisms rarely do, in offering a remedy worth the widest consideration, for the evils that it exposes. Mr. Weeden is a close observer of facts, and he knows, what not all have known, what must be done before any further practical measures in this important matter can possess a proper basis. Moreover Mr. Weeden is a critic and a gentleman at once, which few men ever are in their discussion of extreme positions. His main argument, however, is so fundamental in direction and involves such vital issues, that to pass over any fortuitous errors it would seem to exhibit would wrong no less the author than his public.

Can the difference in kind be observed between prohibitive

and regulative legislation, which the author assumes to exist? Or, is the difference in the present case other than an arbitrary one adopted as a nomenclatural expedient in the language of conversation and law? "The notion that there is no practical difference between a certain amount of prohibition and a certain amount of license is absurd logically and in fact. Certain principles of government are radically different. The mildest form of confiscation differs absolutely from the worst kind of taxation ever invented. So prohibition cuts off, while license permits" (155). "However we may hedge (the drinker) about and restrain him, and prescribe the manner of his drinking and purchasing, for the social good, yet the original right cannot be extinguished, but remains unaffected," &c. (162).

Certain principles of government are indeed radically different, but whether such a radical difference obtain between prohibition and license in liquor law is now the question. Prohibition is a more radical measure, in one sense, than license, much more radical, but is the legislative principle involved different in the two cases? The one chief ground of injustice that Mr. Weeden finds in prohibition is its interference with one of the natural rights of man, an interference that goes so far, the author thinks, as to entirely prevent the exercise of this right. The right is ignored, contemned, usurped. But is regulative legislation not amenable to this same charge? All regulative measures are prohibitive of certain things, and certainly prevent as completely the exercise of natural rights as do the measures called prohibitive. In prohibition there is forfeited the natural right to sell certain liquors as beverages. That is all. The right to sell liquors is not lost, only the right to sell certain particular liquors for a particular purpose, because such a sale has been regarded as productive of more social harm than good. Mr. Weeden speaks as if the very appetite of thirst were legislated away, but all that the law would control and prevent is the exercise of this appetite in certain confined and dangerous directions. This is the utmost interference with natural right that the law attempts, and if every one saw as clearly as do the prohibitionists, and appreciated how dangerous this particular exercise of personal right is, there would be decidedly less complaint about this inter-

ference. Now the natural right to sell particular liquors for a particular purpose is no more absolute, nor, abstractly considered, any more important, than the right to sell liquors in such quantities, at such times and places, and to such persons, as the seller may desire. But any or all of these rights may be forfeited to a license law as well as the first of them to prohibition. If the principle be once admitted that individual rights may ever be forfeited at all in the interests of society, then the argument that any law is unjust in that it conflicts with the exercise of an inherent personal right, cannot but fall to the ground. If in any thing there may be no political prohibition that shuts off a natural right of individuals, then there may be no regulation either. The arguments that Mr. Weeden presents against the prohibition which he condemns, apply equally to the regulations that he would favor, and the arguments that prove the right of regulation prove the right of prohibition too. "Prohibition" in liquor law but controls one other right beside the many already controlled by "Regulation." Both of these things are implied in the one word, "Government." What primarily is government but that which governs, regulates, and prohibits. Political restraint in itself is proper and necessary to human society, and what other rule as to its extent exists than that it should be greater or less according to the demand. How radical any measures ought to be depends upon how radical they need to be in order to accomplish the end in view. The demand for restraint is proportioned to the wrongs and evils that have to be restrained.

And now, finally, with regard to Mr. Weeden's principal argument, it may be said, that if the four modes of interference with natural rights attributed to the prohibitory law constituted severally in any degree grounds of injustice in the law, then taken together they might condemn the law, but since no one of them in any degree is a valid ground of such injustice, so before all four together the law stands justified. It is not justified, however, according to the first position that Mr. Weeden takes.

What then may be concluded as to the real status and conditions of liquor-legislation?

(1.) If Mr. Weeden's facts are correct, the prohibitory law in a number of representative situations has proved an utter failure.

(2.) It has failed because it has not formulated the real will of the people.

(3.) It has worse than failed, in having required political corruption for its production, and in leaving a worse demoralization for its effects.

(4.) As an extreme measure applied to every-day life it was to be expected that it would fail so long as any moderate measures remained untried.

(5.) Moderate measures remain to be tried in America that have met with great success elsewhere.

(6.) In a democratic community no law, much less one whose action is virtually that of a sumptuary law, can be made efficient without the great accord of the people who are affected.

(7.) In order to such accord it is not requisite that a law should in no wise interfere with the exercise of the natural rights of individuals.

The foregoing discussion has suggested certain reflections which may not be impertinent in this connection, regarding the actual claims of the liquor question in this country to political attention. Prohibitionists commonly speak as if they regarded all temperance reform impossible except as their own plan for it succeed. This opinion is very true to human nature but is not true to the facts of the case.

A reform in the drinking habits of different civilized countries and a diminution of the evils of intemperance has been going steadily forward even for centuries. There is probably no country in Europe where drinking is now nearly so excessive as it was two hundred years ago. The common sentiment of the last century on the subject of drinking is admirably symbolized and brought down to modern astonishment in the famous Heidelberg tun, holding 283,200 bottles of wine and so large that a pair of stairs ascends to a platform on its upper side that will accommodate from sixteen to twenty dancers.

Not only have drinking habits changed but changed immensely. However much drinking may prevail among the higher classes of modern society, whether in Europe or America,

the vice of intemperance among these classes does not prevail in anything like the degree it obtains among the lower. It is no longer respectable in good society even for young men to be intemperate. But in "good old times" the upper classes were not outdone by any in free drinking. It was not very disreputable for any one to be occasionally drunken; and for young men, particularly the sons of titled or wealthy families, and university students, frequent intemperance was looked upon as a matter of course.

Figures that Mr. Weeden quotes from Mr. Arthur Arnold show that in England the amount of beer consumption, great as it now is, has fallen off much more than a half within a hundred years. These great changes are due, not by any means to prohibitory laws, but to many different influences proceeding from the gradual improvements of general civilization and the growing refinements of general moral sentiment. Within the last few years in England and America the special moral influences that have been brought to bear directly on the subject of intemperance added to these general influences have given a special impetus to this reform, and with the continued growth of all these influences, general and special, there is likely to be a corresponding advance of the temperance reform.

This is the central point of contrast between ancient and modern historic progress. Of old, as nations advanced in power, wealth, luxury, and art, the life of the people grew more absorbingly selfish, philanthropy became confined to ever fewer and more isolated individuals and the moral sentiment of society sunk lower and more low. But in these days, notwithstanding all the vices and hypocrisy of which the modern Juvenals still complain, the inner life of peoples has more than kept abreast of external civilization, general moral sentiment grows nobler with the years, proving itself in greater charity, greater temperance, and an immensely greater philanthropy than the world has seen before.

As for the particular vice of intemperance in drink, men are far more awake than ever to its individual and social harm. But before this special awakening occurred, the evil was already reduced to less than half its old dimensions, and the

fact of the awakening itself evidences the great improvement of moral sentiment in this matter whose want has been so exceedingly deplored.

From all this it is plain how much the temperance reform may rely for furtherance upon moral means alone. Moreover, the danger indisputably and naturally exists to which Mr. Weeden refers in this particular case, that any reform which, like this may and should be so much a matter of morals, if overmuch entrusted to political action is likely to be morally neglected. And it must not be forgotten that at best political action in such a matter can only produce the habit of temperance and not the virtue, which latter only springs from influences purely moral. Any political movement that discourages or seems to render superfluous a moral movement that gave it birth must be viewed with no small suspicion. A social habit thus produced depending upon common fashion or external necessity does little for character, and can only be relied upon as a social safeguard where and so long as the external pressure remains. Nor may it be said that in this case this external pressure would never be removed. If for a few years prohibition should prove a great success it is not impossible that the law would be repealed. Its very success might cause its overthrow. Another generation might feel so secure in its temperance, because of common custom and long absence of temptation to the contrary that prohibition would come to be felt, first, as certainly a very extreme measure; next, as probably unnecessary under the circumstances; thirdly, as quite superfluous, then as really absurd, and finally, as an insult to the common sense and virtue of the land. Meanwhile this success of political prohibition has brought the moral activity to a standstill. Men no more preach temperance to a temperate people. The evils of intemperance while known as a matter of statistics are no longer felt as a personal interest. The principle of temperance grows generally less pronounced as temptation to its corresponding vice is more removed. The law passes into the limbo of forgotten measures that have served out their day, and many a champagne banquet and glass of grog celebrates the new found freedom. The case would be different with any law where the contingency of a

probable future abrogation did not exist or was unassociated with great consequent risks.

Nevertheless the temperance reform has no little claim upon political assistance.

It has been estimated from official records for 1870, that in the United States 100,000 drunkards are annually imprisoned for crime, 150,000 consigned to drunkards' graves, by drunkenness 200,000 children are reduced to beggary, and \$90,000,000 pays for the litigations, crimes, and imprisonments of which the use of alcoholic liquors has chiefly been the cause. Ay! "With this common use" that finds so much defense, there goes enough "abuse to engender" more offenses and taxations. more "vice and crime" than any other practice which statistics can reach. Verily, society has right to protect itself. If it were true that the good or pleasure derived from temperate drinking could only be had at the cost of all the public, not to mention private, injury which inheres in, and results from such intemperance, then it were better that to the end of time all men should suffer prohibition in the use of every intoxicating drink, for the expenditure is greater than the gain, immense and greater, beyond all comparison. Any use may well be utterly forbidden that must run to such abuse.

In the perpetual presence of these fearful facts, in the unavoidable recognition of their bearing upon the safety of society as such, of their immediate interest for every man as a member of the body politic, who must pay the expenses of the criminal courts, the gallows, penitentiary, and alms-house, for each man as a free citizen whose own primary right to live may be the next invaded by a car-hook, automatically swung by an irresponsible maniac whose dangerous condition society has directly fostered by the legalization of evils which society can prevent, with such foreknowledge surely prohibitionists have reason to cry out against the persistent and gross self-delusion and apathy of men in this matter. With their own personal and even selfish interests so largely involved, can men afford to stand aloof and say the question of temperance is a question of morals alone for which individuals are answerable not to society but only unto conscience?

If the harm of which the liquor traffic in the United States

is the occasion were confined to the drinkers and stopped short with intemperance, then indeed there would be some excuse for interfering as little as possible directly with the traffic, and society might remain politically content with imprisoning the public drunkard. Although even here it would have the right if so determined, as has been shown in the forgoing review of Mr. Weeden's argument, to remove by law the occasion of even no greater offense than intemperance. But as intemperance in individuals is but the beginning and smallest part of the harm to society that the liquor sale involves, there is every reason for governmental action of a very rigorous sort.

True enough, in respect to intemperance as a sin for which a man is accountable to his conscience and his God, society as such has nothing to say, but in respect to any practice, however "normal" an "activity" it may be which in any way gives rise, more than any thing else, to public offences, taxations and crimes, society has every thing to say. And just because intemperance does not affect a man's self alone, just because on the contrary it affects society and does so more universally, violently, offensively, injuriously than any other single vice, therefore is it not only right but imperatively obligatory that society should interfere.

It is often said that the statements made in favor of political action upon this subject are sensational, and that any argument based upon them appeals to man's weak point, his sensibilities, rather than to his judgment. The statements are very sensational indeed, but what if they be statements of facts and the facts be sensational? A man too easily moved by fancies may be weak in his sensibilities, but when facts are sensational and a man is unmoved, he is weak in his intelligence, for when men see such facts as they really are, the facts do not go unfelt, and neither is the feeling unreasonable nor disgraceful.

As to the kind of political action to be taken, as already many times implied or said, if prohibition and this only were effective in this matter, then even to this extreme measure would society be justified in resorting. If such a measure fall uncomfortably upon many who have never abused their previous freedom, it must be remembered that this is a world where the innocent must suffer with the guilty. A mitigation

of this suffering often exists, and, perhaps, might in this case, in the fact that this very suffering of the innocent may be, however unwittingly to them, to their own far best advantage.

But as things stand, while it is very certain that prohibition has in many cases hitherto come far short of satisfying the hopes of its advocates, so is it wholly premature to conclude that no milder measure will prove a better one. Surely, between the extremes of prohibition and no legislation upon liquor are possibilities of political action not yet exhausted. Nor may any failure of license laws as hitherto existing be deemed to preclude the success of others that may yet be tried.

NOTE.—For an interesting statement of the immense improvement in personal habits of English University men during the last few years, vid. Archibald Maclure's *Training in Theory and Practice* (Macmillan & Co., 1874), pp. 74-77.

Mr. M. describes the influence of the boating interest in the Universities in creating not only habits of temperance, but a strong sentiment against intemperance, in a large class of men who not long ago were proverbially dissolute.

The boating interest, in order at first only to its own promotion, has brought new and healthy motives for right living to bear upon the students, admirably illustrating how every moral reform may confidently seek advancement.

The following is worth quoting: "Every one who can look back for even a quarter of a century will admit the immense improvement that has been effected in this direction. The change I believe to pervade, in a greater or less degree, all classes of men; but in that of which I am now specially speaking, and speaking on the strength of careful observation—of men who pass through public school and University life—the improvement is so great that little is left to be desired.

Now it is my firm belief, a belief also founded, I may say, on the strength of careful and extensive observation, that these restrictive training laws and regulations, carried although they may have been to injurious extremes, have been most influential agents in working out this reform. Agents to which all the corrective and preventive measures of local authorities, of proctor and police power united, have been as nought; for the crowning value of this reform is that it has come from within, from the men themselves.

There has been no prohibitive *thou shalt not* in this case; the regulations and the laws all were and are voluntary, handed over and handed down from man to man, from school to school, from college to college, from university to university; aye, and beyond the University too, inculcating the idea and habituating men to its influence, that intemperance and self indulgence are incompatible with health, strength, or activity; that energetic and regular habits, implying early hours of rest, early hours of rising, hard beds and spare bed-clothes, and frequent and abundant use of cold water are all agents in promoting physical power, all means of obtaining physical distinction, etc."

ARTICLE IV.—NOTES ON STEINTHAL.

THE title of Steinthal's work, *Psychology and the Science of Language*, is accurately descriptive of its contents. It treats of the manner in which the mind deals with the various impressions received from without, in which all the vast sum of individual and complex experiences is reduced to order and rendered serviceable to the reasoning process, the mechanism of the genesis of general notions, the precise form under which general as well as individual notions are conserved, rise into consciousness and become connected with other notions in the various processes of thought. The subjects of latent thought, association, and, to a certain extent, of nervous action, are treated in a clear, illustrative, and interesting manner.

Secondary, in every regard, to the discussion of these themes, the subject of language comes under consideration, the manner in which vocal utterances arise in connection with these mental phenomena, and the mechanism of their subsequent association with those same mental processes which first called them forth. Furthermore, the transformation, especially the loss, that occurs in the form of conscious thought as a result of the continued use of these words is described, and thus the office of language in reasoning is finally reached. Throughout the whole, use is made of formulæ resembling the literal formulæ of algebra, a method that in certain parts of the discussion, as in those parts relating to the genesis of general notions, renders the argument much more concise and clear, although, at the same time, perusal becomes a slow and tedious process. The application of formulæ to psychological reasoning is as yet only a tentative and only partially useful method.

As concerns the work as a whole, it may be first remarked that Steinthal's views concerning language may be considered without special reference to his system of psychology. His book would have been nearly as interesting, on the one hand, and well nigh as bulky also, if the subject of language had been passed over altogether, while on the other hand, a right

comprehension of his theory concerning the Origin and Use of Language may be attained without close study of the psychological basis on which he has attempted to found it, taking the words "general notion," "conception," "association," "will," and "reflex action," in the ordinary meaning, confessedly indefinite and imperfect as this is.

For there is indeed a certain latitude in the range of meaning of words in which consists no small part of their utility, and it is by no means always necessary, useful, or advisable, to insist upon rigid and restricted definition. For instance, in common life, it would be impracticable to confine the names of the metals to pure substances alone; "iron" and "gold" must still be called "iron" and "gold," without reference to the varying percentage of accidental foreign substances; the strict demands of chemical reasoning are not to be observed in the application of these terms to matter of another order. And as in this illustrative instance from common life, so in certain departments of inquiry that do not belong strictly to the field of a single isolated science. Nothing, for instance, is gained as to the utility of the legislation against the crime of wilful murder by the distinction between the will as an entity or as a mode of consciousness. So in matters relating to language, it is not easy to see how the minute investigations of Steinthal's book concerning the phenomena of consciousness and representation have contributed materially to the solution of those linguistic problems towards which it is directed, except to more clearly mark out precise border lines. For between a given notion and the symbol that represents it, the same unbridged gulf remains as before; it can only be said that the notion, whatever its origin, the cause of its persistence and the mechanism of its recurrence, did originally suggest (according to Steinthal) and yet continues to correspond to the word, and is finally more or less effaced from consciousness by the constant repetition of the word. And this covers the whole ground of Steinthal's discussion concerning the Origin of Language and the connection between Language and Thought.

It is in this lack of demonstrated connection that may be pointed out the main defect in the plan of the book, an unavoidable lack, because the data for the solution of the problem

are not in the hands of physiologists and psychologists, nor will they be in their hands, until the study of the special functions of the brain has made much more progress than at present.

Interesting indeed are these discussions, and in one respect of considerable utility, in clearly illustrating the variability of the total content of meaning for which a word may stand, and the manner in which this total content is modified by the alteration or removal of part of the whole sum of significance, and perhaps finally by the removal of a large proportion of these details from consciousness. We may gain this benefit from the perusal of the book without accepting any of its special theories relating to language.

The main subject of that part of the treatise that relates to language, although not formally the theme, is the question of the Origin of Language. For the intrinsic difficulties attending the discussion concerning the beginnings of speech are such, while, in Steinthal's view of the subject, the original appearance of words was so intimately connected with the reception of impressions and the elaboration of these into general notions, that this subject practically becomes that towards which the main course of the argument is directed.

Steinthal's theory of the Origin of Language is that modification of the onomatopoeic theory which has been defended by others, but far more distinctly conceived than others seem to have conceived it, and brought into connection with other phenomena, and explained, in attempt at least, by reference to general physiological laws. Namely, words were originally the natural and inevitable results of certain impressions made upon the mind, the word following the mental impression as directly and naturally as a shiver follows the immersion of the body into cold water. Therefore the class of nervous phenomena in which the original production of words is to be placed is that to which this instance of physical action belongs.

As it is important to understand Steinthal's position clearly, we will illustrate it somewhat further, at the risk, perhaps, of touching upon the description of a law too well known to need setting forth. To take a common instance, every one has observed that the muscles concerned in the action of swallowing are only in part under voluntary control. We can retain a morsel

in the mouth so long as it remains in the fore part of the mouth, but if the morsel is purposely or incautiously brought into the pharynx, in contact with the parts back of the tongue, we lose power over it, the muscles there seize it and it is swallowed. How does this happen? Physiologists refer, for explanation, to the action of a nervous centre or of nervous centres, which—to translate into a plain metaphor the force of the technical term “irritation”—upon receiving through the medium of the nerves of sensation the information of the presence of a morsel in contact with the muscles at the back part of the mouth, have as their special office to transmit to these muscles the impulse to swallow. Over this centre, the will (using the word “will” in the ordinary meaning) has no control. The will can indeed refrain from conveying the morsel to the pharynx, just as we can refrain from touching powder with fire, yet powder once fired inevitably explodes, and equally removed beyond control is the resulting action when a morsel be conveyed to the back part of the mouth. This involuntary element of the action of swallowing, as well as a large class of similar actions, is called by physiologists reflex motor. Other common examples of the operation of the same law are shivering on the application of cold water to the skin, laughing on being tickled, and vomiting after an emetic. However, very few voluntary movements are executed without various combinations with reflex motor action.

To this class of actions, Steinthal refers the original manifestation of language.

The *Urmensch* tried, perchance, to swim a mountain stream, the sensation of cold struck the skin, there were several reflex results from this sensation; one was a shiver; another was the uttering of a sound descriptive of the sensation. The sound thus uttered was the primitive word, and the rise of this sound before the consciousness was the same kind of action as the shiver, a reflex motor phenomenon. It is not necessary, however, to suppose that this sound was actually uttered aloud; it may merely have arisen before the consciousness in the same silent manner as that in which we now think of words in connection with any train of thought. This we suppose is what Humboldt and Steinthal mean by the inner form of words as

compared with what they call the audible sound, that expression that at first seems so strange to the reader.

We have previously described this as a variety of the onomatopoeic theory; it should rather be said to be merely akin to it, and it may be added that the kinship is by no means near. Probably the theory was rather first suggested merely by the observation of onomatopoeic phenomena proper in language.

But onomatopoeia may have been in every case a conscious voluntary imitation, originally, and the difference between conscious imitation and involuntary utterance, internal or audible, is indefinitely great. When, for instance, Thoreau writes in his note book, the picturesque phrase—

“The locust z-ing.”

The method by which he arrives at this piece of word painting and his object in recording it, is quite clear. He was impressed with the acute pulsation of the sound, and wished to record his observation; possibly the artifice adopted for illustration occurred to him at once, possibly after much meditation; but there is nothing to characterize the process of its adoption as involuntary, or to lead the student to consider that the impulse to its discovery was anything more than the pure and simple impulse towards communication, whether to his future self or to his readers. It is short hand for the remark, “the sound made by the locust is an excessively acute, vibrating rasp; it reminds the listener of a prolonged z.” The full account of the matter then is imitation, perhaps after some degree of careful thought, for the purpose of communication. This we conceive to be a typical example of the onomatopoeic formation of a word.

On the other hand, reflex action has nothing whatever to do with communication. Man speaks according to this theory, just as he shivers, because he must. Had he been a solitary, instead of a gregarious animal the result would have been the same. The gap between speaking for the purpose of imitation, in order to communicate with another, and speaking as the natural mechanical result of certain mental impressions, is as wide as can well be imagined.

And this gap Steinthal has done nothing, or next to nothing to bridge over. He has not been able to cite anywhere convincing proofs that words in their origin are really reflex motor phenomena. He has, indeed, instituted a series of observations on young children, observations that promise valuable results as to the development of the appreciation of grammatical or logical relations, but none of the few imperfect words quoted by him show anything more than the action of labored and imperfect imitation.

It may be remarked, in passing, that on the theory of the reflex motor origin of words, it is to be expected that the sound made by an object would be only one of the motives impelling to the choice of the word to denote it, a motive which must be the chief motive if the theory of mere onomatopoeic origin is correct. No other basis than this has yet been demonstrated, particularly in the words made by young children.

Furthermore what would be the natural consequence of accepting the theory of reflex motor activity? The natural consequence is that it must be concluded that the words originally appeared simultaneously with the formation of the ideas to be expressed, and increased in number as the ideas were multiplied. Steinthal accepts this conclusion, and it is in shaping his theory to meet it, that he puts forth what would appear to be the most unacceptable views expressed in his book, those relating to the character of the mental endowments of primitive man.

We may indeed safely disclaim all profound penetration concerning this subject, and acknowledge our inability to clearly think ourselves into this condition.

For long before we have finished such analysis as the comparison of the words and forms of even the Indo-European family of languages enables us to make, a point is reached where we are unable to mentally sympathise with the theoretical man thus deduced. Language undoubtedly reflects upon thought, and how the men thought who possessed only plainly physical notions, it is difficult to understand, still less how they thought when the first composition of verbal and pronominal roots was going forward. All this of course because our conceptions are so closely wedded to our present form of speech.

It is not given to the ordinary mortal to move in that remote epoch with the sure step of Steinthal.

But while we may not claim to know the precise or the approximative condition of primitive man, we do know very well what must have been, in certain directions, the limit of his imperfections, and that under certain circumstances supposed by Steinthal, his condition must have been far different from what Steinthal's theory formally and necessarily assumes it to have been. For it is evident that whatever may have been the order of beings to which the *Urmensch* belonged, he must have been an adult, and an adult of sufficiently developed "*apperceptions*" (a word for which "conception" is a quite inadequate equivalent) to enable him to support life. For instance, it was necessary for him to have a clearly developed practical understanding of the fact that a given animal used as food must have been the same animal though seen under varying circumstances, grazing, running or roasting over his fire. That an associate were the same person whether sleeping, talking, or walking, in or out of the house, is a notion that he must have clearly apprehended. This must have been the case with the adult animal at every link in the chain of the development of man. Furthermore, this ability must have been acquired by the individual at a very early period of his individual life, before leaving the stage of utter helplessness, in fact, before he could walk, eat, or drink. Prior to this we have the state of infancy, and however low the grade of the animal may be, care of himself implies having passed this stage of mental imbecility. All this seems too evident to require discussion. Notwithstanding, the nature of Steinthal's theory requires him to maintain that the mental endowments of the *Urmensch* are to be compared with those of the infant. In doing this he must be considered to do more than to draw a mere parallel; this position is indeed logically necessary, since the birth of the word, if it be a reflex motor phenomenon, must inevitably attend the notion at its first birth. No doubt the capacity of the infant of the present time may very far exceed that of the most advanced men at the period of the Origin of Language, yet capacity for development is as nothing in the present exigencies of a moment, and in this regard the circle of conceptions certainly belonging to the *Ur-*

mensch remove him very high above the infantile condition of the noblest modern man.

Such an animal as Steinthal conceives the *Urmensch* to have been has no parallel among existing forms of animated life. For complexity of structure and mental development are to a certain extent associated with each other, and the theory of Steinthal requires us to assume the existence of a being of the complex structure requisite for the production of a speech, and a degree of mental endowment much inferior to that of almost every free moving animal in existence. It is curious further to observe how consistency requires Steinthal, just as consistency has required many other thinkers of a far different stamp, and for far different purposes, to draw a distinct line between the intellect of man and that of the brute. And this distinct line must have existed at a time when, in his conception, the human intellect must have been far lower than the intellect of the dog or elephant.

Finally, on the theory defended by Steinthal we have no sufficient explanation of one cardinal point in the history of language, a point already referred to, namely, the unmistakable traces of the development of that part of the vocabulary referring to mental notions out of that referring to physical. For the notions of self and not-self, of internal and external sensations are, as Steinthal himself expressly affirms, not essential. These must be the result of a late generalization. We should accordingly expect that words denoting mental processes would have appeared side by side with those denoting external phenomena. But actual analysis shows the priority of the latter. The only satisfactory explanation of such a fact as this is that the necessities of communication were first to be satisfied, while the less imperative class of notions relating to the mind remained for a period having leisure to touch upon them. This points towards the conclusion that the need of an intelligible symbol was the original impelling cause to the production of speech and not any internal instinctive impulse.

Such a theory as Steinthal's leads, fairly followed out, to such improbable conclusions, that we cannot well understand how it could be long maintained by thinkers of sufficient ability to have gained such a leading position as that occupied by him

and others of the same scientific creed, or listened to with the respect so commonly paid it.

One reason why many such theories remain unimpugned is that they are cast in such obscure and indefinite form that it is not always possible to reduce them to plain terms, and consequently each reader interprets them after his own fashion, and with a greater or less degree of latitude, depending on his charitable instincts. No doubt the subject is intrinsically difficult; *Denken ist schwer* is Steinthal's motto, and with this plea, the writer may, after the manner of Wilhelm von Humboldt, weave into the tissue of one volume an endless number of crude and conflicting speculations, and half thought-out theories, and may follow at his will the lead of treacherous metaphors, not endeavoring to reduce his fragmentary utterances to a connected system, nor concerning himself in the least to give the ordinary or even a consistent meaning to the words he makes use of. Such a method belongs to mysticism, but should have no place in science.

On the other hand, no more certain deduction relating to method is to be drawn from the scientific experience of the day than the absolute necessity of observing that degree of temperance in constructing a theory which most clearly keeps in view the nature of the relation of the work of the individual to that of other laborers in his own and other departments. Modern science deals so extensively with the comparison of particular facts of all orders that all sound results are to be reached only by the united labor of many different observers, and therefore, the incompetence of any one investigator to reach a point much more remote than the collective historical deductions of the whole body of students of his time is in the inevitable order of things. Yet, philology, perhaps more than any other science, continually produces men, who, carried away by their own imperfect theories, proclaim that they have at last found out the truth, nothing but the truth, and the whole truth forever.

After all, temperance is an impulse affecting the whole mind, and not any one department of its activity singly, and we are not to wonder when the same impatient spirit leads such men, their pretentious shortcomings once exposed, to vent abuse

upon any one and all, who do not accept their utterances as a final scientific revelation.

It is fortunate that American scholarship, whatever its possible defects, does clearly recognize this element of correct method and the limits set to the scientific advance of the individual generation and the individual man, and theories so disconnected from the main scientific standpoint of the times as are those of Humboldt and Steinthal, have never had currency in America, and in all likelihood never will.

ARTICLE V.—THE PLATONIC THEORY OF IDEAS.

EVERY philosophical system is, in some sense, a product of its predecessors, and it is impossible to enter into its spirit without a certain acquaintance with the systems which have given rise to it. To comprehend it, we must familiarize ourselves with the motives which stimulated to its elaboration, we must perceive the ends which its author sought to attain. Only by this method does philosophy become intelligible, or is justice done to the author one seeks to interpret. "It is only by verifying in our own consciousness the discoveries of antecedent philosophers," remarks Professor Ferrier, "that we can hope rightly to understand their doctrine or appreciate the value and importance of their speculations;" and it is only when we view these doctrines and speculations in their historical relations, we may add, that we can thus verify the discoveries of the great thinkers of the past.

When we succeed in carrying ourselves back to their standing point, and place ourselves, for the time, in the midst of their environment, very many of their utterances which, hitherto, have been to us enigmatical and meaningless, though bearing evidence of an earnest purpose in the mind of the writer, become invested with a certain vague significance or reveal quite clearly the interest for which he was laboring. Thus to the modern reader, upon his first perusal of them, the speculations of the early hylozoists seem not merely without foundation, but without meaning. He cannot conceive a mental condition which would issue in such results, and these philosophies seem little better than the follies of disordered minds. When he reads the doctrine of Thales that water is the original source of all things, of Anaximenes, who regards air as the first principle, or, to say nothing of the more advanced Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, of Heraclitus, who looked upon fire as the first and directing cause of all things, he can have no appreciation of these doctrines. But when the mind frees itself, so far as may be, from its present habits of thought, and

travels back to the day when philosophy was in the throes, as it were, the student begins to see how such systems could arise. When he realizes that in that day and until the time of the great Anaxagoras, men were seeking the cause of the world in the world itself, that the Greek mind in its eagerness to find some solution of the great problem which the universe presented, would necessarily first seize upon these active principles of the lower world before passing on to those exalted conceptions of the later Greek philosophy which culminated in the writings of Plato—when he realizes and appreciates this, he is not only able to discern the motives which were productive of these early and tentative systems, he is led to look with admiration on them as the first awakenings of a movement which was to end in a true and spiritual philosophy.

A knowledge of previous speculations is of importance, furthermore, in enabling the student to ascertain to what extent the author, whose philosophy he is investigating, is indebted to those who have preceded him. It is only when we become acquainted with the history of opinions, that we understand to what an extent even the greatest minds have received from previous investigators, and how comparatively small are the contributions which any individual makes to the sum of our knowledge. And while Plato's is one of those infrequent minds which outleap their own age, and are seemingly indebted to no one, we shall have occasion to observe in the course of the examination upon which we are entering, that this remark is not without a certain relevancy, even in the consideration of such a system as that of the founder of the Academy. Yet it is doubtless possible to go too far in an endeavor to detect traces of former philosophical systems in Plato's Theory of Ideas, and we cannot resist the conviction that this has been done in every instance where the attempt has been made to show that he received this doctrine in substantially its present form, from his predecessors. This seems to have been the view of Brucker, the learned historian of philosophy in the last century, who maintained that since the numbers of Pythagoras are not mere arithmetical symbols, but eternal and essential principles, and causes of all things, there is no reason for denying that Plato received his doctrine of

[ideas from the Pythagorean school. Probably this opinion would not be endorsed by any of our eminent modern critics.

That Plato was deeply penetrated by the Pythagorean philosophy it would be fruitless to deny, and Aristotle asserts that one of the later modifications of his doctrine was a reduction of the ideas to numbers. We seem to have a foreshadowing of one of the difficulties connected with Plato's doctrine, when we find the Pythagoreans regarding these numbers as the substance of things, and on the other hand looking upon the things themselves as but the images of the numbers or immanent principles.

But while this is true and while we can trace many resemblances between the two systems, we fail to find in the Pythagorean philosophy that lofty and spiritual character which is at once the charm and the distinction of the dialogues of Plato. Aristotle affirms, in his *Metaphysics* (I. 6, 9) that in his youth Plato had been associated with Cratylus an Heraclitean, from whom he had received the doctrine of Heraclitus that the sensuous is in a state of perpetual flux. Accordingly, we are told, Plato concluded that science is impossible unless we can posit a realm of permanent existences, beyond and above the sensuous. What Plato conceived this Ephesian doctrine of the flux to be, in itself and in its tendencies, we shall have occasion to notice presently. It is only necessary to notice here that Aristotle presents what is universally conceded to be one important source of the Theory of Ideas. Yet this is not the only source, and perhaps we may say it is not the chief source. For though he joins with it the Socratic fondness for definition, affirming that when Plato had derived from Socrates a knowledge of certain conceptions, which, when rightly defined, remain invariable, he concluded that there were existing out of the sensuous world counterparts to these conceptions, which counterparts he termed Ideas, Aristotle fails to mention a philosophy which was far more congenial to the mind of Plato than this doctrine of the flux, and to the important influence of which the Platonic dialogues themselves bear abundant testimony.

This was the Eleatic philosophy, which, ignoring the sensuous, declared that the One alone exists, the One being regarded not as the sum of all concrete existences, but as

absolved from and above the material universe. This doctrine of Elea which was presented in a crude and undeveloped form by Xenophanes, and systematized by Parmenides, was at the furthest extreme from that of Heraclitus, and we may rightly infer that if Plato had been compelled to give his unqualified assent to either he would have embraced the opinions of Parmenides; for in his criticisms of his writings he speaks of him as his father and not as one to whom he is violently opposed. Yet neither in the philosophy of Ephesus nor in that of Elea did he find all that he sought; for in neither was there presented any firm foundation for knowledge or for morality. The doctrine of Heraclitus took the element of certainty from knowledge and did away with all ethical distinctions by affirming that to each mind what appeared to be, is thus ignoring any norm or standard of truth. That of Parmenides, on the other hand, though of a loftier character and better suited to a noble and aspiring mind, was almost equally disastrous in its practical issues; for, in theory, as we shall see, it denied the existence of the sensuous and the changing which was a most important avenue to the spiritual and the immutable, it ignored a portion of man's life concerning which it was of great moment that he should have just conceptions. We propose now briefly to present the views which Plato represents himself as holding relative to these philosophical systems, if indeed, so crude an outgrowth as that of Heraclitus can be rightly called a system, that it may be seen how fully the dialogues justify the student in the views which have been outlined above. We have little concern with the question whether Plato's interpretation of Heraclitus or of Parmenides was in all respects supported by their writings. What we seek is the actual genesis and development of the Theory of Ideas, and while we are in pursuit of this, it is of less importance that we know what Heraclitus or Parmenides really taught than it is that we learn what Plato supposed them to teach. It may be remarked that the conclusion to which we shall be led is that the Theory of Ideas, Plato really mediates between the Eleatic and Heraclitean philosophies, opposing what he believes to be the errors of each, and seeking to unite in his dialectic truthfully opposing truths which they contain.

Noticing now the dialogues themselves, we find that in the *Theætetus* the opinions of Heraclitus are confuted, though it is to be remarked that a celebrated *dictum* of Protagoras of Abdera, one of the most prominent of the Sophists, is made to serve as the representative and interpretation of these opinions; in the *Sophist* the attempt is made to demonstrate the reality of not-being, or of the apparent; while in the *Parmenides*, which Ueberweg, Socher and others, without sufficient evidence, have declared to be spurious, on account of the vigorous and telling objections it contains to the doctrine of Ideas, we have an attempt, according to the view of Schwegeler, to exhibit the true relations of the Eleatic One, or, to speak more definitely, to show that the One cannot be conceived without the Many, or the Many without the One. It will be understood that we are here attempting to set forth only the logical development of the Theory. The chronological sequence of the dialogues is involved in the greatest uncertainty, and no attempt can be more fruitless than is that of Schleiermacher, of Munk, and others when they endeavor to present the dialogues as bearing intended relations to one another as parts of a symmetrical system. "Any such arrangement," as Prof. Jowett has remarked, "is not only unsupported by evidence, but involves an anachronism in the history of philosophy." It is rather true that we have all the parts of a disjointed system, all the limbs of a dismembered body, and we sadly miss the assistance of the great thinker himself when we attempt to exhibit the dialogues in their true relations. Matchless in form and structure as are the individual dialogues, as for example, the *Phædo* or the *Banquet*, the philosophy, the system which we gather and construct from them all, is somewhat fragmentary and ungraceful.

But while we must thus abandon, as ill-considered, every attempt to detect a line along which all the dialogues were arranged in system by their writer, and while a more or less equal-handed discussion may be maintained as to the proper significance of the *Parmenides*, it can hardly be disputed that in the *Theætetus*, and in the *Sophist* we have presented what were the real occasions of the Theory of Ideas.

In dwelling briefly on the *Theætetus*, let us not forget that

the question with which it is concerned, is a palmary question of philosophy, to which the whole Theory of Ideas is nothing more than an answer. "What is the nature of knowledge,"* asks the Platonic Socrates of the young Theætetus; and, if we except two digressions, in one of which Socrates works out in great detail his favorite image of the midwife, which is really a figurative presentation of the Socratic theory of education as a development of the man himself, rather than a process of impartation, and in the other of which we have the famous contrast between the lawyer and the philosopher, we may regard the entire dialogue as occupied in examining such answers to this question as are elicited from the respondent. The first of these is that knowledge is perception, or mere passive sensation. This reply, as has already been indicated, Socrates identifies with the theorem of the Sophist, Protagoras, that "man is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are not" (*πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.*) "To illustrate the meaning of Protagoras," Socrates proceeds, "let us suppose that the same wind is blowing in our faces, and one of us is hot and the other cold. Now Protagoras will say that the wind is cold or not, not absolutely, but only in relation to us; that it is cold to him who is cold, and not to him who is not, so that perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring." We give this exposition of the saying of Protagoras, because it very clearly presents Plato's understanding of the doctrine of Heraclitus; for Socrates immediately affirms that this doctrine that all things are relative can be traced back to Heraclitus, Empodocles and others, who held to the opinion that all things are in a state of flux. All is motion, and motion has two forms, action and passion. All sensation is to be resolved into a combination of agent and patient. But of agent or patient viewed separately, that is, viewed at rest, no idea can be formed. "All things flow" is the *dictum*, or, all things are in a continual state of becoming, so that motion is existence, while rest is non-existence. We need not seek to trace the mental process, by

* In the citations from Plato, we shall follow, in general, the translation of Prof. Jowett.

which Plato is led to the conclusion that this philosophy must issue in the sensualistic theory of knowledge. Whether he is justified in it or not, this is the inference he deduces.

Here then we come upon a most central and important question. In the philosopher's definition of knowledge, in itself and in its objects, we have adumbrated the complete structure of thought he is to rear, and what are the value and reliability of the mind's cognitions is determined when we have formed a right estimate of the objects which the mind knows. Are the knowing mind and the objects known, as really distinct as they seem, or are the latter only complements and appendages of the former? Is that we know the product, as it were, of the mind itself, or is it set over against the mind a real and distinct entity? Is what we look upon as truly being as we ourselves that look, the same to God and men and angels, or does it all exist only "in the mind's eye?" These are questions to which most minds have but one answer, but which, for all reflecting minds, are less absurd and more full of meaning, the longer they are considered.

But, returning to the dialogue, Socrates has several objections to these "charming speculations," to which the young Theæstetus too readily assents. In madness and dreaming, perception is false and known to be false, and as half our life is spent in dreaming we cannot be certain that we are not in a state of dreaming at this moment, even while reaching these Heraclitean conclusions. True, Protagoras would not evade this issue of his theory, and would consistently affirm that, to the madman or the dreamer, the monster shapes which fancy rears are as real as those which appear in moments of sobriety, and wakefulness; for whatever seems to be, is, and the mind can pass into no condition where every fleeting shadow is not a substance and every phantom a reality. But Socrates can not rest satisfied with such a definition, for he cannot see why *man* should be chosen to be the measure of all things. Why, he asks, did not Protagoras begin his great work on Truth, of which the sentence quoted is a fragment, with an affirmation that a tadpole or a pig or any other being which has sensation is a measure of all things?

It may be remarked in passing that this is a specious rather than a real objection to the theory of Protagoras. For the

obvious import of this theory is not that man is the measure of all things, in the sense that he is such for other beings than himself, but that, for each individual, things are what they seem to him. The objection of Socrates would seem to imply that the meaning of Protagoras was that in man we have furnished a standard or criterion of truth, whereas it is the essence of his doctrine that no standard exists to which any repair, but that each individual, of whatever rank or order, contains "the measure" in himself. In this objection, Plato seems to assume that Protagoras spoke of mankind, of the class, but his words are only intelligible when we understand him as referring to the individual; and he would doubtless have replied that it could be properly said of each of the animals to which Plato jestingly refers, that it was for itself, the measure of all things.

As summed up by Schwegler the further objections advanced against the theory by Socrates are: *first*, that it is a logical contradiction, since, as no one can be incorrect, Protagoras must yield the question to every one disputing with him; *second*, that it destroys the knowledge of future events, since in reality, it appears that not every man, but only the wise man can forecast the future; *third*, it destroys perception, since perception is the common product of the perceived object and the perceiving subject, and, according to this theory, the objects are in such an incessant flow that they can neither become fixed in seeing nor in hearing; and *fourth*, that it overlooks the fact that all knowledge cannot be traced to the activity of the senses, and that there must be presupposed an independent province of supersensible knowledge. The remaining portions of the dialogue are occupied with a consideration of the definitions, that knowledge is true opinion, and that it is true opinion accompanied by rational explication, opinion "*μετὰ λόγου*." These are both rejected, opinion being regarded as better than ignorance, but as without the attribute of certainty by which true knowledge is distinguished, and the dialogue closes with a characteristic remark by Socrates, that if Theætetus has any remaining embryo thoughts, they will be all the better for the preceding investigation, and if not, he "will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, not fancying that he knows what he does not know."

If we turn now, for a moment, to the *Sophist*, we find Plato addressing himself to the Eleatic conception of being, or the One. This doctrine denied the reality of all sensuous appearance, declaring that when we perceive things in their multiplicity it is only an appearance. Thus, recurring again to the presentation of Schwegler, the not-being was absolutely denied, and yet its existence in the notion of men was admitted. Plato takes advantage of this contradiction, and shows that upon the Eleatic theory, it is impossible that false opinion should arise, since, as not-being has no existence, it is inconceivable that not-being, or the false, should be thought. Thus the admission of the possibility of false opinion involves an admission of the reality of not-being. Plato then proceeds to discuss at length the relations of being to not-being, but as it is only essential for us to observe that, in opposition to Parmenides he contended for the reality of the sensuous, vindicating for it a place among the legitimate objects of knowledge, any further exposition of the dialogue may be dispensed with.

We have thus before us the two theories of knowledge, the defects of which stimulated to the elaboration of the Platonic philosophy. Bringing them together for purposes of comparison, we find them to be indeed at opposite extremities so far as the form in which they are cast is concerned, while, on the other hand, in their practical tendencies, they are not without a certain striking similarity. They differed in that while one regarded the sensuous as without reality, the other looked upon it as containing all reality. While one considered all sensation not merely as deceptive, but as unreal, the other deemed it the source of all knowledge which was possible to man. While the first negated the sensuous, and recognized only the One, the second was the theory of pure sensation and ignored the One. Yet, as has been indicated, if we regard them as theories of knowledge, they are not so disparate as a cursory examination would lead us to suppose; for, while upon the Heraclitean hypothesis, sensation was said to be knowledge, and the objects of perception the objects of knowledge, it was possible to say this only by foisting in an unaccustomed and altogether false definition of knowledge. The *Eleatæ* rejected the sensuous as only apparent and as lacking in the characteristic of certainty.

But in this regard, the philosophy of Heraclitus, as interpreted by Plato, differed from that of Xenophanes and Parmenides only or chiefly in the employment of the word "knowledge" in an unwarranted sense, and not at all in its estimate of the sensuous. The Ephesian flux would seem to have been the product of a baffled mind, which, despairing the attainment of truth in the midst of so much that was changeable and uncertain, carried scepticism to its outmost limit in denying the possibility of any criterion of truth, and in asserting that the unreal was the real, the uncertain, the certain. Thus, so far as the sensuous and the material were concerned the philosophy of Elea and the opinions of Heraclitus were substantially in harmony: both withholding the attribute of certainty from the knowledge which we receive through sensation, and both seeing nothing but change and mere appearance in the outward world. That which redeemed Parmenides from a place among those whom Plato characterizes as the ones who "drag down everything to earth and who maintain that the things only which can be touched or handled have being or essence;" that which constituted the superiority of his teaching over the vulgar philosophy of Heraclitus was his willingness to allow the existence of one pure and changeless being which being is the object of that knowledge which alone is true and undeceptive. His philosophy, unlike that of Heraclitus, was not the philosophy of mere nescience. It contained a positive element, which gave it a more lofty and spiritual character. Yet as this one changeless and indivisible being was absolved from all relation to space and time, thought being the only positive determination ascribed to it, and as Parmenides refused to recognize in the sensuous any reflection or any traces of the super-sensuous, we see that so long as he was self-consistent, he, not less than Heraclitus, shut out the mind of man from every possibility of attaining a knowledge which had the essential characteristic of certainty.

But the mind of Plato, which was ever struggling toward the certain and the absolute, was not to be confined within the limits of one of these philosophies or of the other. If one was grosser than the other, each barred the approaches to the unseen and denied its highest destiny to the mind. If the

Eleatic doctrine asserted the existence of the One, both shut out the adventurous mind of Plato from that ethereal and changeless being which it was his dream and his ambition to approach. They repressed and discouraged every blind groping after the Infinite; they hushed every cry for the living God.

Yet, like all false systems of thought, each of these was an exaggeration, an over-statement of a legitimate and important truth, and to the truth contained in them, Plato was by no means insensible. Indeed if it may be said without the implication that in producing the Theory of Ideas, Plato was a mere eclectic, we may say that in his dialectic we have what is really a combination of the distinctive principles which were at the foundation of these systems which gave rise to it. That which formed the basis of the doctrine of Heraclitus was the changefulness of the sensuous and its consequent unworthiness to be regarded as a source of knowledge which was the same to all; while the Eleatic philosophers went farther and denied its reality. Plato was not betrayed into this, nor did he refuse to believe that in some important sense, the sensuous was a source of real knowledge; yet as we have seen, we have the testimony of his pupil Aristotle that he received from a disciple of Heraclitus that distrust of the sensuous and of sensuous perception which is such a marked feature in his philosophy. In illustration of this we need only call to mind the marvelous allegory which occurs at the opening of the seventh book of the *Republic*, in which he represents the ordinary condition of man in this life to be similar to that of men confined within a subterranean den, who cannot look upon the light which is behind them nor upon any real objects, but can only see the flickering shadows moving on the wall of the cave. So also we may trace in the philosophy of Plato that great conception of unity which is a characteristic of every true philosophy, and which led Parmenides to sacrifice and deny the reality of sensuous. Plato could but recognize the existence of the many; he could not deny the diversity of being; but he never conceived the universe as made up of isolated and unrelated portions of being. That desire of unity, which marks the true philosopher, was strong in him, and imperative in its demands, and while he always maintained the existence of a multitude of

Ideas, and while, to him, every Idea was a representative of pure being, he contended earnestly for what we may term an hierarchy of Ideas which united all in that crowning Idea of the Good which was no other than the Idea of God. The object, then, of the Theory of Ideas was, first, to distinguish in the sensuous between the true and the false, between the real and the apparent, thus securing a basis of certainty for knowledge; and, second, to exhibit in their relations to one another the Ideas bodied forth in the sensuous, thus representing them as so connected that it is possible for the mind to pass from the lower to the higher realms of being. Plato's object was to indicate the possibility of knowledge, and of knowledge which should have the characteristic of certainty. In the attainment of this, he was led to the development of his great and fundamental thought of Unity in Multiplicity of the One manifesting itself in the Many.

We have thus presented what we believe to be an essentially correct statement of the genesis of the Platonic dialectic. This has been done at the greater length, not only because it enables to see what it was which called forth the Theory of Ideas, but also because in the examination of the Heraclitean and Eleatic philosophies, we come upon the fundamental principles of the doctrine of Plato. We are now prepared to venture upon a more immediate consideration of the subject.

From what has preceded we should anticipate that Plato's investigations would be conducted in two departments, and such anticipation is justified by the dialogues. The first of these is that in which he gives his attention to the world of sense and to the Ideas to which it is related, showing that, while it is subject to constant mutations, it yet contains or at least manifests and leads back to that which is fixed and trustworthy. This, it may be said, was the great task he sought to accomplish, for only in accomplishing this could he assure to man the possibility of knowledge. But in addition to this, there is the department in which he views the Ideas, or pure being, as apart from the sensuous and the material, and considers them in their relations to one another. In the first place then, we have to do with the Theory of Ideas in its relation to the sensuous universe.

Perhaps we cannot better introduce ourselves to the subject,

than by quoting the statement of Plato's theory, given by the late Prof. Butler of Dublin; a statement which is not confined to that particular portion of the theory with which we are at present concerned, but which will be of assistance in any attempt to enter into its meaning: "That man's soul is made to contain not merely a consistent scheme of its own notions, but a direct apprehension of real and eternal laws beyond it, is not too absurd to be maintained. That these real and eternal laws are things intelligible, and not things sensible is not very extravagant either. That these laws, impressed upon creation by its Creator, and apprehended by man, are something distinct equally from the Creator and from man, and that the whole mass of them may be fairly termed the world of things purely intelligible, is surely allowable. Nay, further, that there are qualities in the supreme and ultimate Cause of all which are manifested in His creation, and not merely manifested, but in a manner—after being brought out of his superessential nature into the stage of being below him, but next to him—are then, by the causative act of creation, deposited in things, differencing them one from the other, so that the things participate of them (*μετέχουσι*) communicate with them (*κοινωνοῦσι*); this likewise seems to present no incredible account of the relation of the world to its Author. That the intelligence of man, excited to reflection by the impression of these objects thus (though themselves transitory) participant of a divine quality, should rise to higher conceptions, of the perfections thus faintly exhibited; and, inasmuch as these perfections are unquestionably real existences, and known to be such in the very act of contemplation—that this should be regarded as a direct intellectual perception of them,—a union of the reason with the Ideas in that sphere which is common to both,—this is certainly no preposterous notion in substance, and by those who deeply study it, will perhaps be judged no unwarrantable form of phrase. Finally, that the reason in proportion as it learns to contemplate the perfect and eternal, desires the enjoyment of such contemplation in a more consummate degree, and cannot be fully satisfied except in the actual fruition of the perfect itself—this seems not to contradict any received principle of psychology, or any known law of human nature.

Yet these suppositions, taken together, constitute the famous Theory of Ideas; and, thus stated, may surely be pronounced to form no very appropriate object for the contempt of even the most accomplished of our modern 'physiologists of mind.'

If this statement is not without vagueness, we are to remember that Plato himself is far from being perfectly consistent, and that any attempt to combine in one statement his utterances on this subject, must be attended with difficulties. Probably the representation of the Ideas as the Laws according to which God regulates the universe, is misleading, and we may add that it is impossible to express in any single word, if not in any single sentence, all the properties and relations which Plato attributes to the Ideas. Yet if Prof. Butler's presentation of the theory in its relations to the sensuous, and this is what we are now considering, is carefully read, it will convey a correct impression in the main.

Plato conceives of two distinct realms—one the realm of Ideas, of pure being, to which the mind last attains and the contemplation of which alone is knowledge, the other the world of sense which is full of change and deception, but which, nevertheless, bears important relations to the world of Ideas, as in some sense containing these Ideas or as modeled after them. The *εἶδος*, or *ιδέα* was looked upon as the archetype or pattern of the sensuous object. It is the *παράδειγμα* (exemplar), or, as Aristotle represents it the *μορφή* (form) which, though an independent existence has a certain community (*κοινωνία*) with the sensuous objects which are regarded as its mere images or copies (*εἰδῶλα*, *ὁμοιώματα*, *εἰκόνες*). It has *μέθεξις* (participation), *παρουσία* (presence) in them. Thus we see it was the object of Plato to bridge the gulch which, to the *Eleatae*, was fixed between the world of being and the world of sense. "Looking at the sensible," if we may quote again from Prof. Butler, "he could but admit that does not purely express the true, and yet, on the other hand is not absolutely void of truth; and he consequently attempted the difficult task of distinguishing in the sensible what is true from what is apparent. The former he considered the Ideas—the latter merely phenomenal—merely non-being. We may introduce also a remark of Ritter that "the

object of the Ideal Theory was to insure the recognition of something eternally true in all perishable things." These statements we believe to be in substance correct. Plato could not for one moment deny the reality of that sensation which to Heraclitus was the only knowledge, for in the plastic forms of the sensuous, he found traces of that pure being, the apprehension of which alone answered to his conception of knowledge. To deny this would be to destroy the only thread which could bring him into communication with that for which he sought. Neither could he brook the thought that the sensuous is all, that there is nothing stable, that "man is the measure of all things." That would be to look upon the shadow without believing in the substance of which it brought tidings—to refuse to read the open book before him. The true, the real, the rational, looked out on Plato from the face of nature, stared upon him from every sensuous object. There was a soul in each phenomenon, there was a rational element in every object which linked it with the Infinite and made the meanest thing full of meaning to the philosopher.

Just as he deemed the soul to be a compound or intermediate essence made out of that unchangeable and indivisible essence which is akin to the Absolute, and of the divisible and corporeal which is generated (*Timaëus*, 85 a), so he regarded the sensuous world as containing certain immortal forms or principles, and not composed only of the material substances upon which these were impressed. Just as he represented the immortal soul as of divine origin, and committed to His offspring by the Creator, while around the soul, by certain secondary agencies was fashioned a mortal body which was to be its vehicle (*Timaëus*, 69 b), so, the sensuous was looked upon as freighted with certain eternal truths of an origin and nature quite different from that of the substance which enfolded them, as it were, and exhibited them to men. "When all things were in disorder" he says (*Timaëus* 69 a) "God created in each thing, both in reference to itself and to other things, certain harmonies in such degree and manner as they are capable of having proportion and harmony. For in those days (i. e., the days of the creation) nothing had any order except by accident, nor did any of the things which now have names deserve to be named

at all—as, for example, fire, water, and the rest of the elements”—an account strikingly suggestive of the Mosaic cosmogony. Thus to Plato each object of the lower world bore the stamp of the divine mind, was fitted to link mind with mind, and so to lead back to that realm of pure being, suggestions of which it carried upon its face. He thought that all came from God, and was organized by God, and he was intolerant of what he called “the vulgar opinion that nature brings them into being by some spontaneous and unintelligible cause” (*Sophist*, 265). Now this fixed and rational *substratum*, which Plato recognized in the sensuous object, was what he designated by the term “Idea”; or, if, as many of his expressions indicate, we are not warranted in using precisely this language, he at least considered it an imitation or representation of the Idea, the avenue along which the mind could trace its way to the realm of pure being. “The soul directs all things in heaven and earth and sea,” he said, and it was his endeavor to discern this directing soul shining through the objects of the sensuous world.

It is the Idea which individualizes every object and makes it other than those which surround it. “All things become beautiful, not by color or form or anything of that sort but by the presence and participation of beauty” (*Phaedo*, 100). It is this marriage of the rational and the irrational which produces the beautiful object. Nothing is great but by greatness, nothing is small but by smallness, nothing is just but by justice. And not only are there archetypal forms, or Ideas, corresponding to these great and general conceptions, like the just, the beautiful, the good, but (*Parmenides*, 130) all objects have ideas corresponding to them: even the meanest—as hair, mud, dirt. For when Socrates is at first indisposed to carry the theory to this extreme, he is gently rebuked by the revered Parmenides, who tells him that he is still young, and that the time will come when philosophy will have a firmer grasp of him and when he “will not despise even the meanest things.” The phenomenal world derives its existence from the ideal world. The sensuous object has being only as it is the representative or embodiment of an Idea. This fundamental thought of the ideal theory is presented by Plato in a multitude of forms.

We cannot refrain from quoting here a passage from the incomparable dialogue of the *Banquet*, in which, under the guise of an apostrophe to Love, Plato sets forth the theory in a mythical form. The extract presents very clearly his conception of the sensuous as a means by which the mind could be led back of it to the contemplation of absolute being.

“He who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty—and this, Socrates, is that final cause of all our former toils, which, in the first place is everlasting—not growing and decaying, or waxing and waning; in the next place not fair in one point of view and foul in another, or at one time or in one relation or at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if fair to some and foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, nor existing in any other being; as for example, an animal, whether in earth or heaven, but beauty only, absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which, without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things. He, who, under the influence of true love, rising up from these, begins to see that beauty is not far from the end. And the true order of going or being led by another to the things of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which he mounts upward for the sake of that other beauty, going from one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is.” (*Banquet*, 211.)

What then is essential in the doctrine of Ideas, that in the changing object of sense one comes into contact with something fixed and changeless, something which stimulates to inquiry, and leads the mind back to being, pure and absolute—this cannot fail to appear even from a careless perusal of the dialogues, and presents no great difficulties to the student who seeks to comprehend it. The relation of the Ideal Theory to the sensuous world is easy of apprehension. It is only when

we seek to form an estimate of the precise relation which the Ideas themselves sustain to the sensuous objects that some inconsistencies and obscurity appear. We propose now briefly to direct the attention of the reader to one or two of the prominent difficulties of the Theory, after which we can notice that portion of it in which Plato sets forth the relations of the Ideas to one another, and exhibits them in their unity.

Stated briefly, the great difficulty of his dialectic is this: That while in maintaining the reality of the sensuous it would seem that Plato must have considered it as actually containing the Ideas, or pure being, and while, in some instances, his language seems to indicate that this was his conception, yet, quite the contrary of this, the prevailing forms of expression are such as to leave no room for doubting that he regarded the Ideas as separate from those objects of the lower world which were but copies and imitations of them. Or, as Schwegler states it, "The difficulty lies in the contradiction which grows out of the fact that while Plato admits the reality of the becoming and of the province of the becoming, he still affirms that Ideas which are substances ever at rest and ever the same are the only actual." We can do little more than call attention to this difficulty, and it may be remarked here that we should not attempt to represent Plato as perfectly self-consistent, though we believe that the fundamental principles for which he contended must lie at the basis of every true philosophy. He is not without inconsistencies, and any attempt to rationalize these out of his writings must be a failure. He contends for the reality of the sensuous, and yet affirms that all true being is contained in the Ideas, and these Ideas are widely separate from the objects of the phenomenal world. Thus the Eleatic element in Plato's philosophy was constantly struggling for the ascendancy, while the distrust of the sensuous, which his education in the opinions of Heraclitus had engendered, increased the tendency to deny the validity of the knowledge received through it.

In this connection it is interesting to compare Plato's philosophy with that of Parmenides. Just as Plato in attempting to mediate between the philosophy of the One and the philosophy of the Many, to maintain the reality of each, was, in frequent instances, led into a form of expression which seems to imply

that he would deny the reality of the latter, so Parmenides, in maintaining that the One alone exists and that the phenomenal world is merely phenomenal, could not withhold himself from the consideration of the great problems to which the latter invites, and thus was betrayed into a practical admission of its reality. For in the epic poem in the first part of which he develops his idea of being as One and absolute and of not-being, or the sensuous, as unreal and only apparent, we find a second portion devoted to a consideration of the physical universe, in which, upon the hypothesis of its reality, he sets forth his views relative to the cosmogony, accounting for the phenomena of nature by the mingling of two unchangeable elements, of the nature of which we are left in doubt, owing to the fragmentary form in which his poem exists.

The truth concerning Plato seems to be that just as he regarded opinion as intermediate between true knowledge and ignorance (*Republic*, 533, 534), so he regarded the sensuous, the material, as lying between the pure and the ethereal essence, and that which is strictly without existence. He realized the necessity of attributing reality to the material, and yet on the other hand his distrust of it was such that his language often seems to imply that he regarded it merely as a world of subjective appearance. Thus, as we believe, he was led to think of it as real, and yet, if it may be so expressed, as not having such a degree of reality as the pure essence which it only resembled. (*Republic*, 597a.) This view is substantiated by his account of the creation of the soul, to which casual reference has already been made. We present it again because, after we have made full allowance for the mythical form in which the *Timæus* is cast, it serves to show what was Plato's real conception of the objects of the lower world.

"The soul he made out of the following elements and in this manner; he took of the unchangeable and indivisible essence, and also of the divisible and corporeal which is generated, and he made a third sort of intermediate essence out of them both, partaking of the nature of the same and of the other, and thus he compounded a nature which was in a mean between the indivisible and corporeal. These three elements he took and mingled them all in one form, compressing the reluctant and unsociable nature of the other into the same."

This passage presents the difficulty, but it also suggests its solution. It is said that God *took of* the indivisible, thus dividing the indivisible, and that out of the two elements he compounded an intermediate nature, thus changing the unchangeable. But the nature thus compounded is looked upon as a "third sort of intermediate essence" (τρίτον ἐξ αὐποῖν ἐν μέσῳ ξυνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος) and this we believe to have been Plato's real conception not alone of the soul, but of all objects below the realm of pure being. Yet, as has been remarked, if we confine ourselves to his language, we cannot fail to detect frequent inconsistencies, while this impossibility of reconciling his various forms of expression either on the hypothesis of the reality of the phenomenal world or on that of its unreality goes to confirm the view suggested.

A question quite removed from this, is raised by a class of critics who present the view that the Ideas have no existence outside the mind, that they are only abstractions. This, in substance, is the opinion of Prof. Jowett, who believes that the theory had its mythical period, and that in his earlier writings, in the *Phædo*, the *Banquet*, the *Phædrus*, Plato presented the realistic view. This was supplanted, he maintains, as the system matured, by a more psychological conception which did not contemplate the Ideas as having an independent existence. This view is probably suggested not only by some inherent difficulties of the theory, but also by the employment of the word "Idea." Brucker is of the opinion that the Ideas are called such not because they exist in the mind, but because by the mind alone they be discerned and apprehended. To this it may be added that while the Ideas were regarded as having a separate existence, their counterparts or reflections were recognized within the mind, so that it was not unnatural that the real existences should receive a name primarily applied to mental existences.

One of the most conclusive answers to those maintaining that the Ideas are only abstractions, is to be found in the fact, that in his criticism of the theory, Aristotle, who was an immediate pupil of Plato, and acquainted with that esoteric and oral teaching of the Academy, which, if any credence is to be accorded to the Epistles, was fuller and more systematic

than that contained in the dialogue, uniformly regards them as real existences.

Another reason for rejecting this hypothesis is that the prevailing, and, we may say, the almost uniform impression conveyed by the dialogues is that their author deemed the Ideas to be real existences. This impression has been left, not only on the minds of casual readers, but the realism of Plato is maintained by the great majority of his ablest critics. It is not alone in the *Banquet*, where Plato speaks of rising out of "the sea of change" to "the sea of beauty" (210), or in the *Phædo*, where Socrates asserts that having sought in vain for the true and the real he thought he would better "have recourse to Ideas and seek in them the truth of existence," (100) or in the gorgeous myth of the *Phædrus* (245-257) that we have the reality of the Ideas asserted, but the same thing is affirmed in the more sober and critical *Parmenides*, in which, with rare philosophic insight, Plato has anticipated every important objection to his theory. In this dialogue the conclusion is reached, after some hesitation, that the Ideas are "patterns fixed in nature," and, far from regarding them as mere abstractions having their origin in the manifold objects of the sensuous world, Plato speaks of these objects as "like them and resemblances of them." "What is meant by participation of other things in the Ideas," he adds, "is really assimilation to them." (132).

He insists on the importance of abstraction and classification as essential to true science (*Republic*, x, 596), and accordingly he points out a method of proceeding with Ideas, in accordance with which it is necessary, in order to a correct definition or classification, that some general term be given which comprises several objects, (*Euthyphro*, 6), and then that there be indicated what is distinctive or essential in the term to be defined (*Euthyphro*, 11). In other words there are certain obstructions in this road which leads back to the world of Ideas, and these are to be removed through the process of abstraction. The objects of the sensuous world are to be classified, harmony and unity are to be brought out of seeming discord and diversity, unavailable objects are to be eliminated, so to speak, and all things made ready for the march of reason to the wished-for realm.

But certainly, because this process of abstraction sustains this intimate relation to the Ideas, we are not to confound the abstractions with that pure essence to which they only lead; nor can we successfully maintain that the exalted realm of being of which Plato speaks in reverential words, is to be rationalized into mere notions having no other dwelling-place than that human reason, for which it was Plato's mission and ambition to find an anchorage in absolute being. Let us rather believe, that, according to this philosophy, abstraction was possible and necessary because of the existence, because of the reality of the Ideas; that the Ideas were related to the faculty of abstraction, but that abstractions were not the Ideas.

A few words must suffice for the presentation of that portion of the Platonic philosophy in which the relations of the Ideas to one another are considered and in which they are exhibited in their unity. It is a remark of Prof. Jowett that two great aims appear in the philosophy of Plato—first, to realize abstractions; second, to connect them. Without admitting that the Ideas were abstractions, we cannot fail to perceive the justice of the remark that this system culminates in the representation of the Ideas as having a vital bond of union and as sustaining relations as members of one great hierarchy. To quote again from Ritter: "The true and the real are exhibited in general notions, as elements of science, which are so related to one another, that every higher notion embraces and combines under it several lower; consequently, that the elements of truth cannot be so separated from each other as not to be, nevertheless, held together by some higher bond." Thus there is a vital unity throughout, and one is led back from one class of Ideas to a higher class in which the first class is included. (Cp. *Republic*, x, 597). Tracing its way back in this manner, through the realm of being, it is obvious that the mind will arrive at some all-inclusive Idea in which all the others have their origin—that "nature of wondrous beauty" to which reference is made in the *Banquet*. This is the Idea of the Good, which is set forth in the sixth and seventh books of the *Republic*, and in which we recognize the culmination of Plato's philosophy. In passing, we may remark that while he seems to represent the journey of the soul from the lower Ideas

to the Idea of the Good as long and arduous, he does not reveal his conception of it with clearness, nor, with any precision, indicate its several steps. The Good then is the last to be attained. "In the world of knowledge," Plato says (*Republic*, vii, 517), "the Idea of Good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and the lord of light in this world, and the source of truth and reason in the other; this is the first and great cause which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must behold." "This is he whom I call the child of the Good," he says elsewhere (*Republic*, vi, 508), "Whom the Good beget in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the Good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind. . . . Now that which imparts truth to the object and knowledge to the subject is what I would have you term the Idea of Good, and that you will regard as the cause of science and of truth, as known by us; beautiful too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more beautiful than either, and, as in the previous instance, light and sight may be truly said to be the sun, so, in this other sphere science and truth may be deemed like the Good, but not the Good; the Good has a place of honor yet higher." The relation of the Good, then, to knowledge and truth is like the relation of the sun to sight. "The sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognized by sight."

This will bring before us, with sufficient clearness, the general outlines of Plato's conception of the good. Yet, just as certain difficulties arise in connection with the Theory of Ideas in its relations to the sensuous, so now we find questions suggested by Plato's doctrine of the Good, concerning which there will always be disagreement among his readers; though in this instance it is not difficult to adopt an interpretation which will be consistent with other portions of the system.

The great question, and yet, as we believe, the one which is least entitled to be considered a question, is whether Plato intended, in asserting that the Good is at the summit of being, to represent the Good, as the living personal God. We believe

that he did, but there is one or two objections to this view which require a passing notice. Schwegler regards it as clear that the Good and the Deity were regarded as identical, but is not confident that this highest cause was conceived as a personal being, concluding that this question concerning the personality of God was not yet definitely before him. This, then, is the impression conveyed by Plato's utterances on this subject, when viewed from an Hegelian standing point. To the ordinary reader, however, it seems as impossible that this greatest of questions should not have presented itself to a mind like that of Plato, as it seems evident, from a perusal of the different portions of his writings, that his consideration of it resulted in a firm faith in a personal Providence. The only indications that this was not his belief, are to be found in his impersonal designation of the first cause (*το ἄγαθόν*), and in the fact, that, whatever we may think of this crowning Idea, the lower members of the hierarchy, which are sometimes represented as partaking of the same quality, cannot be regarded as other than impersonal.

Any perplexity arising from Plato's employment of this *το ἄγαθον* we believe will be avoided, if we remember that this is, in reality, an attempt to supply a metaphysical or philosophical basis for the popular faith in the Deity, a vindication of the religious idea of God, and that as in the *a priori* arguments of Augustine, of Clarke, of Locke, or of Descartes, it is necessary that the author use designations which, if taken out of their relations, and isolated from his other utterances, might suggest disbelief in the personality of the Deity.

In reply to the second objection, that Plato speaks of the Good as an Idea, and that hence, so far as personality is concerned, it must be placed in the same rank with the lower Ideas, it must be said that while it is true that the Good is thus designated, it is also true that it differs *toto coelo* from all orders of beings below it. Certainly the expressions of Plato do not encourage the supposition that it was the soul of the world, a diffused and characterless something. They, at least, do not invite us to designate it by any Pantheistic form of phrase. It was a distinct and definite essence, above and separate from all that existed below it, and of which it was the cause. It was invested with all the perfections which it was possible for the

mind of Plato to conceive, and what could better constitute its distinction and superiority than the attributes of a personal God? "O heavens," cries the Eleatic stranger in the *Sophist* (249), certainly a dialogue which we are not accustomed to rank among those which abound in extravagant and metaphorical expressions—"O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with absolute being? Can we imagine being to be devoid of life and mind, and to remain in awful unmeaningness an everlasting fixture?" Who can fail to notice the change in Plato's manner, the reverence and awe of his spirit, when he comes to speak of the Good, and who that is willing to accept the most natural and obvious interpretation of his language, can read those passages which we have quoted, where he speaks of the Idea of Good as "the universal author of all things beautiful and right (*πᾶσι πάντων αὕτη ὁρῶν τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία*), where he describes "the child of the Good, whom the Good begat in his own likeness" (*τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕκγονον, ὃν τὰγαθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ*), and where the Good is exhibited as "the cause of science and truth" (*αἰτίαν δὲ διανοοῦ οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας*), without recognizing in this exalted and ineffable reality something more than an empty abstraction, or a void and lifeless God?

And if this were not enough, we think it not impossible to derive an argument of very considerable strength from those passages where our author is not occupied in a direct consideration of his Theory of Ideas, and in which his belief in a personal God is most explicitly announced or implied. We are aware that it is said, in answer to this, that in these statements Plato does not speak with metaphysical accuracy, but accommodates himself to the popular belief, but we shall persist in believing that when he speaks of the world as coming from God, and as created by divine reason and knowledge (*Sophist*, 265), or when he maintains with earnestness that the Gods have a care for men and the things of earth (*Laws*, x, 901 et seq.) or speaks of God as his guide (*Laws*, xii, 968), he means by these expressions something more than an insincere concession to the faith of the vulgar. And more convincing than any argument, is what we may term the Theistic spirit of his writ-

ings, the awed and reverent tone which bespeaks a soul not unconscious of the presence of its Author, the prevalent sense of indebtedness to God, the willingness and the desire to fly from the scenes of generation and of change, to the pure and the absolute.

Thus in the Idea of the Good, the Idea of the eternal God, we come upon the goal of the Platonic philosophy. "God, holding in his hand the beginning, middle, and end of all that is, moves according to his nature in a straight line towards the accomplishment of his end. Justice always follows Him, and is the punisher of those who fall short of the divine law." And to that law, "he who would be happy will hold fast and follow it in all humility and order," (*Laws*, iv, 715, 716). This is the sublime and true conception in which this philosophy culminates. Thus the famous saying of Protagoras that "man is the measure of all things" is supplanted by one far nobler—"God is the measure of all things," (*Laws*, iv, 716). How faithfully this latter summarizes Plato's whole system it is needless to say. It furnishes a criterion of truth. It renders knowledge possible. It presents a nature to which man is to strive to assimilate himself.

Did the limits of this article permit, we should now be prepared to address ourselves to the consideration of another question, which, though not of equal importance with the one noticed above, is not without interest. The question is concerned with the relation of God to Ideas. Are the latter independent or dependent on the former? Is it true of the Deity that he is the author of all the lower Ideas in such a sense that he is their originating cause, or do they exist independently? Or as the question is stated in the *Euthyphro* (10), "Is the pious and holy beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved by the gods?" Without entering on the discussion of this point, it may be said that the answer is suggested in the remark that the question, as quoted from the *Euthyphro*, is not the entire question with which we have to do. It is undoubtedly true that the great Ideas, such as justice, right, and goodness, this latter being viewed now as an ethical as distinguished from a metaphysical conception, were regarded as independent on the will of God for their existence or validity;

but when we remember that in at least one instance, we have had occasion to observe that Plato speaks of each object of the sensuous universe as representing its Idea or *Παράδειγμα*, we are forced to the conclusion that we cannot affirm of all Ideas that they were considered to be independent.

The world of essence, being such as it is, and the Good being as he represents, we should anticipate that Plato would set it forth as the worthiest attainment of man to enter into the presence of this pure essence, and preëminently to raise himself to the contemplation of the Good. Yet such is the influence over the soul of the mortal and changing element in its composition, that even the best of those who follow God catch only a glimpse of true being now and then, while many who are struggling upward to behold it, are so weighted by the flesh, so diverted from the pursuit by lower interests, that they "go away without being initiated into the mysteries of being and are nursed with the food of opinion" (*Phædrus*, 248a). His aversion to the corporeal is finely illustrated by a passage in the myth of the *Phædrus*, where the soul is divided into three parts, two of them having the forms of horses and the third that of a charioteer. One of the horses is erect and well-formed, with a lofty neck and aquiline nose, being white in color and of dark eyes, a lover of honor and modesty and temperance, a follower of true glory, and needing not the touch of the whip, being guided by word and admonition; while the other is large and misshapen, having a strong, short neck, flat-faced and of a dark color, gray eyed and blood-shot, the mate of insolence and pride, deaf, and hardly yielding to blow or spur (*Phædrus*, 253). This, as has been well-remarked, is perhaps the earliest foreshadowing of the modern three-fold division of the soul.

Feeling thus deeply the disadvantages of the philosopher in his present state, Plato loves to dwell upon a period of preëxistence when philosophers could look upon beauty itself, "shining in pure light," and when they were pure themselves, and "not yet enshrined in that living tomb, which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the body, as in an oyster shell. Let me linger thus long," he adds, "over the memory of scenes which have passed away" (*Phædrus*, 250). Yet these hindrances to the contemplation of being render the attainment of

that contemplation only the more ennobling, and the philosopher is to bend his energies and shape his course with this end in view. Thus we have the crucial test by which the value of any discipline is determined. Speaking of geometry, in the course of his discussion of the subject of education, Plato says the great question is, "whether it tends towards the great end—towards the vision of the Idea of Good, whither all things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze towards that place, where is the full perfection of being, of which she ought, by all means, to obtain the vision" (*Republic*, vii, 526). And it is in the pursuit of philosophy alone that man can hope to obtain this vision. The philosopher is "the spectator of all time and all existence." He only is able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable—"to look at the very truth" (*Republic* iv, 484).

We have thus presented what we believe to be an essentially correct description of Plato's dialectic. If that dialectic is not without obscurities and inconsistencies, it contains what its author was seeking—a basis of certainty for knowledge. It points out an avenue by which man may pass from the finite to the infinite. Whatever we may think of some of its minor portions, its great conclusions are those which are essential to morality, its results are those which are dictated by the best instincts of the heart. Yet it is the lofty spirit of this philosophy, far more than any single tenet, which gives it its perennial value. Committed, as it is, to the best interests of humanity, never despairing of a God-given capacity in man to attain the truth, it has seemed to many like a revelation from on high, while the fathers of the early Church delighted in the belief that its author was indebted to the Hebrew Scriptures—a theory, we need not say, which has no sufficient foundation. "To the Jews was given the Law, and to the Greek philosophy until the coming of our Lord," said Clement of Alexandria, who remarks elsewhere, "When to the doctrine of our Savior as the power and wisdom of God, is added the Grecian philosophy, it does not, indeed, make the truth any more powerful, but it renders futile the attack of sophistry, and as it wards off every fraudulent plot devised against the truth, it has been properly denominated the wall and hedge of the vineyard." "What is

Plato," says Numenius, as cited by Clement, "but Moses in the language of Attica?" (*Μωυσῆς ἀττικίζων.*)

The prominence of this philosophy in the schools of Alexandria was but the prophecy of its influence upon Christian thinkers in almost every age. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Anselm, Calvin, almost all the great minds of the Church have drawn from it. If its domain was encroached upon for a time, by the Aristotelian philosophy, it awoke with new vigor and to unprecedented influence at the time of the *Renaissance*, when the works of Plato were first translated into Latin, and published (1483-1484) by Marsilius Ficinus, and when, as one has said, the grand dukes of Florence died with sentences from Plato on their lips. So, in the present day, under the leadership of Prof. Jowett and others, there is a manifest return to the old Master.

One cannot turn from any contemplation of this grand system without professing an almost personal attachment to its author. The native purity of his soul has so transfused itself into his philosophy that the latter cannot be perused without a conscious elevation of the mind. The impression it conveys of the unmeasurable exaltation and importance of the solemn themes with which it is concerned is never to be forgotten. The impulse it imparts to the student is lasting and invaluable.

ARTICLE VI.—A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE CAUCUS.

SOME of the causes of the political demoralization that we see around us are doubtless moral, and are only to be eradicated by moral means. Yet it is also true that much of it is due to defects in the political machinery which might be remedied by law.

The process of choosing public officers consists of two entirely distinct parts. The first is the selection of a few candidates, for one of whom, in most cases, every voter must cast his ballot or throw it away; and the second is the formal expression of their choice by the electors, through their votes, between the candidates nominated. The first is not often of less importance than the second; in many cases it is the only one which is anything more than a mere form.

Now while the second of these processes is carefully and minutely regulated by law, and guarded by every precaution that the ingenuity of legislators has been able to invent to secure independence, purity, and fair play, the former is wholly ignored by the law. This silence of the law on the subject was proper enough at the time when our government was first set a running; indeed for the law to have meddled with it then would simply have been to introduce needless complications. So long as there was no great diversity of interests or conditions in the community, and there was a substantial agreement as to what kind of men ought to be elected to office, and the voters in each district were for the most part personally acquainted with each other and amenable to the same public opinion, that public opinion was itself a better regulator and safeguard of the nominating process than any plan, however ingeniously contrived, that could have been provided by law. But to suppose that in a different condition of society there may not sometime arise a necessity, while we hold unwaveringly to the great principles of free government which we have inherited from the fathers of the republic and their fathers who fought the good fight of liberty on the soil of the mother

country, for a readjustment of the political machinery by which we seek to apply those principles in detail to the actual conduct of public affairs, is not wiser than to imagine that a man, who from a poor boy has become a great merchant, can administer his vast business in the same simple and informal manner in which he used to manage when he sold peanuts and sticks of candy at the corner of the street, kept his accounts "in his head," and had no bank but the one sound pocket in his ragged trowsers, provided only that he keep the same honesty, shrewdness, economy, industry, and grit, that have raised him from his low to his high estate. Should he try to do so, it is quite certain that some kind of a system would before long be found to have grown up among his underlings: and unless they were men whose virtue was of no common mold, it would be equally certain to be a system beneficial chiefly to those who got it up. If in addition he should entrust to them solely the power of filling vacancies and making promotions in their own number, there is no doubt that no body of men could be got together whose honesty could long stand such a strain. The merchant's establishment would become a den of thieves, and shameful bankruptcy be the sure end.

Now the caucus system, which is the system, that, as the conditions of successful political activity changed, has grown up to fill the gap left in the law, has not yet, it must be admitted, entirely broken down. But in those larger caucuses called conventions, in which the most important nominations are usually made, and in primary meetings in the cities, the caucus too often becomes a mere instrument for carrying out the previous arrangements of some clique of politicians, or a battle ground of rival cliques, in which all considerations of public interest or the fitness or unfitness of a candidate for the office to which it is proposed to elect him are either openly derided or contemptuously ignored. An example, perhaps an extreme case, but very clearly showing the kind of results to which the present caucus system is undoubtedly tending, may be found in the account of his experience at a primary meeting in the city of New York given by a correspondent of the *Nation* last winter. Actuated by a laudable intention no longer to neglect his political duties he set out one evening to attend

the caucus of his party. On his way he pictured to himself an assemblage of men, most of them doubtless committed in advance to this or that candidate, and not, of course, amenable to argument or reason, but at least having the forms and outward appearance of a deliberative body, and among whom perhaps he might find a small number of men not absolutely pledged who might on occasion at least turn a doubtful vote to the better side. In point of fact he found a few men, strangers to him, in a small room, one or two of whom had charge of a box like a ballot box and some of the others were distributing printed ballots as if at an election. From time to time men came into the room, put their ballots into the box and went out. The real work of the caucus had been done in some caucus-before-the-caucus; but when, where, or by whom, he had no means of finding out.

The evils of the caucus system, political demoralization, corruption, hasty, crude and unwise legislation, the increasing repulsion of good men from the public service, and the attracting into it of knaves, demagogues and blatherskites, are too well known to need to be dwelt upon here. It is a waste of labor to point out to men at bright noon that the sun shines. But most people have come to look on the caucus as a matter of course, and the evils resulting from it as necessarily incident to our form of government, part of the price which we must be content to pay for freedom.

Before going on to explain a plan which it seems to us might advantageously be substituted by law for the present nominating machinery in certain elections, it seems proper to refer to some general principles that must be kept in mind in all attempts to construct or improve political machinery.

1. The work of politics in ordinary times will be done, not by disinterested patriots, but by men who are actuated by the same kind of motives that govern men in the ordinary affairs of life, and who only now and then, oftener in the case of high-toned men, more seldom if they are low-toned, rise to the height of disregarding purely personal considerations.

2. If the conduct of practical politics requires a large expenditure of time or money, or the getting of a high degree of special knowledge, the great body of citizens, who follow regu-

lar trades and professions, will not take part in it, and it is useless to try to induce them to do so by appeals to their public spirit or sense of duty. Most men cannot give much time to more than one kind of work. Nor will they go to caucuses merely to go through the empty form of seeming to pass upon matters already virtually decided for them. Men want to feel that they are really of some weight, that they individually count for something, otherwise they will not work at all. They will not chop wood unless they can see the chips fly.

3. The law of competition (which naturalists in their science call the law of "natural selection" and the "survival of the fittest,") holds in politics as everywhere else; so that, even if the work of managing public affairs might possibly be carried on without the expenditures and acquisitions just mentioned, yet if these expenditures and acquisitions will give any advantage to those using them, a class of men will be found who will use them, and thereby get the business of politics into their own hands, gain a power greater than that of other men, and abuse that power to their own advantage if they can. And if the conditions of success are such that a man has the advantage who in addition to the qualifications just mentioned is also unscrupulous, then the unscrupulous men will just as surely crowd out those who are scrupulous as under Mr. Darwin's law a species well adapted to its environment will crowd out one that is ill-adapted. Nothing succeeds like success. An ordinary man who has an end to seek must either use the means that are best adapted to secure that end or see himself beaten by those who do. Now the trouble with the caucus system is that under it the conduct of practical politics does require always a large expenditure of time and often of money and the acquisition of a high degree of special knowledge, and in very many cases gives a decided advantage to men who, if not exactly unscrupulous, are yet not burdened with a too nice and "unpractical" sense of honor.

This furnishes the half truth of the plea usually put in by the party managers when the caucus rule in politics is denounced; that it is necessary. So it is, as the law now stands, inasmuch as it is inevitable. These arts of log-rolling, these poor and petty maneuvers, this abject submission to party dis-

cipline that teaches men to be cowards and bigots and insincere, this long apprenticeship to ignoble requirements, which any man who is worthy to hold high office, will blush if he stoops to use; these are not so usual methods of political work because the conduct of public affairs is in itself unfitted to occupy the purest characters and noblest minds, nor because politicians are sinners above all other men. On the contrary, there are men prominent in public life, who, *qua* private citizens, are respected, perhaps loved, and thoroughly trusted by all who know them, and who seem to have only *qua* public men a curious faculty of slipping on a political conscience, which they never use on any other occasion—just as a man keeps a particular suit of overalls for dirty work—in which they can take a hand in very questionable political jobs with no apparent harm to their private morals. These ignoble means are used simply and only because they are the methods which experience has shown to be the best adapted to secure the ends for which politicians work; and they are used even though those ends are public ones, and not merely personal advantages. The better class of politicians would gladly be rid of the necessity of using them. They have come into use under the law of competition, because they are the tactics of success. And there is only one possible way of getting rid of them, whether the attempt is to be made by moral means or by improvements in the political machinery, or by both; and that is to change in some way the conditions of success. Men will stop using them—even good men, as men go—just as soon as there is no use, or only small use, in using them, and no sooner, unless the millenium comes in the mean time. As far as the matter of improving the electoral machinery is concerned, the conditions of success that now necessitate the caucus system can only be changed in one or both of two ways; either by making it possible for any citizen to take an effective part in the nomination of candidates without any larger expenditure of time or labor or any greater knowledge of politics than may reasonably be expected from the average busy man, or by making it possible to bolt objectionable nominations without either throwing away one's vote or helping the opposite party.

The reader will hardly need to be reminded that under any possible arrangement, it is not to be expected that all citizens will enter with equal interest into politics, or that those who do enter actively will not have more influence than those who do not. The object to be sought is to keep the power of the political class within such limits as the public welfare requires, and to make the entrance into public life and the conditions of success when they are once in more to the liking of the best men. Even the caucus would probably not be entirely done away with, but only shorn of a portion of its present despotic power.

The following plan will be discussed without reference to any questions as to its constitutionality. It is applicable only to those elections in which more than one officer of the same kind are to be chosen, as for example, Congressmen, members of State legislatures, or aldermen or councilmen in cities. The part relating to nominations is, we believe, original with us. The method of finding the rank of the candidates on the several tickets is taken from a plan of minority representation proposed three or four years ago by Messrs. J. Bryant Walker and S. Dana Horton. The process of canvassing the votes belongs, as to the greater part of it, to Mr. Walter Bailey of London.

1. Nominating Candidates.

Any ten* voters may nominate as many candidates as they please by registering their names, at least two weeks † before the election with some proper officer. In municipal elections the registrations might be made with the city clerk, in State elections with the Secretary of State or the county clerks. It would not be necessary that all of the ten voters should attend before the registering officer at the same time, or even that they should attend in person at all. Arrangements could be easily made to have the registrations made before other officers, if desired, and certified to the regular registering officer, or made by proxy. All names registered should be published, either as soon as registered or at the expiration of the time allowed for

* Or any other number that may be fixed by law.

† The time allowed for registration would depend on the size of the voting districts or other circumstances.

registering. No votes cast for persons not so nominated are to be counted.

2. Nominating Tickets.

By a "ticket" we mean a list of as many candidates, to be voted for on one ballot,* as there are offices of the same kind to be filled. For instance, the State of Connecticut elects four Congressmen. If they were all elected on a general ticket, as is contemplated in this plan, instead of by districts, a congressional "ticket" would contain four names. The larger States it would perhaps be more convenient to divide into districts electing not over eight or ten congressmen apiece.

At any time either before or after the expiration of the time limited for registering candidates' names, and at least one day before the election, any voter† should have the right to register, at the same place and in the same manner as in the case of individual candidates, a "ticket," composed of the names of candidates already nominated to a number not exceeding the number of places to be filled. There is no objection to the ticket's containing fewer names, but such a course would be unwise, because, as will hereafter appear, it might result in a loss of some or even all of the votes cast for such a ticket. All tickets registered should also be published in such manner and at such time as might be found best.

3. Manner of voting.

Each voter must vote for one of the tickets so registered without adding any names. He may erase names if he pleases, but, as will hereafter appear, such erasure may not be sufficient to prevent the ballot from being counted in favor of a candidate whose name is erased. Theoretically it would be possible to allow voters to add one or possibly two names (of course of registered candidates) to his ballot, and in some elections it would perhaps not be found in practice to be too inconvenient. But the effect would be to complicate considerably the process of counting; so that in most cases the better way would be to

* The reader should bear in mind the distinction between a "ticket" and a ballot, because the words are often used to signify the same thing. The ticket is the list of names, the ballot is the piece of paper on which the names are written or printed. There are usually many ballots containing the same ticket.

† It might be found more convenient in practice to require a larger number of voters to unite in registering a ticket, as in nominating candidates.

allow no additions of names, but leave each voter to look out for himself and see that a ticket acceptable to him is duly registered. This he can always do, since he has it in his own power to register such a ticket and is kept informed by the publication of the tickets what tickets are being nominated; so that there is no hardship or injustice, except in very rare and exceptional cases, in confining him, on election day, to a registered ticket; and if there should be such hardship or injustice now and then it would be only recognizing and formally allowing, as the least of two evils, a much less degree of the same kind of hardship that voters are in practical effect now, in most cases, compelled to submit to.

The voter should also indicate by numbers on his ballot his order of preference among the names thereon; but if no such order is indicated, the names must of course be taken in the order in which they are written or printed on it. It would be well to forbid the use of ballots with numbers printed on them, in order to encourage the voters to freely express their individual preferences by numbering their own ballots. The probable composition of the tickets that would be nominated, the relations between independent and "regular" candidates and the advantages to be derived from a party nomination under this plan will be discussed further on.

But should the plan stop here, the individual voter, having taken pains to get his ticket nominated, would be no better off than at present, since no ticket not supported by a majority of the votes cast could be elected, and the ticket having the majority would elect all of its candidates, which would be more, in most cases, than its fair share. It is necessary to go farther and provide some means by which the votes cast for each ticket can be made available to elect, if not all its candidates, at least such proportionate part of them as they are equitably entitled to elect. The remainder of the plan is for this purpose.

4. Counting the votes.

The first duty of the counters is to find out, by a simple enumeration, how many votes have been cast for each registered ticket, paying no attention to the order of the names on the ballots and disregarding erasures.

Each ticket is entitled to elect a number of the candidates whose names compose it proportioned to the number of votes it has received. Thus a ticket which has obtained one half of all the votes cast is entitled to elect one half of the officers chosen, and a ticket that has received one third of all the votes cast is entitled in like manner to elect one third of all the officers chosen. But since no ticket can elect all of its candidates, unless it receives all or nearly all the votes, and since every voter may have arranged the names on his ballot differently from most of the other voters, the candidate who stands first on one ballot perhaps standing last on, or even being erased from, another ballot, the question at once arises, which of all the names that make up any ticket are entitled to the election? The next thing to be done, therefore, is to find the relative rank of the candidates on their respective tickets. This is done for each ticket separately in the following manner: That candidate having the most first votes, that is, whose name is numbered "1," or if the ballot is not numbered, stands first in order, on the greatest number of ballots cast for that ticket, has the first rank on the ticket; that one of the remaining candidates who has received the most first and second votes stands second; that one of the still remaining names who has received the most first, second, and third votes stands third; and in like manner the relative rank of all the candidates is found. This will be more readily understood by means of the following tabular arrangement, which Messrs. Walker and Horton call the "party square."

Table of Republican votes.

Candidates.	1st Choice.	2d Choice.	3d Choice.	4th Choice.	5th Choice.	Erased.	Sum.
A	102	30	20	25	25	0	202
B	10	17	25	50	95	5	202
C	30	50	82	32	4	4	202
D	45	80	40	31	4	2	202
E	15	25	35	60	67	0	202
Erased,	0	0	0	4	7		11
Sum.	202	202	202	202	202	11	

Suppose that in a certain election, where there are five representatives to be elected, the Republican ticket, containing the names of five candidates (A, B, C, D, E,) gets 202 votes. In the

left hand perpendicular column place the names of the candidates. The next five columns contain, opposite the names of the respective candidates, the number of first, second, third, fourth, and fifth votes cast for each. The "erased" column, next in order, shows the number of ballots from which each candidate's name was erased. The horizontal "erased" column, next to the bottom sum column, shows the number of ballots that had, owing to erasures, only three or four names upon them. The two sum columns contain the sums of the numbers in the vertical and horizontal columns, which sums must of course, except in the "erased" columns, be the same as the whole number of votes cast for the ticket.

From this table it appears that A, having the most first votes (102) ranks first on the ticket. D, having the most first and second votes ($45+80=125$), ranks second. In like manner it appears that C stands third, E fourth, and B fifth. B's name was erased from five ballots, C's from four, and D's from two. Seven ballots had one name erased, and four ballots had two erased.

If any ticket gets less than ten* votes the ballots cast for it are to be regarded as "scattering" and to be no farther proceeded with or counted; except that, if there is more than one voting place in the district, it might be better, for reasons that will appear hereafter, to allow the scattering votes to be reported to the canvassers like the rest, so that, if there should appear to have been more than ten votes cast for the ticket in all the polling places, they may not be thrown out. The "party square" has this further peculiarity: if the number of votes for the ticket be once correctly counted, a very simple matter since the individual names need not be noticed, either mistake or fraud in the process of finding the ranks of the candidates would be almost impossible; because any error would be at once detected, both as to its amount and position, by the failure of the vertical and horizontal columns to add correctly. Moreover, if any attempt should be made to report the number of votes cast for any particular ticket as either greater or less than it really was, the proper distribution over the party square

* Or such number as might be fixed by law, having reference to the size of the election district and the number of votes.

of the votes wrongfully added or subtracted, so that the columns should still add correctly, could not in most cases be successfully accomplished, if any of the counters were opposed to the fraud. And if the counters were divided into pairs, one pair counting the first votes, and then passing the ballots to the next pair to count the second votes, and they to another pair to count the third votes, any collusion to doctor the whole table would not be likely to succeed. So that, although the process of counting may at first sight appear more complicated than the one now in use—though it is doubtful if it is really so, when we consider the confusion now caused by “scratched” and scattering ballots—it is really far less liable to evolve a wrong result.

With the finding of the candidates' ranks the duties of the counters end. The final marshalling of the votes, and the announcement of the results belongs to the canvassers.

The result of the count should be published.

5. Canvassing the votes.

It makes little difference who the canvassers are, because their action is confined to a simple arithmetical calculation, involving no more difficult process than simple addition, subtraction, and division, performed, according to fixed rules, on the data furnished by the counters. However inclined they may be to cheat, they are under an effectual check from the fact that the data on which they work are published, and anyone who pleases can make the calculation for himself. The newspapers would of course do so, and lay the results before their readers at the earliest possible moment, so that what must be the result of the canvass would often be known to the public before the canvassers met. If there is more than one voting place in the district, the first thing that the canvassers have to do is to make up, for each ticket, a new table of relative ranks and a new party square by combining the tables sent them by the counters from the different voting places. The next step is to find the “quota” or number of votes required to elect one candidate. This is done by dividing the whole number of votes cast by the whole number of persons to be elected and rejecting fractions from the result. Thus if there are 507 votes cast and five candidates to be elected, the quota would

be $(507 \div 5)$ 101. The canvassers have now to distribute the successful candidates among the various tickets according to the number of votes received by each. The thing to be accomplished is to allow each ticket to elect its fair share of candidates, to give to every candidate the full advantage of all votes cast for him on all the tickets on which his name stands, if it happens to stand on more than one ticket, having due regard also to his relative rank on the tickets, and to consolidate fractions of quotas so as to cause as small a number of votes as possible to be wasted. The manner in which this is done will be most easily explained by means of an example.

Tabular Exhibit of a Canvass of Votes.

No. 1.	No. 2.	No. 3.	No. 4.	No. 5.	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
A	F	E	L	N	101	10		101	95	101	95
D	G	G	H	M	*			*			6
C	H	K	I	B					95	*	*
E	I	C	F	F							
B	K	B	M	H							
202	151	95	49	10	H	I	K	L	M	N	
101	101	95	49	8	49	49		49	10	10	
101	50	00	00	2	49	44		49	10	10	
101	6				44						
00	44				8			49		10	
	44				*						
	00										

In a certain election let 507 votes be polled to elect five representatives. The quota, as we have seen, would be 101. There are five tickets in the field, shown in the left side of the table. No. 1 is the Republican ticket, the order of the names on which has been already explained.* It polls 202 votes, as shown by the figures immediately beneath it. No. 2 is the Democratic ticket, polling 151 votes. No. 3 is a mixed ticket made up of selections from the two party tickets, and gets 95 votes. Nos. 4 and 5 are independent tickets, containing the names of three men, L, M, and N, who are not on either of the party tickets, but filled up with some of the best names from

* *Supra*, pp. 742, 743.

them. No. 4 gets 49 votes and No. 5 only 10, who are probably the same ten who nominated N, whose name stands at the head of their ticket. Having, however, taken the precaution to place on their ticket the names of some stronger men, they do not lose their votes, though they fail to elect their favorite. The names of the individual candidates are arranged at the heads of the columns on the right side of the table in alphabetical order. The votes cast for the several tickets, beginning with that having the fewest* votes, are now to be assigned to the candidates standing first thereon respectively, provided that to no candidate are more votes to be at any time assigned than are sufficient to give him a quota. The votes assigned are credited to the individual candidates in their column on the right side of the table. Any candidate receiving in any assignment a full quota, is elected, and the votes assigned to him are debited to the ticket from which they come, which is done by subtracting them from the number of votes standing to the credit of that ticket in its column on the left side of the table.

In the first assignment, N receives 10 votes from ticket No. 5; L gets 49 from ticket No. 4; E gets 95 from ticket No. 3; F receives 101 (a full quota) from ticket No. 2; and A, 101 from ticket No. 1. A and F are elected, which is signified by placing an asterisk under their names in their columns. 101 votes are debited to and subtracted from tickets No. 1 and No. 2, leaving them respectively 101 and 50 votes yet undisposed of. All assignments to unelected candidates are now revoked, which is signified by drawing a line under the numbers credited to them in their columns on the right. This revocation of all assignments to unelected candidates takes place after every assignment in which a candidate is elected. It makes the process of canvassing a little longer, but is useful to prevent confusion, and when there have been several successive assignments without an election, it tends to prevent the same votes being inadvertently used to make up the quotas of two candidates. It is not absolutely necessary however. A second assignment is now made to the candidates standing first. N, L, and E get the same votes as before. No assignments can be

* Or the most; each plan has its advantages, which need not be discussed here.

made from Nos. 2 and 1, because F and A, to whom the assignments would be made are already elected. As no one is elected on the second assignment, it is not revoked, but another assignment is made to the candidates standing second on the tickets. This third assignment gives M 10, H 49, G 95 (from No. 3), G 6 more (from No. 2), and D 101. D and G are elected, and all the assignments to unelected candidates are revoked as before. Tickets No. 1 and No. 3 are now exhausted, and No. 2 has only 44 votes left. The fourth assignment is now made, commencing again at the head of the tickets, and gives N and L, 10 and 49 votes respectively, as in the first assignment. The fifth assignment gives M 10 and H 49, as in the third assignment. F and G being already elected, the fourth and fifth assignments could not extend to ticket No. 2. The sixth assignment, to the third names on the tickets, gives B 10; I 49; and H 44 more (from No. 2). As there is still no election, successive assignments are made to the fourth and fifth names on the tickets as follows: Seventh assignment; No. 2 to I, 44. Nos. 4 and 5 are omitted, because F, to whom their assignments would go, is already elected. Eighth assignment; No. 5 to H, 8, which completes his quota, and makes it unnecessary to go any further with the assignment. All assignments to M, N, L, I, and B are now revoked, and the votes that make up H's quota are debited to tickets Nos. 2, 4, and 6 whence they came. Nos. 2 and 4 are exhausted, and No. 5, which has turned the scale between H and I, has two votes left, which are all that are wasted. In case the bottom of the tickets is reached, in the course of the assignments, without the required number of candidates receiving a full quota, the candidate having the most votes must be declared elected, his votes debited to the tickets from whence they came, assignments to unelected candidates revoked and the process repeated till a sufficient number of candidates are elected. In case of a tie the preference should be determined by relative rank on the tickets from which the votes are assigned.

No. 1 has elected two of its candidates; No. 2 has elected one; Nos. 2 and 3 have elected one jointly; and Nos. 2, 4, and 5 have elected the fifth.

It will be readily seen that, even under the plan above de-

scribed, there is a certain advantage in getting a regular party nomination. Probably the parties would continue to hold their caucuses and nominate full sets of candidates as at present; and any independent or irregular tickets that were put in the field, would as a matter of prudence contain a few names of the regular party nominees, so that if they failed to get a quota of votes, or got a considerable fraction over a quota, their votes or their surplus votes over a quota, would not be wasted, as would be the case if the ticket was made up entirely of men who were on no other ticket, but they might still be able, as in the case of ticket No. 5 in the example, to come in at last and turn the scale in favor of some candidate, who, though not the first choice of the voters who cast them would still be acceptable to them.

The benefits which seem to us likely to be gained by the adoption of the plan of voting above described, in those elections to which it is applicable, are the following:

1. It secures a just and proportional representation in the elected body, not only to the two great political parties, but to all parties and interests in the community which can muster one quota of votes; while at the same time it prevents minorities holding a balance of power from bullying the great parties into pretending to support measures that they do not believe in, as the temperance and labor reform and woman suffrage parties are in the habit of doing.

2. While it accomplishes such a just apportionment of power almost as perfectly as Mr. Hare's plan of proportional representation, at the same time, by substituting a simple mathematical process of adding and subtracting figures for the mechanical handling over and over of the ballots themselves which that plan requires, it avoids the exceeding complexity and abundant opportunities for fraud which have caused Mr. Hare's otherwise perfect plan to be generally rejected as impracticable.

3. It gives every voter, with very little trouble to himself, an opportunity to take an effective part in the process of nominating candidates.

4. If any one of the candidates of a party does not suit all of the party, if he is a man unfit to be voted for, or if the

friends of any one man, who want to vote for him, are unable to secure him a caucus nomination, all such disaffected persons, by registering a ticket which shall be the same as the regular party ticket except that the objectionable name is left out or the wished for name inserted, can vote according to their wishes, and, whether they succeed or fail in the specific object sought, be quite certain neither to do their own party any harm or the opposite party any good. Ticket No. 4 in the example may be regarded as a ticket of this kind. Its supporters, who seem from the other names on their ticket to be Democrats, not polling a quota of votes, fail to elect their favorite L, but do aid in the election of a good Democrat, H, who would not have been elected but for their votes; while the Republican ticket, No. 1, elects exactly the same number of its candidates, and no more, as though the supporters of No. 4 had all voted the regular Democratic ticket, No. 2.

It is in this power to register a ticket that the independence of the individual voter consists, not in the power of scratching on election day. As will appear from attending to the nature of the party square, erasing a name amounts to no more than placing it at the bottom of the ticket. But the fact that "split" tickets can be registered, and that discontented voters can safely and effectively express their discontent by voting for them, ought to have a salutary effect on the tone of the caucus itself, while it certainly would deprive it, not of all power, but of that excessive power which has proved so detrimental to public morals, and would relax party discipline to the point where it would amount to no more than the necessary cohesive force to secure a desirable concert of action among voters who think alike. A citizen, by this plan, could vote freely at first for the man whom he preferred, and if it appeared by an actual count of the votes that his candidate could not be elected, then, but not till then, his vote would pass on to help make up the quota of some more eligible candidate, who is still a man of his own choice.*

5. It would make it easier to sever local elections from politics, which are of no sort of benefit but only a source of cor-

* *Am. Law Review*, VI, p. 271.

ruption, when introduced into such elections. But under the necessity—or alleged necessity—of keeping up party discipline, we go on electing officers to manage the affairs of cities, towns, school districts, counties, states, and other local divisions on the ground of their views on national politics, or their past or expected services to political parties which have no more connection in most cases with the business that these officers will have to do than they have with the internal arrangements of a Hindoo village community—a practice which, it seems to us, cannot be defended on any rational grounds, though it can be accounted for in the same manner in which the existence of the caucus system can. Like that, it is necessary, in that it is inevitable under the present arrangements.

6. It would also enable us to get rid of the mischievous small district system, which has been introduced in order to protect the rights of the minority against the majority. On a general ticket, the majority would, under the law as it now stands, elect not only a majority of the officers to be chosen, as it ought, and under the plan here described would, but elect all, and entirely exclude the minority. Nevertheless where there is only one person to be elected, who must in most cases get the suffrages of an absolute majority of the voters of his district, good, bad, and indifferent, the dire necessity of finding an "available" candidate,—which often means one not good enough to be displeasing to the worse elements in the district, or one who has that kind of "magnetism" which is not observed to be by any means invariably a mark that its possessor also possesses all or any of the qualities of a statesman—too often excludes a class of men most of all fitted by character and education to conduct public business honestly and intelligently, and who, in the larger electoral districts called for by this plan, would easily obtain the quota of votes necessary to elect them, and also, what is of hardly less importance, to keep them in office instead of "rotating" them out just when they have gotten the experience and familiarity with public business needed to make their services of the greatest value.

7. And neither to get nor to keep their offices would such men be obliged to truckle or trim or descend to mean acts, at least to the same extent as if they had to get and keep the favor of the majority of a small district. Since what they would loose in one quarter by a manly and upright course on any question, they would be likely to gain in some other. So that not only honesty and statesmanship, but, what is quite as much needed, courage, would be fostered among public men.

8. With the abolition of small districts, too, would necessarily come to an end the demoralizing practice of "gerrymandering," because it would be no longer possible.

The question remains: is the plan simple enough for practical use? Nothing but a trial can answer that question. The proper place to make such an experiment would be in the elections of some city, town, school district or other small division of the community, rather than, at first, on a large scale in state or national elections; because the constituencies in such local elections are smaller and more compact, and any imperfections that might be found to exist in the plan could be more easily remedied and would do less harm.

ARTICLE VII.—"DO PENANCE." A BIT OF CRITICISM.

THE HON. ASHBEL SMITH, of Texas, is well remembered by those who were contemporary with him in the Academical Department of Yale College between 1821 and 1824, or in the Medical School from which he proceeded M.D. in 1828, as well as by the survivors of those who knew him even earlier in his native city, Hartford. Since those days of long ago, neither his professional eminence in North Carolina, and afterwards in Texas, nor his political and diplomatic career as ambassador of the "Lone Star Republic" to the governments of France and Great Britain, has made him forgetful of those liberal studies which were the discipline of his early years. Returning to his plantation after the disasters which the war of secession brought upon him, he "accepted the situation;" and employing as free laborers those who were once his slaves, and, going with them into the field as their employer, he finds it less costly to pay them wages than it was to support them before they were emancipated. It is pleasant to know of a man whose life has been so active and so full of change, that, in these his latter years, he does not cease to be a scholar nor to read the Greek New Testament with critical and reverent attention.

The following communication, received some months ago, and inadvertently omitted from our last Number, is, perhaps, sufficiently its own explanation; but a few more introductory words will not be impertinent. It was designed for the *New York Tribune*, but the friend to whose care it was sent has taken the responsibility of giving it to the *New Englander*, thinking that thus it would be more likely to find appreciative readers, and would escape the sudden destruction which comes upon the contents of a daily newspaper.

That we may do full justice to our readers and to all parties, we give, entire, the *Tribune's* summary of the paper referred to in Dr. Smith's communication. At the same time we take the liberty of suggesting that we do not understand the sentence about "Do penance" as giving exactly the signification which

is imputed to it and which at first sight it may seem to give. Prof. Short, as reported by the *Tribune*, does not say that "'do penance' is really a fair rendering of the Greek," but "the Latin form [used by Jerome] which is translated [by the Douay translators] 'do penance,' is really a fair rendering of the Greek, dispute as we [Roman Catholics and Protestants] may over the English." If the Douay English truly represents the Latin phrase employed by Jerome (as Dr. Smith assumes, and as Prof. Short does not deny) the strictures which come to us from a Texas plantation are exactly to the point.

Prof. Short's paper, read to the American Philological Association in its meeting at Hartford in 1874, was entitled "The Character of the Latin of the Vulgate." The summary of it, which we copy from the *Tribune*, is very suggestive.

"The Vulgate is now practically the Bible of the Roman Church. It is one of the two oldest and most important versions which we possess. It was made in Africa, in the second century, at a date when Latin was spoken there. It was probably rendered into Latin for the benefit of Latin-speaking Jews. We have no account of the origin of this translation; it was made not later than A. D. 250. St. Jerome, 380 A. D., was commissioned to revise it from the original Greek. Nothing now in existence represents the African manuscript prior to this revision. The principal work of St. Jerome consisted in removing apocryphal additions which had been interpolated. Although the version of St. Jerome at first met great opposition, in the course of centuries it supplanted the old, and the latter went out of existence.

The Vulgate was the first book produced after the invention of printing, and with movable types. A copy of this, valued at many thousand dollars, is in the possession of Mr. James Lenox of New York. In 1590 this edition was carefully revised; it was afterwards amended in 1592 and 1593, called the Clementi, and is now the authorized version of the Church of Rome.

By abundant citation the speaker showed that the Greek order of words was generally followed in the Latin of the Vulgate. But we find occasionally a variation from this form. The Latin form which is translated 'do penance,' is really a fair rendering of the Greek, dispute as we may over the English. 'Possessed with the devils' is in the Vulgate very accurately translated possessed with demons. The form and words of the Greek original are followed with exemplary fidelity, and often with great ingenuity. Numerous examples were given of the accuracy of this following, which not frequently violates the Latin idiom. A critical examination of passages in the Vulgate was then undertaken, and a very large number of defective or inadequate translations cited specifically. One of the most remarkable features of the Vulgate translation is the substitution of Latin words meaning 'because,' 'since,' &c., where the word should be 'that.' But after making all allowance for its errors, it must be acknowledged that the Vulgate is of marvelous accuracy, and goes back to a Greek original older than any we possess.

The Vulgate had a great influence over English translations of the Bible, a very large proportion of the earlier translations of parts of the Scriptures having been made directly from it. If we review the effects which that volume had throughout Christendom, we shall find that no other has exerted equal influence or been comparable in importance."

So much for introduction. Our readers are prepared to appreciate Dr. Smith's discussion of the phrase "Do penance."

EVERGREEN, HARRIS CO., TEXAS, Dec. 28th, 1874.

A few days since a friend gave me several numbers of the *New York Tribune*, extra. In looking over some papers read before the American Philological Association which, it appears, met in Hartford in July of the present year, my attention was arrested by a critical or philological assertion made by Prof. Charles Short of Columbia College, in a paper on the Character of the Latin of the Vulgate. The assertion I refer to is this, "The Latin form which is translated 'Do penance' is really a fair rendering of the Greek, dispute as we may over the English." I confess to no small surprise that so palpable, so grave an error should pass, as this seems to have done, unchallenged, unrebuked in a Philological Association.

"The Greek" referred to by Prof. Short and of which he says "do penance" is a "fair rendering," is obviously the word *μετανοείτε* as used by Matthew iii, 2, and iv, 17, and elsewhere in the New Testament. "To do penance" does not give the meaning, is not a "fair" nor correct rendering of *μετανοέω* in the sentences referred to, nor in any Greek written up to the time of our Saviour, that has come down to us. It may seem a rash assertion to make in Texas where we have no library; but surely if *μετανοέω* would bear such a translation as "do penance" or any thing like it in any classical Greek author, there would have been some hint of such meaning in the voluminous *Thesaurus* of Henry Stephens. The derivation of *μετανοέω* or rather the word itself fixes its own meaning singularly clear, precise, definite, unmistakeable. It is compounded of *μετα* and *νοέω*, the latter being the verb derived from *νόος*—or we may say *νόος* is the substantive and *νοέω* the verb. *Νόος*—contracted *νοῦς*—is the mind, the thinking principle, the reasoning faculty, the motive power of our nature, which prompts

our actions. It is thought, not as a resultant of thinking, but the power that thinks. It is that faculty of our nature which lies behind, if I may so speak, and is the source of action, of our doings. *Μετά* is the proposition which asserts in its compounds *change, fundamental change*. This fundamental change is illustrated in the distinction which Aristotle draws between *Μεταβολή* and *Ἀλλοίωσις*. *Μετανοεῖτε* then means change your mind, *change the motives* of your conduct.

The Greek word has a thoroughness, a precision, an exclusiveness of meaning, which cannot be well expressed by any Latin word, as I shall show in the course of this memorandum.

But first of the English word *repent*, by which the Greek is translated into the English version of the Scriptures. *Repent* is derived from the Latin, and to every scholar it partakes of the incapacity of its Latin original to express the full meaning of the *μετανοεῖτε*. It is only by relating back to its Greek predecessor that it has come to express the fullness of the original idea in the New Testament. The best formula or phrase in Saxon, home-born English to express the idea of John the Baptist, of our Saviour, and of Peter, that occurs to me, is embodied in the words, *change of heart*. Change your heart, let your conduct be no longer dictated by evil passions, by ideas of mere policy or seeming utility, by external motives. But change your heart, and, in place of these motives, substitute pure, internal motives for your life. In illustration let us turn to Acts viii, 21, 22, *Ἡ γὰρ καρδία σου οὐχ ἔστιν εὐθεῖα κ. τ. λ.* *For thy heart is not right, etc.* *Μετανόησον οὖν ἀπο κ. τ. λ.* *Therefore repent, etc.* St. Peter here explains, if one may so speak, the meaning of the Greek word in question. If the Greek word may be fairly rendered "do penance," how does Prof. Short get along with the preposition *ἀπό*? Would he make it interchangeable or synonymous with *ἀντί* or *ἐνεκα*, or would he interpolate a long ellipsis?

I have said in this memorandum that there is no Latin word which renders exactly the Greek word before us.

Henry Stephens, in his *Thesaurus*, under the word *μετανοέω* states the inability to express the meaning fully by any single Latin word. After considerable circumlocution he says, *Sed brevius reddi potest, Sententiam muto. Mentem muto.* "A more

concise rendering is, I change my thought, I change my mind." *Change* is of the *essence* of the meaning. This essential idea is ignored in the words "do penance." The *Thesaurus* was published in Paris more than 200 years ago, long years before the version of the Bible was made in which *do penance* is made to stand for the Greek of the New Testament. Henry Stephens would not have found the smallest difficulty in expressing the idea of doing penance. For, it is a prominent, frequently recurring thought among pagan peoples and occurs frequently in Cicero, Horace, and other classic authors.

In the next, place *do penance* is not a correct translation, a "fair rendering" of *Agite pœnitentiam* of the Vulgate. It may be safely admitted, though it can not be proven, that *agite pœnitentiam* was retained by St. Jerome in his revision, from the earliest versions that were made of the Scriptures into Latin while this language was spoken in its purity. Versions were made thus early but they are wholly lost, except as they may or may not have been used by St. Jerome.

It is worth while to pause here and contemplate how strikingly the Greek word and its Latin translation in the Vulgate denote the respective characters of the Greek and of the Roman. The old Greek was a man of thought even more than of action. The Roman was a man of action almost wholly. The cogitation of the Greek was introverted upon his own nature, on the soul and its future, on life and "the proper business of life, to wit, to learn to die," on duty and its grounds, on material substance and its qualities; and their philosophers pushed their speculations on every metaphysical and transcendental object of thought to the extremest limit of human subtlety. Thus the Greek developed a language the most perfect instrument of thought which ever existed. And in this language are enshrined the teachings of our Saviour for all mankind forever. With the Romans life was external; it consisted almost wholly in action. They had no philosophers. Cicero was not a philosopher. He was only an enthusiastic translator of Greek philosophy into the stern, inflexible Latin language. Seneca was merely a John Stuart Mill moralist, only something better. Thus, in default of language, the Latin Vulgate translated the internal thought of the Greek into external action—*μετανοείτε*,

into *agite pœnitentiam*—act your repentance. The Greek refers to the motive thought, the Latin regards the resultant actions. This comes as near, perhaps, to the command to change the motive of our actions as can be well expressed by single words of classical Latin. *Pœnitementi*, the Vulgate translation of Mark i, 15 is not Latin of classical times. Until otherwise instructed we may suspect it came into use with the diffusion of Christian teachings. However this may be it does not even squint in meaning at *do penance*. Some of the fathers, it seems, sensible of the incompleteness of *pœnitentia* to express the full meaning of the Greek *μετάνοια*, preferred *resipiscencia*. It seems best to acquiesce in the classical Latin of St. Jerome. The correct meaning of *agere pœnitentiam* may be ascertained, if further illustration is needed, by reference to the Roman classics. Quintus Curtius, viii, 6, *pœnitentiam ejus ageret*, and De Oratoribus Dialogus attributed to Tacitus 15, *Neque illius ærumnis mei pœnitentiam ago*. Surely Professor Short would not burlesque the meaning of these sentences by the translation to *do penance*. It seems surplusage to add, what every scholar knows, that *agere* and *facere* are not synonymous.

If uncertainty could rest on the true sense of the Greek word in question, it is utterly removed by what follows in Matthew iii, 8. *Ποιήσατε οὖν καρπὸν ἄξιον τῆς μετανοίας*. *Make or bring forth fruits worthy of THE repentance*. The adjective follows the noun *fruits* and governs the genitive *repentance*. The meaning is still further elucidated for us by observing that the command to *repent* is in the present tense and thus refers to one decisive act, the command to *do or bring forth*, *ποιήσατε* is in the aorist and applies to any and all time. The force of the article *τῆς* before *μετανοίας* is also to be noted. The article makes the repentance relate back and connect it with the command to repent and is equivalent in emphasis to *this*. The force of the article is in a good measure lost both in the Latin and English translations.

I have taken the words "do penance" in their common acceptation. I have not stopped to inquire what meaning they may be sublimated and refined to express to esoterics.

Finally and simply, neither *μετανοέω* nor *agere pœnitentiam* can be "fairly rendered do penance."

This memorandum, which I intended should be only a brief protest against Professor Short's incorrect rendering of a Greek word, has expanded far beyond my expectation—not perhaps beyond the intrinsic importance of the error. In refuting this error there has not been present in my mind any doctrine, dogma, tenet, or practice of any of the denominations or subdivisions which make up the Christian world.

**ART. VIII.—THE HISTORY OF THE CARDIFF GIANT
HOAX.**

THE recent revival of the discussion regarding the Cardiff Giant has made it worth while, perhaps, to present a connected statement of the facts regarding the origin and history of that monstrous hoax. The stone image has been frequently traced from its source in an Iowa gypsum quarry to the workshop of a stone-cutter in Chicago, and thence over various railways and wagon roads to Cardiff, New York, where it was buried only a year previous to its pretended discovery. But the manner in which this curious project for hoaxing the world originated, and its history from beginning to end, as it appears from the point of view of those cognizant of the facts and acquainted with the giant-manufacturer himself, has never been given to the world.

George Hull, who conceived the scheme, and carried it out to its complete fulfillment with a perseverance worthy of a much better cause, lives in the city of Binghamton, New York, where he has of recent years erected a brick block in which he carries on the tobacco business, and which was built with funds earned for him, as rumor says, by the Cardiff Giant. Previous to his embarking in the hoax, he had been known as a small farmer engaged in raising tobacco on a few acres in the outskirts of the city. This occupation was not very lucrative, and in 1866 he went west to see if he could not better his fortunes. In the course of this tour something brought him to the village of Ackley, in Hardin County, Iowa. Here one winter's night found the wandering tobacco planter watching at the sick bed of a man of the name of Benjamin Ogden, and having for a companion in the sick room a clergyman of the village, a Rev. Mr. Turk. The two entered on a discussion of theological subjects, and concluded a long argument with a warm dispute about the sons of Anak. Hull went to bed at a late hour excited by the discussion and convinced of the inordinate credulity of mankind—especially

regarding the giants mentioned in the Bible. In this state of mind his sleepless thoughts conceived the scheme of manufacturing a giant which could be buried and unexpectedly discovered in the earth, and pass for a petrified man. He believed that such a device would both substantiate his theory as to the credulity of mankind, and—something of far greater importance—make his own fortune.

The man carried this project in his mind for a year and a half before putting it in a practical form. But at length, his faith in it having grown with his diminishing success in other pursuits, he removed his family again to Binghamton, and, providing for them for a few months to come, returned immediately to the West for the sole purpose of entering on the work of making the giant. He had up to this time confided his mysterious plans to only a single person, a man named H. B. Martin of Marshalltown, Iowa, who had been taken into confidence under the promise of a partnership in the enterprise.

On returning to the west, Hull joined Martin at Marshalltown, and the two proceeded to Fort Dodge to look at the gypsum of that vicinity, which, as they judged from the description would furnish the proper material for the projected Giant. On the 6th of June, 1868, these two men registered themselves at the St. Charles Hotel, Fort Dodge, and at once proceeded to view the gypsum quarries on the river bank just below the city. Satisfied with the huge masses of soft stone which they saw there and its apparent ease of carving, they bought of one John McDermott an acre of quarry land for one hundred dollars, on which they immediately commenced work, attempting to secure a block suitable for the giant. But finding it difficult to get one large enough, and annoyed by the curiosity and suspicions of the neighbors they finally deserted their quarry.

At this point Martin forsook the enterprise. But Hull, holding to his purpose, and hearing of another bed of the same stone opened by the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad, in the construction of a culvert over Gypsum Creek, about two miles east of Fort Dodge, went there to renew the effort. After carefully looking over the ground he gave the foreman of the work, one Michael Foley, a keg of lager bier, as a consideration for engaging his men to work on Sunday and to "fracture out" as

large a block as possible of the gypsum. They succeeded in detaching from the bed a fragment twelve feet long four feet wide and twenty-two inches thick. This block contained the unhewn form of the future "Cardiff Giant."

But it was forty miles from Gypsum Creek to the nearest railroad station—Montana—and over the poor road covering the distance it required three weeks to transport the huge stone. Three teamsters in succession undertook the transportation, employing all the horses obtainable, and abandoned the job. By the aid of a "ditching machine," a thing peculiar to western farms, and an additional gratuity of \$125 to new teamsters, Hull succeeded, at the end of twenty days, in loading his stone, weighing some 7000 lbs., on a railroad car at Montana, and enjoyed the satisfaction of seeing it start on the railroad, consigned to and marked "E. Burghardt, Chicago, Ill." The consignee was Edward Burghardt, a well known stone-cutter in Chicago, now, or recently, a member of a granite and marble manufacturing company, and at that time residing at No. 940 North Clark Street, where he had on his premises an old shop or barn, in which it was designed to cut out the image. Hull had learned of this Burghardt through one Foreman, of Morrison, Ill., to whom, after Martin's desertion, he had made overtures of partnership. Foreman had declined the offer, but referred Hull to Burghardt, who, after some hesitation, agreed to furnish a place and workmen to complete the image, and to take as his pay one-fourth of the proceeds.

On the arrival of the stone in Chicago, it was moved to Burghardt's barn without attracting notice, and the barn windows and doors having been blinded, a German sculptor named Edward Salle and another named Markman were employed by Burghardt and entered on the work of giant-making. The first step was to shape a clay model. Some ten or twelve clay images, about two feet in length, were completed before a satisfactory model was obtained. It was Hull's aim to represent a man who had lain down and died, but as he entertained doubts of the universal acceptance of a petrefaction theory he also wished to make a giant that would, when that failed, pass muster as an ancient statue. This combination of designs is the cause of that curious feature which attracted notice in the

exhibition of the giant. An unexpected and insurmountable obstacle suddenly arose in the way of the petrefaction theory, however, in the attempt to represent hair. After vain essays, the head had to be left bald: and this caused the defect which opened the way to the earliest explosion of the humbug.

Hull found much trouble also in keeping his German workmen at their task, and was compelled to do much of the work himself, so that it was the last of September before the image was finally cut to shape. The work of the projector was however far from complete, at this stage, for some additional features were deemed indispensable to the petrefaction theory. First it was thought necessary to have the giant bear a water-worn appearance. This was accomplished by means of a sponge filled with water and sand, with which the patient Hull by long continued rubbing produced some of the appearances which have been referred to as establishing the antiquity of the giant and as refuting completely the theories of a modern origin! This task finished, he next procured several dozen large darning needles, and taking small discs of paper, varying from an inch to an inch and a half in diameter, and making on them a regular series of dots, he passed the darning needles through the discs at the dots, and secured the whole in a plaster of Paris mould. Into this he poured melted lead, thus producing a sort of leaden hammer, with the needles projecting half an inch from the face. With these hammers the whole statue was carefully pecked over, to give it the likeness of pores in the skin. The pores thus produced, are the "pin holes" which have been spoken of by microscopists. Hull has still in his possession some of the leaden instruments with which they were made.

On finishing the pores there was still an appearance of freshness and newness about the giant, and to obviate this, Hull conceived the design of washing the surface with ink. He accordingly procured a gallon of English writing fluid with which he bathed the whole exterior. This was found to be a mistake for it gave the body an artificial tint, and to remedy it a gallon of sulphuric acid was applied with a sponge. The acid eroded the surface and gave it a dark, dingy hue, leaving the general appearance of antiquity. Yet some traces of t

ink seem to have been left remaining, for a "reddish hue" about the nostrils and finger nails has been remarked by investigators who have dignified the Cardiff fraud by giving it a close scrutiny.

The appliance of the acid completed the image, and it was now ready for transportation. It was packed in sawdust and enclosed in a huge box made for it by a carpenter named N. Strasser, on North Clark St.; the box was strapped with thick iron, and was then carted to the depot by a drayman named Peter C. Wilson, the whole being marked "Finished marble, G. Olds, Union, N. Y." Hull had not yet decided where to bury the image, but determined to send it to Union, where, being only nine miles from his home at Binghamton, it could be easily sent to the destination to be chosen.

The freight bills which mark the progress of the huge box from Chicago to Union have frequently been produced. Voucher No. 8306, of October, 1868, of the Great Western Railroad shows its transportation from Chicago to Suspension Bridge, where it arrived October 7th. The New York Central R. R. next carried it from there to Syracuse in Car No. 2668, whence it went to Binghamton by the Syracuse and Binghamton Railroad; and thence to Union by the Erie Railroad. The writer has taken pains, in behalf of accuracy, to copy the original way-bills on file at Binghamton and Union, marking the journeys of the giant from Syracuse to Binghamton, and from Binghamton to Union.

The first Way-Bill is as follows:

[Form 8.]

DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA AND WESTERN RAILROAD CO.

(UTICA & CHEMUNGO DIVISION.)

No. *Way-Bill of Merchandise forwarded from Syracuse to Eng'n.*

No. of Car 80, Owner of Car,

Oct. 10, 1868.

N. B.—In all cases where the price charged for Transportation is different from the Tariff rates, the authority for so making the same must be attached to, or stated on, the Way-Bill, and also entered on the Freight-Forwarded Book.

To whom Consigned.	Description of Articles.	Weight.	Rate.	Expenses Paid.	Amount of Freight.	Pre-paid.
G. Olds,	1 Box finished Marble.	3720	27c.	57.06	10.04	67.10
Union, N. Y.						

The second is as follows :

Per Train Copy. ERIE RAILWAY. No. 560, Oct. 12, 1868.

Way-Bill of Merchandise, forwarded from Binghamton to Union, N. Y.

No. of Car 3527.

~~See~~ N. B.—In all cases where the prices charged for Transportation is less than the Tariff rates, the authority for so making the same must be attached to, or stated on the Way-Bill, and also entered in the Freight-Forwarded Book.

To whom Consigned.	Description of Articles.	Weight.	Rate.	Expenses Paid.	Amount of Freight.
G. Olds,	1 Box Wt. Marble,	3720	14		5.21
U.	S. & B. R. R. Chgs.			67.10	

These details are given with particularity, as accessible to all, and as furnishing irrefutable proof that the Cardiff Giant was born in 1868, and was shipped in a box to its burial place, and is unworthy of any scientific consideration except in the history of hoaxes.

Immediately on the shipment of the giant from Chicago, Hull had proceeded to Salisbury, Conn., a newspaper description of the newly discovered cave at that place having attracted his notice. He examined the cave with a view to making it the burial place for this image, but was discouraged by the price demanded. There occurred to him at this moment the reports of fossil remains discovered years before at Onondaga Hollow near Syracuse, N. Y. ; and happening also to remember that a connection—a brother's wife's nephew—named William C. Newell, was living in that locality, he started thither at once. Opening his project to Newell immediately on his arrival, the two men carefully searched the farm for the proper spot to bury the giant. A place near the barn, where a well had been commenced, was selected, and the details of the burial and the unexpected resurrection of the image, by men to be employed in digging a well, were arranged on the spot.

Hull immediately returned home, and securing the services of his nephew, Tracy Hull, and another neighbor named Amesbury, he procured a four-horse wagon to transport the large box from Union to Cardiff. Hull went with them to Union, paid, himself, the freight bill, amounting to \$77.52, receipted for the giant, and saw the train start at about nightfall, November 4th, for Cardiff. He left for the same destination, starting by railroad in an opposite direction, so as to have some days before the arrival of the giant to make preparations for the burial. The

four-horse team did not arrive till the 9th. It was dark and rainy, and late in the evening when it drove up. No attention having been excited in that vicinity—although much remark had been caused at some points on the route—the heavy box was rolled off into a large pile of chaff and concealed in it, the team returning at once to Binghamton. A few nights later the giant was removed to a pit at the well-site by means of a derrick.

Up to this time Hull had spent upon the giant the sum of \$2,600. He now returned to Binghamton, leaving the money buried with the stone image in Farmer Newell's barn-yard, trusting to the credulity of the world to repay it to him. A year elapsed before the next step. October 10th, 1869, he wrote to Newell that it was time to dig up the giant. Immediately on receipt of the letter Newell commenced "putting down his well," employing his neighbors Gideon Emmons and Henry Nichols to help in the excavation; while another, Smith Woodmansee, was engaged to stone it up, and John Parker to draw the stone. This was October 16th. While Newell and Parker were absent drawing the stone, Emmons and Nichols were excavating. The shovel of the latter all at once struck a hard stone substance; Nichols thought it a water-lime pipe, but as he cleared away the dirt from a massive stone foot, Emmons exclaimed: "Jerusalem, Nichols, it's a big Injun!" As the dirt was rapidly cleared away, revealing the outlines of the image, William S. Houghton, B. L. Coleman, and Nathan Park, neighbors of Newell, chancing to pass, were summoned to view the wonder. This was the nucleus of a crowd which numbered thousands after a few hours. It has been stated by believers in the giant's antiquity, that the ground showed no signs of an excavation so recent as a year previous. The affidavit of one John Hagens, who left his wagon to examine the discovery, as he was driving past on his way to the fair, thus describes the appearance of the earth: "I took a shovel and got down into the hole, and as fast as they uncovered the body toward the head, I cleared the dirt off about up to the hand on the belly. When we were cleaning off from the upper portion of the body, the earth cleaved off from the south side of the pit, breaking from the sod, and falling upon the

body. I said, 'Boys, this is the spot where it was put down.' No reply was made to that, but Mr. W. C. Newell stepped around and taking a shovel trimmed the sod down square with where it came off."

The first men of any scientific pretension to view the giant were the four doctors of the neighborhood, Dana, Parker, McDonald, and Kendall, who, on the following day, Sunday, having investigated the subject, concurred in pronouncing the giant a petrefaction. But, soon, Dr. John F. Boynton of Syracuse, a man of some antiquarian knowledge, examined it, and expressed the opinion that it was a statue made some three hundred years ago, by the early Jesuit fathers. Dr. Boynton also offered for the giant \$10,000. His offer, with others more tempting, was promptly declined, for the sight-seers, now paying fifty cents each, seemed to be unlimited in number. Hull, however, advised Newell to sell if they could get \$30,000 for three-fourths and keep the remaining quarter. A sale was made on these terms within the next few days, the purchasers being Alfred Higgins, agent of the American Express Co., in Syracuse, Dr. Amos Westcott, a wealthy dentist and ex-mayor of the same city, a Mr. Spencer, Simeon Rouse, Amos Gillett, and Messrs. J. M. Ellis and B. T. Fitch, bankers, all of Syracuse. A showman was placed in charge, and, for an advertisement, invitations were sent asking Prof. Agassiz, Prof. Hall, New York State Geologist, and Samuel B. Woolworth, Secretary of the Board of Regents of the University, to come and examine scientifically the fossil man.

On Nov. 3d, a large delegation of gentlemen from various parts of the State came to the pit to make a deliberate examination. On inspection, they pronounced the image to be a statue; and as the stone was of a quality different from any to be found in the neighborhood, that it must have been brought from a distance. Prof. Hall believed it to be of great antiquity. Prof. Henry A. Ward, who fills the chair of the natural sciences in the Rochester University, was also present at an early date, and wrote on the subject: "although not dating back of the stone age, it is nevertheless deserving of the attention of archæologists." Some of the expressions of opinion at this early date were quite enthusiastic; as that of a clergyman

who wrote: "This is not a thing contrived of man, but is the face of one who once lived like all on earth, the very image and child of God."

Up to this time the tide of success had been unchecked. But now came a series of reverses which resulted in slowly but surely establishing the true character of the humbug, and consequently in diminishing its revenue. Prof. O. C. Marsh, of Yale College, gave the first telling blow to the empiricism that had vouched for the giant's antiquity in the name of science, by stating that though gypsum is soluble in 400 parts of water, yet the surface of the giant was smooth, and little dissolved though surrounded by wet earth; thus proving that the burial must have been recent. Prof. Marsh also found other indications of newness, which had escaped the learned scrutiny of others, such as recent tool marks in places where they could not easily be effaced, and in places close by water-worn surfaces. Soon, also, there were letters, one after another, from persons who had seen the four-horse wagon carrying the large box to Cardiff. Then came others from Fort Dodge, detailing the history of the stone quarried out and shipped to Chicago by Hull, July 27th, 1868. Finally, the statement of the Chicago stone-cutter, Markman, came forward.

It is to be remembered that Hull had abandoned in despair the attempt to imitate hair on the head of the image. The giant's baldness early attracted the attention of Hon. Lewis H. Morgan, New York State Senator from Monroe County, a gentleman deeply versed in Indian archæology, who remarked that the subject could be neither a finished statue nor a petrefaction, for it had no hair, although complete in all other respects. Palmer, the sculptor, who took another look after the removal from the pit, also found recent chisel marks. The most damaging circumstances now coming to light, however, were those connected with Newell's drawing from the Onondaga County Bank a portion of the money in a draft to Hull's order, thus connecting that mysterious man and his four horse-wagon, and his western stone cutting, very intimately with the giant.

Yet all the discussion helped to advertise the exhibition, which being now removed from Newell's farm to Syracuse, was visited by such throngs of people as to require special trains on

the railroad. Four thousand tickets were sold in a day. The giant was yielding an income equal to the interest on three million dollars at 7 per cent, and large bids were made for its purchase, as high as \$25,000 being offered for an eighth.

But this was to be of short duration. The first decline in fortune was brought about by Barnum, the showman, who now came to Syracuse desirous of buying a share and assuming the management of the show, and being rejected, purchased in retaliation, from a German sculptor of the vicinity, named Otto, an unfinished imitation of the Cardiff Giant; engaged the sculptor to complete it, and then placing it on exhibition at Wood's Museum in New York, circulated the pamphlet description of the original as an advertisement, and denounced the exhibition at Syracuse as that of a counterfeit giant! An application was made to Judge Barnard for an injunction against Barnum's exhibition; but that solemn judicial functionary replied "that he had been doing some business in injunctions but was going to shut down now."

The original of the humbug came on to New York after a short reception in the State Geological rooms in Albany, to find its prestige stolen by Barnum, and after an unsuccessful exhibition of a few days at the metropolis, was hurried away to Boston. Here it was of course visited by the learned men of Athens, and among the earliest, by Dr. Holmes, who reported it to be an immense statue cut from stone by unknown hands and of wonderful anatomical developments. Ralph Waldo Emerson pronounced it beyond his depth, very wonderful, and undoubtedly ancient. Cyrus Cobb, the artist and sculptor, declared that the man who called that a humbug simply declared himself a fool.

On February 4th, a number of learned Bostonians visited the image in a sort of official body. They examined it long and patiently in every way known to science. The exterior was tested with acids; the head was bored into; the compass was carried around the body in search of iron. The learned conclusion was that the giant was a piece of stratified gypsum and was probably old. The subject invaded the Boston Clubs. A whole evening was occupied with it at the Thursday Evening Club, the president delivering a learned address to prove that the giant must be modern because its features were Napoleonic.

The Boston Exhibition proved a brief resuscitation of the financial success of the humbug, but after a few weeks the suspicion of fraud had become so general that the revenue began to decline, and after a few months the Cardiff Giant passed out of public notice.

The revival of the subject during the past year by discussion in some quarters in this country and Europe, and the reconsideration of its merits in some scientific circles, has perhaps made it worth while to present this simple connected statement of facts occurring in the history of the Cardiff image from its origin to the close of its career. These facts being all capable of verification may thus aid in refuting the errors that will be likely to arise where the attempt is made to dignify this Cardiff giant by considering it as any thing more than a clever hoax.

**ARTICLE IX.—NEW ENGLAND AND THE ENGLISH
COMMONWEALTH.**

UNDER this general title, J. Wingate Thornton, Esq., of Boston, has given to the public another of those unique and invaluable productions of his pen, which have made his name so favorably known as an industrious and bold investigator of the facts of our early New England history. His immediate aim in this essay is to bring out and collate, from authentic documents of the times, the proofs which have been generally overlooked, that the English Commonwealth, with its important results to the British Empire, is largely to be ascribed, not only to the example of New England, but especially to the writings and correspondence of her eminent men, acting upon leading minds in the mother country. The full title of the book is, "*The Historical Relation of New England to the English Commonwealth.*"

With this aim, therefore, the author examines the evidence which lies scattered in pamphlets, books, and other historical data of those eventful times; which public libraries at home and abroad, and a rare and extensive private collection of his own have brought to his hand; considering and analyzing carefully the lives of the chief representative men who were then upon the stage, and the parts enacted by them. He concerns himself in this discussion, not so much with the drama of the narrative, which is not a little exciting, as with "the development of principles," touching the vital question of the age,—the question of *ecclesiastical and civil freedom*; and illustrating in that regard, "the spirit of progress," on the one hand, and "the inertia or hostility of conservatism," on the other.

It is not an easy thing to give a succinct account of this elaborate essay, so many and so tersely compacted are the materials which are brought within the compass of the hundred pages or so,—to which by the conditions of its original publication, in a *Quarterly Magazine*, it had to be limited,—and so free from rhetorical amplification is the writer's treatment of

his facts. It appeared in three successive numbers of the *Congregational Quarterly* for 1874; and the present issue, struck off from the forms as they went through the press, was designed for distribution among the author's literary friends. This fact, if taken into account, may explain, in part, the conciseness of his treatment of so broad and interesting a theme. It is to be hoped that the author will enlarge the work, when a future edition shall be called for, giving such additional matter as is under his hand, for the fullest elucidation of the subject to all intelligent readers in this country and England.

The author follows closely the course of history throughout the investigation. He commences at the earliest sources, and traces, in the ecclesiastical conflicts of Europe, the origin and development of the "germinal ideas" of freedom and the rights of conscience, which, in process of time, culminated in free institutions of civil government, on this side of the Atlantic. The primal source was the "light which broke out from God's most holy Word," after centuries of Papal darkness, despotism, and superstition had shrouded and enslaved the mind of Europe. The conflict was "in form with the Church, but in effect with the State." To the Protestant Reformation, under God, the liberties of mankind in modern times are to be traced; liberties the exercise or assertion of which under the Papal rule were resisted and punished as a sin and a crime. When men learned their rights of conscience and of private judgment, in matters of religious faith and practice, they forthwith began to discover the falsity and oppressive injustice of irresponsible civil power, as exercised by the prince, who, as well as the priest, claimed authority by divine right. If by divine right, then all acts and precepts, in either case, must be submitted to the Word of God; and every man, being duly enlightened therein, must be free to judge of the force and application of its teachings. Both the Church and the Government, in their different spheres, were to subsist for the interests of the people. These principles so obvious now, had to be slowly and painfully recovered, after the Reformation had taught men to read and think and reason from the Word of God, out of the mass of perversion and error by which they had been artfully covered up.

"The Reformers and their precursors," says our author, "were like skirmishers on the enemies' frontiers, engaged in light combats, at a distance from each other; but the first to organize hostilities against Rome, the first general in the field, to combine the forces in aggressive and systematic war, was JOHN CALVIN. Rome never felt a deadlier wound than that inflicted by Calvin's policy of quick and thorough destruction of its ecclesiastical pageantry, imagery, and symbolism. It proposed a revolution, sharp and decisive, rather than a halting, lingering reformation like that in England. The pulpit and the Bible in the vernacular superseded the altar with its priestly mediation and anathema, oblations and idols, clouds of incense and glitter of ornamental, gorgeous vestments, punctilious ceremonies, and drawling of dead words. Luther burnt the Pope's bull, but Calvin's *Institutes* razed the tiara and returned the 'keys' to the people, theirs by inheritance, though lost in the long night of mediæval and unchristian darkness. Where Calvin's polity banished the mitre and its livery of sacerdotalism—what John Knox irreverently called its "laughable fooleries and comical dresses"—men were roused from mental torpor, led to think, to consider,—the preliminary of education and progress,—and so to a simpler and higher reverence, to a 'worship in spirit and in truth.' The pall of Popery was torn, and the light shown through the rents; superstition crumbled, with its ritual and mechanism; the inward chains fixed on the soul gradually gave way before the light of inquiry; communities were weaned from mediæval fiction and heathenish ceremonies; and the ecclesiastical merchandise of holy water, old bones, and indulgencies, of specifics, observances, and other sacerdotal nostrums, excited only aversion and contempt."

The conflict was between light and darkness. The Reformers sought to give the Bible to the people, and to instruct them in its truths by preaching. "The first and chiefe means," says Sir Edwin Sandys, "whereby the Reformers of religion did prevaile in all places, was * * * preaching—at that time out of use—the French Protestants making it an essentiall and chiefe part of the service of God; whereas the Romanists make the mass only a work of duty, and the going to a sermon but a matter of convenience." This was the first right which the

Reformers restored to the people,—the right to hear and read in their own tongue, the truths of God's word, and to understand and judge for themselves concerning the duties therein required of them. This kind of knowledge laid the axe at the root of the Papal and Prelatical claims; and hence the persecuting rage which was awakened against its most earnest promoters, in the vain endeavor to crush it out. But "the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the church;" and the dying words of Latimer to his fellow sufferer at the stake,—“We shall this day light such a candle, by God's grace, in England as shall never be put out,” became a glorious prophecy. Unhappily in England the Reformation was arrested before it had fully accomplished its work. By the quarrel of Henry VIII with the Pope, the king violently wrested the British realm from its subjection to the Roman See, and assumed to be the head of the English Church himself, with as little change as possible, in other respects. The Church in England became the Anglo-Catholic, instead of the Roman-Catholic Church with little difference but in name. The Romish rites and dogmas were, to a great extent, retained, and the king, *jure divino*, was the head of both the State and of the Church. Here then was ground sufficient for remonstrance and dissent on the part of those whose eyes were opened to perceive the enormous evils and abuses which, during so many ages of popular ignorance and superstition, had become identified with that false system. A conscience void of offence toward God could not be kept by spiritual Christians thus enlightened, while yielding a visible conformity in their practice to the commandments of men, which so plainly made the commandments of God of none effect.

Besides, the inevitable tendency was, through the seductive influence of imposing forms and ceremonies, with which the people had been so long familiar in the Romish ritual of worship, continually to recede, and lose the ground which the Reformers were endeavoring to gain and hold, for the emancipation of the Church from Papal ignorance and superstition. “Indeed,” says Mr. Thornton, “the reformation of the Anglo-Catholic Church was so imperfect that to be Romish under Mary or Anglican under Elizabeth, or either under James,

involved so little outward change that after the performances in the royal chapel at the feast of St. Michael, 1606, the Duke of Lorraine said, 'I do not see what should hinder the churches of Rome and England to unite. There is nothing of the mass wanting here but the adoration of the Host.' Those whom the word of God had enlightened, especially those who in heart had received the doctrine of justification by faith in Christ, as the only ground of the sinners's hope of pardon, could not acquiesce in this state of things without solemn protest. They could not conscientiously consent, in their ministrations, even to wear the vestments which were the insignia of a system so corrupting and fatal to the souls of men. They appealed from the canons of the Church to the word of God, and insisted that the Scriptures were to be received as the only and sufficient rule of duty, in matters pertaining to the conscience. They contended that men ought to be left free, when duly enlightened, to follow the instructions of the Bible, in the light of a fair and just interpretation; and that of this every man must be his own judge, in the fear of God. Thus arose a sharply defined issue between the Prelatical party in the Church and the Dissenters, which turned upon the rights of conscience and the freedom of private judgment, in matters of religious faith and worship. Of the faith, the King, as the head of the Establishment, was the defender. This put the sword into the hands of the Primate, as the instrument with which to enforce conformity; and the annals of those times attest the bigoted and fanatical cruelty with which it was applied, in order to repress this "sect of factious people,"—Puritans, as in derision they were called,—or "harry them out of the kingdom." Many suffered imprisonment, and many death, and many more the loss of all things; until, at length, a forlorn hope, the little band of Pilgrims, left their native land to find a refuge for religious liberty in this western wilderness. In them, of course, by passing through this crucial trial, the sentiment and theory of religious and civil liberty (both which, in the circumstances, fell into the same category) became in the highest degree pronounced and practical; and the Constitutional Compact, which they formed and signed in the cabin of the *Mayflower*, became the corner stone of a free State, more solid and enduring than the rock on which they landed:—

"In the name of God, Amen. We, whose names are underwritten, . . . haveing undertaken for y^e glory of God and advancement of y^e Christian faith, and honor of our king & countrie, a voyage to plant y^e first colonie in y^e northern part of Virginia, doe by these presents, solemnly & mutually, in y^e presence of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil body politick, . . . and by vertue hereof, to enacte, constitute, and frame such just & equall lawes, ordinances, acts, constitutions, & offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most meete & convenient for y^e generall good of y^e colonie, unto which we promise all due submission and obedience." *Cape Cod*, Nov. 11, 1620.

While "the honor of their king and country" is, in a sense, here recognized, among the inducements of their undertaking, yet the whole tenor of this Instrument, by which they constitute their new "body politick," as thoroughly ignores the office of a king as though it were a thing unheard of, and plants the whole authority of the State upon "such just and equal laws and ordinances," as they covenant among themselves to "enact, constitute and frame," from time to time, for the general good, and to which they "promise all due submission and obedience." The will of the whole people, honestly formed and orderly expressed, is to be the sovereign law; and thus this immortal document became the nucleus of the first Commonwealth of modern times. On these then desolate shores the spirit of religious and civil liberty found room and opportunity for free expansion, and for realizing to the people, which gradually grew up here into prosperous communities, the vast benefits which had been thus achieved for the human race.

The Pilgrim compact, and the infant Colony which sprung from it, exerted a remarkable quickening and controlling influence, almost from its first inception. For when another body of the English Puritans, more conservative, who had not formally separated from the Church at home, though weary of the troubles which they found within its pale, came, about ten years later, under much more promising worldly auspices, to plant a neighboring Colony in Massachusetts Bay, which seems to have been designed, in part at first, by the Company at home, to impose a check upon the radical spirit of the

Plymouth Pilgrims, just the opposite effect, on the contrary, was ultimately produced, through the silent and peaceful energy of the principles espoused and promulgated by the latter. Both communities speedily grew into a substantial oneness, upon these principles of ecclesiastical and civil right; though some offensive features of state interference in religious matters clave, for a time, to the colony at the Bay.

But in process of time this colony, through its superior commercial advantages, and especially through the scholarly writings and investigations of some of its eminent ministers, of distinguished repute among the Non-conformists of England, who had cast in their lot with their brethren here, became a most potent instrument of quickening and developing the spirit of resistance to ecclesiasticism and civil oppression in the mother country. Such were John Cotton, Thomas Hooker, John Norton, Richard Mather, Thomas Shepherd, William Hooke, and others, whose writings were printed, dissiminated, and read with avidity in England. "Thus," says Dr. Orme, "the heresy which had been expelled from England returned, with the increased strength of a trans-atlantic cultivation; and the publications of Cotton, Hooker, Norton, and Mather were circulated throughout England, and, during this writing and disputing period, produced a mighty effect."

There were noble spirits in England, kindred with those who had found a refuge from persecution on these shores, some of whom had proposed to be with them here, who continued striving for the same freedom at home against the overbearing oppression of both Church and Government. Such were Hampden, Cromwell, Sidney, Owen, Bacon, Lock, Milton, Goodwin, Sir Henry Vane, and many more of the first intellects of that or any age; who, when the exigency came, as Macaulay has somewhere said, could "tread upon the necks of kings," and whose lives and writings, whatever the immediate issues of their conflict with brute force, have gained an immortal triumph for the principles they maintained. It is interesting here to note that Dr. Owen became a convert to the views of Mr. Cotton from having studied his writings with a design of confuting them, and that, henceforth, like Paul, he became a champion of the faith which once he would have

destroyed. Thomas Goodwin and Philip Nye were converts of Mr. Cotton, before he left England, maintained an assiduous correspondence with him afterwards, and "published, with their commendation to the reader, his work called the *Keyes*, tending to reconcile some present differences about government, . . . a platform," &c.

Mr. Thornton, after quoting Sir James Mackintosh, who says, in his paper on the philosophical genius of Bacon and Lock, that "by the Independent divines, who were his instructors, our philosopher [John Lock) was taught those principles of religious liberty which they were the first to disclose to the world,"—adds, with reference to his own investigation, "as Lord King counts it an important fact, in the history of toleration, that Dr. Owen [the convert and disciple of our John Cotton] was Dean of Christ Church, Oxford, when Lock was admitted a member of that College, under 'a fanatical tutor,' as Antony Woods calls Owen,—so I propose to show, step by step, by exact historical evidence, that the English Commonwealth was the daughter of New England, the reflex of the New on the Old; for ideas control the world and create institutions, while men are merely players. The political ideas of the Pilgrims have penetrated the thought and life of both lands." The evidence here promised grows cumulative and perfectly conclusive, in the progress of Mr. Thornton's exhaustive investigation. So multiplied and condensed are the facts which the scattered leaves of history are made to yield, under his indefatigable research, that it would be quite impracticable to do justice to their entire drift, without transcribing the whole Essay.

New England contributed to the cause of the English Commonwealth not only *ideas* and *opinions*, thus informing and invigorating the public sentiment of the times, which led on to the great crisis; but, likewise, not a few *men*, who had received their training here, and had seen the practical working of the principles of ecclesiastical and civil freedom as they were here unfolded. Such men were Sir Henry Vane, for a time Governor in Massachusetts, Sir George Downing, educated at Cambridge, and "Hugh Peters, Thomas Weld, and others," of whom Dr. Masson speaks,—they having been

sent over from the colonies of Massachusetts and Connecticut,—as “the accredited ambassadors of the Independency of New England.” The same authority enumerates “seventeen New England men, potent in that period;” and it is remarkable how efficient many of these men were in the cause of political and ecclesiastical reform in England. Some of them, as Vane and Peters, were thought worthy to expiate their devotion to the sacred cause upon the scaffold, when the reflux wave of monarchy returned. But these were important fruits of their beneficent agencies, which did not and could not perish with their lives.

Hugh Peters, instructed and assured by what had been accomplished in New England, suggested many of the most important reforms in the judicial code, which, in the words of Dr. George H. Moore, “have since pervaded the whole realm of English law.” For the *Navigation Act* of 1651, which “raised the British naval and colonial power, in no very long period, from inconsiderable beginnings to an unparalleled state of grandeur and power, and laid the foundation for the inevitable spread of the British race and language through every part of the habitable globe;” also for the plan of *Specific Parliamentary Appropriations*, of 1665,—“the principle by which the Commons of England hold the purse strings, control the Executive and practically rule England,” that country is indebted to Sir George Downing. He had brought the latter idea from New England where “it was the custom.” We are told, in President Quincy’s *History of Harvard College*, that “of the twenty graduates prior to 1646, twelve went to Europe, eleven of whom never returned to New England.” Downing was of the first graduating class.

So sensible were the Independents in England of the value of the assistance received from this side of the water, at that critical period, that a letter, signed by thirty nine “honorable and worthy personages of both Houses of Parliament,” was sent over to New England, requesting “Mr. Cotton, Mr. Hooker, and Mr. Davenport to come, with all possible speed; all, or any of them if all cannot.” They tendered a ship to bring them over if they consented to come. But neither of them complied with this request. “They did better,” says Mr.

Thornton,—“they sent written ‘constitutions’ and examples of their practical workings.”

That all these influences exerted a decisive, we might say a determinate effect upon the minds of the men who were becoming a power in England, at that eventful period, is placed beyond a doubt by the revelations of history brought to view in this lucid investigation. Only a meager and scattered gleanings from its exuberant materials has been here presented; but enough, perhaps, to give an outline of its scope and purport, and to show something of the strength of the position taken by the writer, that the English Commonwealth, so pregnant with the liberties of the nation which have since been measurably evolved, was to a great extent the reflex result of the more successful experiment in New England; and although in the expressive phrase of Mr. Thornton, “the political pendulum backward swung,” in that country because the masses had not been taught to understand liberty, yet the cause of religious and political freedom went on to more glorious triumphs in America, and has continued to react upon the mother country and upon all Europe, in ways of which the social and political agitations of the present times give no vague indications. In the eloquent language of Mr. Thornton, speaking of the supremacy of the Independents under the Commonwealth,—“the brief period of their rule, conceded to be the noblest in English history, *yet shed its beneficent influence over the world.*” In his memorable argument in the Girard case, Mr. Webster declared that the American precedent of a voluntary support of religion under free institutions, without any established order, “will in time come to shake all the hierarchies of Europe.”

Of the spirit of the Papal Hierarchy, it is evident, now, both in Europe and this country, that the Independents, in their day, were not one whit too jealous; and the resistance to its insidious encroachments, which is beginning to be awakened in Italy, Germany, and England, is proof also that the spirit of the Puritans is not extinct. The monitory words of Mr. Webster, if seasonable when spoken are eminently so now,—“not to wait till great public mischiefs come; till the government is overthrown, or liberty itself put in extreme jeopardy.

We should not be worthy sons of our fathers, were we so to regard great questions affecting the general freedom."

Doubtless the designs of the Papacy upon England have been set backward long years, by what was achieved for liberty in the days of the Commonwealth. But that Church is never discouraged. While men sleep she is busy worming her way to the foundations on which the liberties of the people rest. In time the mischief done appears, and it is well if the discovery be not made too late. Mr. Gladstone, in his able exposition of the "*Vatican Decrees, in their bearing on Civil Allegiance*," says, "My object has been to produce, if possible, a temper of greater watchfulness; to promote the early and provident fear, which, says Burke, is the mother of necessity; to distrust that lazy way of thought which acknowledges no danger until it thunders at the doors; to warn my countrymen against the velvet paw and smooth and soft exterior of a system, which is dangerous to the foundations of civil order, and which any one of us may at any time encounter in his path." Alluding to these same Decrees, Mr. Thornton says, "In our own day the chieftain of this vermicular army renews the declaration of open war upon our free institutions; even upon that fundamental principle which distinguishes our American polity from that of Europe, whose debasing and deadening influences are illustrated in Spain, France, and Italy. The doctrine that liberty of conscience and of worship is the right of every man, which ought to be proclaimed and established by law in every well established State, he, with brazen effrontery, denounces as 'a liberty of perdition, . . . destructive of all virtue and justice, . . . depressing to all hearts and minds, . . . against sound reason, . . . impious and absurd, . . . false, perverse and detestable, . . . not only with regard to each individual man, but with regard to nations, peoples, and their rulers.'"

The ecclesiastical polity and ritualistic forms of the Church of England keep the door ever open for the wily entrance of this insidious foe. Hence the troubles both in the Church and State, which are beginning, in our day, to be fomented there. While these peculiar avenues of danger are not, in the same way, offered in this country, yet the visible movements of this grand adversary, in a different direction,—to embarrass,

and, as far as possible, to obstruct the means of free, popular education in our system of public schools,—loudly admonish us to note his covert point of approach, through a sinister use of that toleration and free suffrage, which he so bitterly denounces from the Vatican. Content with it so long as it can be made to serve her ends, Rome has her weapon for its destruction ready in her arsenal of Infallibility, which can know no change through any access of light or lapse of ages.

The view set forth in this Essay, and so conclusively sustained, will have the result to change the whole current of historical comment on English influence upon American affairs. English legislation ever aimed to subordinate the colonies, commercially and industrially, to “home” interests, and to repress the popular institutions and thought of New England; while New England not only successfully resisted all this, but, reversing the tables, taught the mother country the lessons of liberty and law, which she has ever since been slowly but steadily putting into her Statute books. The case is not, as apt to be fondly represented by our English cousins, that of the mother teaching the daughter but the daughter the mother.

ARTICLE X.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

THE KEYS OF THE CREEDS.*—This volume consists of letters purporting to have been written in advancing age and declining health by a Roman Catholic priest who had left the Church of England, to the lady to whom he had been betrothed, and whom he had sacrificed, heedless of her sufferings and his own, “to the inexorable Divinity of Ecclesiasticism.” They purport to have been written in reply to a communication from her, informing him of her distress arising from doubts and questionings respecting religious truth. The writer frankly avows that he had adhered to the practice and profession of his creed long after the dissipation of the early illusions under whose influence that creed had received his implicit confidence. In answer to her expression of surprise, he says: “Ah, if you only knew how many fill the priestly office without having even my justification, . . . your wonder would be that the incredulity of ecclesiastics does not force itself on the notice of the laity to the imminent peril of the Church’s existence.” He proceeds to unfold an esoteric meaning of the doctrines, which he holds independently of revelation on the ground of the accordance of the doctrine, thus explained, with the universal reason and religion of mankind; and this he presents at once as a justification of his own continuance in the priesthood, and as a directory to faith and peace for his correspondent.

Distinguishing the Real from the Ideal, he teaches that religion belongs not to the Real, but to the Ideal. “The process of idealization consists in imagining an object as transcending its limitations, existing in a perfection not actually attainable by it, and filling infinity with its expanded characteristics.” The idea of God originates in “the craving of the intellect for a cause, and of the soul for perfection.” God is necessarily anthropomorphic, because the idea arises from the idealization of humanity, and consists of all that man, in any stage of his development, admires as greatest or best in himself. The Trinity, which is a doctrine

* *The Keys of the Creeds.* New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 4th avenue and 23d street. 1875.

of all the great religions of antiquity, arises necessarily from idealizing man as male, female, and their offspring; also, as Intellect, Will, and Love. The incarnation, also a common doctrine of the ancient religions, "is but a term to express the manifestation of the infinite in the finite, of the absolute in the conditioned, of the ideal in the real; that is, of God in nature." Unable to conceive how such a process can take place, reason is compelled to postulate a miracle. "The Fall consists in man's becoming aware that his real does not equal the ideal he is able to imagine." The Godman is "the ideal man, not according to any supposed historic outline, but as evolved necessarily from our consciousness, when once the notion of such a being has occurred to us," humanity idealized, and yet, while belonging to the ideal, in the real. In worshipping Christ as the Godman, "the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his person," Christians worship the Sun-God of the ancient religions. The Catholic Church embodies (theoretically) all who recognize the ideal as the supreme object of aspiration; it embodies the religious consciousness of the race. Sectarianism consists in the preference of a part to the whole. The part may be good and true so far as it goes: but by being severed from the whole and accepted as itself a whole, it is distorted into monstrosity and falsehood. In virtue of its universality the Church is infallible. "Of that infallibility the chief officer of the Church for the time being is the final depositary and expression." The future life is not in the real but in the ideal. We do not "continue to exist in any sense that can be called real. But self is swallowed up in the universal ideal, absorbed in God, who alone abides, the all and in all. Such is the doctrine of all spiritual catholics, whether Christian or Buddhist."

We sympathize with the author's fair correspondent in the surprise which he represents her as frequently expressing. If this is the esoteric meaning of Christianity, it were as well to wander in exoteric darkness.

The author unfolds and vindicates at length his assertion that Christianity is the continuation of the worship of the Sun-God. His principal argument is the well known fact that the Church, in perhaps an unwise desire to win the heathen, fixed some of its festivals at the same time of the year with previously established heathen festivals. Some of his applications of the argument are curious: "the phrase, 'Who by transgression fell and so went to

his proper place,' applied to Judas, is exactly descriptive of the month of February—dedicated to the successor of Judas—which by transgressing or passing over a day, falls into its proper place in the year." "Even the names assigned by gospel or legend to the grandparents of Christ, on the mother's side, seem to bear a solar signification; *Heli* being a contraction of the Greek *ἡλιος*; and *Anna* the feminine of *annus*, the year."

He adds: "So little is there strange and recondite in these facts, that it is a perpetual marvel among the initiated how even the least credulous of the laity contrive to ignore them,—a marvel not unmixed with apprehension as to the result that would follow from their becoming enlightened. The blind impetuosity, on the other hand, with which the Protestant sects indignantly denounce 'idolatry,' pagan or catholic, while themselves offering palpable homage to the Sun under the name of Christ, is to us a never-failing source of amusement."

We have a great respect for learning; but we cannot help asking whether the present fashion of explaining all religions as worship of the heavens is not being pushed a little too far. When, on the one hand, the nursery rhymes and stories of Jack and Jill, Jack and the bean-stalk, Bluebeard, and the like, are gravely explained as meaning the Sun, or perhaps the moon, or the night, when the ass's ears of Midas are explained as signifying the two auroras of morning and evening (the changeableness of these symbolized by the mobility of those); and when, on the other hand, the Sun-worship comes to be used to explain Christianity itself, we feel that we are being carried beyond the bounds of the "Real," not into the "Ideal," but into the ridiculous; and may appropriately use the words of Festus to Paul: "Much learning doth make thee mad."

THE UNSEEN UNIVERSE.*—The object of this work is to show that the presumed incompatibility of science and religion does not exist. For the sake of brevity and precision the authors have confined themselves to the single point, that immortality is strictly in accordance with the principle of Continuity, which is the guide of modern scientific advance. But their reasonings are equally applicable to other religious truths. The authors themselves in

* *The Unseen Universe, or Physical Speculations on a Future State.*—The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1875. 8vo, pp. xii and 212.

developing their argument, find occasion to apply them to the resurrection of Christ and the Christian miracles; and arrive at the conclusion that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity accords with and gives a basis for completing the most profound and far-reaching speculations of science respecting the visible universe.

The work evinces a thorough sympathy and extensive acquaintance with modern science, and is written in a spirit at once scientific and reverent. Some of the considerations urged are the following: In addition to gross matter, science now recognizes force (potential and kinetic), and a finer kind of matter, called ether, which is not perceptible by any sense. As the gross matter may have been developed from the ether by some condensation or modification, so the ether itself may have proceeded from something still more tenuous; and certain scientific observations are cited which have at least suggested the probability of this; also the accordant theory of Sir W. Thomson is cited, that the primordial atoms are vortex-rings generated out of a perfect (frictionless) fluid filling all space; thus dispensing altogether with the atoms of Lucretius, infrangible in "solid singleness." This line of thought leads to the conception of the visible universe as developed from the invisible, i. e., from a sphere of existence transcending the human senses; and necessarily implies that it had a beginning and in some sense a Creator. Again, the energy active in the seen universe is continually wasting, and must eventually issue in the cessation of all life and motion. But this energy which is constantly leaving the seen universe is not lost, but passes over into the unseen universe. Observations indicating the absorption of light by the ether are cited as illustrative if not corroborative. The unseen universe will eventually absorb the active energy of the seen universe and perpetuate it in continuous action. The authors add: "We may now perhaps imagine, at least as a possibility, that the separate existence of the visible universe will share the same fate, so that we shall have no huge, useless, inert mass existing in after ages to remind the passer-by of a form of energy and a species of matter that is long since out of date and functionally effete. Why should not the universe bury its dead out of its sight?"

In the foregoing paragraph we have not attempted to give an analysis of the course of thought, but only to exemplify the treatment of the subject. We believe that science and philosophy are destined to confirm man's belief in the existence of the spiritual

world, and greatly to enlarge and clarify our knowledge of its relations to the world of sense. Already the old view of the universe as merely inert gross matter, has been displaced by the recognition of the ether, and of the correlation and conservation of force, and new lines of thought from the material to the spiritual indicated. This justifies the anticipation that clearer light is to be thrown on the relations of the two. The bold speculations of this volume are necessarily crude and imperfect. But the authors have the merit of seeing that there is a way to truth in that direction and of resolutely endeavoring to find it. It may be read with profit both by theologians and scientists. It certainly demonstrates that the ocean of human knowledge is broader and deeper than the shallows which may be navigated by throwing the lead and observing the headlands on the shore.

The reputed authors are Prof. Balfour Stewart of Owens College in Manchester, and Prof. Tait.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL THEOLOGY.*—This essay received a prize of £100 offered for the best essay in confutation of the Materialism of the present day, and to be competed for by members of the University of Oxford of not less standing than Master of Arts. It treats the subject of Natural Theology in its relations to existing objections and discussions, and is full of fresh and living thought. The Essay is enriched with notes constituting about one half of the volume, and containing extracts mostly from recent writers illustrating and confirming or contravening his doctrines and arguments, and containing his own comments and criticisms on the same. The whole constitutes a valuable contribution to the rehabilitation of Natural Theology which the times demand.

FREEDOM AND FELLOWSHIP IN RELIGION.†—One purpose of this volume is to make known the "principles and tendencies" represented by the Free Religious Association. It contains ten

* *The Philosophy of Natural Theology.* An Essay in confutation of the Scepticism of the present day, which obtained a prize at Oxford, Nov. 26th, 1872. By the Rev. William Jackson. M.A., F.S.A., author of "Positivism," "Right and Wrong," "The Golden Spell," &c. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co., Broadway. 1875. 8vo, pp. xviii and 398.

† *Freedom and Fellowship in Religion.* A Collection of Essays and Addresses edited by a committee of the Free Religious Association. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1875. 16mo, pp. 424. Price, \$2.00.

papers, the authors of which are, D. A. Wasson, S. Longfellow, S. Johnson, J. Weiss, W. J. Potter, F. E. Abbot, O. B. Frothingham, J. W. Chadwick, T. W. Higginson, and Ednah D. Cheney. It contains also extracts from less formal speeches and discussions in the annual meetings of the Association.

The majority of these writers have not lacked diligence in giving the public opportunity to know their principles and tendencies. We presume the majority of our readers are familiar with them even to weariness, and will find nothing new in this volume.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE.*—This Essay is a discussion of the address of Dr. Tyndall before the British Association at Belfast. It was originally read last autumn before the Philosophical Society of Washington, under the title of "The present State of the Sciences," and was published soon afterwards in the *N. Y. Tribune*. In preparing it for publication in its present form, the author has revised it and inserted some additional matter. He seeks to find the reconciliation of Science and Religion, by distinguishing Science, Philosophy, and Religion, and acknowledging Philosophy as the umpire between them. The author has extensive acquaintance with science; he writes in a scientific spirit, and recognizes the legitimate claims of science and its attained results. The Essay is worthy of the attention of thoughtful persons, and must awaken high expectations of the work in preparation by the author since 1860, designed to exhibit the harmony of science and religion.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE.†—This little book is the result of an effort to learn by inquiry of the Scriptures themselves what is the purely Scriptural doctrine of the Trinity. The result has been a divergence of views in various particulars from the current theological standards. A part of the conclusions reached are presented in the volume before us. The author shows himself a man of scholarship and ability; the work evinces much

* *Religion and Science in their relation to Philosophy.* An Essay on the present state of the Sciences. Read before the Philosophical Society of Washington. By CHARLES W. SHIELDS, D.D., Professor of the Harmony of Science and Revealed Religion in Princeton College, N. J. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1875. Crown 8vo, pp. 69.

† *Philosophy of Trinitarian Doctrine*; a contribution to Theological Progress and Reform. By Rev. A. G. PHASE, Rutland, Vt. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 4th Avenue and 23d Street. 1875. 12mo, pp. xii, and 183.

study, and earnest and original thought; it breathes throughout the spirit of a reverent and devout seeker for the truth. The writings of such a man will be read with interest and profit, whether his conclusions are accepted or not.

The author announces his belief in the annihilation of the incorrigibly wicked—a doctrine which seems to have no necessary logical connection with his peculiar views either of the Trinity or the Incarnation.

STRIVINGS FOR THE FAITH.*—The prevalence of certain forms of disease leads to the multiplication and advertisement of intended remedies, and though, as we have said before, we do not admit the unbelief of this day to be so much more formidable than that of the past as would be inferred from the tone of some apologists for the truth, yet as it is no doubt in some of its forms more aggressive and blatant, it calls forth a corresponding activity in defence of Christianity. In England especially, the attacks of historical criticism on the Bible addressed to the popular mind are met by the publications of the Christian Evidence Society, and this volume is a series of eight lectures for the people given by as many different authors under the auspices of that body, though not revised by their committee, each writer being alone "responsible for the statements and arguments of his own lecture." The authors are in good repute for ability and scholarship, of different communions, handling diverse topics under the common head of Christian Evidences independently of each other, and we judge, from those that we have read, doing their work thoughtfully and with competent preparation. The first lecture, by Dr. Maclear, of King's College School, under the head of "Difficulties on the side of unbelief in accounting for historical Christianity," treats of the universality and significance of sacrifice, and how far and with what lessons its old forms have been supplanted by the Lord's Supper. The second, by Birks of Cambridge, deals with "the Variations of the Gospels in their relation to the evidences and truth of Christianity." The third is on "the Apocryphal Gospels," and refers to a translation of them by the same author, a layman, B. Harris Cowper. Dr. Lorrimer, of the English Presbyterian College in London, gives the fourth, on

* *Strivings for the Faith*: a Series of Lectures delivered in the new hall of Science, Old street, City Road, under the auspices of the Christian Evidence Society. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co. 1875. pp. 287.

the "Evidential value of the early epistles of St. Paul viewed as historical documents." The fifth, by Rev. John Gritton, Discourses of "Lord Lyttleton on the conversion of St. Paul." The sixth, by Rev. C. A. Row, Prebendary of St. Paul's, is on "Alleged difficulties in the moral teaching of the New Testament." The subject of the seventh, by Rev. J. H. Titcomb, of the established Church, is "The combination of unity with progressiveness of thought in the books of the Bible, an argument in favor of divine Revelation." The last, by Rev. W. R. Browne, of Trinity College, Cambridge, is on "The Autobiography of John Stuart Mill." The reprint is in handsome style, and the size of the volume adapts it to the popular use for which it was intended.

We invite attention particularly to the first lecture as a clear and persuasive presentation of an old theme, and to the fourth as a fresh argument most effectively handled. And indeed, as far as it is worth while to make the evidences of Christianity the subjects of pulpit discourse in refutation of current infidelity, most of these lectures may be commended to ministers as fair models in matter, arrangement, and style.

BELLES LETTRES.

QUEEN MARY.*—This "venture," as it has been called, of Mr. Tennyson into the dramatic field has already called forth many and ample notices from all quarters, and the testimony shows that his fame has not suffered but gained from the novelty of the undertaking. The reception given to every thing from his pen indicates that besides being acknowledged as a poet of a high order, he has the good will of the English-speaking public to a degree not always accorded even to such gifts. It may be noted in his case, perhaps as clearly as in any, that the personal character of the poet is taken into the account, making his fame the more enviable. Without attempting formal review or needless eulogy, we are impressed in this drama with the richness and delicacy of sentiment and imagery, felicity of language, and melody of verse, which make the charm of his idyls and smaller pieces, while he also conforms himself more rigidly than would have been expected to the conditions of dramatic composition, its restraints as well as its liberties, keeping himself in the back-

* *Queen Mary*, a Drama by ALFRED TENNYSON. (Author's edition, from advance sheets.) Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1875, pp. 284.

ground, as Byron did not, in the delineation of character, and skilfully subordinating the parts to the whole in the conduct of the action. Some of his admirers have not, we think, shown their own judgment in already classing him with Shakspeare. We should rather agree with those who have found in this play too studious an imitation of the master, as in the introduction of the songs, beautiful as they are, and in the brief colloquies of the common people. He may be commended for keeping closer, as his learning led him to do, to the details of history. We are not so sure as some of his critics, and as the poet is reported to be, of the permanent success of his work on the stage, though this may be more the fault of stage-goers than its own. The representation will no doubt, however, derive a special interest for a time before an English audience, as unavoidably related to the "anti-popery" feeling recently excited anew by Mr. Gladstone's remonstrances and appeals. It is an effective historical argument to English protestantism. The chief deduction we have felt from the pleasure afforded by the work, though we do not remember seeing it adequately noted in current criticisms, is in the choice of the principal personage. "Bloody Mary" has stood and will stand as a representative of superstition, bigotry, and cruelty, neither commanding the respect felt for Elizabeth, nor inspiring the pity felt for Mary of Scotland, not to mention Lady Jane Grey, and, hateful as Philip seems, one does not compassionate even her ill requited love as he would wish to enter into the misfortunes of a heroine. The picture is too painful and repulsive, whether in the history or the play, to be redeemed by the sympathy and tenderness which tragedy aims to inspire. Not the less wonderful, however, is the poet's art in depicting her hopes and fears and at last her miserable despair. Whatever drawback there may be in the material, the workmanship is consummate.

THE ABBÉ TIGRANE.*—The Rev. L. W. Bacon, among other valuable services which he has rendered to the church, while residing temporarily in Geneva, Switzerland, has recently translated a "Tale from the French of Fabre," which is of special interest just at this time. The characters are all clerical. The hero of the story is a French Abbé of extraordinary ability and boundless

* *The Abbé Tigrane*, candidate for the Papal Chair. By FERDINAND FABRE. Translated by the Rev. Leonard Woolsey Bacon. New York: J. B. Ford & Co. 1875. 12mo, pp. 212.

ambition, who is at last successful, by means of political intrigue and the favor of the Empress Eugenie, in obtaining the object of his life long endeavors, his elevation to the episcopal throne of his native diocese. The story is valuable just now for the abundant information which it gives of the inside working of the Roman Catholic system in France. There is not a chapter which will not be found highly instructive. But the part of most interest just now is the representation which it gives of the method by which the Abbé Tigrane, who, up to the hour of his promotion to the episcopal dignity, has been one of the boldest upholders of the Gallican system, at once becomes the most subservient of ultramontanes; and is actually considered to be a prominent candidate to succeed to the Papacy on the demise of Pius IX.

SWALLOW-FLIGHTS.*—Lark-flights, rather; for they have more loftiness of aim than breadth of scope, and they lack the earthward swoop which is the swallow's constant habit. Eagle-flights, even, we might term them, were they somewhat bolder; for they are all sunward, though of slow and gentle wing, and they belong to that type of poetry which eludes attack and baffles criticism, because no marksman can take sure sight at an object between himself and the sun. Miss Kimball's verse is the genuine outcome of a native poet-soul,—pure, sweet, mellifluous,—not written to be printed, but printed because those under whose eyes it fell saw in it what might give comfort, health, strength, aspiration to other kindred souls. It has nothing in common with the poetry so much in vogue now, which presents only shadowy and indefinite outlines of the grand and the beautiful, and is often most prized for an obscurity that leaves the reader in a maze, and gives the writer credit for depth where there is only muddiness. Its imagery is clear, vivid, realistic; its emotional tone fervent, yet never passionate, indicating a soul at peace, and, at the same time, one that has risen into the peace which the world cannot give; its rhythm, of faultless euphony, and in measures that pulse harmoniously on the ear. A large portion of the volume consists of sacred lyrics, many of them on the great anniversaries of the Christian year, and all of them redolent of the hidden life with God. The remaining poems, though not religious by the formal use of consecrated names and phrases, are so in their prevailing

* *Swallow-Flights*. By HARRIET McEWEEN KIMBALL. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1875. 16mo, pp. 131.

spirituality, and could have been written only by one who looks on the world and on life from the higher plane and with the clarified vision of a Christian consciousness and experience. We would fain bespeak for this modest little gem of a book a kind reception, assured that it will satisfy equally the sense of poetic beauty, and the devotional feeling that craves nutriment in holy song.

POEMS.*—This collection puts into permanent form a large number of pieces which have appeared from time to time in less durable publications.

The most of the poems are from the pen of Mr. Riggs, who is known to the public as editor of a local paper in Meriden, and from that of Dr. Cornwell of New London. Both these writers are Connecticut men, having been born in this State, and having thus far spent their lives here. Time, which seems to have a way of its own for deciding all such questions, must be left to determine whether their names are to stand in the list of the true poets of the country. But no one who looks over these pages with care can fail to find marks of poetic genius. Dr. Cornwell has written fewer pieces than Mr. Riggs, and evidently writes with more care. His verses show patience, study, elaboration. He doesn't seem to *turn off* any verses. As an illustration of his lighter work we quote these lines from a little poem entitled "Autumn."

No more is heard the reaper's ringing blade,
No more the blackbird whistles in the sedge,
No more the crimson-fingered village maid
Seeks the wild fruitage of the berry hedge.

But from the hills the smiles of summer die,
And trailing vapors hang in dismal shrouds,
And swiftly through the blue fields of the sky,
The winds, like shepherds, drive the fleecy clouds.

We have been pleased also with two pieces which bear the titles of "Land of Promise" and "Sunset City."

From Mr. Riggs' poems we quote a few verses from "October."

Over the vale
Comes the sound of the flail,
While the thresher unbands
With brawny hands
The ripe and rustling sheaves;

* *Poems*; by HENRY SYLVESTER CORNWELL, FRANCIS GERRY FAIRFIELD, LUTHER G. RIGGS, and RUTH G. D. HAVENS. L. G. Riggs & Co., Publishers, Meriden, Conn.

Then strong and slow,
 With a muffled blow,
 The flying flail he heaves !
 While the children laugh,
 As they watch the chaff,
 So light and dry,
 Fly wide and high—
 While underneath,
 From its golden sheath,
 Down rattles the ripened rye.

Mr. Riggs writes often beautifully and well, but he writes too easily. Yet his freedom is in one sense a charm. But he would please the public better if he would imitate the children in his picture, who

“ Watch the chaff,
 So light and dry,
 Fly wide and high—
 While underneath,
 From its golden sheath,
 Down rattles the ripened rye !

Mr. Riggs is comparatively young, and he will probably write a good deal yet, as his poems have been well received. He can afford to sift the fancies he throws off so easily, and his work, or play, if it is play, will gain by the process. He has written already, so many good things that he does not need to publish anything but what can be pronounced really good.

MISCELLANEOUS.

GALTON'S ENGLISH MEN OF SCIENCE.*—The object of this work is to ascertain and generalize facts respecting the lives and characteristics of English men of science, and thus “to investigate their sociology from wholly new, ample, and trustworthy materials.” The writer selected by various tests 180 scientific men and addressed to each a circular of questions as to his ancestry, qualities, education, and origin of his taste for science. The work consists of a summary of the answers, and the author's generalizations from the same. The book is not without interest and value. But its scientific worth is slight. A large proportion of the answers would have been essentially the same if the questions had

* *English Men of Science: Their Nature and Nurture.* By FRANCIS GALTON, F.R.S., author of “Hereditary Genius,” etc. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 549 and 551 Broadway. 1875. 12mo, pp. xiii, and 202.

been addressed to the more successful men of any department of life, and therefore present nothing distinctive of men of science. Others are indefinite; and so complicated are the influences bearing on the direction of a human life and the formation of character and habits, that the brief answers to many of the questions are necessarily untrustworthy without a more minute knowledge of the history of the person. The work has a pretentious scientific form with little material for real science.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS GUTHRIE.*—The first volume of this admirable work was noticed in our number for April, 1874. It had the advantage of a certain personal interest, delineating his earlier life, and being more than half occupied with the autobiography, which, as we then said, "every reader will wish that the author had begun earlier so as to have completed it to the time of writing, instead of having 'to lay it finally aside while in the midst of describing the Disruption conflict.'" His sons, however, have done their work well as editors, enlivening the narrative by extracts from his letters and addresses; and this volume derives an interest of its own from the stirring events to which it relates, and the picture given of his activity and influence. High as was his standing, on this side of the water as well as the other, as a preacher and a philanthropist, he cannot fail to be yet more admired by the many readers who are thus brought into a fuller acquaintance with the man and his work, and we must renew the expression of the regret we felt, in common with so many others, that his death frustrated his cherished purpose of visiting this country. He was physically and intellectually and morally a Scotchman of whom his country might well be proud. The older readers who watched with interest the Disruption of the established Church of Scotland in 1843, and the course of the "Free Church," will find that interest renewed in this second volume, and others will find pleasure and profit in the account here given of that noble movement, and of other enterprises into which Dr. Guthrie entered with the "*perfervidum ingenium*" noted as characteristic of his countrymen. The first chapter of this volume (the fifth of the whole work) relates to the "Disruption;" the next to the "Manse Fund," which he had the chief part in raising,

* *Autobiography of Thomas Guthrie, D.D., and Memoir.* By his sons, Rev. DAVID K. GUTHRIE and CHARLES J. GUTHRIE, M.A. In two volumes. Vol. II. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1875. pp. 494.

for furnishing parsonages for the ministers who gave up those of the established Church; another relates to the "Ragged" or Industrial "Schools," which he may be said to have originated in Scotland; two chapters are given to his ministry; one to his advocacy of "Total Abstinence," and others to "National Education," to his "Domestic and Social Life," his "Interest in other Lands," his "Evening of Life," and "his Closing Year." It should stimulate all Christian Churches at this day to be reminded, as here, of the sacrifices and liberality of the ministers and members of the Free Church of Scotland in their exodus and subsequent course, particularly of the fact that within two years after the Disruption they raised not less than three and a half millions of dollars for the wants incurred by that decisive step. It should refresh and animate Christian ministers and workers in every station to study the delineation here given of one of the most eloquent, philanthropic, and magnanimous men of our times.

NEW PUBLICATIONS.

James R. Osgood & Co., Boston.

The Building of a Brain. By Edward H. Clarke, M.D. 16mo, pp. 153.

Sex in Industry. A plea for the working girl. By Azel Ames, Jr., M.D. 16mo, pp. 158.

The Maritime Provinces. A handbook for travelers. A guide to the chief cities, coasts, and islands of the Maritime Provinces of Canada, and to their Scenery and Historic Attractions; with the Gulf and River of St. Lawrence to Quebec and Montreal; also Newfoundland and the Labrador Coast, with four maps and four plans. 16mo, pp. 336.

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What Young People should Know. The Reproductive Functions in man and the lower animals. By Burt G. Wilder, with 16 illustrations. 12mo, pp. 212.

Roberts Brothers, Boston.

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A Paragraph History of the United States from the Discovery of the Continent to the present time, with Brief Notes on Contemporaneous Events. Chronologically arranged. By Edward Abbott. 16mo, pp. 93.

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A Pastor's Recollections. By Rev. T. G. Dashiell, Rector of St. Mark's Church, Richmond, Va. 12mo, pp. 208.

MacMillan & Co., New York City.

Catholic Reform. Letters, Fragments, Discourses. By Father Hyacinthe. Translated by Madame Hyacinthe-Loyson, with a preface by Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, Dean of Westminster. 12mo, pp. 234.

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American Tract Society, No. 150, Nassau St., New York City.

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J. B. Ford & Co., New York City.

A Summer Parish; Sabbath Discourses, and Morning Service of Prayer, at the "Twin Mountain House," White Mountains, New Hampshire, during the summer of 1874, by Henry Ward Beecher. Phonographically reported by T. J. Ellinwood. 8vo, pp. 231.

A. S. Barnes & Co., New York City.

The Teacher's Hand-Book, for the Institute and the Class Room. By Wm. F. Phelps, M.A., Principal of the State Normal School, Winona, Minnesota. 12mo, pp. 335.

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Presbyterian Board of Publication, Philadelphia.

History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. By the Rev. E. H. Gillett, D.D. Revised Edition. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Two vols. 12mo, pp. 576 and 605.

Preparing to Teach. For study by Sabbath School Teachers and Training Classes. By John Hall, D.D.; Edward P. Humphrey, D.D., LL.D.; Wm. Henry Green, D.D., LL.D.; Francis L. Patton, D.D.; and J. Bennett Tyler. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 12mo, pp. 408.

The Presbyterian Hymnal. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Large 8vo, pp. 544.

PAMPHLETS.

The Early American Spirit, and the Genesis of It. An Address delivered before the New York Historical Society, at the Celebration of its Seventieth Anniversary, April 15, 1875. By Richard S. Storrs. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Company. 1875. 8vo, pp. 74.

Oration on some of the Relations and Present Duties of the Legal Profession to our Public Life and Affairs. Delivered by Hon. Daniel H. Chamberlin, LL.D., Governor of South Carolina, before the Yale Law School, at its Fifty-first Anniversary, June 30, 1875, at the Center Church in New Haven. Yale College: Published by the Law Department. 1875. 8vo, pp. 34.

The University of the Future; an Address delivered before the Alumni of St. John's College, at the Annual Commencement, July 7, 1875. By Hiram Corson, M.A., Professor of Anglo-Saxon and English Literature in the Cornell University. Printed by order of the Visitors and Governors of St. John's College, at the request of the Alumni Association. 1875. 8vo, pp. 38.

Charles Kingsley. A Sermon preached in Westminster Abbey, on January 31, 1875, being the Sunday after the burial at Eversley of Charles Kingsley, Canon of Westminster. By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, Dean of Westminster. Third Edition. London: MacMillan & Co. 1875. 8vo, pp. 20.

Prendergast's Mastery System, adapted to the study of Japanese or English. By S. R. Brown, D.D. E. R. Wetmore & Co., Publishers; Yokohama, Japan. 1875. 12mo, pp. 213.

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